Power Politics and the Indonesian Military

Throughout the post-war history of Indonesia, the military has played a key role in the politics of the country and in imposing unity on a fragmentary state. The collapse of the authoritarian New Order government of President Suharto weakened the state, and the armed forces briefly lost their grip on control of the archipelago. Under President Megawati, however, the military has again begun to assert itself, and to reimpose its heavy hand on control of the state, most notably in the fracturing outer provinces.

This book, based on extensive original research, examines the role of the military in Indonesian politics. It looks at the role of the military historically, examines the different ways in which it is involved in politics, and considers how the role of the military might develop in what is still an uncertain future.

Damien Kingsbury is Head of Philosophical, International and Political Studies and Senior Lecturer in International Development at Deakin University, Victoria, Australia. He is the author or editor of several books, including *The Politics of Indonesia* (Second Edition, 2002), *South-East Asia: A Political Profile* (2001) and *Indonesia: The Uncertain Transition* (2001). His main area of work is in political development, in particular in assertions of self-determination.
Power Politics and the Indonesian Military

Damien Kingsbury
## Contents

*List of illustrations* vi  
*List of frequently used terms* vii  
*Acknowledgements* xvii  

Introduction 1  

1 The problematic role of the TNI 6  

2 Context, continuity and change 36  

3 The functional structure of the TNI 67  

4 Factions, reform and reassertion 140  

5 The political economy of the TNI 188  

6 The more things change … 222  

*Notes* 248  
*Bibliography* 259  
*Index* 268
Illustrations

Table

3.1 Diagram of East Timor militia command structure 124–5

Figures

3.1 Map of TNI in Aceh 71
3.2 Map of TNI in West Papua 72
3.3 Map of TNI in East Timor 73
3.4 Map of Kodam pre-1985 82
3.5 Map of Kodam 1985–99 83
3.6 Map of Kodam 1999 84
3.7 Cover sheet of the Kopassus Group IV training manual 99
3.8 Contents of the Kopassus Group IV training manual 100
3.9 Covering letter sent with the Kopassus Group IV training manual 101
3.10 Map of Aceh militia bases 107
3.11 Diagram of militia origins 114
3.12 Map of militia in East Timor 119
3.13 Map of TNI Territorial placements in Aceh 137
5.1 Patronage and East Timor’s economy 193
### Frequently used terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>abangan</em></td>
<td>informal Muslim, usually Javanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>ABRI</em></td>
<td>Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia – Republic of Indonesia Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>ADF</em></td>
<td>Australian Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Agama</em></td>
<td>religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Akabri</em></td>
<td>Akademi Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia – Armed Forces Academy of the Republic of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>aliran</em></td>
<td>stream of influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>AMD</em></td>
<td>ABRI Masuk Desa – Armed Forces Enters the Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Apodeti</em></td>
<td>Associacao Popular Democratica de Timor – Timor Popular Democratic Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>asal bapak</em></td>
<td>‘as long as the boss is happy’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>senang</em></td>
<td>‘as long as the boss is happy’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>ASEAN</em></td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>ASNLF</em></td>
<td>Aceh–Sumatra National Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Babinsa</em></td>
<td>Bintara Pembina Desa – NCO Village Builders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bahasa Indonesia</em></td>
<td>Indonesian language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>BAIS</em></td>
<td>Baden ABRI Intelijen Strategis – The Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bakin</em></td>
<td>Baden Koordinasi Intelijen Negara – State Intelligence Coordinating Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bakorinda</em></td>
<td>Baden Koordinasi Intelijen Daerah – Regional Intelligence Coordinating Body</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bakorstanas  Baden Koordinasi Stabilitas Nasional – National Stability Coordination Agency

Bapak father, term of respect to male superior

Bela Negara Defend the State

Bhinneka Tunggal Ika ‘unity in diversity’ (common translation)

BIA Baden Intelijen ABRI – Armed Forces Intelligence Organisation

BIN Baden Intelijen Nasional – National Intelligence Agency

BKO Bawah Kendali Operasi – ‘under operational control’

BKR People's Security Body

BPI Baden Pusat Intelijen – Central Intelligence Agency

BPK Badan Pemeriksaan Keuangan – Supreme Audit Agency

Brimob Brigade Mobil – National Police Mobile Brigade

BRI Bank Rakyat Indonesia

BRTT Barisan Rakyat Timor Timur – East Timor People’s Front

Bulog Baden Urusan Logistik Nasional – State Logistics Agency

bupati district head

CIDES Centre for Information and Development Studies

CNRT National Council for Timorese Resistance

CSIS Centre for Strategic and International Studies

Darat land

Dar’ul Islam Heavenly/Peaceful Nation of Islam

Demokrasi democracy

Demokrasi Termpimpin ‘guided democracy’

Desa village

DOM Daerah Operasi Militer – Military Operations Area

DPKN Dewan Pemantapan Ketahanan Nasional – Council for the Enforcement of Security and Law

DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat – People’s Legislative Assembly

dwifungsi ‘dual function’
Frequently used terms

Falintil  Forcas Armada de Liberacao Nacional de Timor L’Este – Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor.
FKM  Front Keadilan Maluku – Maluku Justice Front
Fosko  Forum Studi dan Komminikasi – Study and Communications Forum
FPDK  Forum Persatuan, Demokrasi dan Keadilan – Forum for Unity, Democracy and Justice
FPI  Front Pembela Islam – Islamic Defenders Front
FPI  Frente Politico Interno – Internal Political Front
Fraksi Hijau  Green Faction
Fraksi Merah-Putih  Red and White Faction
Fretelin  Revolutionary Front for Independent East Timor
GAM  Gerakan Aceh Merdeka – Free Aceh Movement
Garda Paksi  Garda Muda Penegak Integrasi – Young Guards to Uphold Integration
Gestapu  Gerakan September Tigapuluh – 30 September Movement
Gestok  Gerakan Oktober Satu – 1 October Movement
Golkar  golongan karya – functional groups, also Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups, also a political party
Hankamrata  Total People’s Defence
Hansip  Pertahahanan Sipil – Civil Defence Force
IBRA  Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency
ICG  International Crisis Group
ICMI  Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia – Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals
IMF  International Monetary Fund
Indonesia Raya  Greater Indonesia
Interfet  International Forces in East Timor
IPP/IntelpampolIntelijen dan Pengaman Polri – Republic of Indonesia Police Intelligence and Safeguarding
IPSI  Ikatan Pencak Silat Indonesia – Indonesian Silat Self-defence Society
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>jihad</td>
<td>‘holy war’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPS</td>
<td>social security net</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kabupaten</td>
<td>sub-provincial district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaksuda</td>
<td>Kopkamtib’s Regional Special Operations unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamra</td>
<td>People’s Security Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCT</td>
<td>Korps Commando Troepne – Commando Corps Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kecamatan</td>
<td>sub-district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kekaryaan</td>
<td>secondment to the civil service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kelurahan</td>
<td>local administrative district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kesaktian</td>
<td>mystical type of power (Javanese, contemporary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kesekekten</td>
<td>mystical type of power (Javanese, old)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kesatuan</td>
<td>Marinies Special Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kesatuan</td>
<td>Komando Teritorium III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kesatuan</td>
<td>Komando Angkatan Darat – Land Force Command Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ketahanan</td>
<td>National Resilience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kewaspadaan</td>
<td>‘vigilance’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KKAD</td>
<td>Kesatuan Komando Angkatan Darat – Land Force Command Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNIL</td>
<td>Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger – Royal Netherlands Indies Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kobame</td>
<td>Melalui Yayasan Korps Baret Merah – Red Berets Welfare Corps Institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kodalops</td>
<td>Komando Pengendalian Operasi – Command and Control of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kodam</td>
<td>Komando Daerah Militer – Military Command Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kodim</td>
<td>Komando Distrik Militer – Military District Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komandan</td>
<td>military garrison command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konfrontasi</td>
<td>the Confrontation (with Malaysia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kontras</td>
<td>Komisi Untuk Orang Hilang dan Tindak Kekerasan – Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kopaska Komando Pasukan Katak – Kopaska Navy Dive Force Command</td>
<td>kopaska komando pasukan katak – kopaska navy dive force command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kopassandha Komando Pasukan Khusus Sandhi Yudha – Covert War Special Force Command</td>
<td>kopassandha komando pasukan khusus sandhi yudha – covert war special force command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kopassus Komando Pasukan Khusus – Special Forces Command</td>
<td>kopassus komando pasukan khusus – special forces command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kopkamtib Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban – Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order</td>
<td>kopkamtib komando operasi pemulihan keamanan dan ketertiban – operational command for the restoration of security and order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koramil Komando Rayon Militer – Military Area Command</td>
<td>koramil komando rayon militer – military area command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korem Komando Resort Militer – Military Resort (Garrison) Command</td>
<td>korem komando resort militer – military resort (garrison) command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kostrad Komando Strategik Angkatan Darat – Army Strategic Command, formerly known as the Army Strategic Reserve Command</td>
<td>kostrad komando strategik angkatan darat – army strategic command, formerly known as the army strategic reserve command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOTBD East Timor Peace Association</td>
<td>kotbd east timor peace association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kowilhan Komando Wilayah Pertahanan – Territorial Defence Commands</td>
<td>kowilhan komando wilayah pertahanan – territorial defence commands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPM Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij – Dutch shipping firm</td>
<td>kpm koninklijke paketvaart maatschappij – dutch shipping firm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPP HAM Commission for Investigation into Violations of Human Rights</td>
<td>kpp ham commission for investigation into violations of human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laksuswil Kopkamtib’s Inter-regional Special Operations unit</td>
<td>laksuswil kopkamtib’s inter-regional special operations unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laskar Jihad Holy Warriors</td>
<td>laskar jihad holy warriors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laskar Rakyat People’s Militia</td>
<td>laskar rakyat people’s militia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lemhanas National Resilience Institute</td>
<td>lemhanas national resilience institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIPI Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia – Indonesian Institute of Sciences</td>
<td>lipi lembaga ilmu pengetahuan indonesia – indonesian institute of sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LKB Lembaga Kesadaran Berkonstitusi – Institute of Constitutional Awareness</td>
<td>lkb lembaga kesadaran berkonstitusi – institute of constitutional awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makikut militia company name (proper)</td>
<td>makikut militia company name (proper)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariner Marines</td>
<td>mariner marines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masjид mosque</td>
<td>masjid mosque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masyumi Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims</td>
<td>masyumi consultative council of indonesian muslims</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
xii Frequently used terms

milisi militia
milsas militerisasi – militarisation/militarised people
milsus militer khusus – ‘special military’
MPR Mejelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat – People’s Consultative Assembly
Mujahidin ‘holy warriors’
Muspida Regional Security Council
Nanggala Kopassus operational name
Nasakom nasionalisme, agama, komunisme – nationalism, religion and communism
NCO non-commissioned officer
NGO non-governmental organisation
NII Negara Islam Indonesia – State of Islamic Indonesia
Niju seif dual government (Japanese)
NSB National Socialist Bond
NU Nahdlatul Ulama
OECD Organisation for European Cooperation and Development
oknum ‘involved’/military gangster
OPM Organisasi Papua Merdeka – Free Papua Organisation
Opsus Operasi Khusus – Special Operations
Ordre baru New Order
Osint open source intelligence
P3TT a pro-‘autonomy’ organisation, nominally civilian but in fact run by the army
P4 Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila – Guideline for Understanding and Implementing Pancasila
P4OKTT Secure and Successful Determination for Special Autonomy in East Timor
Pam Swakarsa Voluntary Militia
PAN Partai Amanat Nasional – National Mandate Party
Pancasila Five Principles (of State)
panglima ‘commander-in-chief’
paradim baru  ‘New Paradigm’ (of the TNI)

Paspampres  Satuan Pasukan Pengamanan Presiden – Presidential Security Force Unit

PDI  Partai Demokratik Indonesia – Indonesian Democratic Party

PDI-P  Partai Demokratik Indonesia-Perjuangan – Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle

PDP  Presidium Dewan Papua – Papuan Presidium Council

pembangunan  ‘development’

Pemuda Keamanan Desa  Village Security Youth

Pemuda Pancasila  Pancasila Youth

Penembakan misterius  mysterious killings

Permesta  Perjuangan Semesta – Overall Struggle

Peta  Tentara Sukarela Pembela Tanah Air – Volunteer Army of Defenders of the Fatherland

Petisi Limapuluh  Petition of Fifty

Petrus Affair  penembakan misterius – mysterious shootings

PGRS  Sarawak People's Guerrilla Force

PKI  Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Community Party)

PNI  Partai Nasional Indonesia – Indonesian National Party

Polda  Local Police

Polisi  Police

Polri  Kepolisian Republik Indonesia – Indonesian National Police

PPP  Partai Persatuan Pembangunan – United Development Party

PPRC  Pasukan Pemukul Reaksi Cepat – Rapid Reaction Strike Force

PPRC-TNI-AU  Pasukan Pemukul Reaksi Cepat-TNI-AU – Indonesian Air Force Rapid Reaction Strike Force
PRB Brunei People's Party
preman gangster
priyayi traditional Javanese administrative class
PRRI Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia – Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia
PT incorporated, limited
Pusintelstrat Pusat Intelijen Strategik – Strategic Intelligence Centre
Puspassus Pusat Pasukan Khusus Angkatan Darat – Army Special Forces Centre
Rajawali Yongab BKO Brimob – a specific combined military battalion under police control in Aceh
Ratih Rakyat Terlatih – Civilian Militia, literally ‘Trained People’
reformasi ‘reform’
RiDEP Research Institute for Democracy and Peace
RI Republik Indonesia – Republic of Indonesia
RIS Republik Indonesia Serikat – Republic of the United States of Indonesia
RMS Republik Maluku Selatan – Republic of the South Moluccas/Maluku
RPKAD Resimen Pasukan Komando Angkatan Darat – Army Parachute Regiment Command
Saka East Timor militia company
Sandhi Yudha Covert War (aka Kopassus Group IV)
santri formal Muslim
Sapta Marga Seven Pledges
Satgas Kesatuan Tugas – Duty Unit Task Force
Satgas Atbara Counter-Terrorist Task Force
Satgas Gegana Brimob Counter-Terrorist Task Force
Satgas Merah-Putih Red and White Task Force (West Papua militia)
Satgas Tebas private security force/militia
Sesko  Sekolah Staf dan Komando – Staff Training Command College

SGI  Satgas Intelijen – Intelligence Task Force

shariah  Islamic law

Sistem  Hankamrata  Total People’s Defence and Security System

SMI  Satria Muda Indonesia – Indonesian Young Knights

SOB  Staat van Oorlog en van Beleg – State of War and Siege

SSKAD  Sekolah Staf Komando Angkatan Darat – Army Staff Command School


Surat jalan  letter of passage

Taifib  Pasukan Intai Amfibi – Marines Amphibious Reconnaissance

Tapol  political prisoners

Tarpadnas  Penetaran Kewaspadaan Nasional – National Vigilance Refresher Course

TBO  Tenaga Bantuan Operasi – Operational Auxiliaries

Tentera Negeri Aceh  Aceh State Army

Teritorium  see Kodam

Tim Alfa  East Timor militia company

Tim Mawar  Rose Team

TNI  Tentara Nasional Indonesia – Indonesian National Army/Military

TNI-AD  TNI-Angkatan Darat – the army

TNI-AL  TNI-Angkatan Laut – the navy

TNI-AU  TNI-Angkatan Udara – the air force

TNKU  National Army of North Kalimantan

Tontaikam  Pleton Pengintai Keamanan – Security Surveillance Platoons

Tontaipur  Reconnaissance and Combat Platoon
Tribuana Kopassus unit command
Tribuana Chandraca Satya Dharma Threefold World of the Lords of Noble Service
UDT Uniao Democratca de Timor – Timorese Democratic Union
UNAMET United Nations Assistance Mission to East Timor
Unit Ksatria Penegak Pancasila Noble Warriors for Upholding Pancasila
UNTAET United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
Wakil panglima deputy commander in chief
Wanra Perlawan Rakyat – People’s Resistance
Wawasan Nusantara Archipelatic Outlook
Wong cilik little people
Yamato damashii official ideology (imperial Japan)
yayasan ‘charitable’ foundation
YKEP Kartika Eka Paksi Foundation (army)
Yongab Batalyon Gabungan – joint battalion
Yonif Batalyon Infantry – Infantry Battalion
This book is the product of a number of years’ study of the Indonesian military, the TNI, initially as an adjunct to Indonesia’s political processes and later in its own right. To that end, I have relied on the assistance of numerous people in gathering information and trying to piece together the jigsaw puzzle that is the TNI’s exercise of political power. Because of the continuing sensitivities associated with this area, I cannot name most people, many of whom live in Indonesia, who have assisted me greatly in this work. It is worth noting, however, that most of them are Indonesian or Indonesian-based journalists, workers in NGOs, and active and concerned individuals – all admirable representatives of what is known as civil society, the anathema to military political power. Without the assistance and generosity of these people, this project would have foundered in the dark.

Among my professional colleagues, again I would choose not to name those who have assisted, not through any lack of generosity in recognizing their contribution, but because if this project achieves its aim of challenging the preconceptions that underpin military power in Indonesia, then acknowledgement will necessarily compromise their own work there. And if this project fails to achieve its aim, I would not wish to embarrass those people who have so generously given of their time, ideas and information. However, I would like to acknowledge the work done by Matt Davies, in the area of Open Source Intelligence and in organizing the maps and diagrams for this book. His contribution has been invaluable (and his work is copyright). I would also like to thanks my colleagues at Deakin University, in particular those in Philosophical, Political and International Studies, and the administrative staff in the Faculty of Arts, for providing such a supportive environment in which to conduct research and spend time writing. Here I would like to note the particular encouragement of Scott Burchill, Dan Flitton and Clinton Fernandez for their continued stream of critical political observation, and Joe Reminyi and Greg Barton for their ethical perspectives. I would also like to note that much of the research for this project was undertaken with the assistance of a Deakin University Central Research Grant, for which I have been most grateful.
Most importantly, however, I would like to thank my wife, Fiona Delahunt, and children Cailan and Alexandra. They have continued to bear with me through this project, and other work that has contributed to it, in difficult and sometimes confronting circumstances. Spending times in conflict zones was perhaps not what Fiona had in mind when she first encouraged me to pursue an academic path. My family has always offered a loving and supportive home to come back to, and without this the project would not have been possible.

Damien Kingsbury
Melbourne 2002
We were woken shortly after midnight by gunfire coming from just across the empty block of land next to our house that, all of a sudden, seemed awfully exposed. The small group in the house quickly gathered in the most secure room, barricaded the window with a cupboard, gathered lengths of timber to use as clubs, and sat in the dark and waited as the gunfire rang on the high, eerie wind. Each of us later admitted that night, trapped deep in our own thoughts, we believed we were going to die.

The heavily armed police who were supposed to protect us had disappeared early that evening, the first ominous sign that things were not right. In the morning, one of our group left the town with a large group from another house. There was, he noted, no safety. Within three days, another of our group had descended into a deep psychological breakdown, unable to function, hardly able to speak. The hot morning wind blew down the town’s deserted main street, the only people left being the United Nations workers, soldiers, the ever-present, often violent and increasingly surly militiamen, and a handful of accredited observers. The police had retreated to their headquarters, reluctant to come out. Within a week, their headquarters was the site of a wholesale massacre of dozens of innocent civilians, and the town was in the process of being completely razed. The time was East Timor’s referendum on independence, in 1999, and the town was Maliana, near the West Timor border. It was a place of fear and, disturbingly, was typical of much of that territory at that time.

There are few – if any – human responses that are as gripping or as potentially overwhelming as fear. Real fear has a physical as well as psychological quality: the body is confused, at once both deadened and too responsive. It is a precursor to blind panic, or immobilisation. I have seen people across Indonesia expressing fear, in ways that make their behaviour seem irrational or which have at times locked them into a passive acceptance of violence. I have seen such fear in East Timor and West Timor, in Aceh, West Papua, Ambon and Central Sulawesi, and among ethnic Chinese, as well as among citizens of Jakarta and Java. I know that fear exists, or has existed, in many other places besides. There was real fear in South Sumatra when soldiers massacred more than a hundred women and children near
Lampung; in Jakarta, when troops opened fire on protesting Muslims at the port area of Tanjung Priok, killing dozens, maybe hundreds; when soldiers and their gangster associates raided the PDI headquarters in Jakarta, killing dozens; in East Java, when black-clad gangs murdered hundreds of religious leaders; and in the innumerable incidences of killings, ‘disappearances’, torture, rape and other forms of violence that have been inflicted upon countless thousands of Indonesian citizens in a diverse variety of circumstances. Indeed, the genesis of the military’s contemporary political style can be found in the massacres of 1965–66, in which hundreds of thousands of people were murdered, usually for little more than having a loose political association.

The imposition of fear, and its associated lower order of intimidation, is the principal tactic of the Indonesian military, used almost solely to quell and cow the population it claims to serve and protect. In some cases, responses to this oppression have led to anger and retribution, expressed through riots and other violence. The causes of such anger and retribution are sometimes poorly articulated and can have a variety of sources. In other cases, such responses are an expression of exasperation, of an unwillingness to remain cowed, and of an assertion of the basic principles of human dignity. Such is the implicit moral foundation of anti-government organisations, some of which have sought and continue to seek to separate themselves from the state. In such instances, the responses to state violence are more carefully planned, more organised and more methodical. The goal of these organisations is not just to respond, but to radically alter the balance between repression and freedom. In doing this, some of them have themselves resorted to high levels of organised violence, and sometimes to the state’s own terror tactics. They claim, with considerable justification, that this is the only means of conveying their rejection of the TNI and hence the state, or at least the only language that the state understands.

But in the end, as an agent of the state, it is the Indonesian military that is accountable for the use of what is often indiscriminate violence. In conventional state theory, the state and its agents have a responsibility to act in the interests of the state’s citizens. Every state reserves the right to use violence to compel its laws. But when the violence is used beyond law, instead of law and, very often, against the law, its citizens may reasonably believe that the state has abandoned them, that it is not just failing to act in their interests but is acting against them; that instead of being the answer, the state and its agents are the problem. Hence it is the state, ambiguously and usually locally understood, that is the target of much retribution, and the reciprocator of much retribution. Needless to say, this leads into a cycle that can only be resolved by overwhelming violence or, in rare cases and after much suffering, a brokered resolution.

Many of the people of Indonesia that I have met have explicitly acknowledged that the Indonesian military is an organisation to be feared and, if possible, avoided. I have also been with Indonesians who have been in fear
of their lives and the lives of their loved ones. Some of these people have
overcome their fear through desperation and anger, and have fought back.
Most do not, however, and the psychology of the victim identifying with the
oppressor is well documented. And the risks of fighting back are enor-
mous. To confront the Indonesian military is not merely to confront an
out-of-control soldier or some rogue element, as is sometimes claimed; it is
not even to confront an institution that is beyond the control of the state, as
has also been claimed. To confront the Indonesian military is to confront an
agent of the state that is at the same time also the state’s keeper. No matter
how much the Indonesian military portrays itself as a conventional defence
organisation, it and its minatory function is embedded in the meaning of the
state of the unitary Republic of Indonesia, and is consequently the defining
quality of the state.

Research methodology

There are two issues in terms of research methodology that are relevant to
this book, the first concerning its general approach and the second
concerning sources.

General approach

The general approach of this book favours a broad cognitive style which is
intended to indicate or to reinforce the idea of the existence of a pattern or
patterns of behaviour. That is, there appears to be a high degree of internal
consistency to the political actions of the Indonesian military over a long
period of time, despite what appear to be external changes and short-term
rationalisations of particular events. In turn, this appears to reflect the
origins and structure of both the state and the military as its self-appointed
guardian. And within this more general approach there is also, of course,
detail. However, this detail is far from exhaustive and where and how it is
used is intended to illustrate patterns of behaviour.

There is also a normative aspect to the book’s approach, which recognises
the legitimacy of a revolutionary military force for the purpose of achieving
independence, the practical necessity for a country to have a self-defence
organisation, and that the military and its officers have often been the most
organised aspect of what has often been a deeply disorganised society.
However, there is also an assumption of mutual consent (Plamenatz 1968:
Ch. 1) or mutual advantage (Rawls 1991: 4) manifested as some degree of
reciprocal relations, or social contract; normatively, that a state in the post-
colonial world has a duty of care to its people (the basis of legitimacy for
post-colonial governments), that the state exists only to serve and enhance
the quality of life of its people, and that the agents of the state, including the
military, should not have a vested interest in their own status beyond that
specified by the government. That is, the military should be entirely under
civilian government control and have no independent capacity beyond that control. If it is not, then an agent of the state is given the privilege to exert state control, which begs the very purpose and function of the state.

Related to this are serious questions about the origins and structure of the state as a mechanism for realizing the aspiration of the peoples it claims to represent. In particular, the structure of post-colonial states such as Indonesia contain within them the logical contradiction that if the colonial state was illegitimate (the argument that legitimises revolution) then the successor state, unless freely agreed to by all its participants, is also illegitimate. Bringing together this statist contradiction with a militant and self-serving state agent produces a conflict, or series of conflicts, of interest. When the state agent is armed and asserts its authority through the use of arms, the state sets up a structural internal tension that can only be resolved through the threat of violence, and the use of violence. This, then, is the key theme of the book.

Sources

The sources for this book derive from a number of basic categories, each of which I will explain briefly.

Books, working papers, reports, more reputable websites and other published documents speak for themselves as public documents on and related to the field. These have been cited where they have been used. In addition to this, there is a small category of documents that have not been published outside the areas from which they came, such as TNI headquarters. However, these documents were not, to my knowledge, classified as secret nor were they marked as such.

Somewhere between the two is what some call ‘open source intelligence’ (‘Osint’). Osint is essentially derived from public or non-classified sources. The value of Osint is the methodical care that is given to the analysis of the wide range of information available from such sources. One consequence of this is that Osint documents are often as good as, or in some cases better than, classified intelligence (especially if the latter has already been ‘interpreted’, i.e. tampered with to produce a particular political orientation) as a source of accurate information. Osint sources have been cited where used. Related to Osint is, of course, classified intelligence material. In cases where such information has been ‘leaked’ and hence made available to the public, for example Indonesian government documents leaked in East Timor in 1999, it has been cited. There is also limited reference to ‘classified’ information that was not otherwise publicly available.

The many interviews that constitute an important part of the research for this book can be divided into three groups. The first consists of those interviews where the interviewee held a responsible position and was able to comment on the subject at hand in an official capacity. In such cases, these interviews have been cited. Much more common, however, are the interviews
belonging to the second group, those with people in a range of capacities speaking for attribution but not for identification. This group includes interviews with junior officers and servicemen in the field, political activists or militants, NGO representatives, and so on. For security reasons, these interviewees have mostly not been identified, but in the rare instances that they have been cited, it is because they have spoken in an official capacity (for example, as the head of an NGO). However, interviews in the third and final group consist of those that have not been cited at all. In such cases, there may be an assertion without a reference. If this does not match formal scholarly requirements then, in these instances, I must claim the primacy of the welfare of my respondents over the curiosity of my peers and others. Interviews have been conducted in both English and Indonesian (Bahasa Indonesia), in some cases using a translator.

Finally, I have learned much simply by making field trips, by being in certain places at certain times and witnessing events unfolding, or by seeing the aftermath of such events. This of course has involved having conversations with local people, soldiers, ‘militias’, and so on, none of which are attributable and which are therefore only noted in the broadest terms. But in some cases it has been adequate to just watch the actions and behaviour of various participants. This has sometimes occurred between interviews or while travelling, usually overland, to various destinations. The most obvious and outstanding example of such field research took place while I was in East Timor from late July until early September 1999, at which time I was acting in the formal capacity of a UN-accredited ‘observer’ to the ballot process. My interest in the political function of the Indonesian military predates this period, based on its role in Suharto’s New Order government, and continues to this day. But it was impossible not to be deeply influenced by the repressive political role of the military and its militia proxies in East Timor at that time, and to have it made clear what it would be like to be on the receiving end of the military’s rejection of what might ordinarily be considered a legitimate expression of political preference.

Perhaps the one thing that I have learned from all of this is that a society which does not genuinely encourage or even tolerate debate and open decision-making, repressing it through high levels of often arbitrary but nonetheless state-sanctioned violence, will inevitably engender a backlash. When a gag on debate about genuine concern is enforced with guns, then only guns can be used to remove the gag. It is somewhat trite and certainly obvious to say that the primary victims of such a situation are usually uninvolved and almost always unarmed civilians. But, more to the point, when a political society is constructed in such a way as to be – now here, now there – at war with itself, such an outcome is inevitable. I hope that the following begins to explain how such a situation might come about and, in some senses, how it works.
1 The problematic role of the TNI

If a military campaign does not have popular support behind it, it is bound to fail.

(Pour 1993: 260)

The Indonesian National Military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia – TNI) has played and continues to play a role in the politics of the Republic of Indonesia that begs the distinction between a civil and a military state. The balance between civil and military authority has, at times, varied. But the civil state continues to be so fundamentally weak, and the military relatively so strong, that the continued existence of the state without the active intervention of the military is at least improbable and perhaps impossible.

In the early years of the twenty-first century the military establishment in Indonesia was involved in many affairs of state that, other than in totalitarian countries, would not normally be associated with military forces, and which were at odds with the claim of civilian political supremacy. The military, led by its dominant branch, the army, has been the country’s premier institution since 1966 when it assumed a central position within the state. From the declaration of independence on 17 August 1945, the TNI has had a prominent and often leading role in the state’s political life; during the period of the war of independence it rarely considered itself to be under civilian control. A significant number of cabinet members have been serving or former generals, a situation that continued, albeit to a lesser extent, well into the post-Suharto era. Furthermore, active and retired officers have occupied a large number of seats in the legislature, the People’s Legislative Assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat – DPR), and, consequently, the supreme governing body, the People’s Consultative Assembly (Mejelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat – MPR), which they continue to do although in reduced numbers. It is worth noting here, however, that although the number of TNI/national police representatives in the DPR has been reduced, when each seat in the assembly represents around 400,000 people, the TNI and police, with 38 seats and a combined personnel of approximately 500,000, are still grossly over-represented. In August 2002 a special session of the MPR voted to remove TNI representation from the DPR and MPR entirely in 2004, a move that the TNI only grudgingly
accepted. Conversely, due to a process of political and economic decentralisation which started at the beginning of 2001, the TNI’s grip on the provinces has grown stronger, especially through provincial funding of TNI activities. Commanders of the various Territorial commands have also continued to play a highly influential role in the affairs of their respective regions, although, except for regions affected by separatist sentiment, their function is not as predominantly repressive as it once was. In the post-Suharto period, most civilian and some military leaders have advocated the removal of the TNI from politics, but this call has not been met by concerted action. As a consequence, although the political role of the TNI has changed since the fall of Suharto, it retains significant political influence and the demonstrated capacity to direct or subvert the affairs of state if and when it chooses (as is discussed in later chapters).

Within the TNI there is a long-standing belief that civilian officials are fundamentally incapable of running the state and too easily fall prey to sectarianism based on self-interest. This belief grew during Indonesia’s first years, when various governments rose and fell as a result of factional infighting, and was reinforced through the process of impeachment and removal of President Abdurrahman Wahid in mid-2001, continuing into the post-Wahid period.

A common factor in the politics of post-colonial states is that the extent to which independence was achieved through persuasion or through military force has directly affected the constitution of the resultant institutional political structure. Commonly, where post-colonial states have gained independence through military pressure, the military has retained a relatively greater role in post-independence politics. Similarly, where independence has been achieved without the aid of a military force, the tendency has been for the military to play a lesser role in the political affairs of state. As a state that came to independence through revolution and in which the military retained close links to members of the elite, or in some cases were the elite, Indonesia’s experience has approximated that of a number of other post-colonial states.

Yet since the mid-1960s Indonesia has been a state with military personnel in government, not a state with a military government. In some respects this is a fine distinction and might easily obscure the active political role that the TNI has played and continues to play. But an example of the TNI’s resourcefulness is the way in which it was able to both formally and informally insert itself into political life, and the fact that this has become if not an accepted outcome then at least an acknowledged political reality.

The services

The TNI comprises three military services and, formerly, the police. There are approximately 317,000 personnel in the TNI, including the army (*TNI-Angkatan Darat*, TNI-AD, or TNI-Land Force); about 47,000 in the navy
(TNI-Angkatan Laut, TNI-AL, or TNI-Sea Force), including about 1,000 navy air-arm troops and 13,000 marines; and about 27,000 in the air force (TNI-Angkatan Udara, TNI-AU, or TNI-Air Force). The army is by far the largest and thus the dominant service, with around 243,000 active-duty personnel. The air force is a generally politically inactive branch of the armed services, although its senior officers have sometimes held posts at formally high levels of the TNI, most notably during the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid and his successor Megawati Sukarnoputri, as a less belligerent alternative to army personnel. Prior to the events of 1 October 1965, the air force was extremely loyal to Sukarno and relatively more sympathetic to the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, or PKI). The air force was subsequently ‘purged’ of its pro-Sukarno and leftist elements by the army in the post-1965 period, and was long afterwards considered by the army to be a politically suspect organisation. The navy was similarly purged by the army in the post-1965 period, although, given Indonesia’s archipelagic nature, it retained an obvious necessity. The navy’s marines branch was viewed by many Indonesians as being a similarly equipped but far more benign and civilian-friendly organisation than the army. As a consequence, the marines were called out to help restore peace after the rioting of May 1998, which saw Suharto’s resignation from the presidency. However, the marines were especially active in East Timor, Ambon and Aceh, and their presence in the outlying regions was far less benign than was their presence at the heart of the state.

An International Crisis Group report noted that with the resolution of the problems in Aceh, Maluku and West Papua, and assuming no changes to the regional strategic environment, army numbers might be halved to approximately 100,000 (ICG 2001: 20). Although relatively small, if understood primarily as a civil guard or paramilitary police then the army is relatively large for its actual, as opposed to nominal, function. That said, overall numbers were reduced between 1966–82, reflecting Indonesia’s need to reduce military spending and a bid to ‘professionalise’ the army, while enlistment was maintained at existing levels.

While the conscription of civilians into the armed forces is provided for by the law, because of a high level of unemployment and underemployment the armed forces have been able to attract sufficient voluntary numbers to maintain mandated strengths. However, some specialist officers such as doctors are occasionally conscripted for short periods of service. Reflecting the continuing prominence of the Territorial system (discussed in Chapter 3), most enlisted personnel are recruited, trained and serve in units near or in their own provinces.

The armed forces officer corps numbers approximately 50,000, with less than 1 per cent at the rank of general officer. Retirement age for officers is 55 and, other than in rare and exceptional circumstances, is enforced. This has helped to clear the way for the promotion of younger officers, especially from the backlog built up from the high level of officer recruitment that
occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Officer training at the Armed Forces Academy of the Republic of Indonesia (Akadami ABRI – Akabri) and its successor organisation, the Staff Training Command College (Sekolah Staf dan Komando – Sesko), has engendered a relatively high level of institutionalised *esprit de corps*, despite earlier regionalism, rivalry between the services and factional competition in particular within the army.

Indonesia’s armed forces also link to, in a variety of related capacities, paramilitaries (or militias) of different types, most of which are poorly trained and equipped. Some of these paramilitaries are officially recognised; others are not but still receive varying levels of covert support from branches of the TNI. Examples of such covertly supported militias include the thirteen militias that were operating in East Timor in the run up to, and immediately after, the referendum on independence in August 1999; a militia organisation operating in West Papua; and an ethnic Javanese militia in central Aceh. More shadowy support has been given to the extremist Islamic Laskar Jihad (Holy Warriors) who are primarily from Java but who were operating in Maluku and Central Sulawesi, and later in West Papua and Aceh, until October 2002.

The official government budget for the TNI is relatively small by international standards – at only 1.8 per cent of GDP – but it is supplemented by revenue from many military businesses and foundations (*yayasan*), which, it is estimated, quadruples the TNI’s overall income (both legal and illegal). The Indonesian National Police (Polisi Republik Indonesia, or Polri) was a branch of the armed forces from the early 1960s until they were formally separated on 1 April 1999, a process which was completed in July 2000. This separation was intended to ‘civilianise’ the police, which had been under military command, and to contribute to the ‘civilianisation’ of Indonesia’s numerous conflicts. The separation occurred under the auspices of the TNI’s ‘New Paradigm’ (*paradim baru*), which was intended to formally depoliticise the TNI. With 190,000 personnel (but growing quickly), the national police forms a much smaller portion of the population than in most other states. However, this figure does not include provincial and local police, although it does include the paramilitary Mobile Brigade (Brigade Mobil, or Brimob), which acts as a supplementary military force in particular in Indonesia’s trouble spots such as Aceh and West Papua, and which had a high presence in East Timor until Indonesia’s formal separation in October 1999.

Two functions

The TNI’s primary and all-encompassing doctrine is known as *dwifungsi* (‘dual function’). The *dwifungsi* is a doctrine of the military’s own making and has continued to evolve ever since it was first enunciated within General Nasution’s ‘Middle Way’ speech at Magelang in 1958. According to this doctrine, the TNI performs an avowedly double role both as defender of the state and as an active component of the social and political life of the state. In its role of defender of the state the armed forces portrays itself as
performing defence duties common to most other states. Yet in this capacity the TNI’s primary purpose is not focused on external threats to the state but on actual or perceived internal threats, and is therefore highly political, albeit in a decidedly minatory sense.

However, the unique element of *dwifungsi* is the role of social and political actor that it bestows on the TNI. The broad and ambiguous charter of *dwifungsi* formed the means by which military personnel, until the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid, were assigned throughout the government to posts usually filled in other countries by civil servants or politically appointed civilians, such as governorships and heads or senior officials in government agencies or departments. The most prevalent of these assignments for active-duty and retired military officers were as provincial governors, district heads, legislative members, numerous functionaries within civilian governmental departments, and as ambassadors abroad. Since October 1999, however, TNI staff have been required to choose between civil appointments and active military duty. While this has ensured that the number of active officers occupying civil posts has fallen dramatically, there remain very close links between retired or non-active officers and those who remain on the TNI’s active list. These links have always been dominated by the active officers, and this relationship was formalised by an internal decision by senior TNI officers in February 2001. That said, there is usually such close agreement between active and non-active or retired officers on political issues that the formalisation of the seniority of active officer status over non-active or retired officer status failed to mark a significant shift in the TNI’s political orientation.

Beyond the development of its civil function, perhaps what is of greater significance is the morphing of the TNI’s defence role, which is internally focused, into that of arbiter of political life, both geographically through its Territorial structure (Teritorium) and centrally as the guarantor of government. The TNI has been the mechanism by which the state has survived more or less intact, and it has arbitrated, in an often brutal fashion, over what is and what is not acceptable political activity or expression. Under the New Order, Indonesia’s military culture had the capacity to regard almost any form of political activity as a security threat to which it could and should respond. Although having stepped back a little from this domineering position, the TNI continues to assume that it is automatically involved in all internal security matters, even if that is by way of handing over authority to the police. Thus the TNI has retained the view that it is the arbiter of what constitutes a security threat.

Except for a brief period in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Indonesia’s government could not be characterised as military in nature, and it has become less so into the early years of the twenty-first century. Not all top national, provincial, regional and district jobs are held by the military, and the number of military personnel assigned to *dwifungsi* civilian positions at all levels of the government was probably fewer than 5,000 officers in 1992
and had declined thereafter. In 1992, approximately one half of the country’s district (kabupaten) heads (bupati) and one-third of the twenty-seven provincial or region governors were military officers. Nevertheless, under the dwifungsi doctrine, which legitimised the performance of both its military and non-military missions, the TNI became a dominant factor in the political life of the country and has acted as an executive agent of government policies, with which it both agrees and, in areas of state security, directs.

The close relationship between President Suharto and, as it was then, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia – ABRI) dominated the leadership dynamics from the beginning of Suharto’s New Order government in 1967. But by the 1990s, the personal tie between Suharto and many of the generals had diminished as a result of the growing age gap between them and an increasing desire on the part of the new armed forces leadership to resist personal ties to the presidency. Since Suharto’s resignation ABRI’s and then the TNI’s links to the presidency have been troubled. The TNI under Habibie was in practical terms unaccountable, and most of its senior officers actively worked to undermine the presidency of Indonesia’s first genuinely democratically elected president, Abdurrahman Wahid. Only under Megawati Sukarnoputri might it be said that the TNI has a more comfortable relationship with the presidency, but this is most likely due to the fact that Megawati has long been close to the TNI’s core group, that she reflects their values and interests, and that she has not attempted to limit them.

**Indonesia’s importance**

Indonesia is the world’s fourth most populous state, with about 232 million people from 10 major and more than 300 minor ethnic groups living across approximately 1,000 islands within a 13,600 island group over an area of a little over 5 million square kilometres. It is the world’s biggest Islamic state, a major oil producer and occupies a strategic location at the crossroads of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. During the Cold War Indonesia was regarded as a lynchpin for regional security, and in the early twenty-first century it was again being courted by the US both to assist in building an informal coalition to contain China and then as an important part of the US ‘war on terrorism’.

Furthermore, Indonesia has an economy that is linked with the rest of East Asia and the US and, since 1997, has been one of the world’s greatest economic basket cases and a major recipient of IMF payments. Since the resignation of President Suharto in May 1998 the political process in Indonesia has become quite unstable, and indeed was already unstable prior to his resignation (such instability in part precipitating that resignation). Political instability is cited as the primary cause for the country’s continuing economic malaise. It has also been suggested that the state could break up into its component parts, in a process of ‘Balkanisation’. Despite its claim to being a stabilising force, the TNI has been a significant contributing factor to this instability.
Symbiosis: Indonesia and the TNI

The central thesis of this book is that the state of the Republic of Indonesia is not viable without the active involvement of the TNI in its political and security activities, which are inextricably linked. This in turn reflects the relatively arbitrary construction of the state from a non-homogenous colony, or set of linked sub-colonies that had separate pre-colonial histories. Indeed, the TNI is constructed not as an external defence organisation but primarily as an internally focused source of state cohesion, and regards the maintenance of the contemporary unitary state as its reason for being. The state and the TNI’s current role within it are mutually dependant; the state cannot maintain its territorial integrity without unity being imposed by the TNI, and the TNI cannot exist in its present form without the demands of a potentially or actually fragmented state. That is, if one side of the relationship were to fundamentally alter its structure, the diminution or dissolution of the other would follow.

In this respect, the present work considers the enduring power and political role of the military in a major developing state, and considers its role in the light of the reduction of the military’s political power in a number of other developing states (in particular in Latin America and South-East Asia). That is, Indonesia contradicts the development, democratisation and ‘end of history’ scenario as proposed by Francis Fukyama. In this respect, the book takes its cue from Bennedict Anderson’s recent critique of ‘democratic fatalism’, also supported by Edward Said, in which it is claimed that there is no certainty of positive outcomes for developing states and that, without vigilance and effort, it is entirely possible to end up with non-democratic political development.

Some theoretical considerations

A range of theoretical questions arise when considering the political role of the TNI. These are important for placing the TNI within a broader context, and for understanding its motivation and function. Such theoretical issues can be broadly divided into two groups, the first of which concerns the idea of nation and the nature of the state and its claims to legitimacy, and the second of which concerns issues of power.

National interest in regional relations

The TNI claims to act in the ‘national interest’ or as the expression of popular will. Yet given the non-democratic nature of the TNI’s involvement in state politics – it is not an elected institution and its political role is both deeply embedded in the state and largely self-defined – such claims can only ever be, at best, an assertion. The TNI says it acts first and foremost in the interest of the maintenance of the unity of the state, and secondarily in the interest of ‘development’, taken here to mean economic growth and
improvement in material well-being. The primary assumption of a correlation between ‘nation’ and ‘state’ in regard to Indonesia is problematic, and will be discussed further. However, assuming a politically bonded group does exist in the territory known as Indonesia, the interests of its constituent members are far from uniform. There is little doubt that the TNI acts to ensure the continuing unity of the state, but its claim to support the ideal of ‘development’, while having some substance in terms of particular projects, at least as much represents particular and narrowly defined interests.

Apart from ethnic and communal distinctions, the large gap in the distribution of income – between the rich and the poor and between the centre of the state (primarily Jakarta and its environs) and the periphery – creates tensions over where respective interests lie. It might be suggested that benefits given to the rich or the centre are eventually redistributed to the poor or the periphery, and that capital formation is a necessary criterion for investment and growth. But this assumes that a type of social contract is in place, in which there is a commitment on the part of one to share a meaningful proportion of accrued benefits with the other. No such social contract exists in Indonesia, and indeed the country’s elite is known for its sense of disengagement from the mass of the population. That is, the notion of a higher degree of reciprocity, or at least of enlightened self-interest, was not a significant characteristic of the pre-colonial political forms that constituted the polities of what was to become Indonesia. Such concepts were further diminished rather than enhanced as a consequence of the colonial experience, most notably through Dutch use of the indigenous administrative class (priyayi) at least until the end of the nineteenth century. This separation of ruler and ruled has echoed throughout Indonesia’s history, and in part explains the vertical (group identity under a charismatic leader) rather than horizontal (group interest under a representative leader) characterisations of divisions in Indonesian political society. Furthermore, this lack of social contract explains, in part, the large gap in the distribution of income and the difficulty of sustaining a case for a singular ‘national interest’.

It is reasonable to assume that a ‘nation’ which identifies itself as such has a degree of commonality of interest, and that even if there are tensions within it they are not so great as to undermine the common sense of belonging. To this end, many Indonesians claim that Indonesia is a ‘nation’, regardless of tensions within it. However, this then begs the meaning of ‘nation’. For the purpose of this book, ‘nation’ has a particular meaning. A ‘nation’ may be described as a bonded cultural group that, by definition, shares in common core values and beliefs. Such values and beliefs would include a generalised world-view, common social customs, often a shared religion, and usually a commonly identified or shared history or set of myths. All of this would usually be expressed through a common language. Not each of the characteristics is absolutely necessary, nor is it necessary to have a sense of universality within the group, but bonded political groups tend to have all or most of these characteristics as bonding agents.
Conversely, not to have such bonding agents identifies the quality of ‘other’. But even what might otherwise be characterised as ‘other’ can be included in the bonded group if there is a perceived common interest, for example in the face of an external threat. The identification of an external threat or shared enemy is a common bonding tactic used by new states when establishing their ‘national’ identity, and has been often used by state leaders to reinforce perceived weaknesses in ‘national’ unity. Furthermore, as Anderson (1991) has so famously pointed out, it is not necessary for members of a ‘nation’ to literally know each other, but it is necessary for them to have a conceptual or ‘imagined’ sense of community.

The claim of ‘nationhood’ for Indonesia is a contested one, as the state is more highly constructed than most. The anti-colonial revolution of 1945–49 certainly bonded together many disparate groups, and the introduction of a standardised and common language, Bahasa Indonesia, has increased internal communication and mutual intelligibility. Sukarno, as president, employed a range of nationalist myths to bolster a sense of belonging, while Suharto’s New Order government staked its support for national solidarity on the rhetoric and practice of ‘development’. However, the specificity or thinness of nationalist myths (for example, Prince Diponegoro’s anti-Dutch rebellion, Indonesia as a recreation of the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Majapahit Empire), communal tensions, ethnic separatism and the rejection of the very idea of ‘Indonesia’, especially in its unitary form, have all competed with claims to a legitimate Indonesian national identity. As noted by Rickleffs, it may be said that no set of shared ‘national’ values applied before the construction of the Indonesian state (Rickleffs 1993a: 50, 147; 1993b: 10); furthermore, according to Geertz, Indonesia’s ‘essentialist element’ is extremely unhomogenous (Geertz 1993: 244–5).

**The state**

As relatively recent (post-colonial) and highly constructed, it is valuable to assess Indonesia in terms of more general conceptions of what constitutes the state. The aim of such an exercise is to gauge the extent to which Indonesia meets conventional state requirements, how these might impact on both political loyalty and disaffection, and how this invites, compels or allows the TNI to include itself as a political actor.

In conventional modernist terms, the state consists spatially of a particular administrative area within a defined boundary. This boundary, give or take any disputes over marginal areas, should be internationally recognised as existing. That is, one of the criterion for statehood is the external recognition of the state.

Within its defined geographical area, the state has, or would claim to have, full and equal application of its authority up to the extent of its borders. Such authority would be defined by a codified law or set of conventions or practices that would be widely accepted on the basis of both popular consent.
and precedent. For example, parliamentary democracy applies to the whole of the UK even though it is not codified; it is not constitutionally guaranteed. But it is widely accepted on the basis of popular consent and a long-standing precedent. Similarly, France and the US have constitutions that guarantee in both principle and practice their political systems and the authority of their governments. In terms of the application of law more generally – that is, the capacity of the state to compel a degree of compliance from its citizens – it may be said that these states apply their respective legal codes in a consistent and impartial manner. The consistent and impartial application of law in Indonesia remains a long way from being realised, due in part to the mixed origins of its codification and due also to the intention and high degree of interpretability of some of its aspects, most notably in relation to the regard due to the president and the state. The notorious corruption and malleability of the judiciary further brings into question the consistency and impartiality of the legal code.

The state can also be defined in a functional sense, in terms of its ability to operate as a state. The functionality of the state is predicated upon the extent, efficacy and, to some degree, coordination of its institutions, such as the administrative bureaucracy of government, the judiciary, taxation, communications, education, health, external affairs and defence. Such institutions must be enduring to the extent that they continue despite changes of governments or political leadership (Morris 1998). Some states may choose to offer some of these functions through private institutions, but such institutions will act on behalf of the state. There is, of course, no absolute as to what institutions a state should have or the degree to which they need to be effective. However, there is a point at which state institutions cease to function effectively and at this stage the existence of the state as such may be called into question. For example, if a state is unable to secure its sovereignty, or if there is an effective collapse of the rule of law, then it might be argued that in practical terms the state no longer exists. Finally, although the criteria for what constitutes a state are extensive, the main criteria for assessing the existence of the state must be the ability to compel obedience, to maintain the sole legitimate use of force, to have the allegiance of its members, and to function to protect and promote the interests of its members.

**Fluid political geography**

Although the general principle could have been applied elsewhere, the traditional idea of the state in South-East Asia reflected what has been referred to as a ‘mandala’, or concentric Buddhist representation of the universe. That is, while the idea of the mandala reflected an idea of the universe in which everything rotated around its exemplary centre, the more temporal application of this idea had notions of power revolving around a political ‘exemplary centre’. Within this idea, the centre – the monarch or
power-holder – wielded sole authority, distributed to and served by the closest concentric circle of his advisers and retainers. The next circle out comprised the court, the next the city, then outlying towns and villages, regional power centres, and so on, up to the point at which the authority from the centre would be dispersed.

At the point of dispersal, the power of the monarch would meet an alternative source of power, and, because each is founded on the principle of sole authority, they would necessarily conflict. According to this model, if the state was not expanding it was necessarily contracting, and the capacity of the state to expand or contract both determined and reflected the monarch’s, or, in more abstract terms, the centre’s, capacity to wield power. Thus, as Moertono noted, disequilibrium and aggression were the givens of interstate relations (1981: 71). In a practical sense, most traditional states in South-East Asia were not just political mandalas but often contained within them potentially competing sites of power. While the centre was strong, these sites would remain under the sway of the centre. But when the centre was weak, they would be able to break away from the centre or compete with it as an alternative site for the location of power. Thus, not only would competing external sources of power weaken the state, but a weak centre would necessarily mean that the periphery of the state was more inclined to spin out of the centre’s orbit. This inherent instability of the state implied a high degree of anxiety about state cohesion and the logical use of force to assert peripheral compliance. Such characteristics may well still apply to state maintenance in Indonesia, and in particular to the military’s understanding of both the means and ends of such state maintenance.

It is worth noting that within this traditional context, central powers did not restrict the ebb and flow of people, nor were they able to. Indeed, the migration of people often gave rise to particular mandalas, or led to their fall. It is also worth noting that, as a test of its capacity to assert authority, the central state would by choice encapsulate as much territory and as many peoples as possible; thus, when successful, the state would represent an empire in the contemporary sense of the word. The Javanese Majapahit Empire of the thirteenth century is the best known example of this phenomenon occurring within the Indonesian archipelago, although the seventh- to thirteenth-century state of Srivijaya on the Palembang River in southern Sumatra also laid claim to mandalic or imperial status (Coedes 1968: Chs VIII, IX). While there may have been other supporting factors, by definition the maintenance of the mandelic state relied primarily on military force. Military force was necessary to create the state, and was absolutely necessary to maintain the state, to ward off competitor states or to thwart dispersal or fragmentation.

While the mandalic or imperial idea carried some legitimacy in the pre-colonial era, insofar as it was the commonly recognised order of things, the fluidity and expansionary character of mandalas does not sit comfortably with modernist conceptions of state, the primary quality of which, as
noted, is defined borders. Indonesia, based around the core island of Java, has been relatively slow in accepting the idea that a mandala is not an appropriate model for a modern state. This is not to suggest that the idea of a mandala has found explicit endorsement in Indonesia’s constitution or from its political leaders, but that it is implicitly reflected in the behaviour of the state in regard to its neighbours and, indeed, in terms of its internal relations.

The key events that suggest this expansionist orientation include the constitutional debates of 1945, the claim to West Papua, the Confrontation (Konfrontasi) and the invasion and annexation of East Timor. In terms of the constitutional debates, although the constitutional committee eventually decided that the state should reflect its colonial boundaries, a strong claim was made in the course of that discussion that the state should in fact be pan-archipelagic, incorporating the territories of all Malay peoples (i.e. including Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines and Portuguese Timor). This Indonesia Raya version of the state was, of course, difficult to sustain given the presence of pre-existing political entities in Malaysia, the Philippines and Portuguese Timor, and the incapacity of the fledgling state of Indonesia to assert the authority of its claim. For quite practical reasons, then, the constitutional committee opted for a version of the state that was most legitimate in the eyes of the international community, and which could conceivably be held through armed force. Indonesia’s claim to West Papua was made on the basis of being the successor state to the colonial empire, although this assumed a political unity that was defined by proximity and less by colonial organisation, if the Papuan Presidium Council/Free Papua Organisation (Presidium Dewan Papua – PDP/Organisasi Papua Merdeka – OPM) claim to the separateness of West Papua is to be accepted. However, the Indonesia Raya idea continued to appeal to a number of political thinkers in Indonesia, not least of whom was Sukarno (viz. the Confrontation).

The fundamental problem for the post-colonial successor state – a problem which also concerns Burma/Myanma and, to a lesser extent, India – is that the rationale behind its claim that the colony was illegitimate ipso facto translates to the post-colonial structure. In other words, successor states that correspond to colonial empires are, in terms of territorial reach, no more legitimate than the colonial empires upon which their territorial claim is based. Thus, seeking legitimacy, the question of territorial organisation is claimed as legitimate by the state if it becomes self-determining. The question then arises as to the extent of self-determining inclusion that the constituent parts of the successor state may exercise.

While dressed in anti-colonial rhetoric, Indonesia’s claim to ‘liberating’ West Papua was based more on the rising tide of ‘nationalist’ assertion than on any formal claim under international law. Although the eventual transition of authority in 1963, formalised in 1969, was supervised by the UN, the claim had no more formal legitimacy than would a pan-Indic claim incorporating
Pakistan into the new state of India. The distinctive characteristic in Pakistan’s case was its religious basis, being predominantly Islamic as opposed to Hindu, yet this was no stronger and possibly a weaker claim to separate identity than that of Melanesian separation from their Malay neighbours, at least based on the commonly expressed mutual antipathy between the two groups.

Similar anti-colonial rhetoric was employed in Indonesia’s opposition to the creation of the state of Malaysia, which they regarded as the artificial creation of another colonial power. While this view was in part quite correct – the division of the Malay peninsula from Sumatra being a colonial construct – it was also an expression of desire for incorporation that was not based on succeeding a colonial power, nor could it be claimed on any other sense of unity, short of appealing to long disappeared empires. It was, in short, an expression of expansionist ambition. The invasion and incorporation of Portuguese Timor in 1975 was also an expression of expansionist ambition, although this was claimed to have a necessary strategic component (East Timor had fallen under the influence of a leftist political organisation), and focused on a more clear colonial separation of a geographic entity. However, in both international law and in regard to the political aspirations of the vast majority of its people, this invasion could not be regarded as anything other than external imposition.

As the successor state to a colonial empire, then, Indonesia confronted at least some of the same issues that the colonial authorities confronted. That is, local grievances against Dutch colonialism were not necessarily assuaged by what was sometimes seen as exchanging a more distant colonial master for a more regional one.

The success of the anti-Dutch revolution in 1949 led to a brokered settlement over the construction of the new state, the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, comprising a federation in which fifteen outlying states were able to secure a relative degree of autonomy through numerically disproportionate representation in the new parliament. This disproportion of representation necessarily impinged on the degree of representation in the most populous parts of the state, namely Java, and was otherwise seen by many proponents of the new state as a means by which the Dutch could retain political influence in and economic control over large sections of the new republic. Yet the federated form of the new republic also reflected a less than complete desire to break away from the Netherlands, or to enter into a close and inherently unbalanced political relationship with Java. When the new government in Jakarta decided, in 1950, to scrap the federation and institute a unitary state, it did so to reduce Dutch influence and control. But it also did so to more firmly tie the outlying regions to the centre of the state. There may have been good administrative, political and economic reasons for this change, but based on the rebellions this move inspired, many in the outer islands saw the centralisation of the state on Jakarta as the recreation of a new and unwelcome Java-centric empire.

18 The problematic role of the TNI
There were two primary responses to this change. The first was the raising of a rebellion in South Sulawesi among officers who had previously been a part of the local Dutch army, the KNIL, which quickly spread to nearby Maluku. The second was the launching of the Dar’ul Islam (Nation of Islam) rebellion in West Java (Sunda), South Sulawesi and Aceh at the northern end of Sumatra. West Java, historically the kingdom of Pajajaran, had a history of asserting political and linguistic independence from the kingdoms and empires of Central and East Java. West Java was often incorporated into other Javanese empires, but it retained its own sense of distinct ‘national’ identity. In 1948 during the war against the Dutch, West Javanese (Sundanese) Islamic militias were abandoned by their regular army counterparts in the West Java-based Siliwangi Division when the latter retreated from West to Central Java under the ceasefire conditions of the Renville Agreement, which was designed to achieve a qualified independence for West Java by conceding territory it had lost in 1947. These guerrillas continued to fight what they termed a jihad ('holy war'), until declaring in December 1948 the establishment of the Negara Islam Indonesia (NII – State of Islamic Indonesia).

In 1950, in response to the abandonment of federation in favour of a unitary state, South Sulawesi and the already strongly independence-inclined Acehnese also joined the NII. The Acehnese regarded the Dar’ul Islam rebellion as an assertion of their historical claim to independent statehood, and operated largely without regard to their avowed comrades in West Java or South Sulawesi. Having successfully fought the Dutch from 1873 until 1912, and having conducted an anti-Dutch guerrilla campaign thereafter until the Japanese occupation, and then against Japan, the Acehnese were in little mood to accept another form of external control. Although they supported the war of independence against the Dutch, they did so, according to pro-independence Acehnese activists, as a part of their own strategy of thwarting a Dutch return to Aceh. Most historians claim that the Dar’ul Islam rebellion was not a separatist revolt but was aimed instead at changing the nature of the existing state. However, the Aceh–Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF), also known as the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka – GAM), claims that, having been betrayed by the abandonment of federation, Aceh’s involvement in the Dar’ul Islam rebellion was intended to secure Aceh’s separation from the state. This interpretation is disputed by some historians, but it does conform with the overall history of Acehnese aspirations for independence.

Stability?

In all of this, the underlying logic of the state has been that to remain united it must be stable. Most notably under the New Order, this requirement for stability was paramount, yet it was a stability imposed at a high and brutal price. And the fundamental questions remained unanswered: stability of what, and stability for whom?
The principle notion of the TNI that the state must be retained in its united and unitary form rests on a poorly articulated ‘nationalist’ belief system. Support for the notion of ‘nationalism’ has been widespread, especially among Indonesia’s elite. But beyond the less than representative Constitutional Committee of 1945, there has been little discussion about the logic of the philosophical underpinnings of the state, other than it being a successor to the Dutch East Indies. Hence the question arises, if stability of the state is that which will secure its unity, for whom is this unity intended? There are two, related answers to this question. The first is that the state’s elite are the primary beneficiaries of stability and state unity. The elite enjoy extraordinary political power and, usually in an associated manner, wealth, especially relative to the lack of power and the poverty of the vast majority of the population. Such inequality reflects in part a historical disequilibrium between social classes, most notably in Java. But it also reflects a reinvention and reification of class stratification and privilege, especially since the mid-1960s. The obliteration of the PKI from 1965, both as a movement and as an intellectual force in Indonesian political society, effectively ended any significant challenge to this stretching of traditional privilege.

Indonesia’s elite derive from across the archipelago; thus they have no necessary Java-specific focus. However, an empire usually co-opts its subjects into the process of empire building and maintenance, and in this respect it is not unusual to find that non-Javanese are as committed to the Java-centric Indonesia project as most Javanese. This applies especially to members of the elite, but also to non-elite subjects who have been co-opted, bought off or who otherwise see their loyalty as best rewarded by remaining close to the prevailing system (see Kingsbury 2002: 22–3). Needless to say, the TNI’s officer class comprises a significant proportion of the elite, in terms of political power and economic access, and occupy a special place within the elite structure as guardians of elite interests.

Beyond Indonesia’s elite as such, Java has since the earliest days of the republic been a distinct beneficiary of the economic organisation of the state. In the 1950s in particular Java benefited from being the major recipient of government spending even though it was, per capita, not the greatest contributor. This situation was enhanced under the New Order, in particular with the growing level of exploitation of the archipelago’s natural resources. By way of illustration, Indonesia’s single largest income earner, hydrocarbon, was located at sites as far afield as eastern Kalimantan, Riau and Aceh, while the single biggest contributor to government taxation, the Freeport copper and gold mine, was located in West Papua, while other major mines were located in Kalimantan. Similarly, forest products were located primarily in Kalimantan and Sumatra, while the country’s dominant tourism destination was Bali. Yet organised through and often owned or dominated by Jakarta’s elite, these sources of income greatly benefited the centre – and relatively few at the centre at that – and did significantly less to contribute to the well-being of the periphery.
In one sense this economic arrangement was necessary, as a distribution of resources based on place of origin would preclude a significant amount of wealth from flowing into Java, even though Java contained more than half of the total population. Cut off from such wealth, Java would be plunged into economic chaos and, given the tensions that seem to lie just under the surface, it is likely there would be consequent political chaos. Chaos in Java would very likely have a significant impact on the nearby region, in particular Indonesia’s outer islands.

The current arrangement of effective cross-subsidisation or redistribution, then, is in large part the glue that holds the state together. Yet the practical rejection of economic redistribution, manifested in the huge wealth gap between the elite and the ‘little people’ (wong cilik), and the refusal of the elite to explicitly acknowledge this redistribution, means that it has no philosophical underpinnings. That is to say, were the current arrangements openly acknowledged on the basis of economic egalitarianism, there might be some greater capacity for acceptance of the current state of affairs. This assumes, of course, that such economic socialism would be regarded as ideologically acceptable. In the 1950s this exact same proposal was explicitly rejected by the outer islands and, along with related issues, directly led to the PRRI–Permetsa rebellion. Similarly, if the elite were to embrace such a principle, it would as a matter of consistency have to engage in its own economic redistribution. As Mackie (1996) has noted, the extremes in wealth that came to symbolise the New Order were not known during the more egalitarian Sukarno period, during which the principle of economic redistribution across geographic and class lines had some credibility.

The philosophical inconsistency of economic arrangements under the New Order, which survived largely intact into the post-New Order period, has led to a high level of regional resentment. This has been coupled to a high and perhaps even higher level of antipathy over government efforts to repress expressions of such resentment. The rejection of the economic order by many in the periphery has become linked to a rejection of the political order, which in many cases has been tied to an historical sense of localised ‘national’ identification. Preservation of the state has therefore come to mean preservation of a relatively arbitrary and internally inconsistent economic and political order. This situation was justified under the banner of ‘development’ but, like most rhetoric in Indonesian public life, rang hollow for many of the state’s citizens. Apart from having an explicit role in state ‘development’ and hence partially manifesting the gap between rhetoric and reality, the TNI has also been the primary, self-appointed and very often self-instructing agent of maintenance of this state of affairs. Being the agency of compliance for an at best partially compliant population by definition means that power is exercised, often in a very naked way, for distinctly political ends.
State reorganisation

Implicit in any critique of the structure of the Indonesian state is the normative desire for a more equitable alternative. As noted, the philosophical underpinnings of the Indonesian state are incoherent, so a reconsideration of the state, its meaning and purpose is essential in order to address its manifest shortcomings. The autonomy laws of 2000 might be regarded as one limited gesture in this direction, although they are quite limited in scope and in many cases seen as inadequate in terms of addressing fundamental problems of the redistribution of power and wealth (see Kingsbury 2002: 145–7). This means that a more fundamental reconsideration of the state is required.

At the time of writing, the government of President Megawati Sukarnoputri was considering establishing a Constitutional Commission to reassess the adequacy of the 1945 constitution and to draft a new document. However, while there seemed to be in principle agreement among many of Jakarta’s elite that this was a broadly acceptable proposal, there was fundamental disagreement about what direction such a commission should take, or indeed who should be on it. This reflected a widespread recognition that a new constitution had the capacity to fundamentally alter the balance of economic and political power, and few who had it were prepared to risk losing it. Not surprisingly, the TNI played a major role in defining the parameters of the debate, explicitly ruling out the introduction of shariah (Islamic law), as demanded by some Islamic groups in what was referred to as the Jakarta Charter (JP 2001g). However, shariah was introduced by fiat in Aceh in 2002, and was adopted by some provinces or sub-provincial districts.

What did seem to be non-negotiable was the unitary structure of the state, which by definition focuses economic and political power in Jakarta and hence Java. This position was clearly spelled out by various representatives of the TNI throughout the post-Suharto period and especially in the run-up to and after the election of Megawati as president. Yet by maintaining the unitary structure of the state, it seemed that there would be little scope for breaking the nexus between the centralisation of the elite and the centralisation of economic and political power.

The primary alternative was for Indonesia to devolve into a federation of states, breaking the above mentioned state–elite nexus and diminishing if not completely removing the need for the TNI to act as guardians of the state. In simple terms, if the state was devolved the TNI would have no need to insist on it being bound tightly together. But, as noted, such a devolution of the state to its constituent parts would most adversely impact on Java, and likely cause real hardship among its people. In simple terms, Java was not independent, in particular in terms of export income which predominantly came from primary exports, excluding some manufactures. Yet it had the physical capacity, at least in the short term, to externalise its hardship. A distressed and chaotic Java would be a difficult and probably dangerous
neighbour for all concerned. This is not to suggest that the principle of devolving the state to its constituent parts was not legitimate, but it is to acknowledge that the practice, were it to eventuate, would be highly problematic.

The real difficulty with all of this was that there was no readily available compromise position, short of a voluntary agreement on the part of the periphery to give up a significant proportion of its locally generated income to help prop up the Javanese economy (and the economies of other regions that were low income generators). But realistically, even if such an agreement might be reached, it would be unlikely to be sustained for more than the medium term. A functionally independent state within a genuinely federated structure will eventually want to benefit from its own geographic advantages.

In an environment in which such agreement might be reached voluntarily, there would be some commitment to making the process work, as well as a sense of a larger shared ‘nationalist’ project. This was the case with Indonesia’s neighbour, Australia, which voluntarily came together as a federation of previously separate colonies. In a series of implicit and explicit moves towards constructing a national identity, Australia increasingly moved towards a centralised model of the state, until it reached the stage somewhat less than one hundred years after its federation where it functioned as a unitary model, with varying degrees of cross-subsidisation between states, with only local administrative powers left to the constituent states. By contrast, however, the Indonesia ‘project’ got off to a difficult start and has faltered a number of times over the course of its history. There seems to be less commitment to the idea of ‘Indonesia’ early in the twenty-first century than there was half a century before, if one is to take as indicative the Aceh rebellion and expressions of a desire for independence in West Papua, and to some extent in Maluku Selatan, Riau and perhaps parts of Kalimantan. As a consequence, any agreement on a compromise form of the state, including devolved power but voluntary income distribution, would be, at best, highly contested. And this is assuming that the state elite would be prepared to enter into such a radical reorganisation of the state, which seems unlikely. As a consequence, with so many internal contradictions, the role of the TNI in the maintenance of the state is, in practical terms, a given. This does not mean that the role cannot be or is not in the process of being modified. And it does not mean that the TNI must act as an often arbitrary and frequently brutal enforcer of state supremacy, an approach that has at times appeared to be culturally ingrained into TNI thinking, across all ranks. Of course, culture is not fixed and change is possible. But if culture is based upon and continues to be shaped by its material circumstances, indications were, at the time of writing, that the role of the TNI as arbiter and enforcer would continue to imply a use of violence on its behalf as a means of obtaining compliance. The TNI, according to Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo, was a fundamentally conservative organisation as a consequence of
its method of internal organisation, which was in turn determined by its organisational role (Agus Widjojo 2001a). But in one sense, a sense that seems to justify the TNI’s continuing political role, there are few if any practical alternatives to the TNI’s continuing role in state affairs.

**Power as a political application**

The idea of power has been one that has long transfixed political theorists, not least because power, as usually understood, has been the primary method by which political institutions (such as states) have compelled a high level of subject compliance. Power is the universal aspiration of political interest. Power in this sense is somewhat different to notions of authority on the one hand and force on the other.

Authority can be defined as an attribute of political organisation in which there is an inherent recognition of some greater competence or legitimacy in either a person or an institution. Authority tends to imply a mutual recognition of the rules of engagement, such as a country’s laws. A more authoritarian state, for example, would tend to have a preponderance of restrictive laws. A less authoritarian state would tend to rely more on mutual respect and obligation for and understanding of the social rather than legal codification of the rules of behaviour.

Force implies compulsion, by a variety of means up to and including the use of violence. The threat of force may lie behind the use of power. However, there are examples of power, such as will (exemplified through non-violent resistance), that do not rely on force. In this sense, power is rarely stable, being converted into authority or expressed as force, or shifting between these positions.

Aspects of authority might include power, particularly if one accepts the view that hegemony – that is, subjects agreeing with that which is not necessarily in their interest through means of social reinforcement – is the unspoken ideological glue that holds political society together; see, for example, Lukes (1974) and Gramsci (1971). In their views, Lukes and Gramsci are not far removed from Weber’s observation that political submission may be simulated for reasons of self-interest, weakness or survival, because there is no acceptable alternative (Weber 1964: 326). Furthermore, power does not have to be overt or even covert to exist; unawareness of alternative forms of behaviour, or even the questions that might raise such possibilities, can also be a product of power.

Weber famously noted three idealised types of authority: rational-legal, traditional and charismatic. Rational-legal authority is based on acceptance of the legality of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands. Traditional authority is based on ‘an established belief in the sanctity of tradition and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority’. Charismatic authority is based on ‘devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary
character of an individual person, and the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him’ (Weber 1964: 328).

According to Weber, none of these categories of power exist in a pure state; furthermore, and at least as importantly, such categories may be influenced or compromised by various issues. Rational-legal authority may be compromised by a lack of rationality of law, a lack of independence or corruption of the judiciary, and subject to compliance that responds to the latent violence of law rather than by agreeing with its legitimacy. In the case of traditional authority, loyalty was not to the office of the political leader but to the person, in which relations were personalised and in which administrative staff were in effect personal retainers. In a contemporary sense, traditional authority can be ‘sanitised’ to form a politically convenient and usually reified cultural reconstruction. As such, what passes for ‘tradition’ tends to express itself as a fixed ideology uncritically disseminated by state institutions such as schools and through state-influenced media. In traditional society, patrimonialism was a common means of bonding retainers to the political leader. Similarly, in more contemporary settings, the patron–client relationship of a particularly economic nature (such as a business opportunity) tends to be the social glue that holds together re-invented ‘tradition’. Charismatic authority is highly individualistic and is subject to diminution through reversals in the personal fortune of the leader, hence it usually attempts to transform itself into a more institutionalised (resilient) traditional model. Charismatic authority, however, does serve the purpose of reinforcing the power of the individual political leader beyond proscription. In a contemporary sense, charisma may also be open to manipulation via a compliant media and institutional control over the symbols of state. In Indonesia, this might be said to have been the case under both Sukarno and Suharto, although to a much lesser extent under their successors.

In that it described a process of evolution from charismatic authority to traditional authority to rational-legal authority, or of mutual reinforcement of each category, Weber’s view of power was not unrelated to Marx’s ideas of power. In particular, both agreed that power was derived from three spheres of social life: the political, economic and cultural. Marx gave primacy to economic power, or to the material conditions of life and economic relations between groups of people. Weber, on the other hand, proposed that the primacy of influence could shift according to circumstance. As a consequence of this view, Weber tended to be followed by Mann, although Mann categorised the sources of power as economic, ideological, military and the state (1986: 29, 46–9, Ch. 16).

While one can debate the distinction between Mann’s categories – and he was primarily referring to the distant past – in each case they all come together in the form of the TNI. Mann notes especially that the coercive force of military power in particular was in most cases concentrated (1986: 26, Chs 5–9). As such, direct military social control was logistically difficult to administer, in terms of both geographic reach and social reach (through
the economy, polity and so on). In this regard, the TNI’s Territorial structure, the *dwifungsi* and being enmeshed in the regional and central economy all acted to militate against what Mann saw as the primary political weakness of the military. Mann also noted that military efficacy was defined by an essentiality of ‘the unquestioned downward transmission of orders’ and that such a society was governed by ‘compulsory cooperation’ (1986: 56). However, Andreski (1971: 29, 92–101) identified centralisation as being necessary to a functional military command, which set up both a tension within the TNI command structure on the one hand, in terms of its Territorial function and the streams of patronage within the TNI that affect such a command structure, and between the TNI’s functional independence and the centralisation of state authority on the other. Manifestations of this tension can be seen in the fragmentation of lines of command and control, and in the creation of personal military fiefdoms.

The above references to power define it in terms of what Hindess called its ‘simple capacity’ or ‘quantitative capacity’. He differentiates this from a ‘right’ to act, based on the consent of those to whom power applies (Hindess 1996), which implies legitimacy. As Hindess notes, in the view of theorists like Lukes and Gramsci, the issue of right is redundant if it does not contain capacity, and it is a variety of quantitative capacity if it does. Probably what is most important here is not that theorists debate the precise distinction between types of power, but that they generally agree that it can operate in extremely subtle as well as quite unsubtle ways, from a Lukesian third-dimensional power (Lukes 1974) to a Gramscian hegemony (Gramsci 1971), in which subjects may be moved to act (or not act) without the knowledge of alternatives, and where their agreement is based on the ‘right’ of consent, with full awareness or complete ignorance, through to being compelled to act at the point of a gun.

The value of this in understanding the political power of the TNI is that although it is best known for its capacity for compulsion and its use of violence, it also operates in a range of vastly more subtle ways, many of which have been ‘naturalised’ into the lives of Indonesian citizens, often in ways they do not explicitly comprehend or in some cases are even aware of. It might be said that a Gramscian hegemony operates through the TNI’s influence on sources of information – in particular on what is said in the media but also in terms of what is not said (and what publications cannot exist or have been precluded from existing), and in terms of its influence in Indonesian education (the construction of ‘national’ myths). It must be acknowledged here that the TNI’s capacity, or desire, to influence the media was markedly less in the post-Suharto period and indeed it was a former senior officer, Major General (retired) Yunus Yosfiah, who as Minister for Information presided over the formalisation of Indonesia’s free media. However, in one sense the flow of information from critical areas – for example, from Aceh, West Papua or Maluku – was still deeply influenced by the TNI. Similarly, although there was some discussion about the need to
rewrite Indonesian history for use in schools, the primary ‘nationalist’ myths of the pre-colonial unity of the state prevailed. Furthermore, the TNI’s development of its own myth as the ‘guardian of the state’ and the reification and ‘Indonesianisation’ of aspects of Javanese tradition continued to resonate in a range of ideas with common currency.

Philosophical origins of the TNI

While many public aspects of Indonesian political life have reflected Javanese political tradition, and elements of that find their way into some aspects of the TNI, where the TNI derives its fundamental philosophy from, as with its constitution, is imperial Japan. There are some cultural (or institutional) aspects of the TNI that also reflect the exigencies of military organisation. However, such organisation has been styled more along the lines of the military in an organicist state rather than, for example, the military in a state that generally recognises and tolerates distinction and difference.

During the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies, the Japanese army trained Indonesian youths in Islamic and nationalist military units to both police the colony and assist in defending against expected Allied attack. By 1943 there were over 35,000 men in the Javanese auxiliary army alone (Feith 1964: 198). This organisation, the Volunteer Army of Defenders of the Fatherland (Tentara Sukarela Pembela Tanah Air – Peta), was to become the basis of the revolutionary army and later the foundation of the armed forces.11

The influence of Japanese military thinking on the incipient Indonesian military was profound. The primary concept of the legal structure of civil–military relations in the Japanese state was essentially one of military independence. In Japan, the government was divided into two spheres, one military and the other civil. This reflected the principle of niju seif, or dual government, which found reflection in the TNI’s dwifungsi. Similarly, while civilians were unable to exercise any authority within the Japanese military, the military were able to expand their power into the civil arena (Huntington 1957: 13). In Indonesia, the defence minister was essentially subservient to the TNI’s panglima, or commander-in-chief, and the TNI was only directly answerable to the president, and then in some cases only nominally so.

In the Japanese military, ‘[b]oth the authority and the influence of the military extended into foreign and domestic policy’ (Huntington 1957: 133). So too in the TNI and its predecessors, who were able to influence foreign policy especially in relation to the Confrontation (Konfrontasi) with Malaysia (against the wishes of the president), in the military intervention in East Timor (initially against the wishes of the president) and in the heightening of difficulties with neighbours, most notably Australia in 1986. In domestic policy the TNI’s influence has been more profound, ranging from
involvement in industrial disputation, communal conflict, repressing separatist aspirations, persecuting non-violent political activity, limiting the media, acting as the prosecution for the judiciary and, not least, in occupying a range of ministerial and provincial government positions. Likewise, officers from Japan's military had often held senior non-military posts in government, unlike the other major fascist state of the time, Germany (Huntington 1957: 135). In imperial Japan, as in Indonesia's New Order government, 'it became the accepted thing for military men to hold top posts in the government' (Huntington 1957: 136).

Again, the role of military–civil relations in Japan, where officers received support from and gave support to mass organisations, was highly influential: 'Military officers frequently played an important role in organising, leading and financing them, and the groups invariably supported military foreign and domestic policies...' (Huntington 1957: 137). The effects of these relations can be traced over a long period of Indonesian political history. Student mobilisation in particular has been an important element of political life in Indonesia, and many student and other groups have been organised and financed by military figures for various purposes: for example, the orchestrated demonstrations towards the end of Sukarno's rule in 1965–66; the role played by the senior officers (in particular General Sumitro) opposed to Suharto in the Malari riots of 1974; the increasing number and range of demonstrations against Suharto's rule between July 1996 and May 1998; and the demonstrations against the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid in 2001. Other examples include the shadowy involvement of an Islamic faction of the army in pushing a putatively Islamic political agenda, in particular in 1997 and 1998, and the organisation and training of numerous paramilitary political groups linked to different political parties and causes. Most notable among such groups was the Laskar Jihad (or Holy Warriors), more than 2,000 of whom trained in West Java and were active against local Christians in Maluku, and also various militia groups, in particular in East Timor, West Papua and Aceh (discussed further in Chapter 3).

In imperial Japan, a 'final aspect of military political influence was the reversion in 1931 to terroristic methods of government. In effect, this involved the superimposing of an extralegal system of violence upon the formal system of constitutional government' (Huntington 1957: 137). There is no doubt that the TNI has engaged in extra-legal violence, more or less muted during the 1950s but surfacing again with the massacres of hundreds of thousands of communists and suspected sympathisers in 1965–66; in the 'disappearances' of political and social activists which continues as this is written; in the killings of around 5,000 alleged criminals in the Petrus affair (penembakan misterius – mysterious shootings) of 1983–84; in the murder of a supreme court judge just four days after Megawati achieved the presidency; and in the sudden and unexpected death of the TNI's leading reformist and whistle-blower, Lieutenant General Agus Wirahadikusumah.
on 30 August 2001. In addition, the TNI’s special forces (Kopassus) Group IV was established to specialise in covert domestic operations, against internal political dissenters as well as separatist movements. Its methods are by definition both political and extrajudicial (see Chapter 3 for further discussion of Kopassus).

Apart from the obvious influence that Japanese organicism (or fascism), in part based on a military ethic, has on both military ethics and fascism, they are similar in a number of respects, in particular in their emphasis on order and hierarchy. But a conventional military has one fundamental difference. According to Huntington, what the military accepts as the facts of existence to be wrestled with as effectively as possible, fascists glorify as the supreme values of existence. The military, Huntington observes, regards the idea of struggle as being inherent in human relations, while fascists glorify struggle as the highest form of human activity. According to Huntington, the military accepts the nation-state as the highest independent unit, while fascism hails the state or party as ‘the embodiment of moral virtue, the ultimate source of morality…The military man recognises the necessity and uses of power; the fascist worships power as an end in itself’ (Huntington 1957: 91).

**Formalising military political power**

When the Sastroamijoyo Cabinet resigned in March 1957 – the seventeenth Cabinet since 1945 – parliamentary democracy was finally abandoned and Sukarno’s Guided Democracy (*Demokrasi Termpimpin*) was adopted in a modified form. Guided Democracy can be variously interpreted, and has shifted in nature between its inception and its application by Suharto, but it may be broadly understood as the process in which there is a high degree of presidential authority that is only nominally accountable to the people by means of what might pass (or have passed) as a representative process. The president is ‘advised’ by the Cabinet and to a lesser extent by the legislature (which becomes increasingly nominal). In practice Guided Democracy implies quasi-dictatorial powers. Along with Guided Democracy came martial law, on 14 March 1957, strengthening the position of the army’s central leadership under its Chief of Staff, Major General Abdul Haris Nasution. This provided legal grounds for army intervention in civil affairs and laid the groundwork for the military’s ‘dual function’ (*dwifungsi*) of both protecting and helping to run the state. The Indonesian Army had never confined itself to a purely military role, being particularly active in the affairs of the fledgling Republic during the period of the revolution. From 1949, the military had formally accepted the sovereignty of the civilian government, but this acceptance belied a continuing belief within the army that it was the guardian of the state, both in security affairs and in the broader political environment. To that end, the army ran a parallel administrative structure to that of the state, from Cabinet level through to local administrative regions and down to villages. This system has been identified
as deriving from, and being similar to, the military system initiated by Japan during the Second World War, through which civil society was increasingly regimented and militarised. In particular, there continue to be parallels between wartime Japan and Indonesia’s armed forces, and the organisations they created. The similarities range from the creation of village or sub-district military commands (in Japan, *goshi*; in Indonesia, *komando rayon militer*) all the way through to a wives’ organisation (*Fujinkai*; *Darma Wanita*), the officially sanctioned and imposed ideology (*yamato damashii*; *Pancasila*), and the politico-military role of the armed forces (*gunsai*; *dwifungsi*) (Mangunwijaya 1992: 12–15). When the army finally asserted what it regarded as its rightful role in the affairs of the state, its structure for implementing that role was already firmly in place.

**Stability and development**

From the beginning of Suharto’s rise to power in 1965, the armed forces accepted and supported the foundation of his regime; namely, the belief that economic and social development was the nation’s first priority and that social and political stability was absolutely essential if that goal were to be realised. The primary mission of the armed forces has therefore been to maintain internal ‘stability’, although this has been a rigidly applied form of stability, which has at times shown itself to be brittle. The military was successful in imposing a high degree of ‘order’ across the state after the mid-1960s, which in part led and in part enforced the state to abandon the period of political and social upheaval – but also the (albeit decreasing) political plurality – that characterised the early to mid-1960s. This laid the foundations for a period of relatively long-lasting domestic order and control, and, for Indonesia, a period of occasionally interrupted economic growth. From the mid-1980s, as a consequence of an over-reliance on a narrow income base (oil), this imposed ‘stability’ also allowed increasing diversification of the economy and a high level of foreign investment. However, the nature of unaccountable political systems is such that this ‘stability’ also engendered a high and ultimately unsustainable level of corruption along with a poor record on income distribution that ultimately weakened the state, creating internal structural problems in terms of a wavering allegiance to the idea of the state, in particular in the state’s relatively wealthy periphery. This failure to secure long-term allegiance to the idea of the state was based on a relatively high level of pre-existing political and cultural difference, but was exacerbated and enhanced by the gratuitous plundering of the regions for the benefit of a small and usually centrally located elite. Objections to this plundering were met by the imposition of ‘stability’ by the military, marking it as partisan in the political economy of the state and as a force that functionally viewed many of the state’s own putative citizens as residents of ‘enemy’ occupied territory.
Because the Suharto government viewed national and regional stability as essential to maintaining the pace of state development, the maintenance of internal security was considered an integral part of state defence itself. Indonesian doctrine considers national defence within the broader context of ‘national resilience’, a concept that stresses the importance of the ideological, political, economic, social and military strength of the state, conceived of in this instance as a ‘nation’. Like dwifungsi, this concept has also legitimised activities of the armed forces in areas not ordinarily considered as being related to the military, but rather to issues of law and law enforcement, both of which have been notoriously weak in Indonesia.

In terms of official doctrine, Indonesia’s military has been driven by the following four determinants:

1. National Resilience (Ketahanan Nasional). The National Resilience programme was initiated between 1968 and 1972, and had as its emphasis the economic stability and internal cohesion of the state.

2. This was to be achieved through the military’s so-called ‘dual function’ (dwifungsi), including both a defence and civil role, the latter being defined as ‘socio-political’ and including responsibility for both state-sponsored development projects and, until 1999, the appointment of serving military officers to political posts. In 1999 this capacity was redefined as ‘Territorial Affairs’, having a similar function but more explicitly acknowledging the Territorial or regional role of the military in contributing to or determining political affairs, including ‘development’.

3. The Total People’s Defence and Security System (Sistem Pertahanan Memanan Rakyat Semesta – Sistem Hankamrata) was originally defined as the means by which a relatively small, poorly trained and poorly equipped military could function throughout the archipelago in the case of attack. The intention was, and to some extent still is, that the Territorial component of the army in particular would operate with the support of the ‘people’ in containing and combating foreign intervention. ‘In-depth guerrilla defence in tandem with a limited conventional capability, is designed to cope with lower level external threats, internal security, resource protection, and regime maintenance’ (Lowry 1993: 18). This set-up has since been developed to incorporate a range of militia-type organisations that have varying degrees of legality and support from and links to the military. These organisations might be used as auxiliary units but have most notably been employed as proxies of the army in causes where direct military intervention would be seen as politically inappropriate. The linkages between the army and various militias has been well documented, and in many cases army personnel have been actively involved in training and leading such militias in the field. According to Mak: ‘Because of the size and complexity of the
Indonesian nation, a multi-layered strategy structured on a “territorially based internal warfare force” has been the foundation of Indonesia’s defence since the nation’s establishment’ (Mak 1993).

4 The ‘Archipelagic Outlook’ (Wawasan Nusantara) reflects all major elements of Indonesia’s defence and internal security strategy and its state and world-view. It is predicated upon the recognition that Indonesia’s fragmented physical structure is its defining characteristic and that this acts as both a strength and a weakness. It is a strength in the sense that, as a group of islands, Indonesia is relatively insulated from attack or the disturbances that could affect mainland states. However, it is also a weakness in that, in the face of attack, defence of particular parts of the archipelago could be difficult. The fragmented physical quality of the state is also reflected in the historical, cultural and, to some extent, political fragmentation of the state, which continues to function as the primary cause for elite and ‘nationalist’ anxiety.

Service hierarchy

The army has always been the dominant group in the Indonesian military, being both the original service and the one that has been most politically engaged. The air force and navy have always performed secondary roles in Indonesia’s military hierarchy, and were only built up in 1958–62 in response to the West Papua campaign. Equipment purchases from 1958 were, however, significant, including sixty jet fighters, twenty bombers, two destroyers, submarines, a cruiser and various patrol and missile-firing strike craft from the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This made Indonesia the largest non-communist recipient of Soviet military aid at that time (Leifer 1983: 60–1). Military support for the West Papua campaign was instigated less for ideological reasons than it was for building up military strength, a recognition of the fact that the military had played and would continue to play a dominant role in the affairs of the state, yet until 1958 did not have an adequate capacity with which to do so.

However, due to the economic constraints of the 1960s and thereafter (and following the abandonment of the only half-heartedly pursued the Confrontation (Konfrontasi) with Malaysia), as well as the absence of any perceived external threat to Indonesia after the mid-1970s, focus on further development of the military was limited. This lack of concern with external threats also allowed Indonesia to concentrate on internal cohesion and the imposition of unity as concurrent with state development priorities. Although the Indonesian military’s internal security function has always been paramount, by the late 1970s attention was again also focused on the development of a credible conventional defence capability against potential foreign threats. This defence capability had previously been neglected under Suharto for both economic and doctrinal reasons and because the state had
not faced a genuine external threat. Neglect of a conventional defence capability resulted in deteriorated equipment throughout the armed forces and raised doubts about the military’s capability to confront either a foreign or a severe domestic threat. Under the then military commander General Mohammad Jusuf, the armed forces initiated extensive retraining and reorganisation programmes that culminated in a major reorganisation of the armed forces in 1985. Thereafter, through to the 1990s, the armed forces gradually upgraded its military capability, particularly that of the navy and the air force. Both had been seriously weakened by national spending priorities that continued to stress economic development and relegated defence spending to a much lower priority than might be found in most developing nations. In significant part, this state of affairs was able to be rationalised as a consequence of the success of the military’s sourcing of off-budget lines of income, which into the 1990s comprised three-quarters of total military income.

Military activity

Throughout Indonesia’s history, the TNI has been engaged in or responsible for a wide range of campaigns and other activities, including the following:

- the revolution against the Netherlands, 1945–49
- controlling and eventually ending the Dar’ul Islam revolt, 1949–63
- the rebellion in South Sulawesi, 1950
- quelling the revolt of the Republic of Maluku Selatan (South Moluccas), 1950
- nationalising Dutch interests, 1957
- crushing the PRRI–Permetsa rebellion in Sumatra and Sulawesi, 1958
- devising and implementing its dual security and political function, 1958–99
- conducting the West Papua campaign against the Netherlands, 1962–63
- conducting the Confrontation (*Konfrontasi*) with Malaysia, 1963–65
- nationalising British interests, 1964
- nationalising American interests, 1965
- organising and participating in the massacre of between 300,000 and 1 million communists and suspected communist sympathisers, 1965–67, and sustaining an anti-communist campaign thereafter
- evicting President Sukarno from office, 1965–67
- installing Major General Suharto as president, 1966–68
- establishing the party of government, Golkar
- having a (declining) presence in the ‘parliament’ (DPR, MPR), as well as at provincial and sub-provincial levels
- having the ‘Territorial’ function of matching all civilian government posts with military posts down to village level, and engaging in ‘development’ projects.
• engaging in illegal activities, by 2002 worth approximately US$2 billion p.a.
• establishing an ‘intelligence’ state of repression against numerous actual and perceived critics invading East Timor in 1975
• running a state of repression, 1965–98
• combating separatist rebellions in Aceh, 1976–present day, and West Papua, 1963–present day
• being engaged in civil unrest campaigns across Kalimantan, Maluku and throughout Nusa Tenggara in the late 1990s and early 2000s
• orchestrating the East Timor violence of 1999
• continuing to act as the country’s power broker in both policy formation and presidential selection and succession, despite ‘democratisation’.

Military culture

Due in part because of a consequence of its ad hoc origins, in part because of overall funding restraints and in part because of its accumulated culture as an organisation that deals primarily with unarmed civilians, according to a source formerly close to the TNI, one thing that most Indonesian soldiers and officers lack is initiative and the ability to take responsibility for actions on the spot. If an unexpected situation arose that was not planned for earlier, the junior commander on the spot would be likely to do nothing until he had sought instructions from his senior who, in turn, would seek instructions from his senior. This could lead to higher-level commanders overseeing operations more suited to the conduct of subordinates.

This deference to senior levels of the military hierarchy derives from a pervasive feudal psychology. It was relatively common within the Indonesian military to hear the saying *asal bapak senang* (‘as long as the boss is happy’). The junior ranks rarely second-guessed or questioned their superiors. When undergoing training or education, Indonesian soldiers rarely asked questions for fear of giving the impression that they did not understand what was being taught (and thus also saving the instructor’s face by not implying that the instruction was inadequate). This approach has had two consequences, the first of which is that there is a low level of initiative in the Indonesian military, and that it is often incapable of acting in ways that would be required of a conventional defence organisation. This is a major drawback for its operational capacity, and is only slowly being ameliorated in the more specialised branches of the service. The second consequence is that if Indonesian soldiers of lower ranks were to act, especially in ways that later would be described as inappropriate or illegal, they would be likely almost always to act not just with the permission of a superior officer but as a consequence of a direct order from high up in the chain of command. That is, there have been very few incidents in Indonesian military history,
including the murder or torture of political activists, and attacks against large numbers of civilians, that were not a consequence of a direct, high-ranking order. It is simply not within the capabilities of the Indonesian military system for its lower ranks to act on initiative or without direct and explicit orders and, given the disinclination to shoulder responsibility, for these orders to have come from a level in the command chain that might reasonably quarantine itself from any negative consequences.

As a means of counterbalancing this lack of initiative, a great deal of attention is paid to drill, which, due to practice, is one thing most Indonesian soldiers are proficient at. A lot of time is expended in training activities that are designed to develop a martial appearance and to perpetuate an image of machismo. Drill, martial arts and patriotic songs are all important to how an Indonesian soldier sees himself and his role in the military. This machismo element was clearly demonstrated when General Ryamizard Ryacudu was promoted to Chief of Staff. Ryamisard explained that the unusually large military parade that accompanied his promotion was important to ‘show the people how brave and tough the military is’. He said: ‘I think we need to differentiate between a ceremony involving civilians and a military ceremony, which needs to be heroic in nature’ (Tiarmo 2002c).

The author’s experience of the TNI in the field is, in some respects, consistent with knowledge of soldiers in other developing countries that have been involved in suppressing internal rebellion or civil conflict. As a result of the combination of the social psychology of power, weapons and a low degree of direct connectedness or linked interest, together with an unsophisticated understanding of their role, the military, in many developing countries, acts as a law unto itself and its members often have a swagger about them that implies a well-developed sense of superego. Personal importance can be very well developed when one’s horizons are not broad. Similarly, the inculcation of esprit de corps, especially among officers, combined with a high level of what amounts to ideological indoctrination, means that, when allied to an unsophisticated base, there is considerable scope for such a military to act in a malignant manner even when the people with whom it is primarily engaged can be recognised as ‘same’ as opposed to ‘other’. In Indonesia, ‘otherness’ has been a defining characteristic of identification: ‘other’ aliran (stream of influence), religion, place of origin, ethnicity, class or status group, ideological disposition, and so on. In many respects, Indonesia is a ‘nation’ of such ‘others’. ‘Other’ does not fare favourably when confronted by the regularised, uniform and often regimented thinking of military personnel. And when ‘other’ is a primary characteristic of the ‘enemy’, in this case ‘of the state’, the categories of soldier, civilian and combatant can and do blur very easily. Drill and martial spirit are necessary for soldiers, but they are not enough. And when the ‘enemy’, ambiguously defined, is more often than not ordinary people, drill and martial spirit becomes grossly inadequate.
2 Context, continuity and change

National unity can never be taken for granted, so that welding the country together into a single and cohesive political, economic and defence unit, which is the essence of the Archipelagic Outlook, remains a major concern for any Indonesian government.

(Anwar 1999: 201)

When considering the deeply entrenched and assertive role of the military in the Indonesian state, one might think that it was simply an expression of local culture and conditions; that it was just the way things are. Yet the way the Indonesian military has developed and the role that it has taken upon itself derives from some very specific influences, some of which are the product of history and some of which are the result of more deliberate actions.

The contextual development of the Indonesian military has been shaped largely by two intersecting influences. The first influence has been the history of military development, based on ideas of power and the nature of the state, and the influence of foreign ideas about military and political organisation. These ideas derive primarily from Java, being the locus of authority of the Indonesian state, and influence official thinking in both subtle and obvious ways. To illustrate this point, while Bahasa Indonesia is the official state language and Javanese has no official status, Javanese terms continue to find their way into official mottos, such as Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (‘unity in diversity’), in much the same way that Latin permeates English. It is not the language in which the state speaks or thinks, but it is the language that embodies the principle ideas on which the state was founded. Related to this relatively subterranean guiding principle about how power and authority should be ordered is the idea about the nature of the state and intrastate relations. Although the state is theoretically composed of twenty-seven equal parts (provinces), clearly some provinces have a greater capacity to influence state outcomes than do others. Indeed, some provinces seem to have an overwhelming impact on state priorities while others are relegated to the margins of decision-making, most often being the recipient of centralised decision-making, a situation that was only slowly beginning to
change with the application of ‘local autonomy’ from the beginning of 2001. In this unequal geo-spatial relationship, the ‘centre’ of the state reserves for itself not just the greatest authority but many of the advantages of such authority. The periphery of the state, on the other hand, may contribute significantly to the state (notably the centre of the state), but has little influence over its own affairs, much less state affairs.

The second contextual influence has been the construction of the state as a unified and unitary political formation from a disparate and fragmented region with no pre-existing logic of unity. This situation derives from the history of the state as a colony, somewhat arbitrarily constructed to suit the colonial interests of the Dutch, who pieced together the overall territory in an ad hoc manner with little regard for the unities or divisions that existed within or between regional peoples. Consequently, there exists an interesting internal contradiction. The early independence movement identified the peoples of the Dutch East Indies as having a common claim to independence, upon which the state was eventually founded. Yet at the same time this movement denied the legitimacy of the Dutch colonial empire, thereby implicitly denying the legitimacy of any successor state based on the same territory. That the successor state was constructed without consent and, at various times, despite considerable opposition from its component parts, only further endorses the notion that the state that exists is not a product of prior agreement but is imposed and maintained, to the interest of the dominant power within the state, and by the use of force.

Conceptions of power

It should be noted here that ‘cultural’ reasons alone do not offer a sufficient explanation of particular types of political behaviour. What passes for culture within the framework of power is itself a product of particular circumstances and reflects the establishment and maintenance of particular interests. Furthermore, what passes for ‘culture’ is often reified to suit particular political interests, while the real driving force for particular sets of social, political and economic arrangements are situated in the material conditions of the territory under consideration. However, insofar as ‘culture’ does call on the legitimacy of precedent, and conforms to familiar ways of understanding (for some at least), it is an important tool for understanding how ideas about the state are processed, rationalised and institutionalised.

One consequence of Java’s pre-colonial autocratic political forms and its syncretic animist tendencies was that conceptions of power were developed partly to explain and partly to rationalise early political circumstances. These were later reinvented as a ‘legitimate’ expression of cultural authenticity, to fill the vacuum of political ideas left by the Dutch. In traditional Javanese society, the desires of subjects had only a minimal bearing on the responsibility of the monarch, so conceptions of political power lost all but the most abstract sense of there being a relationship between cause, effect and ethical responsibility. In
the context of a volcanic geographic environment that was indifferent to the fate of the people living in its shadows, the political forces at work in the lives of ordinary Javanese were understood not as conditional upon jural consent but as simply there, in much the same way that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west. An animistic conception of power, then, linked the power exercised by a monarch with the power of nature and did not incorporate any idea of popular participation or representation.

Within this sort of political environment – that is, an environment informed by syncretic animist belief systems and related conceptions of power, in which power was abstracted from the influence of ordinary people and simply ‘was’ – the issue of power did not raise the question of legitimacy (Anderson 1972). This formula was adhered to by a number of Indonesian political observers and analysts in Jakarta during the New Order period and, given the symbiotic link between the New Order and the military, appeared to implicitly imbue the military with certain powers. It could be argued that this position was in the process of change in the post-Suharto period, but it was at best a slow change, only gradually addressing many of the fundamental aspects of the military in relation to the civil population.

According to Anderson’s account, in traditional Javanese thinking, power derives from a single, homogeneous source. As such, the idea of power does not include ethical questions, such as whether power is being exercised for good or evil purposes. In Anderson’s view, in traditional Javanese thinking it would be meaningless to claim the right to rule on the basis of differential sources of power – for example, by claiming that power based on wealth is legitimate, whereas power based on force is illegitimate. In a traditional Javanese sense, power is neither legitimate nor illegitimate and is ‘without inherent moral implications as such’ (Anderson 1972: 1–8; see also Moedjanto 1993; Proudfoot 1980). The holder of political power within a traditional Javanese context is free not only from reliance on popular political participation but also from the need to defend or legitimise political decisions.

To further complicate the traditional Javanese idea of power, there is no single translation of the word ‘power’ in Javanese or old Javanese, the closest equivalent being kasekten (the contemporary version is kesaktian), which incorporates ideas of power, legitimacy and charisma, or mystical or magical conceptions of power. This interpretation is based on an idealised traditional conception and accords with a number of aspects of Weber’s conception of charismatic and traditional authority. However, kasekten, as a conception of power, underwent significant change during the colonial period and during later contact with European political values, as its logic was fundamentally challenged and, along with its practitioners, its rationale defeated: ‘Contemporary Javanese political culture is therefore a heterogeneous, disjunctive and internally contradictory complex of traditional and Western elements, with a lower degree of internal logic and coherence than in the past’ (Anderson 1972: section 5.8; see also Zainu’ddin 1975: 97).
While *kasekten* is a widely accepted synonym for ‘power’ (if of a mystical type), there are also other words, notably from old Javanese, that also imply power but which have slightly different connotations. These include *prabhawa*, which connotes might, power, strength, and extraordinary or supernatural potency, and *wibhawa*, which connotes power, majesty, exalted position, wealth, possession or influence. Both words have been modified as the contemporary names Prabowo and Wibowo, respectively, Prabowo being best known as the first name of a Suharto son-in-law and former army lieutenant general, Prabowo Subianto. *Kasekten, prabhawa* and *wibhawa* derive from Sanskrit, reflecting the early Hindu influence on Javanese political culture. Other Javanese words indicating power include *wasesa* (ruling), *kawawa*, *kuwawi* and *wenang*, and *mrabawani* (to exert authority or influence over). *Kawawa* is old Javanese, while *kuwawi* is contemporary Javanese, both meaning *mampu*, or ability/capability, or to be able to withstand or endure something (*tahan* in Bahasa Indonesia). *Wasesa* is old Javanese, while *wisesa* is a literary expression, both having the same meaning as *kawasa*, which is contemporary Javanese, and in Indonesian translates as *kuasa*, meaning might, power, authority or competence. *Wenang* is best known in the phrase *sewenang-wenang*, which means arbitrary ruthlessness, while in Indonesian *wenang* alone is to ‘have the right’ (*berhak* in Bahasa Indonesian). *Kuasa* does not have a negative connotation, according rather with an acceptance of the ‘divine right’ to rule, or in its contemporary sense can mean positive control or the capacity to master something (as in *menguasai bahasa*, to master language, *kuasa* being the root of *menguasai*). *Wibawa* can also have the positive connotation of the authority, as in ‘public trust’ (Zoetmulder 1982).

There are, therefore, several words connoting aspects of power in both old and contemporary Javanese. Although different types of power or authority can be exercised in different ways, understandings of the basic quality or qualities of power, in particular as illustrated by Anderson’s use of the term *kasekten*, do illustrate the manner in and effect to which power is exercised. As such, although power may be exercised or understood in a beneficial or positive manner, there remains a gap between this exercise of power in effect as a gift of grace and power as a reciprocal and accountable social tool. The various formulations do not appear to be inconsistent and do not alter the fundamentally non-reciprocal nature of traditional Javanese conceptions of power.

**The political mandala**

As discussed on pages 15–17, one aspect of traditional Javanese culture that is implicitly reflected in the contemporary thinking of the TNI is the Hindu-Buddhist conception of the mandala. A mandala is a circular figure symbolising the perceived universe, and in political terms is analogous to the local pre-modern idea of the state (Wolters 1999; Stuart-Fox 1997: 2–4;
Moertono 1981: 71, n207; Wilson 1969: 7). In modern terms, the state is an organised political community under one government within recognisable borders. But in a number of pre-colonial, in particular Asian, societies, the state differed primarily in that it had no clearly recognisable borders and had an organised political community only at the centre. The centre of authority and administration was clearly delineated, but power became increasingly diffuse as one moved further away from the centre. Consequently, at the boundaries, the state faded into an area of ambiguous political control, often under semi-autonomous local government, until finally merging with the realms of a competing power (Tambiah 1976: 114; see also McCloud 1995: 93–7). That is, within the political notion of the mandala, the state is strongest at its center and recedes in distance (Kingsbury 2001: 14–18; Anderson 1972: 30; see also Geertz 1993: 223; Lowry 1996: 9–15). At the centre of the state was the monarch, who was the pinnacle of the state’s power.

Because the Javanese conception of power disperses towards the periphery, where it is ‘fluid and unstable, always ready for dispersal and diffusion, interstate aggression necessarily becomes a basic assumption about interstate relations’ (Anderson 1972: 31). This ‘doctrine emphasised the cult of expansion…as the dynamic factor calculated to disturb the equilibrium of inter-state relations. A state’s belligerence is in the first place directed towards its closest neighbour(s)’ (Moertono 1981: 71). Furthermore, ‘power’ is understood in this context as a static universal quantity, whereby an increase in power on the part of one by definition means the loss of power on the part of another. If the a priori enemy of the state is its closest neighbour, Java is happier in a dominant rather than an equal (or power-sharing) role within the wider contemporary state, and its belligerence is primarily directed towards territories that should, as a part of this framework, occupy a subservient position within the state.

Beyond Indonesia’s state borders, secure only in the modern statist sense, Indonesia is most likely to be more aggressive towards neighbours than distant nations. This might, in part, explain military hostility towards Malaysia during the Confrontation (Konfrontasi) of 1963–66 and towards East Timor, as well as the country’s regional rebellions. Jakarta’s interest in East Timor in 1975, of course, derived from the possibility of a potentially influential (and hence potentially threatening) leftist state emerging within the archipelago. However, Indonesian interest in what was then Portuguese Timor officially dates back to the constitutional debates of 1945 (see Feith and Castles 1970). Furthermore, if, in a ‘mandalic’ view of the state, power recedes the further one is from the centre, East Timor continues to symbolically represent a point of dispersal of central power, from which other outlying regions might take a cue. The Indonesian government had repeatedly acknowledged East Timor’s potential to threaten the cohesion of the state in this way, while separatists in Aceh and West Papua have held up the example of East Timor’s independence as an illustration of what they might
achieve. Within the intra-Indonesian context, this extension of the mandalic state rests on the basis that the state is most ‘pure’ closest to the centre – in this case Jakarta-centric Java – and that the distant provinces are more inclined to spin out of the Javanese orbit. Implicit in this is the idea that Indonesia is therefore not a state in which all parts are equal, but rather a reinterpretation of a Javanese empire.

**Indonesia as Javanese empire**

There has been considerable debate over the definition of the Indonesian state: on one side, a somewhat off-hand perspective identifies it as a ‘Javanese empire’; and on the other, an almost diametrically opposite response, coming invariably from Javanese and supporters of ‘nationalism’, claims that it is, rather, a ‘nation’. Pro-‘nationalists’ – especially those in official capacities – and their supporters, will usually cite as part of their claim to nationhood the presence of non-Javanese in powerful or decision-making state positions (for example, senior positions in the army of the late 1990s and early 2000s), the flow of migration into Java (though more usually out of it) and the government’s pan-Indonesian policies and philosophies, summed up by one of the five principles of state, ‘unity in diversity’ (which, used in Indonesia, is a Javanese term, as was noted earlier). Furthermore, they point out that if Java has a dominant role in aspects of Indonesian life then it is because it overwhelmingly has the largest population. And, to a lesser extent, an allusion is sometimes made to Java’s relatively highly developed cultural history, as opposed to what are portrayed as the usually less developed cultural histories of the rest of the archipelago.

One significant error that often occurs in such debate is that the idea of empire is understood to be monolithic, implying total Javanese domination. This misinterprets the meaning of the word and ignores the most successful historical examples of empire. The term ‘empire’ means an area or group of areas ruled by a single authority and consisting of the central or imperial state in a dominant relationship with other ‘states’, colonies or dependencies. These ‘states’ will have been joined or acquired by the imperial state other than by voluntary means. In most cases, empires are made up of different ethnic groups, with distinct histories, languages and cultures. ‘Thus the imperial power will have relied upon notions of an imperial religion, linguistic dominance, an imposed legal code, settlement by members of the imperial nation, etc., to unify and integrate their domains’ (Roberts 1971: 74).

In the case of Indonesia, the newly independent state was defined as the territories of the Dutch East Indies, with support for the cause of independence clearly strongest in Java. Indeed, many outlying islands, particularly in the east, were reluctant to join the new state, and only did so under an agreement of federation. Under the unilateral imposition of a unitary state, these constituent states in some cases rose in rebellion against the central authority. Indonesia also clearly comprises numerous and quite distinct
ethnic groups, or nations of peoples, with their own histories and cultures, despite occasional Javanese claims to a previous historical unity (which, if existed, was by definition under empire; for example, Majapahit). It cannot be claimed that Islam is a ‘state religion’, but it can be claimed that Islam determines the basic criterion for one of the five guiding principles of the state (that all citizens must profess ‘belief in one God’). Similarly, Bahasa Indonesia is not the Javanese language – a complex and unwieldy language to impose on a disparate state in any case. But many of the values informing Bahasa Indonesia derive from Java (see Anderson 1990) and, although it was a Malay-based trading language for the archipelago, its adoption and imposition has been perhaps the greatest unifying factor in Indonesia. Indonesia’s legal code is so malleable as to almost not stand up as a code in a formal sense, but the retention of elements of Dutch law, designed for imperial purposes, endorses the notion that it retains an imperial application. Indonesia’s transmigration programme, of course, speaks for itself, regardless of the rationale which holds that Java and Bali are overpopulated and hence need to export people to the outer islands. Java and Bali may be overpopulated and need to export people, but this only serves as a further explanation of the central need for empire. Finally, the primary function of the military is to internally secure the state, rather than to protect it from external aggression. This is the crowning aspect of empire, regardless from which parts of the empire its troops are drawn.

Furthermore, it was a common feature of empire not only to place representatives from the imperial state in the provinces, but also to co-opt local functionaries into the imperial service. The Roman Empire, for example, not only employed functionaries from Gaul, Germany and Britain, but also raised armies in those provinces for use both there and elsewhere, while people born in those places adopted Roman values and styled themselves as ‘Roman’.4 In a similar manner, Jakarta uses both central and provincial functionaries in a range of posts, and employs soldiers from around the archipelago for use both in those provinces as well as elsewhere (this latter tactic having been pioneered by the imperial Dutch). Indeed, as functionaries and soldiers, and even civilians, the primary loyalty of many was to the empire, over and above their province, and their political identification thus followed. It is therefore not unusual if non-Javanese consider themselves loyal to an entity greater than their province, or that non-Javanese might be employed in what amounts to imperial service. The idea of empire, therefore, fits very well with the mandalic conception of the state.

Be this as it may, the fit between traditional conceptions of the state and the contemporary model does not explain why there has been such a strong commitment to the state. This may be explained, in part, by some of the philosophical influences brought to bear in the state’s formative period, in particular the hegemonic idea of the ‘nation’ comprising a ‘united’ people (hence ‘unity in diversity’). The internalisation of these ideas, noted below, helped to form a world-view that was largely internally cohesive and under-
standable in the light of the intellectual chaos that debilitated archipelagic thinking in the late Dutch period. The commitment to such ideas was therefore strengthened by their determinist logic, given mettle by the experiences of the war for independence, and institutionalised by the developing corporatist identity of the military. There were, of course, more immediate and material incentives for the military to develop, sustain and expand such an identity of the state. But in one sense, this idea of the state gave purpose to the military, without which the rationale for its existence would be hollow.

**Military precedents**

If the implicit principles behind the role of the military in the modern Indonesian state derive from Java, the actual organisation of the territory that was to become Indonesia was undertaken by the colonial Dutch. To do this, the Dutch required a colonial army. By 1830, following economic and military catastrophes in Holland and the devastating war of 1825–30 in Java, the Dutch raised the indigenous Royal Netherlands Indies Army (*Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger* – KNIL). The KNIL was manned mostly by outer islanders and was used to quell uprisings in other parts of the archipelago. The KNIL provided the basis for the first Indonesian military forces, but, reflecting a division over political aspirations, it also constituted a basis for outer-island opposition to the government of what was then the new republic.

While Dutch political hegemony was well established in Java and much of Sumatra by the nineteenth century, its control over the wider archipelago was not fully achieved until the early twentieth century. Aceh in northern Sumatra maintained its political integrity until, deprived of British protection, the Dutch attacked in 1873, although it held out formally until 1908. Bali was occupied in 1906, and eastern Nusa Tenggara, inland Kalimantan, and Sulawesi were effectively ignored until being ‘pacified’ between 1900 and 1910 (Zainu’ddin 1980: 132–5; Grant 1996: 16–17). The period before Europe’s Great War represented the peak of European colonialism, with European powers scrambling for the last scraps of territory that had not already been brought under one or other of their powers. Already ensconced in the East Indies, the Netherlands moved to complete its regional political and military hegemony. This completion of Dutch domination over the East Indies had a number of consequences, one of which was to transport indigenous troops from one area to assist in repressing the peoples of another. This had the effect of spreading the old, simple Malacca-based trading language of market Malay. The increased trade between the islands also furthered the development of this language; as already the most common language to be used between ethnic groups, it increasingly became the lingua franca of indigenous Dutch East Indians wishing to communicate with each other, providing the disparate ethnic groups with their first sense of common identity. The other major outcome of this last colonising effort was
that, over a period of three centuries, the Dutch eventually pieced together a patchwork of disparate territories that had no previous unity of note and which were largely independent of one another at the time of Dutch intervention. It took military force for the Dutch to create and maintain their archipelagic Asian empire; it would take military force to keep it together once the Dutch had left.

While the KNIL provided the initial basis for the Indonesian military, the loyalty of some of its soldiers appeared to be based more on opportunism than a commitment to the Dutch empire. After Japan displaced Holland as the local military power in March 1942, when police matters were passed from the military to civilian police, some members of the KNIL and others were recruited into Islamic and nationalist military units to both police the colony and assist in fending off expected Allied attacks. By 1943 there were over 35,000 men in the Javanese auxiliary army alone (Feith 1964: 198). This organisation – the Volunteer Army of Defenders of the Fatherland (Tentara Sukarela Pembela Tanah Air – Peta) – became the basis of the revolutionary army and later the foundation of the armed forces. One of the impacts of Japanese training of the auxiliary army was to encourage young Indonesians to believe that people of the ‘East’ could militarily defeat people of the ‘West’ (Mangunwijaya 1992: 6). Another impact of the Japanese military influence, described as ‘fascist’ in character, was the introduction into Indonesia’s incipient armed forces of a notion that society should be controlled and that the armed forces should be allied with government in closely directing and controlling local society.

In part to delay the advancing Allies, and in part to strengthen its occupied territories as a part of its own empire, the Japanese military co-opted proto-nationalist leaders for propaganda and organisational purposes. Japanese occupation was ruthless, with few of the 300,000 Indonesians deported to work in labour camps returning, but Japan did hold out the hope of independence. The Japanese also promoted the use of market Malay as a national language and began to open senior administrative posts to Indonesians. The Japanese influence in the outcome of the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Independence, which began in March 1945, was marked. In particular, the ideas that informed the fledgling state were in part derived from organicist ideas imported from Nazi Germany via Holland (where a small element of Dutch society was sympathetic to such an ideology) and, more immediately and importantly, from wartime Japan. Such ideas would plant further notions in the minds of military leaders, including the inefficiency of civilian leaders, the legitimacy of military intervention in civil affairs, the unity of the people of the ‘nation’, the concurrence of the people and the state, and military solutions to civil problems.

On 17 August 1945, two days after Japan surrendered, Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed the Republic of Indonesia, of which Sukarno was to be president and Hatta vice-president, with an advisory Central National
Committee of 135 members. The republic received widespread support within Java and varying degrees of support in other parts of the archipelago. By the end of September that year, members of Peta had obtained arms from surrendering Japanese soldiers. While independence had been proclaimed, it was clear from the outset that such a unilateral declaration would still need to be ‘negotiated’ with the former colonial power. Not surprisingly, given the manner in which the Second World War had been fought, the Netherlands government and the governments of the Allies initially regarded the establishment of the republic as an instrument of Japanese warfare. Allied troops, mostly Australian, had been involved in ‘mopping-up’ campaigns in the eastern islands in the final months of the war and, upon the cessation of hostilities, moved to assume authority from the Japanese. Within weeks British troops had begun to land in Java, and Dutch troops began to return soon after, assuming the role they had occupied before the war. In technical terms, as the pre-war administrative power, the Netherlands held the ‘legal’ claim to sovereignty over the archipelago, while in practical terms it was the British and Australian troops who initially occupied the region and accepted the surrender of the Japanese, while republican troops also occupied some areas. Given the nature of this set-up, in which authority was claimed by two armed and politically opposed groups, fighting inevitably broke out, particularly in Java and Sumatra, first with the British and then, as they handed over authority, with the Dutch.

One of the moderate socialist leaders, Sutan Sjahrir, as head of the republic’s Cabinet, agreed to negotiate with the Dutch, as did his successors. But there was considerable opposition to negotiation, both from the republic’s regular army and from the irregular military units, including Islamic and communist groups, over which the government had little control. As a consequence, the period from 1945 to 1949 was marked by both negotiation and fighting, with negotiation tending to be pursued by the government of the day and opposed by the Opposition, almost regardless of who held power and who was in opposition. This dichotomy indicated the first serious point of division between the army and the government, given that they were operating under different sets of requirements and, at times, had distinctly different agendas. The Dutch military forces were stronger in the cities and surrounding areas but had little influence in the hinterland. By the middle of 1947, the Dutch had 150,000 soldiers in Indonesia and, with negotiations failing, launched a full-scale attack on the republic, predominantly in Java. The United Nations Security Council pressured the Netherlands to settle, while within the republic the more radical, anti-negotiation socialist Amir Sjarifuddin headed the Cabinet.

In August 1948, the exiled communist Musso returned from a twenty-year exile in the Soviet Union and welded together the republic’s left-wing parties into an expanded and significantly more influential Communist Party, which he headed. Sjarifuddin’s Cabinet was replaced by a moderate Masyumi–PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia – Indonesian National Party)
coalition, and, believing that they were about to be disarmed, a group of second-tier PKI leaders at Madiun in Central Java announced a revolt against the Sukarno–Hatta government in September that year (Hindley 1964: 21). The republic’s army attacked the rebels, and Musso, Sjarifuddin and a number of other senior leaders were killed in the weeks that followed, all of which constituted a severe blow to the PKI. The ‘Madiun affair’, as it was called, was regarded by the republic’s regular army as treachery during hostilities with the Netherlands. It marked the beginning of distrust between the armed forces and the PKI, which culminated in the events of 1965–66.

A second major attack by the Dutch beginning in December 1948 resulted in military successes in Java but also in increasing pressure from the United Nations, and in particular from the US, through its post-war Marshall Plan, to end the conflict. In November 1949, the Netherlands agreed to a settlement in which fifteen outlying, Dutch-created states would come together with Java and Sumatra in a federated Republic of the United States of Indonesia (Republik Indonesia Serikat – RIS). The creation of the outlying states reflected local conditions and loyalties, as well as the Netherlands’ conception of its colony as comprising a number of smaller colonies rather than being a large, unified colony. But the manoeuvre was also a means by which the Netherlands would continue to exercise some control over the region. The republic was also required to assume the Netherlands East Indies’ debt of 4300 million guilders, of which 1291 million guilders (US$339 million) was external debt repayable in foreign currency (Feith 1964: 203). From the very beginning, Indonesia’s economic position was compromised, a situation that was exacerbated in the following decade by poor economic decision-making and management, and which pushed the state to the brink of self-destruction. It was in this climate that much of the military viewed with considerable dismay the course being pursued by the civilian government, and under which it developed its own independent sources of income. As a consequence of the way in which the army came together during the revolution, the lack of civil government control over the army during wartime and the relatively high degree of independence the army maintained thereafter, in the early 1950s Indonesia’s army was united in theory, but its operational command was loose and it functioned more as a confederation of warlords than a standing army answerable to the civilian government.

Liberal Indonesia: 1949–57

On 27 December 1949, Sukarno was sworn in as president of RIS, while Hatta was chosen as prime minister. The Cabinet included ministers from Masyumi and PNI, as well as non-party ministers and five ministers chosen from the federal states. The first significant change to be implemented was the abandonment of the federal structure, partly because it was unworkable, partly because it was a result of Dutch divisionist policies, and partly in
keeping with the unitarian ambitions of the Jakarta-based government. Being at the forefront of the revolution, the Javanese increasingly took it upon themselves to lead the new state. Their claim to be at the centre of the new republic was further enhanced by the fact that Java was also the location of the Netherlands' administrative centre of Batavia (Jakarta), and that the Javanese had by far the biggest population of the islands' ethnic groups. This situation was warily accepted by the outlying regions, but in some cases was rejected, most notably by Aceh and South Sumatra. The 65,000 KNIL soldiers left in Indonesia were absorbed into the army of the newly proclaimed RIS, a smaller number joined the Dutch army and the remainder were demobilised. Relations between KNIL and earlier republican soldiers were bad from the start, and quickly deteriorated.

The end of federation on 17 August 1950 immediately led to a rebellion in South Sulawesi by predominantly former KNIL soldiers, which was quickly brought under control by Javanese and Sundanese forces. After the failure of this rebellion in the face of attack by the Java-based divisions, many local political leaders fled to Ambon, in the southern Moluccas (Maluku) where, on 25 April 1950, they declared the formation of the Republik Maluku Selatan (Republic of the South Moluccas/Maluku – RMS). After the RMS refused to negotiate, in July 1950 the central government sent soldiers to Ambon, bringing the rebellion to an end by December that year. Also in 1950, reflecting an earlier rejection of compromise with the Dutch as well as the secular nature of the new state, there was a fundamentalist Islamic rebellion, known as the Dar’ul Islam (Nation of Islam) rebellion in West Java, South Sulawesi and Aceh. In this instance, the rebellion was based around irregular Islamic military units that had been fighting since the Japanese occupation and later against the Dutch. These militant Islamic groups had always been outside the control of the central government and were unwilling to bow to central government directives after 1949, especially after earlier ‘treachery’. The prime example of such ‘treachery’ was the fledgling government’s acceptance of the compromise Renville Agreement in January 1948, in which, to attain a qualified independence, the republic conceded territory it had lost in 1947 to the Dutch. As a part of the agreement, the republican government conceded West Java to the Dutch on the condition that the Siliwangi Division based there would be removed to Central Java. However, this left behind independent Islamic guerrillas in West Java, who continued their own campaign against the Dutch, proclaiming their struggle to be a jihad (‘holy war’). By December 1948, the Islamic guerrillas, under S.M. Kartosuwirjo, declared the establishment of the Negara Islam Indonesia (State of Islamic Indonesia – NII). Kartosuwirjo announced that the republic had ceased to exist and that the NII was the true embodiment of the revolution. After Indonesia gained independence in 1949, the Dar’ul Islam movement continued to defy the central government and the proclamation of the unity of the state, at times extending its influence into Central Java and over Aceh and much of South
Sulawesi. The Dar’ul Islam rebellion probably had the most impact in the period between 1957 and 1961, at least in part in reaction to the growing influence of the PKI in government. It also received a significant boost when rebels in South and Central Sulawesi joined the movement in 1952 and 1958, respectively, both having been in their own state of rebellion since 1950 (initially through the rebellion in South Sulawesi). The South Sulawesi rebellion collapsed in 1961, in response to a government amnesty. With the capture of Kartosuwirjo in 1962, the movement in West Java was militarily wiped out. The Aceh component of the rebellion, according to many Acehnese, reflected a local rejection of Aceh’s subservience to Java. The Acehnese had been among the leading participants in the war for independence, but had done so in order to defeat the Dutch and to secure for itself at least equal status in a loosely federated state. They did not see as acceptable exchanging Dutch colonialism – against which many Acehnese had been battling since the nineteenth century – for Javanese colonialism, and to that end threw in their lot with the Dar’ul Islam movement. From its beginning in 1950 until its effective collapse in 1962, the Dar’ul Islam revolt had been Indonesia’s longest sustained rebellion.

While the central units of the army could be more or less counted on to support the central government in order to control the restive provinces, there was considerable division within the army as well as between the army and the government. As such, the army was less than entirely subservient to civilian authority, as demonstrated in 1952 when the republic was shaken by the ‘October 17 affair’, in which a group of army leaders attempted to force Sukarno to dissolve parliament. The affair followed the increasing disgruntlement of officers who did not believe that the civilian government accorded them adequate respect or recognition for their efforts in the war of independence. The army leadership, which was under civilian authority and based primarily in Jakarta and Bandung, sought to reduce the army to the size of the post-conflict force – a ‘revolution-sized’ army was no longer needed – and to ‘professionalise’ it – a less ad hoc army was required. Capitalising on Opposition support, army members who believed they might be removed from the army because of their informal or semi-formal training and angry over what they regarded as civilian interference in internal army affairs, organised a large demonstration outside the presidential palace. One outcome of this was that the Army Chief of Staff, General Abdul Haris Nasution, lost his position. Another outcome was that the army demonstrated that it would never again be entirely under civilian control. A reduction in government funding for the army later that year together with weakened central army authority and a frail civilian administration meant that, rather than reduce personnel, those in the army that relied on their own business activities to survive became more independent of both central army and government control.

The political consensus that had marked the development of policies until that time began to fall apart, with the parties’ positions becoming
polarised. On the one side, there was Masyumi, the socialists and the two small Christian parties (Protestant and Catholic); on the other were the PNI, the PKI, and several smaller parties. In 1955, a coalition Cabinet of the PNI, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and smaller nationalist and Islamic parties, led by Ali Sastroamijoyo, pushed for greater ‘Indonesianisation’ in the areas of imports, banking and shipping. The consequences of this nationalist policy on economic life included escalating inflation and corruption, and an exchange rate that further hampered exports. In 1955, the army refused to accept the Sastroamijoyo Cabinet’s appointment of a new Chief of Staff and, as a consequence of this lack of confidence, the Cabinet fell. A change of government to a Masyumi–Socialist–NU coalition offered a reversal of economic policy, which reduced prices and settled the exchange rate, but which also damaged much indigenous business. Political differences hardened, and by the time of the elections of December 1955, political bitterness had become extreme and increasingly there was a view that an alternative political system had to be found (Feith 1964: 204–7).

In December 1956, matters worsened, highlighting the division between both the centre and the periphery of the republic, between Javanese and non-Javanese Indonesians, between former revolutionary soldiers and former members of KNIL who had been incorporated into the Indonesian army, and between two broad political groupings. As (reinstated) armed forces Chief of Staff General Nasution attempted to assert central authority over what amounted to a semi-unified network of warlords, bloodless coups were enacted in the three provinces of Sumatra, where newly established councils headed by local (often former KNIL) army officers claimed power, rejecting the central government and accusing it of excessive bureaucracy, over-centralisation, neglect, corruption and being too tolerant of the PKI. Fuelling this discontent in practical terms was Java’s declining share of the export trade despite its being the main recipient of government and private expenditure. To effect their rejection of the new Sastroamijoyo-led government, the officers channelled exports directly to foreign markets, which, along with extensive smuggling often sponsored by army units, deprived Jakarta of foreign exchange. While the North Sumatra Council was overthrown from within, the Central and South Sumatra councils remained intact. In March 1957 a similar bloodless coup gave power to an army-led council in Eastern Indonesia (Sulawesi, Maluku and Nusa Tenggara). The outer islands thus came to most strongly represent Masyumi–socialist interests, while the centre reflected PNI–NU–PKI characteristics.

The dissident leaders in the outer islands called for a return to consensus politics, to which Sukarno responded with the idea of Guided Democracy, which was generally warmly received by the loyalist elements of the army; indeed, it has been claimed that the idea for it was developed in the office of General Nasution himself (Lev 2002). This ‘Guided Democracy’ was to be supported by an advisory National Council representing a range of ‘functional groups’ (golongan karya) including workers, peasants, the army,
business, and so on. These functional groups would later be reflected in the functional groups brought together as one by the military in 1964, which, under its abbreviated name, Golkar, was to become the political vehicle for Suharto’s New Order government and, in 1999, a formal political party in its own right. The PKI, which (along with the PNI) strongly supported Sukarno, gained forty-five seats on the National Council, although none in the Cabinet.

PRRI–Permesta

Of all the events of the 1950s, perhaps the most important and far reaching in their consequences were those that led up to and followed the effective nationalisation of Dutch property in 1957, which was formalised in 1958. The nationalisation of Dutch interests, at the beginning of December that year, was done ostensibly in response to a failed United Nations bid to settle the outstanding problem of the incorporation of Dutch New Guinea (West Papua) into the republic, as well as to end Dutch ‘economic imperialism’. The process of nationalisation of Dutch interests had the combined effect of halting foreign investment in the republic and reducing the amount of shipping within the multi-island state by the Dutch-owned shipping company KPM (Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij), which had provided about three-quarters of the transportation between the islands. Alienated both politically and economically from the central government, Sumatra and Sulawesi raised themselves in revolt, in what was called the PRRI–Permesta rebellion.

Local military leaders had staged a series of aforementioned bloodless local coups against civilian authorities between December 1956 and March 1957, establishing revolutionary councils. The local military was supported in the coups by business people and, in many cases, ordinary people in the outer islands. The Sulawesi-based Overall Struggle (Perjuangan Semesta – Permesta) rebellion was formally proclaimed by the regional military commander of Eastern Indonesia, Colonel Sumual, on 2 March 1957. One of the first moves of the councils was to engage in open and direct trade with Singapore, Hong Kong and other international centres. When the Sastroamijoyo Cabinet resigned in March 1957 – it had been the seventeenth Cabinet since 1945 – parliamentary democracy was finally abandoned and Sukarno’s Guided Democracy was adopted in modified form, aided by the fulsome prompting of General Nasution; furthermore, Sukarno declared a State of War and Siege (Staat van Oorlog en van Beleg – SOB), or martial law, as had been earlier defined by the colonial Dutch. This was the primary means by which the armed forces inserted themselves into the political system, under the guise of saving the country, before going on to restrict a wide range of political activity. Martial law also provided legal grounds for army intervention in civil affairs and laid the foundations for the military’s ‘dual function’ (dwifungsi) of both defending and helping to run the state.
The proclamation of martial law by the Indonesian government in March 1957 only exacerbated regional tensions. When Dutch interests were nationalised in December 1957, the move assisted the rebellious movements by limiting their sea contact with Jakarta.

On 10 February 1958, after the call for a new, less Left-oriented Sukarno–Hatta-led government in Jakarta went unheeded, rebellious officers in West Sumatra demanded full autonomy and proclaimed the birth of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia – PRRI) in the town of Bukit Tinggi. As well as the proclamation, the councils demanded that the Cabinet installed by Sukarno be replaced by a new Cabinet under either Hatta or the sultan of Yogyakarta, with related changes to financial arrangements between Jakarta and the outer islands. On 15 February, with no change in Jakarta, a revolutionary government was formalised at Padang in Sumatra. The PRRI invited other rebel groups outside Java to accept its authority, with which the Permesta group complied, although South Sulawesi, already embroiled in the Dar’ul Islam revolt, remained apart from this further conflict.

Sukarno, then in Tokyo, was hesitant to move militarily against the rebels, but army commander General Nasution and Air Marshall Suryadharma declared war on the rebellion in any case. Opposing what was increasingly seen as a Left-leaning government, especially after Sukarno’s invitation on 21 February 1957 to the PKI to join his government, the US and the UK provided covert support to the rebels (with a US B-26 aircraft being shot down by government forces). However, within two months the army had crushed the PRRI rebellion and moved on the rebels in Sulawesi, defeating them three months later. The division of the army between the Javanese-based ‘loyalists’ and the PRRI–Permesta rebels ensured that outer islanders would for many years play a reduced role in the army’s officer base (see MacFarling 1996: 153–7). Having defeated the rebels, the military could now more forcefully assert its role as an indispensable player in Indonesia’s decision-making process, being able to more fully assert its claim to a role in the affairs of state.

The military formally in politics

As noted in Chapter 1, in November 1958, in a speech at the Officer Training College at Magelang, General Nasution outlined what came to be known as the ‘Middle Way’ for the armed forces – as the defender of the state simultaneously involved in politics. Nasution proposed that the military should assume a more visible, larger role in government and all state institutions. The military would travel the ‘middle road’ being neither political activists nor spectators. According to Daniel Lev, the basic principles of Guided Democracy, including the idea of functional groups, the army’s middle road and the return to the 1945 Constitution, were developed by Nasution (rather than Sukarno, as is more commonly believed) (Lev 2002).
According to the Indonesian military, the first real product of ‘dual function’ (dwifungsi), as the Middle Way came increasingly to be known, was the creation and then the preservation of the republic. The military ousted the Dutch and put down separatist movements in South Sulawesi and Ambon in the 1950s to restore the unity. The military was at the forefront of the annexation of West Papua in 1962 and East Timor in 1975. More importantly, according to the military, their strong role in government and political affairs provided the stable atmosphere necessary for economic development.

Furthermore, Nasution claimed that the military was not just an instrument of government but was in a practical sense a partner in government. This formalised the close links between army leaders and politicians that had existed informally since the revolutionary period of 1945–49, but more importantly elevated in the decision-making hierarchy the only institution that Nasution and many in the army believed capable of competently running the country. The ‘Middle Way’ meant that while the military was not taking over the running of the country – it was not a coup – nor was it confining itself to barracks. This assertion was accepted by Sukarno, and the armed forces thereafter promoted itself as the saviour and guardian of the state, a role it enthusiastically adopted, ultimately in a form even far more comprehensive than that envisaged by Nasution himself.

The ‘Middle Way’ was initially relatively modest in its political goals. But as Sukarno’s Guided Democracy enhanced the prestige and influence of the PKI, the military generally and the army in particular also moved to step up its own political authority. The ‘Middle Way’ concept gradually gave way, in practice, to the military’s dwifungsi doctrine, which increasingly cemented its role in all aspects of state activity. The dwifungsi and the dominant role of the army came into being with the overthrow of Sukarno, increasingly from 1 October 1965, with effective state power being handed over in March 1966. In taking control of the state, the military placed back in centre stage the state philosophy of Pancasila, which had under Sukarno been sidelined by his own syncretic ideology of Nasakom, incorporating nationalism, religion and communism (nasionalisme, agama, komunisme). In 1968, Suharto standardised the formulation of Pancasila as the immutable ideology of the armed forces and of the state: ‘changing Pancasila means treason against the purity of the struggle of ABRI [the armed forces] itself’ (quoted in Elson 2001: 174). Thus the military’s understanding of Pancasila8 – a widely interpretable concept – became the formal and rigid ideology of the state. Perhaps more importantly, the military’s Sapta Marga, or Seven Pledges, was its primary guiding goal. The first pledge is that all soldiers be citizens of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia which is based on the Pancasila (my emphasis). The second pledge is that all soldiers be Indonesian patriots, supporters and defenders of the state ideology, responsible, and invincible. The remaining pledges are more rhetorical.

Until the fall of Suharto, the military considered dwifungsi to be its function, reason and spirit. The missions of security and socio-political
development were inseparable. By directing socio-political development, the military served to support the goals of development, political and social stability, defence, and national integrity. Any deviant social or political movement that threatened the status quo was seen as a threat to national security.

While the army formally included itself in government, the PKI also increased its standing, both as an independent political party and within the government. As with other communist organisations, the PKI grew by appealing to popular sentiment regarding issues of economic equality, especially among the abangan Javanese, and through ‘front’ organisations of special interest groups. It was, at this time, vying with the military as the most influential organisation in Indonesia, a move that made the anti-communist military deeply uncomfortable. Sukarno manipulated, negotiated and bargained, bestowed and withdrew approval and appointments, and pre-empted the probable responses of his supporters and of other leaders and contenders for power. And, significantly, there was an ‘absence of concrete and specific provisions for succession, which served to heighten the jockeying among contenders for his favor’ (Willner 1970: 249).

The concept of dwifungsi, as it came to be defined and elaborated upon, was developed in seminars at the Staff and Command College in the early 1960s, against the backdrop of disastrous economic policies resulting in high inflation, financial chaos, widespread poverty and political instability. In these seminars, senior army officers considered how they could stabilise the country without overtly entering the political arena. When Suharto and the military assumed power in 1966, dwifungsi became official policy. While there was nothing in the constitution that specifically allowed for the active participation of the military in political affairs of the state, there was also nothing that prohibited participation. The military regarded dwifungsi as implicit in the constitution. Thus, using various articles in the constitution, military officials developed a formal sanction for dwifungsi. First, they argued, since sovereignty is vested in the people and exercised by the MPR, and since the MPR is augmented by delegates from regional territories and groups as well as by members of the DPR, the military, as citizens, was entitled to provide representatives to the MPR. Second, since all citizens are equal before the law and are obliged to respect the laws and government, and since every citizen has the right and obligation to participate in the defence of the country, the military was free to participate in government and business along with the other citizens of Indonesia. Finally, since the President is the Supreme Commander of all armed forces, he or she can use the military in whatever role is chosen. With the constitutionality of dwifungsi rationalised, the next step was to formally recognise the practice. Beginning in 1966 the government enacted a series of laws to define and improve the role of the military in government and national affairs. However, it was not until 1982 that dwifungsi became official policy when the ‘Basic Provisions for the Defence and Security of the Republic of Indonesia’ became law (Sidwell 1995).
Perhaps the key to dwifungsi was that senior military officers believed that it was fundamentally mistaken to share decision-making with civilian agencies, which had demonstrated their lack of organisational skill, their inability to work across the archipelago and their lack of unity of purpose. Thus the mission of the military became the two functions of national security and socio-political development.

The events of 30 September and 1 October 1965

The style of government under Suharto, and subsequently the role of the military, was largely predicated on its method of achieving power. On 30 September 1965, at the height of the economic and increasingly social chaos under what was to become known as the ‘Old Order’ government of Sukarno, the PKI allegedly attempted to stage a coup, during which six senior generals were killed. The alleged coup attempt was put down by forces still ‘loyal’ to the formal military hierarchy under the command of Major General Suharto. Over the following months, being caught both unprepared and unarmed, the PKI was crushed by the army with the assistance of civilians, predominantly from the NU. At least 300,000–400,000 PKI members, suspected sympathisers and victims of long-standing local feuds were killed in the carnage. Some have estimated that up to 1.5 million political deaths occurred between 1965 and 1970 (Defence of Democracy Groups 1985: 4). The crushing of the PKI, the consequent assumption of authority in 1966 and the ousting of Sukarno from the presidency in 1967 all ushered in Suharto’s New Order government, which was formally installed in 1968.

The practicalities of the shift from Sukarno to Suharto were thus reasonably straightforward. But there is considerable disquiet about the motives and internal manoeuvres involved in the events. The view popularised by the New Order government was that the affair was a PKI plot against the government. According to this official view, the killing of the generals was the result of an ‘attempted coup’ that failed to win popular support and was subsequently put down by loyalist forces. The PKI might have been involved, but the version of events according to which it was primarily a PKI-planned event seems unlikely and makes more sense as a rationalisation for the massacres that followed, as well as for the army’s final demolition of its old communist enemies. It is also useful to note that the most practical method of determining who has successfully staged a coup is to look at who has achieved office as a consequence of the events in question.

What is known about the ‘coup’ or ‘attempted coup’ (as it was popularly although incorrectly called) is that a middle-ranking officer, Lieutenant Colonel Untung, led a small group of soldiers and air force personnel and, on the night of 30 September 1965, kidnapped six of the Indonesian army’s leading generals, killing three in the process. It was widely believed that the generals were themselves intending to act against Sukarno, probably to stage
a coup, and according to this view the action against them was intended to thwart their plan. Kidnapping senior figures to persuade them to a different course of action and then releasing them was not uncommon during the revolutionary period, and that might have been the Untung group’s original intention. But the resistance of three of the generals, which led to their deaths, reconfigured that plan, leaving Untung and his group with few options.

The dead and surviving generals were taken to the Halim air force base, just south-east of Jakarta, where the remaining three were killed and the bodies dumped in a well. General Nasution evaded his abductors, although his daughter was shot in the process of his attempted abduction and one of his aides, a lieutenant, was captured and killed with the generals. The army maintained, at the time, that the bodies of the officers had been mutilated, which, according to some, further inspired the consequent feverish violence. But these claims were not supported by photographs of the bodies on display at the armed forces museum at Bukit Tinggi in West Sumatra in 1996. Although taken from a distance, the photographs do not indicate that the bodies had been mutilated, and certainly not in the manner alleged (such as having the eyes and genitals cut out). Considering the Javanese Muslim respect for the dead, these stories of mutilation created a sense of public outrage over and beyond that of the murder of the generals. However, like much of the official version of events – which did not necessarily correspond to anything resembling provable fact – such stories appear to have been designed with a particular political purpose in mind. One such story, which has never been established and which serious historians rarely mention, is that, at the time, the PKI was about to receive shipments of arms from China in order to create an independent ‘people’s’ military force. The PKI was close to China, as was Sukarno, and there was discussion about the establishment of a PKI-based ‘fifth force’. However, this does not imply the establishment of a militia intended to challenge or replace the army. But Ian MacFarling argues that the PKI’s campaign to establish a ‘fifth force’, which was supported by Sukarno, ‘had the potential to reduce the Army’s monopoly on weapons and the management of violence in the name of the Republic’ (MacFarling 1996: 70).

Tensions between the majority of the army and the PKI had reached almost hysterical levels by 1965. The PKI was gaining more and more influence in Sukarno’s government, and the armed forces were required to compete with what they had previously considered to be an untrustworthy organisation. Policy differences between the army and the PKI were numerous:

- PKI members claimed that they were the true revolutionaries, but the army had played the primary role in the revolution.
- The PKI wanted military training for the civilian population, but the army did not want civilian military training.
The PKI wanted to rely on ‘the people’ for political mobilisation, but the army wanted to exercise greater administrative control.

The PKI was in favour of the Confrontation (Konfrontasi) with Malaysia, but the army was against it.

The PKI opposed Western ‘imperialism’, but the army was more friendly towards the West.

The PKI wished to give more power to trade unions and peasant organisations, but the army wanted to restrict their influence.

The PKI looked to communist countries for economic inspiration and self-sufficiency, but the army looked to Western aid.

The PKI wanted to reduce army representation in the government, but the army wanted to reduce PKI representation in the government (Hindley 1964: 286–97). Both organisations had been vying for position in the government, and although the army held a commanding position, the PKI was increasing its status quickly. Both organisations were attempting to position themselves in the event of Sukarno’s death or incapacitation, while Sukarno was using both of them to balance the increasing power of the other.

Apart from their sense of historical hostility, there was almost nothing of substance on which the PKI and the army agreed. Yet, as now, the position of the armed forces was not universal, and there were many in the services, particularly in the air force and navy, who were either communists or sympathetic to them. Furthermore, a reduction in the living conditions of lower-level soldiers in the period of the Confrontation (Konfrontasi) with Malaysia from 1963–66 had exacerbated tensions within the army, particularly between lower-level soldiers and the senior generals.

It is possible, though not certain, that Untung had the tacit endorsement of at least some senior members of the PKI when he and his co-conspirators decided to abduct the generals. But the subsequent announcement of ‘revolutionary councils’ ahead of elections seems like an ad hoc decision rather than a careful plan. Notably, the PKI had developed something of a reputation for careful planning, which the events of 30 September did not exemplify. For example, almost all those named by Untung as being part of the revolutionary council denied knowledge of the plot, and the PKI – three of whose members were named as being involved in the plot (along with other political parties) – were militarily unprepared for the action. It therefore seems odd that its leaders would commit the party to this move against the generals, although perhaps they were panicked by the developing circumstances.

A more realistic version of events, which does not endorse the ‘coup’ theory and which was propounded by Untung in a radio broadcast on 1 October 1965, is that some junior pro-Sukarno officers moved against the generals because the generals were planning their own coup against President Sukarno. In August 1965 Sukarno had fallen sick, raising the
spectre of his death and the ensuing competition between the PKI and the army for control of the presidency. The proposed date for the generals’ coup was Armed Forces Day (5 October), when large numbers of troops loyal to the generals would have been in Jakarta. By 1965 Sukarno had moved closer to the PKI, particularly to balance the growing influence and power of the armed forces. The senior leaders of the army had long been deeply hostile towards the PKI, and by this stage many were only marginally more enamoured of Sukarno. The generals almost certainly had the tacit support of the US in toppling the militantly non-aligned (and increasingly pro-China) Sukarno and bringing Indonesia into closer contact with the West.

In assessing the events leading up to (and of) the night of 30 September, it is easy to believe that some of the junior officers who supported Untung informed some of the very top levels of the PKI of the plan, consequently drawing major political players into the scheme. However, given the PKI’s lack of preparation for a ‘coup’, it seems that only the party’s most senior leaders, or some of them, and its ‘Special Bureau’ (of intelligence), which maintained contact with the armed forces, knew of the Untung plan. The PKI most probably decided to go along with the Untung statement – that the abduction of the senior generals was an internal army affair – so that it might benefit if events turned its way but deny responsibility if they did not.

There is also the persistent view that Suharto himself knew of the Untung/PKI plan to kill the generals (Wertheim n.d.; see also Institut Studi Arus Informasi 1995). Suharto had known Untung, from when he had been the latter’s commanding officer in Central Java. He also knew another coup leader, Colonel Abdul Latief, who more than coincidentally visited him when Suharto took his son, Tommy, who had just suffered minor burns, to hospital on the night of 30 September. Suharto was excluded from the inner circle of the army’s most senior officers and, indeed, had been at odds with Nasution, but had also had responsibility for executing Sukarno’s plan to occupy West Papua militarily. Latief spent 32 years in jail for his part in the 30 September affair and, upon release, immediately said that he had visited Suharto, who was then regarded as a Sukarno loyalist, as a part of the move against the other generals. He said that he had told Suharto of the move against the generals and that Suharto had indicated his support for the move. It has been further suggested that Suharto might himself have been involved in the plot against the generals, but although he had the motive there is little further evidence to directly support this view. Others who might have provided an answer to the question of Suharto’s involvement or foreknowledge (and, indeed, of who else might have been behind the affair) have since died or been executed (as late as 1986) (Defence of Democracy Groups 1985; Waddingham 1987; see also Crouch 1998: 97–134).

Regardless of Suharto’s knowledge of or support for the move against the generals, once the plan began to unfold Suharto immediately assumed power. Suharto was then head of the Army Strategic Command
(Komando Strategik Angkatan Darat – Kostrad), which had its headquarters facing Jakarta’s Merdeka Square. Troops who were ostensibly loyal to the coup occupied three sides of the square, but the Kostrad headquarters were not blocked. Furthermore, troops from the two battalions that occupied the square in support of the ‘attempted coup’, battalions 454 and 530, were under Kostrad and hence Suharto’s command. Once ‘returned to loyalty’, these two battalions were later used to thwart the ‘coup’ leaders.

After the death of the generals, the movement launched on 30 September briefly appeared to stall, giving Suharto time to rally ‘loyal’ soldiers and to launch an attack against Untung’s supporters at Halim, to which Sukarno had travelled. It is worth noting the poor logic of the New Order government’s claim that the 30 September movement was an ‘attempted coup’: the abduction was intended to protect Sukarno, and he was eventually implicated in the events. One can launch a coup against a government of which one is the head, but one cannot, of course, launch a coup against oneself. Sukarno never called the events an ‘attempted coup’ or used Suharto’s preferred term Gestapu (30 September Movement); rather, he referred to them as Gestok (1 October Movement), thereby being ambiguous about whether he was referring to the Untung group or to the movement launched on 1 October by Suharto.

The leader of the PKI, Aidit, was also at Halim that day, having spent the night there, therefore implicating the PKI in the affair, although he may have been taken there rather than gone of his own accord. Aidit’s presence at Halim provided the pretext for unleashing the massacre of PKI members, supporters and others. It is difficult to adequately outline the scale of the slaughter (see Cribb 1991 for a comprehensive account), but the killings were so extensive in Java and Bali in particular that rivers were said to be clogged with bodies. No one knows how many people died in the terror of 1965–66, with estimates ranging from 100,000 to over 1 million, although 300,000–400,000 seems realistic. Not all of those killed were communists. Many were suspected communists or sympathisers, members of organisations linked to the PKI, or simply victims of old grudges and score-settling.

The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) – which, according to some, supported the destruction of the PKI – described the killings in the following way:

> In terms of numbers killed, the anti-PKI massacres in Indonesia rank as one of the worst mass murders of the twentieth century, along with the Soviet purges of the 1930s, the Nazi mass murders during the Second World War, and the Maoist bloodbath of the early 1950s. In this regard, the Indonesian coup is certainly one of the most significant events of the twentieth century, far more significant than many other events that have received much greater publicity.

(CIA 1968: 71)
The political events that occurred between 1 October 1965 and early the following year were marked by manoeuvrings in which Sukarno attempted to shore up his crumbling power base through the Cabinet. He was beset by an increasingly belligerent armed forces leadership, which encouraged public demonstrations and a sense of chaos in Jakarta’s streets. Sukarno’s attempts to save his position by making strategic Cabinet appointments, which included the appointment of some PKI members, only served to further alienate much of the already hostile military leadership. In practical terms, Sukarno, in a letter dated 11 March 1966, which became known as *Supersemar*, gave almost carte blanche to Suharto to ‘restore order’. It is widely believed that senior military officers pressured Sukarno into signing the letter, while Sukarno believed that by signing it he could buy time in which to restore his political fortunes. In the case of the latter, quite the opposite occurred. The day after the letter was signed, Suharto formally banned the PKI. Four days later, after Sukarno refused to dismiss Cabinet ministers distrusted by the army leadership, the army arrested them. The signing of the letter by Sukarno marked the effective transition of power from the president to the general. Consequently, the ‘charisma’ of leadership as it pertained to Sukarno was transferred in accordance with ‘the natural order of things’, as leadership and then the presidency itself was ‘transferred’ – or taken (see Weber 1964: 366). Sukarno fought a rearguard action until the last, attempting repeatedly to restore his authority while limiting the rising power of Suharto. However, the tide of events was against Sukarno and, with much of his power base destroyed or diminished, the remaining days of his period in office were numbered. In formal terms, the struggle for power between Sukarno and Suharto went on for another two years, but from 11 March 1966 – or, one might argue, from as early as the latter part of 1965 – power had been increasingly with Suharto and the army, of which Suharto was now the head.

Under the provisions of the letter of 11 March 1966, Suharto used the newly established Operational Command to Restore Security and Order (Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban – Kopkamtib) as his principal means of control during this period. Kopkamtib not only had authority for tracking down remaining PKI members and sympathisers, but also soon took responsibility for quelling other signs of dissent, including the granting and withdrawal of licences to publish. A parallel body was known as Special Operations (Operasi Khusus – Opsus), which was built up by General Ali Murtopo and used for covert operations:

It was primarily a task-oriented covert political ‘fix-it’ agency with no set structure. First formed in 1962, as an executive agency of General Suharto’s Mandala command for the Irian campaign, it also played a key role in the negotiations to end Konfrontasi [Sukarno’s Confrontation with Malaysia], conducted political lobbying, manipulated elections within political organisations, arranged the outcome of the ‘act of free
choice’ in Irian Jaya in 1969, was a key player in organising the first New Order elections in 1971, and was involved in the Timor dispute – among many other activities.

(Lowry 1993: 71)

A more clandestine body, the State Intelligence Coordinating Body (Baden Koordinasi Intelejen Negara – Bakin), was also established in 1967. This was a type of military dominated secret police with responsibility for intelligence assessments and action aimed at the non-military population, such as political parties, dissidents, the Chinese community and especially those thought to be planning a communist revival. After 1974, intelligence agencies were streamlined and concentrated under General Benny Murdani, then the nominal deputy head. From 1983, when Murdani was appointed commander-in-chief of the armed forces, both domestic and military intelligence organisations were further concentrated under Murdani through Bakin. Like Opsus, Bakin was originally constructed as a pro-Suharto organisation and operated in that manner, until Murdani formally fell out with Suharto in 1988. Bakin, still under Murdani’s influence, was effectively dismantled, and in the early 1990s the intelligence organisations were brought under tighter control.

As an individual within the army, Suharto’s initial grip on power was tenuous. Although he had headed the army’s response to Untung and the PKI, he was still a junior member of the army’s top echelon, and the few remaining senior officers believed that he should – and would – share power. There were many others who opposed him, but they had to wait for an opportune moment before they could challenge him. Such a moment never came. Although political tensions ran high during this period, no one, including both Sukarno and Suharto, wanted a showdown, as the ensuing civil war would have produced no winners but many losers. There was also unease within the army-influenced MPR, which had constitutional authority to appoint or sack the president, about Suharto’s grab for power. But the choices were too stark, and while many had reservations about Suharto, there was no longer any question of Sukarno returning to his position as the country’s leader. Within the army, officers and men who remained loyal to Sukarno were ousted or, where they were too well entrenched, were outmanoeuvred or mollified until they could be dealt with, usually through retirements, non-military postings, and so on. The air force, a bastion of Sukarno support, was thoroughly purged, while the navy, which was largely loyal to Sukarno, was only slowly brought to heel. In the political manoeuvring that occurred between late 1965 and March 1967, Suharto and his supporters in the army not only purged the armed forces, but also cleared the civil service of pro-Sukarno elements. The process of bringing the bureaucracy to heel was partly brought about through the army’s political organisation, Golkar, originally the organisation of functional groups, which rapidly assumed the status of an institutionalised government party.
A provisional session of the MPR, similarly purged of its old PKI and leftist members, formally stripped Sukarno of the presidency in March 1967, from which time Sukarno was effectively placed under house arrest until his death in 1970. Riding a wave of anti-Sukarno sentiment (which was at least partly engineered) and his own growing authority, Suharto was named as acting president with the deposing of Sukarno, and was formally endorsed by the MPR as president in 1968.

Early opposition to Suharto

In the early years of his presidency, there was much popular support for Suharto’s initial commitment to law and order, which had been regarded as missing under Sukarno’s Old Order government. But the legal system he had inherited from Sukarno was developed by the Dutch, and was based on the need to enforce centralised colonial control. Not only did the legal system escape reform, but the promise of the rule of law in Indonesia was also dishonoured (Hadad 1989: 48). According to Tim Lindsey, ‘under Soeharto the court system was, through a deliberate policy inherited from Soekarno, reduced to a state of desuetude, political subservience and rampant corruption…The judiciary’s venality and incompetence has made it a national scandal and most Indonesians, quite accurately, still see the judicial system as an arm of the state and not a forum for addressing their grievances against each other – let alone the state’ (Lindsey 2001: 2). Suharto’s failure to address law-reform issues and to apply the rule of law in a consistent manner, as he had promised to do (Vatikiotis 1993: 6; see also Hadad 1989; Schwartz 1994: 247–63), fuelled discontent within the New Order government. This failure was due in particular to the army acting in an extrajudicial manner – in effect acting as a law unto itself (a characteristic it has been slow to shake off).

In seizing, maintaining and building on power, Suharto demonstrated in this formative period the political wiles for which he would later become famous. Suharto managed to stay one step ahead of his military colleagues and foes alike, and thus increased his grip on real political authority. From the outset there were those in the army who were concerned with Suharto’s style, and in particular his personal domination of the political process. But Suharto quickly moved to marginalise or oust his opponents, both real and perceived, and increasingly consolidated his position as leader of both the state and (still) the head of the military.

Following the political showdown of 1965–66, the idea of consensus was given a new lease of political life. Yet it was a polarised consensus. Indonesian (Javanese) politics was – or was held to be – an ‘either–or’ system; for example, it was posited that in 1965–66 the options were either Suharto or communism. The post-Suharto period saw a move towards a more plural approach to politics, but it was a tense pluralism fraught with the spectre of a return to an ‘all or nothing’ style of politics. When the stakes were lower and the country
appeared to be prospering and united there appeared greater potential for political flexibility. However, as Suharto’s tenure grew beyond a period considered tolerable by an increasing number of army officers, and in particular beyond the difficult times of 1997, and although the public elite had a desire for pluralism, the political game was increasingly being played for ‘all or nothing’ stakes. This applied, not least, to the continuation of the unity of the state, as adopted and defined by the army.

Suharto embodied everything that was known or understood about the Indonesian New Order political system. Under him the armed forces claimed to be the only institution with the organisational skill required to run the country. Once this was decided, anyone opposing the idea of the military’s dual function was treated as fundamentally opposing the state and was thus classed as an ‘enemy’. In this respect, Suharto followed the precedent set by Sukarno, continuing with Guided Democracy and a reinterpretation of central Javanese political tradition, with all power being centred on the person of the ‘king’ (the exemplary centre of the state-asmandal) and, at least in the early years of his rule, his loyal retainers belonging predominantly to the army.

To maintain Indonesia’s new ‘consensus’, not only were the PKI and affiliated or suspected sympathetic organisations banned, but the New Order government also explicitly rejected liberalism and severely curtailed any desire for a participatory, representative democratic process. This was done in large part according to the armed forces’ belief whereby ‘anyone with a dissenting view became a suspect Communist or Muslim radical bent on the destruction of the state’ (Vatikiotis 1993: 14).

According to Robert Lowry, who is a graduate of the Indonesian Army Command and Staff College at Bandung,

Because the regime is underpinned by force rather than by political consensus and compromise, the regular Army is at least twice as big as it needs to be given the regional security situation. At least 100,000 of the approximately 150,000 men employed in the Territorial structure could be replaced by reserves or militiamen if the external threat were the only consideration.

(Lowry 1996: 219)

In particular, the creation and maintenance of the Indonesian army’s Territorial structure has been widely regarded as both the means by which the military exercise political authority and that which constitutes the greatest impediment to fundamental political reform (see Munir 2001). Attempts to modify or disband the army’s Territorial structure, as a part of the post-Suharto reform process, appeared to falter as the army’s conservative ‘nationalists’ – the group that coalesced around a continuing political function for the TNI with ‘nationalism’ as its core value – reasserted their political authority in mid-2000 (see Chapter 4).
Political and administrative role

The TNI’s perception of itself has always been as an organisation above partisan interests (though deeply anti-communist) and closely linked to the people. It is the TNI’s duty, it believes, to ensure political and communal stability. These views corresponded to those of the army – that political excesses during the first two decades of the republic had discredited party politics as a proper outlet for grass roots expression and forced the armed forces to act as the principal guarantor of internal security and political stability. As was expressed officially in 1966, the armed forces had an interest in participating in the efforts to form and manage a strong and progressive government with authority. Consequently, the armed forces have been intertwined with the civilian side of government at every level. Military officers, active duty and retired, have served in the highest organs of policy-making and administration since independence, and as the creator of and then a major functional group within Golkar, the military was allotted blocs of appointive seats in both the MPR and DPR. The provision of appointed military members of the MPR and DPR was also viewed as compensation for the active duty members of the armed forces being denied the right to vote (which was a consequence of ‘being above politics’). However, retired members were permitted to vote and most of them belonged to an association of retired officers that formed another of the functional groups within Golkar.

The military’s involvement in national life included the assignment of both active duty and retired military personnel to civil administrative and policy-making positions. Gradually, as the economy stabilised, military personnel withdrew from the economic policy-making area, and by 1980 all active duty personnel had left their positions in non-defence-related economic enterprises, although they remained active in military owned and managed businesses. Retired military officers continued to run some nationalised firms and military owned enterprises, although they frequently hired civilian managers (see Chapter 5).

To ensure that certain categories of people understood what the New Order government wanted it to understand by the otherwise ambiguous meanings of the Pancasila, the military instituted what became known as Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (Guideline for Understanding and Implementing Pancasila, also referred to as P4). P4 education was compulsory for government employees and university students, for example, and was used to measure loyalty to the government. According to P4, not only was the state unitary but it was also integralistic; that is, the state was viewed as a family, in which each member of the family had a clearly defined role and which was headed by the government – or, more accurately, the president – as ‘father’ (Anwar 1999: 208). The reification of the state as integralistic imposed a relatively arbitrary and artificial political commonality that has been shown not to have met the expectations of a significant and often geographically specific number of its constituent
members. Furthermore, the ‘family’ metaphor for integralism closely parallels the organicist thinking that guided the founding of the state. Interestingly, Suharto also identified both the ‘organicist’ as well as the corporate nature of Indonesian political society, and the functional role of the armed forces within it, when in 1967 he said that Indonesia’s ‘Pancasila Democracy puts...the people’s interest first and not the group or private interests’, and that his government ‘pursues institutionalisation and rejects individualisation’ (quoted in Elson 2001: 161).

In late 1982, the DPR put the military’s civil role on a firm legal footing when it replaced the old 1954 defence law with a new one expressly proclaiming ABRI (now TNI) to be both a military and a social force. The new law, unlike its predecessor, was based on the principles of Pancasila and the 1945 constitution, and conferred formal legitimacy on the wide-ranging powers exercised by the armed forces in the name of preserving and strengthening national resilience. By sanctioning *dwifungsi* in this way, the government recognised the need for the military’s continued influential role in politics and the basic national infrastructure, thus allowing national development to buttress national defence.

This system closely resembled the Japanese military thinking that was employed during the Second World War. At around the time that the military’s dual function was formalised, both the New Order government and the army were at their political peak. The slow decline of the political role of the military, and in effect the New Order, from the mid-1980s onwards meant that this system underwent gradual transformation, until the tension in the relationship caused what amounted to a break. Suharto continued to rely on the military, in particular the army, and to exercise considerable control over it. But the increasing division between Suharto and the army caused the president to look elsewhere for support (see Chapter 4) and ultimately concluded with his downfall and the collapse of the New Order. However, the army, already developing an alternative political paradigm, revived and reinvented itself as the prime institution of the state.

**Elite insecurity**

The fragmented physical and cultural structure of the state, as noted by Anwar,

has imbued the government, and in particular the military, with a deep-seated sense of insecurity, constantly fearing the threats of disintegration and general political instability which could be exploited or exacerbated by outside forces...This feeling of insecurity has largely been the result of Indonesia’s own historical experience, particularly in the first two decades of independence, when a series of rebellions and independence movements broke out around the country.

(Anwar 1999: 201)
As a consequence of its disparate and poorly integrated origins, Indonesia’s elite, along with its military, was caught in something of an ideological trap. Having constructed the idea of the ‘nation’ in the revolutionary period, yet having done so without consulting its constituent members, and relying on a highly idealised and very particular version of Javanese history, rationalised by Dutch colonial occupation, Indonesia was an idea in the minds of some, perhaps many, but it was not an existing reality. With such a fervent attachment to this idea, and with its leaders’ predisposition to portray aspirations as reality, Indonesia was caught in a logical bind; what was said to be was not what actually existed. What was desired as united was based on a disparate historical and geographic reality. Having few other serious options, if agreement on the form of the new state had not initially existed it might have been won through a mutually beneficial form of social contract, in which costs to the parties were offset by mutual and distinct advantages. Yet this model of the state did not accord with the largely Javanese-influenced political thinking that tended to dominate Indonesia’s political landscape in the 1950s and early 1960s, and thereafter under the New Order government.

In achieving independence, Indonesian nationalists had much to be proud of, although it would be a serious misreading of history to assume that independence was won militarily by those who were fighting for it. In fact, Indonesian independence was won in the international arena, in particular by the US, although without an armed struggle within the archipelago there would have been no concrete situation at that time upon which to base a claim to independence. Such a claim would have become available later, under a voluntary decolonisation process, but this did not accord with the experience of the colony under Japanese occupation, or perhaps the style of Dutch colonial administration.

In any case, the army came out of the revolutionary period as its heroes and its victors. Given its role in achieving the independence of the new state, the army had an interest in maintaining the new state’s independence. Given that many of the campaign veterans had no other livelihood, and had developed increasingly lucrative forms of income as an adjunct to their service, their interest in maintaining the state became increasingly vested. There is no doubting the genuine loyalty of many and probably most veterans to the cause of protecting and serving the state. But there is equally little doubting the lack of political sophistication of most of those personnel at that time, and that the few influences they did have to guide them in their thinking were not conducive to political development as such or to the passive or benign role of the military. To a degree this has been the more general experience of post-colonial governments that have achieved independence through violent means, and as such Indonesia’s experience was no different. It did differ, however, in one notable respect: as a consequence of its physical fragmentation, when its army travelled primarily from Java to other islands to repress dissent it did so, functionally, as an army of occupation. The
development of the army’s Territorial structure, based primarily on local troops and by which it located itself throughout the archipelago at a particular level, meant that such local troops would be less inclined to act or be seen as a foreign army. But as with any colonial army, employing local troops to suppress local people is not any less a colonial exercise, nor does it any less represent the interests or perspectives that may be alien to those local people.

In desiring a ‘nation’, Indonesia’s nationalist elite, represented by and in large part constituting its military, has asserted a vision that has not matched reality. In attempting to reshape reality, and in the way it has done so, it has necessarily found and indeed encouraged opposition. That has made the nationalist vision seem that much more problematic and has consequently heightened that much more the insecurities of the elite, who have responded by asserting their nationalist vision even more forcefully. It seems to have escaped Indonesia’s nationalist strategists, at least in recent generations, that if one is reluctant to accept another’s embrace (perhaps because of the conditions of that embrace), violence is unlikely to make one feel any more affectionate. Indeed, as it has done, it is much more likely to encourage precisely the separation that caused the anxiety that led to the violence in the first place. The logic of the Indonesian military’s role in the state is therefore internally contradictory. Greater coercion does not and cannot produce greater voluntarism.
Almost half a century after the first formal insertion of the military into politics, the TNI was still represented and active in Indonesia’s political process, from retired guards at the top of the formal political structure of the Cabinet and administration all the way down to the villages. And its centralised combat units continued to be extremely politically active, especially in terms of internal security maintenance and as a covert force against dissent. The structure of the TNI shows how the military organised itself in response to what it defined as its most pressing security concerns, virtually all of which are domestic. But, as such, it also defined for itself a structural political role. The TNI’s structure and organisation also illustrates its historical origins, and the way in which it evolved to meet what it perceived to be the challenges of holding the state together, including as an actor in state affairs. The TNI’s functional structure, then, is an inherently political one.

Until the resignation of Suharto, given his retired military status, it might have been said that the TNI was represented from the very top of the political structure; and it was certainly well represented throughout the various levels of state, provincial and local administration. Even in the post-Suharto era, the TNI actively influenced the president in a range of subtle and obvious ways. For example, some serving ministers were former generals (retired as a legislative requirement, but retaining close links to their active service colleagues) and other administrative positions were occupied by retired officers. In addition, from Cabinet level downwards, civilian administrators regularly consulted with and, when there was a variance of perspective, usually deferred to their military equivalents, especially at the provincial and sub-provincial levels. Furthermore, the military retained an active function in a number of provinces, such as Maluku Selatan, which linked it directly to the local administration both formally and informally.

It was widely recognised throughout Indonesia that no one could run the state without the tacit approval and assistance of the TNI. It was also widely accepted and frequently alluded to in the media that sections of the TNI had actively worked to destabilise the first two post-Suharto presidencies,
insofar as it was able quite successfully to capitalise on the respective presidential foibles, most notably in fomenting trouble in East Timor under Habibie, and in Maluku and Kalimantan under Abdurrahman Wahid. As a presence in state affairs, whether or not the TNI was supportive, or at least unopposed, was a critical factor in state-level decision-making. This situation was apparent in consultations between government leaders and senior military officers, as well as in public pronouncements by senior officers on affairs of state ordinarily the preserve of the relevant minister or the president. Such pronouncements applied in particular to issues of state security, the deployment of troops, the definition of key aspects of the constitution and state ideology, and what were and were not acceptable methods of resolving Indonesia’s myriad political problems, in particular in relation to communal tensions and separatist aspirations.

In addition to former officers occupying ministerial posts, the TNI’s commander-in-chief holds ex officio status as a Cabinet member, is influential in Cabinet decision-making and is involved in Cabinet politicking. The commander-in-chief is answerable only to the president and is not accountable to the defence minister, who in practical terms is his junior and whose primary responsibility lies in assisting the bureaucratic and logistical side of the TNI. The senior status of the TNI commander-in-chief affords the title holder the opportunity to become dominant in decision-making on security matters and to treat the TNI as a personal fiefdom – as indeed at times he has. This tendency towards dominance became apparent under the highly personalised command of General Benny Murdani from 1983 to 1988 and under the similarly personalised command of General Wiranto in 1998 and 1999. To limit this potential, President Suharto elevated each of the service Chiefs of Staff to the equal (four-star) rank of general. While this constrained the authority of the commander-in-chief, with the exception of the two aforementioned generals, it also meant that the Army Chief of Staff had practical operational control of his service and could veto or redirect its use. An attempt to introduce greater ministerial authority over the TNI by President Abdurrahman Wahid was abandoned in the face of an overwhelmingly hostile response, in particular when he (unsuccessfully) attempted to garner TNI support in his battle for political survival. His successor, Megawati, was not inclined to rein in or support policies that were opposed by the majority of senior officers, and hence executive authority remained nominally with the president but in practice within the ranks of the TNI itself. As a consequence, the TNI’s commander-in-chief remained deeply influential in Cabinet politics, while the creation of the National Intelligence Agency (Badan Intelijen Nasional – BIN) as the coordinating intelligence organisation, also headed by a retired general having ex officio Cabinet status, further ensured that the TNI continued to be represented in the executive decision-making process.
The service hierarchy

Historically, the dominant service within the TNI has been the army (TNI-Angkatan Darat – TNI-AD) and, until 1998, overall command of the armed forces resided with army appointees. In 1998, the navy's Admiral Widodo Adisucipto was promoted from assistant commander-in-chief (wakil panglima) to commander-in-chief (panglima besar) following the elevation of then commander-in-chief General Wiranto to the position of Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs. While this was an attempt to break the army's stranglehold over the position of commander-in-chief, Widodo was widely regarded as being a Wiranto appointee and Wiranto's influence over the TNI remained strong beyond his dismissal from the ministry in February 1999. The staff of the commander-in-chief includes a vice-Chief of Staff, an inspector general and assistant Chiefs of Staff for logistics, operations, personnel, planning and budget, security, and, until October 2001, for Territorial affairs. The latter position oversaw the TNI's Territorial function, whereby the army inserted itself both across the archipelago and throughout the social and political hierarchy, and its involvement in social and political affairs, including the appointment and secondment of officers to civil positions (the position was previously known as assistant Chief of Staff for social and political affairs).

As noted, the Indonesian military engages with the state politically in a vertical manner by means of direct political representation, from the Cabinet and legislature down to the village level (it was intended that the latter level of representation would be removed in 2000; however, this did not occur outside Jakarta). A second, related and, in many ways, more directly imposing means of engagement is through the functions of the army's horizontal and geographic structure, whereby different components have both distinct and interrelated functions. Virtually all of these functions pertain to Indonesia’s political context, and the external defence orientation of the army has been limited.

Teritorium

According to Indonesian army doctrine, there are three types of ‘defence’ operations: intelligence, combat and Territorial. According to Sidwell (1995), strategic goals determine the type of operation employed. To seize an area occupied by an enemy, the TNI would conduct intelligence or combat operations, and use intelligence or psychological-type operations to acquire information or force the enemy from a particular area. These different types of operations are somewhat nominal because, apart from the war of independence, the TNI has not engaged an external enemy on its own territory. However, it has applied these types of operations against anti-government or separatist movements. If such an action were intended to create or restore political, economic or social order, the TNI would
conduct Territorial operations. Because of its limited defence role, the creation and restoration of internal ‘order’ is the TNI’s primary role, hence the primary geographic function of the TNI; furthermore, the largest single proportion of the Indonesian army is made up of Territorial units, those that constitute the divisions that are more or less evenly located throughout the archipelago.

Despite its primary, internal focus, the TNI maintains the position that the Territorial units are the first line of defence in the face of foreign attack. But because of their generally low or only partial level of training, professionalism and equipment, the Territorial units are intended to be little more than a holding or delaying force against an invading enemy. They are intended to slow an enemy’s advance and cause whatever attrition they can until better trained and equipped forces arrive to conduct a counter-attack.

In comparison to most other armies, including those elsewhere in the South-East Asia region, the Territorial units cannot be considered as combat-ready in any meaningful sense of the term. This situation is regarded as acceptable, however, primarily because Indonesia has not, since 1949, faced any external threat.

The actual rather than rhetorical primary focus of the Territorial structure, therefore, is internal: on the dual function of assisting with ‘development’ and maintaining or restoring ‘order’. At least as practical is the TNI’s role in rooting out actual and suspected internal subversion. It has been claimed that such subversion is based primarily on communism, religious fanaticism and separatism, although liberalism was also a target under the New Order and is often confused with the first two categories. The belief remains within the TNI that individuals or ‘cells’ representing the above-noted dissident movements will infiltrate Indonesian society and foment discord leading to rebellion. It is therefore the duty of the TNI to conduct intelligence operations to counter the development of such ‘cells’. If these cells were to gain a local foothold, the TNI would conduct operations against them. How this theory translates in reality is that organisations which oppose government policy, sometimes even to the extent of opposing a particular local policy that was poorly planned or implemented, are regarded as the ‘enemy’ and are often treated accordingly. In numerous cases this approach has led to legitimate local disputes quickly escalating into confrontation and often the deaths of innocent local people. The main function of the Territorial units, therefore, is less as a defensive force and more as a quasi-military/quasi-‘social’ force, intended to maintain a presence among Indonesia’s sometime fractious communities (see Figures 3.1–3.3, identifying, respectively, TNI placements in Aceh, West Papua and, until September 1999, East Timor). To an extent, the Territorial units also provide a sense of political cohesion throughout the provinces, largely through coming from those provinces themselves, and through the infrastructure development (pembangunan) they undertake.
Figure 3.1
Map of TNI in Aceh

See also Figure 3.13, p. 137 for Territorial placements
About a third of the TNI is located throughout the country, placing units of soldiers at every level of society, paralleling or involved in each political tier of administration. The purpose of this placement is to ensure that a potentially alternative and politically engaged administrative structure to the government exists throughout the archipelago, one that is able to respond to local crises until more highly trained troops from the centralised divisions can be transferred. Embedded within and parallel to the local administrative structure, the TNI has been able to exercise considerable influence over a range of local decisions regarding such matters as population redistribution, the production of food and strategic materials, and the development of air and sea transportation.

The formalisation of the TNI’s Territorial function was outlined at a series of seminars at the military academy (Akademi Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia – Akabri, the forerunner to the Staff Training and Command College) conducted in the early 1960s; interestingly, Suharto was
Figure 3.3 Map of TNI in East Timor

(1) “—” denotes vicinity of deployed unit
(2) Most recent source used: 23 Apr 99
Subordinate formation locations & identity TBA
(3) Reporting on 7 Apr 99 noted that 2 X battalions arrived in Diliaboard LST no. 504
a significant participant in these discussions. The concept was eventually formalised as the Territorial Management and Civic Mission doctrines (Sidwell 1995).

**Total People’s Defence**

It has been claimed that the original purpose of the Territorial structure – to provide an in-depth defence against any attack on Indonesia – was derived from the days when the army worked with local people against the Dutch – a system referred to as Total People’s Defence (Hankamrata). Such reasoning, however, is less than convincing because, as noted, Indonesia has not faced an external threat since 1949. During the Confrontation (Konfrontasi) with Malaysia of 1963–66, which Indonesia initiated, the military engaged British Commonwealth forces in guerrilla warfare with minimal support from the border peoples of Sarawak and Sabah. Similarly, in the dispute with the Dutch over West New Guinea in 1962, the military fought against Dutch troops but without the assistance of local people (although such assistance was a stated requirement of operational success). However, because at least some of the framers of the 1945 constitution had claimed these areas as belonging to Indonesia, the above conflicts were portrayed as anti-colonial wars, and as such were said to represent the completion of the war of independence begun in 1945. In reality, and given international recognition of the state’s borders, these conflicts were demonstrably wars of territorial expansion.

The Total People’s Defence doctrine, based on experiences gained from the struggle for independence, noted that Indonesia could neither afford to maintain a large military nor would it compromise its independence by depending on other nations to provide for its defence. Instead, the state would be self-reliant and defend itself through a strategy of Territorial guerrilla warfare in which the armed forces, deployed throughout the archipelago, would lead the entire population in a ‘people’s war’. When this idea was first enunciated, Indonesia’s military planners envisioned a three-stage war, comprising a short initial period in which an invader would defeat conventional Indonesian resistance and establish control, a long period of unconventional, regionally based fighting, and a final phase in which the invaders would eventually be repelled.

This strategy required that a close bond be maintained between the civil population and the military, to encourage the support of the entire population and enable the military to manage all war-related resources. Accordingly, the people would provide logistical support and intelligence along with upkeep, while some civilians, reserves permitted, would be organised, trained and armed to join the conflict. This strategic culture was deeply influenced from the beginning by a strong sense of nationalism and self-reliance, which by the 1970s had developed into the doctrine of National Resilience (Ketahanan Nasional). This particular view of defence was
further developed in the late 1970s, which saw the strengthening of Indonesia’s defences in 1977–78 and later the establishment of the idea that Indonesia should be effectively shielded by its neighbours. To this end Indonesia attempted to develop defence cooperation with its neighbours. The commander-in-chief from 1983, General Benny Murdani, called this system ‘stability-in-depth’, to compliment the internal defence system of ‘defence-in-depth’ (Anwar 1999: 202). The process of building defence links with neighbouring states, however, was not successful.

The retention of the Territorial structure, according to the above rationale, was theoretically based on the limited numbers of the armed forces, its relatively unsophisticated weaponry and its relatively slow response times, requiring that the army already be in place should an attack occur. In practice, the placement of soldiers among the civilian population provided the army with an opportunity to act as a type of localised paramilitary police force, involved in local political and economic affairs. The political aspect of this placement came to the fore during the 1960s, especially after the persecution of the PKI and with the rise of the New Order government.

The army’s ‘development’ role

The success of this type of military strategy, according to the National Resilience doctrine, required that a close bond be maintained between citizen and soldier in order to encourage the support of the entire population and enable the military to manage all war-related resources. Under the terms of this arrangement, the people would provide logistical support, intelligence and upkeep, and, as resources permitted, some civilians would be organised, trained and armed to join the guerrilla struggle. In trying to attain the goals of National Resilience, the military maintained a Territorial organisation to support public order. In this way the army exercised considerable influence over local decisions regarding such matters as population redistribution, the production of food and strategic materials, and the development of air and sea transportation. Armed forces personnel also continued to engage in large-scale civic action projects involving community and rural development so as to draw closer to the people, to ensure the continued support of the populace and to develop among military personnel a detailed knowledge of the region to which they were assigned. According to Sidwell (1995), what the military’s Territorial function actually achieved under the New Order government was to ‘maintain the status quo through the elimination of political opposition’. This role was slightly modified in the post-New Order era, although tight controls on political organisation remained. Sidwell (1995) also noted that the Territorial ‘construction operations do serve to develop the infrastructure of the outer islands, but appear to benefit the business elite connected to the President’. Such businesses that benefited in the post-New Order era were linked to other members of the elite or, more commonly, to the military itself.
The increasingly and overtly politicised role of the military’s Territorial function followed the rise of the New Order government from 1966 onwards and the development of a then new approach to the state ideology of Pancasila. According to later military commander-in-chief General Edi Sudrajat:

When we adopted our political system [from 1966], there were two mainstreams in the world, that is Western democracy based on individualism and the Communist regime based on class. However, they were not suitable for Indonesia where the sense of togetherness in society transcended both individual and class [interests]. This was the foundation of our Pancasila democratic system.

(Sudrajat 1997)

One of the characteristics of the military’s growing role in political affairs between 1965 and 1966, in particular in their Territorial-based kekaryaan (secondment to the civil service) role, was the need to expand the officer base. In order to ensure that officers seconded to civil positions and their civilian counterparts understood their particular roles within the developing New Order state, the government, through two of its agencies, introduced what it called the National Vigilance Refresher Course (Penetaran Kewaspadaan Nasional – Tarpadnas). This programme was a joint project of Lemhanas (the National Resilience Institute) and Kopkamtib and was introduced after the crackdown on the 1977–78 student movement, to indoctrinate both officers and civilians as to potential threats to ‘national stability’ posed by supposedly ‘communist’ elements. Tarpadnas was implemented by new Lemhanas governor Lieutenant General Sutopo Juwono, a former head of Bakin, who replaced Lieutenant General Sayidiman, who had been sacked for being critical of the intelligence officers then close to Suharto (notably Ali Murtopo and Benny Murdani). Efforts to ensure that such ‘vigilance’ (kewaspadaan) prevailed were almost complete by 1988 (Honna 2001: 156–8). As well as indoctrinating civilian groups, Kopkamtib’s Inter-regional Special Operations unit (Laksuswil) conducted the indoctrination of regional civilian organisations and provincial parliamentarians. At the lowest level, Kopkamtib’s Regional Special Operations unit (Kaksusda), in cooperation with the local Military Area Command, coordinated meetings of Tarpadnas to spread indoctrination. And in 1984 the indoctrination programme was extended by the then recently appointed commander-in-chief and former ‘intelligence czar’ Benny Murdani (Honna 2001: 58).

The move towards including more officers in civil positions resulted in a marked increase in class sizes at the National Military Academy (MacFarling 1996: 146–7). ‘The burgeoning size of the officer corps reaching middle ranks during the late 1980s and early 1990s made possible new kinds of specialisation in response to challenges emanating from civil society’ (Kammen and Chandra 1999: 62). It was later argued that the
increased number of officers coming through the army system was a major contributing factor in the high turnover of senior army officers during the late 1990s, when officers trained in the late 1960s and early 1970s began to reach compulsory retirement age (Kammen and Chanda 1999). To indicate how important the kekaryaan role was for the military at this time, after the 1985 reorganisation of the armed forces, the then Army Chief of Staff General Rudini said that successful service in kekaryaan positions would be necessary in order to achieve higher-ranking appointments in active service. Not to have kekaryaan experience, he said, would hold back an otherwise qualified officer (Kammen and Chandra 1999: 70–1).

As a guiding philosophy, then, the notion of Territorial placement was firmly fixed in the thinking of virtually the entire TNI (even though in practical terms emphasis was shifted towards some centralisation of the army by the redevelopment of the Kopassus and Kostrad forces in the mid-1980s). The Territorial structure was a core element of dwifungsi while at the same time being the means by which dwifungsi could not be practically removed (Lowry 1996: 184–6; MacFarling 1996: 133–40). In 2001, and again into 2002, there was discussion about the longer-term application of the Territorial structure, but its possible dismantling remains at best still many years away.

Indeed, in the aftermath of the East Timor independence ballot of 1999, the TNI quickly moved to once again strengthen its Territorial structure, to ensure that no other territories would break away (although it should be noted that East Timor achieved independence through a ballot process initiated by then President Habibie, with the nominal approval of the TNI, and under the auspices of the United Nations). This strengthening of the Territorial structure was undertaken by Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo, and was formulated while he was director of the military’s Staff Training and Command College (Sekolah Staf dan Komando – Sesko) at Bandung in West Java. While the plan was pushed along by events in East Timor, it was in fact first announced by Army Chief of Staff General Subagyo in March 1999, and was originally developed by Wiranto in order to assert control over the TNI, contain ethnic or communal tensions, and compensate for the loss of local political positions and the access to business that such positions offered. Part of the plan was to increase the number of divisional strength Military Command Areas (Komando Daerah Militer – Kodam), which in effect reversed a reduction of Kodam undertaken in 1985 as part of the restructuring of the armed forces under then commander-in-chief General Benny Murdani. Agus Widjojo’s then colleague and high-profile military reformer Brigadier (later Lieutenant) General Agus Wirahadikusumah offered an alternative, calling for the number of Kodam to be reduced to eight, and for all sub-divisional units at the regency, district, area and village level to be removed. Although the formal placement of soldiers at the local level was scrapped in Jakarta, the rest of Wirahadikusumah’s plan was ignored, with senior officers correctly seeing it as diminishing the army’s potential control over the population.
Under the post-1999 division structure, the intention was to have ‘A’ and ‘B’ Kodam, with the ‘A’ Kodam receiving an extra combat brigade (including infantry and intelligence units) and a cavalry unit (tanks and armoured personnel carriers). The intention was to deploy the ‘A’ units to more troubled areas, reflecting the heightened tensions and the high level of violence that affected some of Indonesia’s more outlying provinces. It was claimed by some that the reinstatement of seventeen Kodam reflected the need for more opportunities to place those officers who had come through the expanded recruitment process of the 1970s and who had been displaced by the removal of serving officers from administrative functions, in particular from governorships of provinces (The Editors 2000: 132). However, the creation of the new Kodam was also the very real response to the 1999 East Timor crisis and its aftermath, including the presence of foreign troops along its border, the escalation of the conflict in Aceh and the seemingly communal violence in Maluku and Central Sulawesi, as well as a desire to more fully contain separatist aspirations in West Papua. The result of the creation of the new Kodam was that the TNI’s Territorial structure, rather than being reduced, was in fact increased in terms of its proximity to provincial governments. If the period from 1966 until 1985 was the most militarised in Indonesia’s history, made manifest in part through the Kodam structure, then while the post-1999 environment was perhaps not as aggressively militarised, the Territorial structure nevertheless reflected that earlier period.

Also intended to reverse Murdani’s 1985 moves was a plan to restore the three previously disbanded Territorial Defence Commands (Komando Wilayah Pertahanan – Kowilhan), while a rapid deployment force was to be set up to deal with popular unrest (Tapol 1999b). Although the rapid deployment force was established (see section on Kostrad, pp. 87–93 below) and quickly put into regular use, at the time of writing the Kowilhan had not been reinstated. Given their role as regional defence commands to ensure broad regional self-sufficiency in time of external attack, this would suggest that Indonesia faced little external threat and that the Kowilhan were not required for the TNI’s primary role of internal political maintenance.

In the period between 1999 and early 2001, it was possible to detect, even among the TNI’s leading reformers, a distinct disinclination on behalf of some, including the Assistant Commander for Territorial Affairs, Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo, to abandon the Territorial structure, which located the TNI deep within the day-to-day politics of Indonesia. Widjojo did talk about eventually devolving the Territorial structure, but his position was inconsistent and his proposed time frame so long as to have no practical significance. This particular issue, then, was one that constituted a major divide within the ranks of the TNI’s ‘reform’ faction. A political analyst close to the Speaker of the DPR, Amien Rais, said that while the TNI’s Territorial structure remained in place, Indonesia’s path towards real democratisation would remain impeded. It was the goal of Abdurrahman
Wahid as president, he said, to start to dismantle the TNI’s Territorial structure. This alone pitted the majority of senior officers against Abdurrahman Wahid, although his attempts to ‘depoliticise’ the TNI, his sacking of the influential Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs, General (retired) Wiranto, and his promotion of reformist officers such as Wirahadikusumah (in itself a politicising move), all added to move the TNI sharply against the president.

**Kodam**

Kodam (Komando Daerah Militer – Military Command Areas) are the TNI’s Territorial units, organised on a regional divisional basis. As well as a social development and security role, each Kodam has support elements, performing intelligence and internal security functions and maintaining liaison with local officials charged with implementing the government’s policies. During and until just after the period of the New Order government (1966–98), a number of military personnel filled civilian government positions, from national and provincial levels down to the district, sub-district and village level. In its social development capacity, the Territorial structure frequently saw soldiers engaged in local development projects, in keeping with the New Order’s ‘developmentalist’ ideology.

This developmentalist approach to social insertion rationalises long-term military control of politics by insisting that the military must safeguard national development. Thus, in each area in which it is present, the TNI influences and watches over social and political life to ensure, in theory, that the state’s developmental objectives are not resisted in any way by the emergence of movements that might challenge the legitimacy of the government or the cohesion of the state. But in a more constructive, practical sense, Territorial battalions have also been involved in local projects such as the construction of houses, schools and other public buildings, and in introducing new farming techniques or other public works projects such as irrigation and dam construction. (However, some claim that such activities were designed to move the TNI closer to the people, to ensure the continued support of the populace and to develop among military personnel a detailed knowledge of the region to which they were assigned.) This development work consisted of nationwide civic action campaigns held roughly three times a year to provide assistance in planning and constructing rural and urban projects selected by local villagers. They constructed roads, bridges and public buildings, provided medical service in remote areas, and worked to improve rural conditions. The military’s civic action mission received added attention after 1983 as part of a programme designed to address the problems of a perceived growing gap between the army and the civilian population. The largest of these programmes, known as Armed Forces Enters the Village (Angkatan Masuk Desa – AMD), began in 1983. While such activities have benefited local people, they have also been used to support the country’s now abandoned
transmigration programme, which resettled people predominantly from Java, Bali and Madura to the outer islands. The transmigration programme was regarded by many inhabitants of the newly settled regions as internal colonialism, whereby the central government established colonies comprised of citizens from Indonesia’s ‘heartland’ in regions that had both a smaller population density and also a less pronounced loyalty to the state. Within the whole of this developmental approach, the military’s ‘vigilance’ doctrine (kewaspadaan) was employed to identify incorrect or suspect development as a source of threat to the state. This helped to enhance the military’s continued Territorial function (Honna 2001: 59).

One positive outcome of the nature of the TNI’s Territorial structure was that it diminished if not eliminated an earlier separation of army divisions based on more specific personal loyalties, although divisional identification continued to have some significance, notably in regard to the former Siliwangi, Diponegoro and Brawijaya divisions, of West, Central, and East Java, respectively. This divisional identification developed during the war of independence and in the years immediately after. The detachment of the Jakarta area from the control of the Siliwangi division and the reorganisation of the army from a divisional structure to the Territorial Kodam system diffused and diminished the regional power of these units and helped to reduce, if not eliminate, a tendency towards warlordism. Troops for each Kodam are usually drawn from the region in which they serve, and are therefore sometimes referred to as ‘organic’ troops.

There were until 1985 seventeen Kodam, at which time a major restructuring programme reduced the number to ten. However, in 1999, the ‘loss’ of East Timor, the high level of regional violence, an increased role for the TNI’s specialist combat divisions and the provision of new jobs for lower-ranking officers who had lost their jobs in the kekaryaan system (along with the increased number of officers reaching higher ranks) brought about a further reorganisation of the Kodam designed to bring the number back up to seventeen by 2009. (See Figures 3.4–3.6.) The geographic organisation of Kodam following the implementation of the 1999 restructure is as follows:

Kodam I Iskandar Muda, Aceh
Kodam II Bukit Barisan, North Sumatra
Kodam III Imam Bonjol, West Sumatra and Riau
Kodam IV Sriwijaya, Jambi, Bengkulu, South Sumatra and Lampung
Kodam V Jayakarta, Jakarta

formally brought into being on 5 February 2002 in direct response to escalating separatist violence in Aceh after 1999
the former command including both Aceh and central Sumatra
formed in response to separatist sentiment in Riau
the remainder of Sumatra
unchanged
Each Kodam has a headquarters contingent of at least one battalion (700 troops) and at most one brigade, plus at least one quick reaction battalion (around 700 troops) for emergency situations; this is in addition to its attached Territorial battalions which are located ‘in the field’ as Korem (see below) and whose total numbers vary depending on the prevailing circumstances. In a period of sustained crisis, these forces are supplemented by Kostrad battalions. While approximately two-thirds of the army is engaged in internal security duties, operations are rarely conducted in any formation larger than a battalion, indicating the fairly localised nature of most operations. Army doctrine differentiated between tactical battalions, which were found in Kostrad and included at least one quick reaction force battalion for each Kodam, and Territorial battalions, which made up the majority of the units assigned to the ten Kodams. Each battalion had a strength of close to 700 men, and personnel programmes within a fixed staffing size called for recruitment of sufficient numbers to bring chronically understrength units up to authorised levels. Some of these forces were occasionally assigned on temporary missions to Kostrad or Kopassus, to constitute joint battalions (Batalyon Gabungan – Yongab).
Figure 3.4 Map of Kodam pre-1985
Figure 3.5 Map of Kodam 1985–99
Figure 3.6 Map of Kodam 1999
One of the more infamous Yongab battalions was Satgas Rajawali, of West, North and East Aceh. Rajawali was made up of Kostrad and a small number of Kopassus troops operating with some Brimob police ‘under operational coordination’ (Bawah Kendali Operasi – BKO) of the police. They were among the deadliest troops in the TNI and in fact operated entirely outside police control (other than for logistical support) but were officially identified as local ‘police officers’, whose presence, according to the Indonesian government, was intended to ‘civilianise’ or ‘demilitarise’ the Aceh conflict!

The army also has its own small air arm that performs liaison and limited transport duties. It operates one helicopter squadron and one composite squadron composed mostly of light aircraft and small transports, such as the domestically produced CASA 235. Although army recruits receive their basic training at a central training facility located in each Kodam area, specialist corps training is provided at the appropriate national corps centres. Non-commissioned officers (NCOs) are required to attend training courses and to pass examinations in their fields prior to promotion.

In terms of internal organisation, each Kodam is divided into smaller administrative units, each of which corresponds to one of the civil administrative divisions, as follows: Military Resort (Garrison) Command (Komando Resort Militer – Korem), with at least one battalion, which corresponds to the sub-provincial district (kabupaten); Military District Command (Komando Distrik Militer – Kodim), which corresponds to the sub-district (kecamatan); and Military Area Command (Komando Rayon Militer – Koramil), which corresponds to the local level (kelurahan). At the bottom of the structure, NCOs are assigned to every village (desa) in the country as NCO Village Builders (Bintara Pembina Desa – Babinsa). Thus, the army is able to maintain a presence and administrative structure that parallels the civil administration, from the level of the state all the way down to the sub-district and village levels.

Turnover of personnel

During the 1990s, there was a high turnover of officers, in terms of both middle-ranking positions and more senior appointments. At one level this situation reflected the unstable political environment in which the TNI was operating, and the increased amount of jockeying for position and political advantage that was occurring within the command structure at that time. But it also reflected a growth in the officer corps base that had begun in the early period of the New Order government and which, twenty or so years later, was producing a proportionately larger number of officers who would otherwise reasonably have assumed a higher rank. While this phenomenon was most noticeable at the top of the command structure, where such movement was closely watched and analysed for its political permutations, quantitatively more movement occurred at the midle-ranking officer level.
The accelerated rate of officer transfers and new appointments at Kodim and Korem levels reflected both the increasing number of officers coming through from the academy system as well as the destabilising effects of political retirements, reappointments and general reshuffling. One consequence of this activity was that officers thus appointed to Kodim and Korem levels were increasingly seen as having achieved their positions not through military competence but through educational background, which itself often implied a privileged upbringing. As such, and due to their often short tenures, such officers had little opportunity to gain experience or display command competence, and may have been less focused on the welfare of the troops under their command (Kammen and Chandra 1999: 64–5). Local troops who would in any case see out a number of commanding officers and, as a consequence, would entrench themselves in the local society and economy, were further encouraged to look after their own welfare by establishing businesses, protection rackets and other illegal means (see Chapter 5).

Similarly, because of the operation of shorter tours of duty in a given command position, the social networks that a local commanding officer would ordinarily have been expected to make over a longer tour were often absent. Consequently, according to Kammen and Chandra, the social mechanisms for controlling local unrest were less well established after the mid-1990s, which in turn allowed for an upsurge in general violence (1999: 65). While there is some legitimacy to the idea that social networks were less well established, the upsurge in violence was probably due to more complex reasons and not just the short tours of duty alone. Other equally if not more important reasons for the rise in violence were the divisions within the army; the greater distance at the local level between most of the army and Golkar, which controlled social administration; and the greater sense among civil groups of the possibility of redressing long-held grievances following the political fall of Suharto.

While the Territorial structure was implicit in both the organisation of the army and the administration and control of the state, as noted above, there was also an increasing amount of discussion about either modifying it or removing the army’s role. This discussion followed an MPR decree in 2000 to replace the army in regional conflict areas with national police, in particular the paramilitary Mobile Brigade (Brigade Mobil – Brimob), as a continuation of the TNI’s self-proclaimed reformist ‘New Paradigm’. In practice, however, Brimob were used to supplement TNI units (or vice versa) and, in any case, operated in conflict zones under the same command and control structure. The ‘New Paradigm’ (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4) was designed to remove the TNI from state politics. Although discussion about the removal of the army’s role from the Territorial structure had been around since 1998, the army’s head of Territorial affairs, Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo, also cautiously returned to this position. As noted, Widjojo, only a little more than a year previously, had been one of
the senior ‘reformist’ generals who had opposed dismantling the Territorial structure. The then Army Chief of Staff (and later commander-in-chief) General Endriartono Sutarto said that rather than wanting to scrap the Territorial function, the TNI’s intention was to hand it over to the national police and provincial administrations. However, he did specifically say that this should only take place when the police and local administrations were ready to assume a similar level of responsibility; that is, to operate in effect as a local civil guard. He also said that the proposed dissolution of Kodim, Koramil and Babinsa was only one of a number of options being considered by the TNI, indicating his lack of support for the idea. Agus Widjojo also admitted that although the TNI had been involved positively in civic projects in the regions, ‘In the past, there were also many deviations of TNI’s Territorial function, for instance being used as a political vehicle to ensure that Golkar won elections’ (JP 2001d). Within days of this admission, however, Agus Widjojo further explained that the process of dismantling the Territorial function would take between twelve years for Java and nineteen years for West Papua and that the TNI would construct an alternative structure to accommodate any military personnel transferred from the regions (JP 2001f). In other words, nothing of substance was expected to change. Agus Widjojo’s one-time close associate, Lieutenant General Agus Wirahadikusumah, had proposed an almost identical plan in 2000, but at that time had been howled down by his fellow generals and, because of this and other high profile attempts at reform, was later sacked from the army’s active duty list. He was found dead, officially from unknown causes, just days before Widjojo made his own announcement on the Territorial structure in August 2001.

Kostrad

The TNI’s Territorial structure ensures that in terms of geographic dispersal it is well placed throughout the archipelago and that, as a result, it is well placed to contribute to or intervene in local affairs. However, the Territorial units are poorly trained and equipped, and have what is regarded as, even by TNI standards, a low level of combat readiness. Consequently, the TNI has two branches whose prime concern is combat operations. They are Kostrad (Komando Cadangan Strategik Angkatan Darat – Army Strategic Command), which is the TNI’s primary combat unit, and Kopassus, the elite Special Forces Command. Kostrad is the principal means by which the TNI is better able to engage in higher-level military action. The author’s own experience of Kostrad, however, revealed a mixed military capacity, an assessment that was confirmed by military observers who had seen them in training.

The Kostrad troops with whom the author first spent time, in February 1999, were young, friendly, partially organised and clearly reliant on the instructions of their captain, who happened on that occasion to be in
Atambua, West Timor, having a meal with a United Nations military observer. As fortified positions went, the perimeter wall of the Kostrad compound was barely adequate and the watchtower seemed more like a target than an observation point from the dense tropical foliage beyond. As with most military camps, the primary focus here was on food and washing. If it had not been for the small creek that ran alongside the fortification facing the ‘enemy’ position, this compound would have been in a very vulnerable position. Indeed, some months earlier an Australian Interfet (International Force in East Timor) patrol had crossed the poorly delineated border and come under fire from this very position. Returning fire, the patrol killed a policeman and wounded two soldiers. This, then, was Motaeen, at that time a front-line position on the East–West Timor border, and the troops were primarily from a Kostrad brigade attached to South Sulawesi (3rd Airborne).

Refugees and UN personnel were allowed to cross the border, and the following day a colonel at Atambua issued a surat jalan (letter of travel) so I too could cross. I was given a lift by some Catholic nuns from Atambua who were travelling to Dili. A week later I spent the night with a Kenyan medical team at Batu Gade, about 700 metres from Motaeen, and in the morning walked across the border. When the soldiers lounging behind cement-filled drums recognised my hat, they stood and waved, and welcomed me back. They were, I recounted later, a bit like boy scouts with guns. There was little of the hard, alert and professional attitude that I had found on the eastern side of the border among the Australian troops. Kostrad came into being in 1958 in response to the ‘outer island’ PRRI–Permesta rebellion, which helps to explain its primary presence on Java, and was further developed in 1960 when Indonesia was increasing pressure on the Netherlands to relinquish possession of what was then Dutch New Guinea. Kostrad was formally constituted on 6 March 1961. Initially designated the Army General Reserve Corps, its name was changed to Army Strategic Reserve Command, universally known as Kostrad, in 1963. In 1984, as a consequence of the general overhaul of the
military, the Kostrad commander was made responsible to the armed forces commander for the conduct of defence and security (meaning combat) operations. Kostrad has therefore had a strong presence in places such as Aceh since the late 1980s, especially during the Military Operations Area (Daerah Operasi Militer – DOM) period (1989–98) and again since 2000.

As Indonesia’s principal combat-ready division, Kostrad is employed in most front-line or conflict situations, including any operations along the border with East Timor, in Aceh, in West Papua and, depending on the severity of the situation, in response to communal conflict in places such as Ambon/Maluku, West and Central Kalimantan, and Central Sulawesi. In West Timor near the East Timor border, Kostrad was mixed with members of Territorial units who had previously been based in East Timor (Battalions 744 and 745) and was also partly mixed with Kopassus members who had been working with the East Timorese Territorial units and militias. (This observation is based on a visit to the Korem headquarters at Atambua and a brief but forced stay at the army post at Motaeen in February 1999). The author also met and talked with Kostrad officers in Ambon who appeared to be at a lower level of readiness compared with their colleagues in West Timor, which perhaps reflected in part the different levels of tension in each place at the time, or the extended length of duty the Kostrad officers had spent in Ambon. In Central Sulawesi, in the region near the troubled town of Poso, Kostrad maintained their own posts at regular intervals along the main roads, although they appeared to mix freely with Territorial soldiers. Some were particularly keen to engage in friendly conversation about our respective experiences in East and West Timor.4

Kostrad professionalism

Although it is Indonesia’s principal combat force, Kostrad has varying capacities and levels of readiness, reflecting the effects of material limitations on the one hand and, on the other, the need for a higher alert status among some elements of the force. With regard to the latter requirement, the Rapid Reaction Strike Force (Pasukan Pemukul Reaksi Cepat – PPRC), established in 1984, is on very short notice to move into action. The PPRC is made up of Kostrad units taken usually from the Second Infantry Division and is located just south of Jakarta, about a forty minute journey from the Halim airbase and about two hours away from the Jakarta naval base. The other units based outside Jakarta are on less short notice.5 In the case of foreign attack, or more probably domestic emergency, the intention is that after an initial response conducted by Territorial units, which are by definition close at hand, the PPRC should arrive soon after to conduct the initial counter-attack or impose a higher level of security. The PPRC would then be followed up by subsequent Kostrad units. The PPRC has been widely used in action in Aceh and was deployed on the streets of Jakarta in July
1999 to help restore order after thousands of protesters demanded the revo-
cation of the state security law, leading to a confrontation that cost seven
lives.

While Kostrad soldiers are given better training than their Territorial
counterparts and are ‘very comfortable with their weapons’, the weapons
themselves are often poorly maintained. By way of illustration, the machine
guns used by the premier Kostrad battalions based near Jakarta were
rendered inaccurate as a result of the rifling being worn from the barrels. A
machine gun of the type they used would normally be supplied with a set of
two barrels, to be swapped periodically during firing to avoid overheating
and excess wear. The machine guns in question, however, had only one
barrel, the other one having been fixed to a gun in another unit. ‘When fired,
these guns would spray bullets in all directions with no accuracy at all. The
soldiers just said that they didn’t think the guns were any good because of
how inaccurate they were’ (anon.).6

Kostrad soldiers operate with a significantly higher level of military
professionalism compared with the Territorial units, are relatively well
equipped and, in most cases, are parachute trained. The standard of disci-
pline is said to be generally good within Kostrad and the corps is not
especially known for intentional human rights abuses or for unofficial atroc-
ities committed by its troops. This is not to suggest that Kostrad troops have
not been involved in such offences; they have been and continue to be, a fact
which reflects their primary function: to maintain internal security. But this
is not one of their official duties, as it is for Kopassus units (in particular
Group IV), or a consequence of low levels of training and discipline, as is
the case with Territorial soldiers. However, as with Territorial units, an
element of quasi-lawlessness is not uncommon among Kostrad troops, espe-
cially in relation to small-scale organised crime. I had the opportunity to
witness such activity in Ambon, where the local Christian preman (gang-
sters) who operated the cross-bay boat service were under the control of a
(Christian) Kostrad officer, who took payment in return for a higher level of
‘protection’.

According to a source that had been close to Kostrad, while the level of
discipline within Kostrad is generally good, it is externally enforced rather
than internally motivated, and corporal punishment is applied as a matter
of course. This means that Kostrad troops are more likely to adhere to
normative military conduct when under the direct command of an officer.
The esprit de corps among Kostrad troops is also said to be good, although one observer noted that he ‘often felt that the spirit displayed
was more form than substance. A strong sense of patriotism and loyalty is
drummed into them through rote learning and displays of martial cere-
mony and machismo. Again, the depth of the discipline and patriotism
seemed to be rather shallow sometimes, as soldiers would moonlight or
conduct mild extortion to earn extra money as a supplement to their
meagre salaries’ (anon.).
If the behaviour of Kostrad troops has been largely determined by their officers, it is worth noting that the standard of officer training and, subsequently, officer performance has varied markedly, and has sometimes been less than the standard normally expected of a prime combat force. According to one report, it was not uncommon for a middle-ranking Kostrad officer undergoing further training at Sesko, for example, to buy, from a college lecturer, the answers to and staff solutions for an assignment that he was required to produce later on in the course. Original thinking was not encouraged at the college and copying a lecturer’s answers was regarded as an intelligent move. One observer said that the object of the staff college was to pass as many students as possible so as to make the college look good.

As is the case in other TNI groups, there is a sense of hostility or superiority within Kostrad towards the police (including the military police), and competition over access to illegal business, in particular with the state police, Polri. This has led to numerous clashes between the two organisations, one of which occurred in September 2001 when belligerent Kostrad members from Batallion 501 began a fight with Polri members at a petrol filling station in Madiun, East Java. After the Kostrad soldiers were beaten, more than 100 of their number descended on a nearby police station and attacked the police there. In the mayhem, three students were shot dead and dozens were injured. In October 2002, in North Sumatra, a conflict between soldiers and police left four dead and one and a half tonnes of marijuana missing from the local police station. Such incidents – though not frequent, they are also not uncommon – have occurred two or three times a year over several years and are a fundamental aspect of the ‘security’ landscape.

Kostrad has also been accused of involvement with brutalities in Aceh and Maluku, against alleged separatists and Christians respectively. In Aceh, Kostrad soldiers allegedly assisted Territorial troops in the killing of suspected separatist sympathisers (Kontras 2001). This rise in anti-civilian Kostrad activity came after the Kostrad commander, Lieutenant General Ryamisard Riaucud ‘declared war’ on GAM (JP 2001b) and said that the organisation ‘must be eliminated’ (Xihuanet 2001). In one sense, this ‘declaration of war’ was unnecessary, as Kostrad had already been involved in a massacre of at least sixty civilians at Beutong Ateuh in West Aceh on 21 July 1999, following a failed attempt to find GAM members in the nearby district. On that occasion, a platoon from Kostrad Battalion 328 had supported members of Yonif 131 and 133 from Korem 011/Lilwangsa, all of whom were commanded by the intelligence officer from Korem 011, Lieutenant Colonel Sudjono. This group was known locally as pasukan TNI pembantai rakyat sipil (TNI civilian killers).7

In Maluku, where Kostrad was supposed to help bring an end to communal violence between Christians and Muslims, Christians claimed that in 1999 Muslim Kostrad soldiers had sided with Muslim militias in attacks on Christian villages, and in particular that Kostrad soldiers from
Kodam VII Wirabuana had massacred Christians in a Protestant church at Batu Merah, Amatelu village in the Sirimau district of the Ambon region (FICA undated). Furthermore, Kostrad was also identified as being involved in the training of East Timorese militias in 1999, although Kostrad was eventually responsible for cracking down on the militias’ illegal activities within West Timor (IO 2000).

**Kostrad and politics**

Major General (later President) Suharto was the first commander of Kostrad, and it was from this position that he organised the anti-PKI putsch which began on 1 October 1965. Thereafter the strategically important post of Kostrad commander has been filled by officers considered particularly loyal to the president. Most notably, on 1 April 1998 Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto was elevated from his position as commander of Kopassus to commander of the significantly larger Kostrad, in a move intended to secure Suharto’s crumbling political position. After Suharto’s forced resignation from the presidency on 21 May 1999, Lieutenant General Prabowo made a brief and poorly executed bid to gain command of the armed forces. However, General Wiranto, himself a former Kostrad commander, had already been reconfirmed in that position and Prabowo was reassigned from his command of Kostrad to briefly head Sesko at Bandung before being dismissed from the armed forces altogether.

Similarly, when President Abdurrahman Wahid attempted to reform the TNI, after sacking Wiranto from the Cabinet and thus breaking his principal link with the TNI, his most important move was to have Lieutenant General Agus Wirahadikusumah appointed as Kostrad commander. However, as was the case with Prabowo, he was unable to sustain this overtly political appointment in the face of widespread TNI hostility and Wirahadi Kusumah was soon dismissed. His replacement, Lieutenant General Ryamisard Ryacudu, was initially also regarded as being close to Abdurrahman Wahid, but quickly showed that his loyalties were with the conservative, ‘professional’ core faction of the TNI. Ryamisard was thereafter promoted to the position of Army Chief of Staff and was tipped to eventually succeed as TNI commander-in-chief.

Apart from its role in the PRRI–Permetsa rebellion, Kostrad has had a prime role in Operation Mandala against the Dutch in West Papua in 1962; in the 1965–66 attacks which demolished the PKI as a viable political force; the Trisula campaign against PKI remnants near Blitar in East Java in 1968; and in operations against the Sarawak People’s Guerrilla Force (PGRS) and the National Army of North Kalimantan (TNKU) in West Kalimantan after 1965. It is worth noting that Kostrad and the RPKAD (the forerunner to Kopassus; see below) had initially trained and supplied the TNKU, which, as the Brunei People’s Party (PRB), had in December 1962 attempted to both thwart the incorporation of northern Borneo into Malaysia and
create a socialist state. However, after the events of 30 September 1965, the Indonesian army turned on and wiped out the TNKU and its ethnic Chinese PGRS ally, which by this time were based in West Kalimantan (Aditjondro n.d.). Kostrad was also at the forefront of Operation Seroja, the invasion of East Timor in 1975 – which included the disastrous parachute landing on Dili in which Kostrad soldiers killed numerous TNI soldiers who were already on the ground – and has since then maintained its presence in East Timor and, from October 1999, along the East–West Timor border. Kostrad troops have also been involved in a number of international operations, including the Congo, Egypt (1973–78) and Vietnam (1973–75), as well as with combined peace forces, in the Iran–Iraq war (1989–90) and in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1996). They have also trained for a potential peace-keeping role in Afghanistan. However, although Lieutenant General Ryamizard confirmed on 22 March 2002 that Battalion 305 was prepared for the Afghanistan trip, he added that the troops may not be deemed as qualified for the mission, and would therefore only be able to participate as a back-up force. As it transpired, Indonesian military involvement in this campaign turned out to be too sensitive for the country’s santri Islamic community.

More significant, and more directly political, was the role of Kostrad in the ousting of President Abdurrahman Wahid. Although Kostrad did not participate directly in the president’s downfall, it did send a very clear signal of its loyalty, or lack thereof, by presenting on the day that Wahid was sacked as president 800 troops in full battle dress together with a number of tanks with the caps of their gun barrels removed outside Kostrad headquarters facing Merdeka Square. Lieutenant General Ryamisard Ryacudu said at the time that ‘A soldier’s politics is the nation’s politics–Let there not be a single Kostrad soldier who betrays this or becomes a traitor to the republic and people of Indonesia’ (FEER 2001). This was intended to convey the message that Kostrad would follow the wishes of the DPR before those of the president, at a time when the president, Abdurrahman Wahid, was struggling for his political survival. It was also a very clear message that Kostrad would neither protect the president nor would it thwart any bid to oust him.

Since the late 1950s, Kostrad has been at the centre of the TNI, and former Kostrad commanders have tended to be promoted to the TNI’s most senior positions. In addition, Kostrad is still the main power base for the TNI’s conservative, ‘professional’ officers (see Chapter 4). As such, as the TNI’s principal combat force and core of the conservative, ‘professional’ officer group, Kostrad’s stature as one of Indonesia’s key political forces has been further enhanced (see Ingo 2000b).

**Kopassus**

If Kostrad is the Indonesian military’s principal combat organisation, then its other centrally based, but perhaps higher profile, military command is
the infamous elite Special Forces Command (Komando Pasukan Khusus – Kopassus). Kopassus has been the force most frequently identified with the perpetration of state terror, including a wide range of covert anti-civilian activities and related human rights abuses, and as having the strongest political orientation, in addition to performing its military role. In particular, Kopassus has featured prominently in East Timor, Aceh and West Papua, as well as in a support function in combined battalions for Kodam operating in difficult areas such as Maluku. While Kopassus is best known for its counter-insurgency activity, against the armed independence movements of East Timor, Aceh and West Papua (Falintil, GAM and OPM, respectively), it has also been involved in a range of other covert ‘anti-subversion’ operations against both politically active and politically inactive civilians, either by way of a warning to others or as agent provocateur. Serving and former Kopassus members have been identified or suspected in a variety of activities, including assassinations, bombings and kidnappings, that blurred the distinction between serving the state and private security interests, most notably those connected to former President Suharto and private militias. In this sense, the activities of Kopassus have ranged over more or less conventional (although often brutal and internationally illegal) military functions, direct political activity, and private and criminal activity.

Kopassus is headquartered at Cijantung in East Jakarta and has its special warfare school in Batu Jajar in West Java. It has been through a variety of guises and name changes since its inception, with ‘Kopassus’ being but the latest variation. The original forerunner organisation to Kopassus was a company-sized commando unit called the Kesatuan Komando Teritorium III, founded by the commander of the Bandung-based Siliwangi Division, Alex Kawilarang, on 16 April 1952. The original unit of 500 men began training at Ski, Bandung, on 24 May 1952 under a former English-trained KNIL commando, Captain Rokus Bernardus Visser (later known as Major Mochamad Idjon Djanbi, having married a local woman and converted to Islam). Soon after its establishment it was moved to be under direct supervision from headquarters at Batu Jajar and its name was changed to Kesatuan Komando Angkatan Darat (KKAD – Land Force Command Unit) (Pour 1993: 109–10).

In 1955 its name was changed again, to Resimen Pasukan Komando Angkatan Darat (RPKAD – Army Troop Regiment Command), comprising three companies, each one of 300 men – ‘A’ company (combat), ‘M’ company (headquarters) and ‘Z’ company (demonstration)8 (see also Pour 1993: 97–100) – soon afterwards expanding to about 5,000 men in total. In 1959, the word ‘pasukan’ was replaced by the word ‘para’, denoting parachute capability. In 1960 the RPKAD was headquartered at its own Army Special Forces Centre (Pusat Pasukan Khusus Angkatan Darat – Puspassus).
In October 1965, Kopassus embarked on its more overtly political phase, when Brigadier General Sarwo Edhie, the RPKAD commander, was ordered by General Suharto to hunt down suspected members of the PKI in Central Java – an operation in which Muslim gangs quickly became involved, spreading the killings to East Java. It was at this time that violence and impunity became the hallmark of the New Order government and the special forces, as they assumed an overtly political role in regime and state maintenance.

The RPKAD was reorganised and renamed Kopassandha (Komando Pasukan Khusus Sandhi Yudha – Covert War Special Forces Command)\textsuperscript{9} in 1971, at which time it was reduced in size to 2,500 men before rising again slowly to between 3,500 and 4,000 men. In October 1975, members of Kopasandha were involved in covert and ‘deniable’ infiltration operations into then Portuguese Timor to assist pro-Indonesian elements, leading the attack of 7 October 1975 on the border town of Batugade (Pour 1993: 326), and in a follow-up Sandhi Yudha attack nine days later on the town of Balibo, in the hills south of Batugade.

The force eventually became known as Kopassus on 23 May 1985, at which time it was further developed and used extensively in East Timor, Aceh (from 1989) and, to a lesser extent, West Papua. It was also in the early 1980s that Kopassus became increasingly involved in clandestine operations against political activists that had been identified as potential troublemakers for Suharto’s New Order government.

In 1995, Colonel Prabowo Subianto was promoted to Brigadier General and was Kopassus commander until 1998, at which time he was moved to Kostrad. Under Prabowo, Kopassus almost doubled in size, from less than 4,000 men to around 7,000 men. (In 2001, Kopassus was reduced by about 700 to a little more than 6,000 men.) Prabowo’s membership of the Suharto family together with his grooming by Suharto as the caretaker of family business both indicate the extent to which Kopassus was used not just as a political tool but as a tool of the personal and family interests of the former corrupt president.

Although Kopassus has had an almost exclusively domestic function, it has been widely recognised as the most professional and best trained military group when compared with other South-East Asian military organisations – special forces or otherwise (the possible exception being the Vietnamese army’s special forces, the Dac Cong\textsuperscript{10}). Characteristically, Kopassus soldiers are generally well equipped (by OECD military standards), disciplined, tough, fit and are unquestioningly loyal to their commanders. Their training includes the use of covert warfare techniques such as isolation, sleep deprivation, survival, disguise and assassination by various means (including the use of traditional weapons such as blowguns, throwing knives and axes; allegedly, some have also learned to use poisons). While Kopassus troops are well suited to counter-insurgency work they do lack some basic skills such as navigation, the result, according to one military observer, of not having access to suitable maps.
Ordinary members of Kopassus are required to be proficient both in languages and in martial arts, including the principal form of martial arts for the area, Indonesian Young Knights (Satria Muda Indonesia – SMI), which usually also includes the indigenous *silat* or *merpati putih* forms; Kopassus officers are required to practice two forms of martial arts, SMI and another of their choice. Associated in particular with the use of SMI is a group known as *Kelompok Tidar* (the Tidar Group, also known as the Tidar Boys, a name derived from their training area near Mount Tidar in West Java), among whom are believed to be officer cadets who perform political ‘dirty tricks’ (such as assassinations dressed as ninjas, that is, in full black garb). Martial arts are popular among many senior officers as well as enlisted men; for example, Lieutenant General Ryamisard Ryacudu was awarded an honorary fifth dan black belt in Karate in late 2001, and former Kopassus commander Prabowo Subianto was patron of the Indonesian Silat Self-defence Society (Ikatan Pencak Silat Indonesia – IPSI), a wider martial arts network, some of whose members belonged to proto-militia organisations in East Timor.

Kopassus soldiers have also been instructed in how to harness and use mystical powers, for example, to track their enemy and see in the dark – a reflection of the Javanese influence that has pervaded much of the army. However, demonstrations of these ‘powers’ in front of others were, according to one observer, unconvincing. While this aspect of their training is certainly irregular by conventional military standards, Kopassus soldiers do not lack physical courage. To help instil such courage in his men, Prabowo, as commander of Kopassus Group III, introduced rugby as a means of toughening them up.

**Specialist groups**

Like most specialist combat organisations, Kopassus consists of a number of distinct groups, each with their own different roles. In addition, a small detachment of Kopassus troops (along with representatives of other forces) is assigned to the presidential guard, the Presidential Security Force Unit (Satuan Pasukan Pengamanan Presiden – Paspampres). There are also ‘irregular’ Kopassus units that operate well outside the formal military structure, which in some cases are made up of former Kopassus operatives who have come back on ‘freelance’ assignments (see below). Of the more formal groups, there are five in total, each led by an officer with the rank of colonel; they are discussed in more detail below.

**Group I**

Group I is based at Serang, West Java, comprises approximately 2,000 men (a size equivalent to regimental strength) and is trained in ‘conventional’ parachute commando operations (that is, traditional war roles such as long
range reconnaissance, guerrilla warfare and related activities). Group I traces its origins back to the first special forces unit and, along with Group II, is the most conventional of the Kopassus units.

**Group II**

Group II, based at Kartasura, Central Java, is also at regimental strength (made up of approximately 2,000 men), undergoes the same training as Group I and is separated for command purposes. Groups I and II were the first of the Kopassus-type units in operation; the other groups were created later.

**Group III**

Group III, based at Batu Jajar, West Java, came into being in 1963 and comprises approximately 500 members, working in Special Forces education and training. This group is experienced in all core skills (including parachute commando skills), induction, training (primarily in the Bandung-Cilacap region), parachuting and related tasks. Group III also receives additional training in counter-insurgency, including interrogation techniques and torture methods (Field 2001).

In East Timor, Group III was attached to the intelligence section of Kopassus, the SGI (Satgas Intel – Intelligence Task Force). The SGI parallels the intelligence capabilities of similar special forces units around the world and, in theory, is necessary to support infiltration and counter-insurgency work. The term ‘Satgas Intel’ is generic, and in the field the intelligence units are designated as ‘Tribuana’; until 1990, they were known under three operational commands, ‘Satgassus’ in Aceh, ‘Naggala’ in East Timor, and ‘Maleo’ in West Papua. The designation attached to each of the Tribuana groups reflects the time at which they were operational. For example, Tribuana III was attached to West Papua from December 1996 to December 1997, followed by Tribuana VII for the following twelve months, Tribuana IX after that and, from January 2000, Tribuana X; similarly, East Timor had Tribuana II, V and VIII from December 1996 until September 1999, while Aceh had Tribuana I, IV, VI and XI (Davies 2001: 22). If the number of Tribuana commands has exceeded the total available to Group III, it is because they have been supplemented by men taken from Groups I and II for training purposes, with successful candidates continuing on to Groups IV and V. At the time of writing there was some discussion of disbanding Group III’s ‘group’ status and retaining its members in a training unit.

Prabowo’s reputation as a Special Forces officer reached its peak in the closing years of the Suharto era, a period of huge labour strikes and demonstrations as pressure grew for Suharto to stand down. In order to deal with
the growing unrest, Prabowo established Kopassus’ Groups IV and V, most of whose members were recruited either from or through Group III. Group IV and V members were trained in German anti-terrorist methods, Prabowo being one of only a few Indonesian officers to have trained with Germany’s *Grenzschutzgruppe* 9/1 (GSG 9/1) anti-terrorist unit. Group IV, located at Cijantung, Jakarta, is also known as Sandhi Yudha (Covert War) – part of the name given to the special forces unit as a result of the 1971 name change mentioned above – and consists of selected members taken from Groups I, II and III. The recruits are trained again by Group IV, whose main (formal) duties are infiltrating and attacking the enemy from behind the front line.

**Group IV**

Group IV comprises approximately 800 men who work with the Joint Intelligence Unit on interrogations and domestic clandestine operations. These operations include the majority of Kopassus’ most controversial and politically problematic roles, such as ‘deep cover’ activities, agent running, assassinations, sabotage, intelligence, espionage and as agents provocateur. In particular, Group IV has focused on infiltrating what were deemed to be opposition groups, acting as agents provocateurs in order to legitimise official crackdowns.

If there was ever any doubt about Group IV’s clandestine function, it was quickly dispelled when its training manual and covering letter, marked ‘Confidential’ and signed by the then Deputy Army Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Johny Lumintang, was leaked in mid-2002 (see Figures 3.7–3.9). The training manual cited, among other things, ‘tactics and techniques’ for the following activities: conducting a ‘war of nerves’, propaganda, kidnapping, terror, agitation, sabotage, and psychological operations (Lumintang 1999: 35). The covert and intelligence roles of Group IV, and indeed Kopassus members generally, stem from the period 1974–75, when the army hierarchy was divided between operational officers and intelligence officers. Jenkins notes that the planning of the initial attacks against what was then Portuguese Timor were organised by senior intelligence officers, in particular by Benny Murdani, and then undertaken by the forerunner to Kopassus, Kopassandha; the army was only involved in the invasion plan after that, and without the knowledge of some senior officers such as the deputy commander of the armed forces and the commander of Kostrad (Jenkins 1987: 22–8, esp. n22). Thereafter, the Special Forces maintained a more covert (that is, secret or ‘intelligence’) orientation than did the rest of the army.

Members of Group IV often grow their hair long, dress in non-conformist civilian clothes, set up secret cells based on groups of five, and sometimes carry out assassinations and other acts of terror; furthermore, they do not formally recognise or salute superior officers when outside their base. Group IV frequently recruits criminals as auxiliaries, something that
KONFIDENSIAL

TENTARA NASIONAL INDONESIA
MARKAS BESAR ANGKATAN DARAT

BUKU PETUNJUK PEMBINAAN
tentang
SANDI YUDHA TNI AD

Nomor : 43 - B - 01

PENGESAHAN

SURAT KEPUTUSAN KASAD
NOMOR : SKEP / 365 / VI / 1999
TANGGAL : 30 Juni 1999

TAHUN 1999

DILARANG MEMPERBANYAK ATAU MENGUTIP TANPA IJIN KASAD

KONFIDENSIAL

Figure 3.7 Cover sheet of the Kopassus Group IV training manual
2) Latihan. Dilaksanakan di basis untuk memelihara kemampuan Sandi Yudha TNI AD yang sudah dimiliki dengan cara:

a) Pelajaran teori Sandi Yudha TNI AD di kelas diatur dan disesuaikan dengan jadwal kegiatan satuan yang meliputi:
   1) Taktik dan teknik Perang urat saraf.
   2) Taktik dan teknik Propaganda.
   3) Taktik dan teknik Penculikan.
   4) Taktik dan teknik Terror.
   5) Taktik dan teknik Agitasi.
   6) Taktik dan teknik Sabotase.
   7) Taktik dan teknik Penyusupan.
   8) Taktik dan teknik Penyurupan.
   9) Taktik dan teknik Penyadapan.
  10) Taktik dan teknik Foto Intelijen.
  11) Taktik dan teknik Operasi Psikologi.

b) Ujian tertulis untuk mengetahui sejauh mana pendalaman anggota tentang pelajaran teori Sandi Yudha TNI AD yang telah diberikan.

c) Praktek lapangan secara perorangan / kelompok untuk mempraktekan teori dan pelajaran Sandi Yudha TNI AD yang telah diberikan.

3) Penugasan. Semua personel Sandi Yudha TNI AD mempunyai kesempatan yang sama dalam menerima penugasan khususnya di daerah operasi. Penugasan di daerah operasi merupakan suatu sarana yang tepat untuk menguji kemampuan personel Sandi Yudha TNI AD.

Figure 3.8 Contents of the Kopassus Group IV training manual
was especially apparent in operations conducted in East Timor and, later, in West Papua. Also, unusually for a combat military group, but perhaps in keeping with its covert and intelligence functions, Group IV, so some close observers have claimed, includes a number of female operatives.

Group V

Group V, formerly known as Detachment 81, is also located in Cijantung, South Jakarta. It is much smaller than Group IV, comprising approximately 200 men (although some estimate its membership to be as many as 800). Group V primarily conducts counter-terrorist activities, including anti-hijacking and special recovery operations and hostage rescues. It also provides protection for VIPs and visiting foreign dignitaries, as well as security for its diplomats based in sensitive overseas posts (such as Australia). Group V is best known for its success in freeing the hostages of a hijacked Indonesian aeroplane at Don Muang airport, Thailand, in 1981.
Another of Group V’s high-profile operations took place in 1996 when, under the direct command of Brigadier General Prabowo, it attempted the rescue of nine hostages from the Worldwide Fund for Nature who were being held by the Free Papua Organisation (Organisasi Papua Merdeka – OPM). However, it was regarded as only a marginal success when it was later revealed that the OPM had been moving around within a couple of kilometres of Group V troops for several days prior to the freeing of the hostages. Two of the hostages were killed in the rescue, while others made their own way to a group of Territorial soldiers who were also involved in the search (Start 1997: 320–7). Although the ‘rescue’ was initially played up as a success for Kopassus, it was later portrayed as an illustration of Prabowo’s poor leadership.

Like Group IV, Group V is also renowned for the kidnapping or killing of opposition figures during the latter period of the New Order government, and together with other Groups was involved in operations in Aceh and West Papua. Group V consists of select members of Group IV and is regarded as the most highly skilled and best equipped of the force.

Finally, as the officer who was most keen to develop Kopassus, it is worth noting again that Prabowo was also the only Indonesian officer to have completed anti-terrorist training with Germany’s GSG 9/1. Consequently, it is thought that Group V’s internal structure – organised into twenty- to thirty-man teams – is closely modelled on that of GSG 9/1 (as well as that of the British SAS). (These aforementioned teams are further subdivided into assault and sniper groups; all personnel receive special forces, parachute and other training, and many are qualified for underwater work.)

Kopassus ‘irregulars’

In August 1998, Prabowo, the then commander of Kostrad, admitted to a military investigation team that, as commander of Kopassus, he had been responsible for a series of political kidnappings and disappearances. He and two other senior Kopassus officers were removed from their posts, and Prabowo was eventually dismissed from the army. In addition, a number of Kopassus Group V members were also tried and given minor sentences. These soldiers were from the sub-group known as Tim Mawar (Rose Team), eleven of whom were eventually sentenced to between twelve and twenty-two years in prison. After Prabowo’s dismissal, several Group IV and V platoons were reported as having defected. Since then, there have been unofficial reports of ‘phantom’ troops operating in Aceh and Maluku, which suggests that these ‘disappeared’ Kopassus platoons were still active, albeit outside any accountable command structure. Furthermore, it is believed that some of these Kopassus members were deployed with several thousand Islamic Laskar Jihad (Holy Warriors), who were operating against local Christian militias in Maluku in 2000 and 2001, and in Sulawesi from 2001. The more radical mujahidin in Maluku have also been linked with Kopassus
(although this has not been confirmed), especially through their penchant for wearing black ninja outfits that are otherwise favoured by Kopassus troops when conducting clandestine operations. Kopassus members were also identified as having been involved in the training of the Laskar Jihad near Bogor in West Java in early 2000.

This type of activity has been connected with an officially unrecognised or ‘irregular’ wing of Kopassus, known as milsus (militer khusus – ‘special military’), allegedly comprising former or in some cases serving Kopassus troops, including NCOs (that is, sergeants, corporals, etc.). The term milsus should be distinguished from milsas, which in fact refers to paramilitary militias, who are often trained by milsus members. These milsus (and their milsas proxies) have been used for covert or illegal operations, especially against civilians, in which formal military involvement would have invited a strongly negative international response. Furthermore, the milsus have never been an acknowledged part of the army, despite the fact that, according to documents leaked from East Timor in 1999, they operate on the army payroll and under army orders (anon.; Tapol 1999b). Aditjondro has claimed that there are about 3,000 milsus, based in East Kalimantan, and that they are highly trained (to the extent that some NCOs are able to fly aeroplanes) (Aditjondro 2000b). It has been reported elsewhere that Kopassus members have been operating with and, in many cases, leading local pro-Jakarta militias in East Timor since late 1998 and early 1999, and that they were responsible for much of the violence and destruction in the lead-up to and the aftermath of the ballot on self-determination held on 30 August 1999.

Allegedly, Kopassus members were also involved in the so-called ‘ninja killings’ in East Java in 1997, in which attackers wore the black ninja outfits later seen in Maluku. The ‘ninja killings’ were attacks against clerics from the rural Islamic organisation Nahdlatul Ulama, which appeared to be intent on fomenting religious strife in the months prior to Suharto’s downfall, and were designed apparently to derail protests against his rule. About three hundred people were murdered in these attacks.

By late 2001, Kopassus had come under the close supervision of the BIN chief, Lieutenant General Hendropriyono, and some sources claimed that Groups IV and V were operating under his personal command. The close relationship between Hendropriyono and Kopassus reflected the ‘intelligence’ aspect of much of the latter’s work, through which it might legitimately be brought closer to BIN. But it also reflected Hendropriyono’s personal relationship with the corps, as well as his desire to exercise a very particular type of political influence that, for many observers, was reminiscent of that exercised by General Benny Murdani when he was head of intelligence. Hendropriyono had been close to Murdani earlier in his military career, and as a Korem commander at Lampung (Danrem 041 Garuda Hitam), then Colonel Hendropriyono was in charge of a group of soldiers who attacked the ‘islamic’ village of Talangsari at Lampung on 7 February 1989, killing up to three hundred men, women and children. This event left Hendropriyono
labelled as ‘The Butcher of Lampung’. Hendropriyono also saw extensive active service as a Kopassus officer in East Timor. At a time when other retired generals were more discreet about their continuing military connections, Hendropriyono was one of the overtly ‘political’ generals, occupying an influential position in the Cabinet of President Megawati Sukarnoputri.

The murder of Theys Eluay

On 10 November 2001, the Secretary-General of the Papuan Presidium Council (Presidium Dewan Papua – PDP), Theys Hiyo Eluay, was murdered. The PDP is the main political organisation in West Papua working for independence from Indonesia, and is in practice the civilian wing of the OPM. The PDP briefly received official endorsement from President Abdurrahman Wahid, although this was quickly rescinded, under pressure, while he was still president. Eluay was murdered while driving home after a dinner with the Kopassus commander at Kopassus headquarters at Hamadi, near the provincial capital of West Papua, Jayapura. Although it was made to seem as though his car had left the road and that he had been killed in the resulting crash, the car had in fact come to rest close to the roadside against a tree, and tests quickly showed that the cause of death had been suffocation. Suspicion immediately focused on the provincial commander of Kopassus, with whom Eluay had had dinner that evening to celebrate National Heroes Day. However, despite numerous attempts to subvert the investigation, information was eventually gathered which indicated what had actually happened to Eluay.17

As Theys was being driven home his car was rammed by another vehicle, forcing him to stop. A group of men from the ramming vehicle then murdered Eluay, put his body back in his car and then pushed it over the steep edge of the road, where it came to rest against a tree rather than plunging to the depths below. The body of Theys’ driver was never found. The car involved in the ramming was traced by police back to the Kopassus compound, where it was discovered damaged and with traces of paint on it from Eluay’s vehicle. A number of Kopassus members were subsequently interviewed and, according to a source close to the investigation, admitted to murdering Eluay. However, they refused to sign a confession and, as members of the TNI, could only be tried in a military court. Consequently, the civil investigation foundered at this stage. The principal Kopassus members being investigated for the murder were not part of the Kopassus group based in Jayapura, or West Papua, but belonged instead to Group V and had been sent from Jakarta. It has been alleged by a number of sources that the group that was sent to kill Eluay was under the orders of a senior, retired and politically active general as part of his campaign to quell regional dissent. Reports in the news magazine Tempo Interaktif and in the Jakarta Post later supported this assessment, identifying the alleged killers as Lieutenant Colonel Hartomo, Major Doni Hutabarat and Captain Rionardo, who were assisted by Lt. Agus Supranto, Sgt. Asrial,
Sgt. Lorensius and Pvt. Achmad Zulfahmi. Three of the accused were seen that night securing the route for the Kopassus vehicle just before Theys was murdered, while Nyoman was also seen in the killer’s car. The Tempo Interaktif article said that the order to kill Theys Eluay had come via a captain of the Sandhi Yuda battalion (Group IV), who in turn was passing on an order from a lieutenant colonel, which before that had come from an ‘intelligence body’ operating outside the formal Kopassus command structure (Maha Adi et al. 2002). Furthermore, in early 2002 a number of other civilians were also identified as being on a Kopassus anti-dissident ‘hit list’. However, while numerous other killings have occurred in Aceh since then, the international and domestic furore caused by Eluay’s murder appears to have dampened the enthusiasm for killing anyone else on this list18 – although a PDP leader in the central highlands did die in suspicious circumstances in June 2002, which the locals attributed to poisoning. In May 2002, another Kopassus member attached to the Tribuana Task Force, Sergeant Yani, was arrested after he attempted to murder the key witness to the Theys investigation, Yaret Imoy (JP 2002c).

**Domestic training**

Each member of Kopassus is trained to a relatively high level, and, like members of other special forces around the world, must posses a range of special skills, including: combat free-fall parachuting, diving, sniping, moun-taineering, electronic warfare, psychological warfare, and the ability to master at least two indigenous languages (officers must also speak some foreign languages).

Yet according to one close observer:

Despite relatively modern doctrine and training there seems to be in many instances a deep-seated belief in animism and mysticism. This is more a part of the Javanese culture than TNI culture. But what this does is take training time away from weapon training and other military skills. This belief has advantages as well, such as identifying with local people due to shared belief systems which assists the total defence concept. As far as I can tell TNI continues to experience problems with their junior leadership who are rarely allowed to display any real initia-tive, obedience being the primary quality. And form is extremely important. I guess this also could fall within the cultural sphere as it wouldn’t do to make the boss lose face by questioning his orders or suggesting something better.

The really interesting thing is the reliance on quasi-mystical powers (for night work, tracking, etc.), which seems a major flaw, and perhaps more importantly the lack of critical judgement, initiative and respon-sibility. I do understand that soldiers need to understand their place in the chain of command, but there are also circumstances where soldiers
also have to act on their own, within the parameters of orders. This also seems to apply to the officer training situation, where what is required is not substance but form. In significant part, this seems to derive from the deferential approach to social and official relations, in which there is a strong social hierarchy and where questioning is either seen as stupidity or impolite.

(Anon.)

Kopassus recruits are selected not only for their physical and mental toughness, but also for their ideological soundness (due to the fact that they are heavily tasked with combating subversive movements throughout Indonesia). Those who pass the initial screening process are then permitted to take part in selection. Selection lasts for nine months, with heavy emphasis on physical endurance. The selection process ends with a 380-kilometre march through mountainous terrain with only very basic rations. After passing this, candidates undertake a week-long ‘escape and evasion’ test where capture means failure. Those who succeed, however, reach the rendezvous at a remote beach where the graduation ceremony later takes place.

In addition to the physical and skills training, the psychological training of soldiers is seen as equally important, in particular among the special forces. According to a close observer of the TNI:

There is also an issue of patriotism and esprit de corps/machismo. There seems to be a high level of machismo throughout the TNI, expressed as a slightly pumped up pride at senior officer level. This is often played out in a freewheeling approach to the exercise of authority, or power, in non-military situations, especially around the margins of business or other military-social financial considerations: protection etc. The patriotism part is interesting, as it seems to be an embedding of elite ‘nationalist’ values in what amounts to a sort of praetorian guard. That is, soldiers end up identifying with particular state or institutional/sectional interests, not with the state as the repository of general civilian interest. It is also particularly useful in the descending order of ‘professionalism’ in ingraining the idea of the cohesion of the unitary state in the minds of those given the task of enforcing its writ on the ground. The obedience, nationalism, machismo and even elitism are tools used by the executive to camouflage their own agendas within a corrupt system. Not only do these tools allow them to control the troops but it also allows them to rationalise their own actions to themselves.

(Anon.)

From 1975 until at least 1999, East Timor has been the most important ‘training ground’ for Kopassus (and its forerunners).19 Even as late as September 1999 Kopassus was still highly active in East Timor, organising anti-independence militias. Although ample proof of this activity already
existed, a number of suspected members of Kopassus were detained by Interfet forces in East Timor, who at the time were sweeping the territory for armed militiamen. Approximately ten men who appeared to be militia were seized, and some were found to be carrying Kopassus identity cards.

Initially, the East Timor military command operated the Kopassus and Kostrad troops via central command, and the Territorial units via local command. However, because of a high level of resistance from members of Falintil, direct practical command was increasingly transferred to Kopassus itself. By 1993 the overarching military command in East Timor was dissolved and its functions were secretly transferred to Kopassus Group III. Consequently, Group III came to dominate both the central and Territorial lines of command, and it was from Group III that many lower-level Territorial commanders originated. As such, Kopassus came to dominate army operations in its most consistently troubling area of operations.

Kopassus also ‘trained’ in Aceh and West Papua, where they would venture into villages to form local bases of resistance against insurgents (see Figure 3.10). This activity was particularly noticeable in Central Aceh among Javanese transmigrants. These transmigrants were recruited and armed by the TNI and trained by Kopassus, in theory to defend themselves from attacks by GAM rebels. GAM officials claimed that these Javanese ‘militias’ were in fact actively employed against nearby Acehnese villagers, as a means of strengthening Javanese control over central Aceh.20

Figure 3.10  Map of Aceh militia bases
Foreign training

Kopassus’ own training programme was originally modelled on that of the Netherlands’ army’s Commando Corps Troops (Korps Commando Troepne – KCT); later, it was modelled on that of the US Green Berets, under whom some Kopassus members (especially from Groups IV and V) were trained in urban warfare. Kopassus troops have also received training from other countries, including Britain, Germany and Australia, where its parallel organisation is the Special Air Service Regiment (SASR). Kopassus training in Australia (as well as that of Singaporean Defence Force personnel) was undertaken at the Australian Defence Force (ADF) area at Shoalwater Bay near Proserpine in Queensland. Until 1999, Australian SASR troops also trained with Kopassus in West Java. During the OPM hostages operation of 1996, Group IV were also assisted and trained by five members of a South African mercenary organisation, Executive Outcomes, and after the event, Brigadier General Prabowo went to the ADF SASR base near Perth, Western Australia, to address them on details of the campaign (Cronau 2000).

Kopassus training in Australia and the US was suspended indefinitely as a result of the breakdown in relations between Australia and Indonesia over the violence which followed the independence ballot in East Timor in 1999, and Australia’s high-level participation in Interfet. Ironically, it was privately conceded that alleged ‘militias’ who were operating across the border from West Timor against Australian soldiers were, in many cases, Kopassus.21

Kopassus members were also used for training and leading other forces, both officially and unofficially, in the form of combined battalions (Yongab). An example of official training and leading occurred in Ambon, where discipline among locally based soldiers was poor after two years of fighting between Islamic and Christian militias. Numerous Territorial soldiers had defected or briefly taken up arms to support one side or the other (usually although not exclusively the Muslim side), while many more had tried to capitalise on local problems by running protection, extortion and black market rackets. Kopassus troops from Groups I, II and IV (the latter with specialist marines and air force commandos, the Rapid Reaction Strike Force (Pasukan Pemukul Reaksi Cepat – PPRC), forming a joint battalion under a Kopassus major) were introduced to Ambon in late 2001 with the purpose of imposing discipline.22 Among other things, Kopassus members led local or Territorial units in ‘pacification’ operations, which reportedly boosted morale and operational efficiency. And it was also said that Kopassus members helped to clean up the worst cases of military corruption: the offending party would be told to cease illegal activities and then, if they had not done so within a given (often short) time, they were unofficially punished. Such punishments ranged from serious beatings to being hit by a car, none of which could be officially attributed to other members of the TNI. Within a few weeks, the high level of disorder and lawlessness that had characterised the TNI in Ambon was reduced to a more
‘conventional’ level. It should be noted, however, that some TNI-run ‘protection’ rackets continued to operate, albeit at a lower level and more in keeping with ‘conventional’ TNI practice.

A bombing in front of the Amboina Hotel in central Ambon city in early April 2002, not long after the signing of the Malino II Accord, killed seven people and injured around sixty others. The bombers dropped a radio from the van in which they escaped; the radio was later identified as a type used by the TNI. A Kopassus officer was also killed in a shoot-out with Brimob officers in Aceh just a few days after the Ambon bombing incident. On this occasion, a man dressed in civilian clothes shot dead a Brimob officer in a motorcycle taxi near a bus station in Lohksukon, about thirty kilometres east of Lhokseumawe. The Brimob officer and the motorcycle taxi driver were killed instantly, and Brimob officers at a nearby post who saw the incident opened fire, killing the assailant. He was later identified as a Kopassus officer. There was no explanation for the killing and a TNI spokesman initially denied that a Kopassus officer had been involved. Theories as to why the Brimob officer had been killed ranged from a personal dispute or a dispute over business (or the imposition of discipline related to ‘business’ activities) to highlighting the vulnerability of Brimob (and thereby reinforcing the necessity of Kopassus) in Aceh.

Other military units, paramilitary police, militias and covert agencies

The marines

The Indonesian navy has a total of 47,000 personnel, 13,000 of whom are marines and 1,000 of whom belong to naval aviation units. It has Western and Eastern fleets, based at Jakarta and Surabaya respectively, with seventeen frigates, thirty-six patrol craft and a range of other amphibious, support and miscellaneous craft.

The Indonesian navy has always occupied a slightly unusual place in Indonesia’s military politics, being historically more liberal than the army, more sympathetic to or influenced by communism in the period before the rise of the New Order government, and, generally, widely regarded as far less repressive than army units. Although the navy was purged with the rise of the New Order, to remove elements linked to or sympathetic with the PKI, and has occupied since then a subservient position to that of the army, in the period since Suharto’s fall it has reasserted its political credentials. The navy’s primary combat unit, the marines, were called out onto Jakarta’s streets in May 1998 to quell rioting without brutality, and were accepted by many of the protesters as military saviours. The marines were thereafter used in a number of delicate protest situations, which could have otherwise led to significant bloodshed. They maintained their reputation for being ‘friends of the people’ by overseeing peaceful resolutions. Furthermore, the
political rise of the navy was evident in the appointment of Admiral Widodo as the TNI’s commander-in-chief following Wiranto’s removal in 2000. For a while it even appeared as though President Abdurrahman Wahid was trying to use the navy to subvert the political authority of the army, although, if that was his intention, the TNI in fact held together more firmly than he would have liked and was largely unanimous in its desire to see him removed from office. Similarly, the marines may have performed a benign function in and around Jakarta in the period after May 1998, but their presence elsewhere in the archipelago, such as East Timor and Aceh, has been as a far more conventional element of the TNI’s strategy for maintaining the unity of the state.

The marines play a principal, active part in the navy’s efforts to maintain Indonesia’s territorial integrity. The 13,000 marines comprise two infantry brigades, one special forces battalion and one combat support regiment. At one time plans were underway to bring marine numbers up to 23,000 personnel through the development of a new brigade to be based at Rate Island near Lampung in southern Sumatra (The Editors 1999: 134). Marines are ordinarily associated with conventional military duties, although with a focus on seaports and waterways. In the swamps of eastern Aceh, for instance, marine units equipped with amphibious vehicles are used instead of Kostrad or Brimob units.

In addition to their more conventional units, the marines also have their own special forces unit, the Kesatuan Gurita, established in 1982 and based at the port of Jakarta, which is akin to the US Navy Seals. This unit is intended primarily for counter-terrorist operations at naval installations and other offshore sites, such as hijacked shipping or oil platforms. Recruits are drawn from the marine corps’ underwater demolition team and from amphibious reconnaissance units, and undergo limited hostage rescue training. There are about 250 members of Kesatuan Gurita, divided into ten teams which in turn are sub-divided into operational groups of about eight men.

Separate from the marines and the Kesatuan Gurita is the navy’s other special forces unit, Dive Force Command (Komando Pasukan Katak—Kopaska). Kopaska was formed on 31 March 1962 by President Sukarno to participate in the West Papua campaign, in which they were required to guide torpedoes into Dutch shipping in what amounted to suicide missions. The formation of Kopaska was influenced by the early US Navy underwater demolition and contemporary Navy Sea Air Land (SEAL) teams, and based on the training they received at Coronado, California and at Norfolk, Virginia. Kopaska comprises approximately 300 men, divided into two groups: one is attached to Western fleet, based in Jakarta, and the other to Eastern fleet, based on Surabaya, East Java. Its main duty is underwater demolition; other tasks include raiding enemy’s ships and bases, destroying underwater installations, beach reconnaissance, prisoner snatches, and preparing beaches for larger naval amphibious operations. The unit also deploys seven-man teams to serve as security personnel for VIPs, as well as
to the Paspampres. Furthermore, they are responsible for limited search-and-rescue duties and have been deployed as part of UN peacekeeping forces. Recruitment for Kopaska draws exclusively on navy personnel other than from the marines. Of the more than 700 men who sign up each year, usually less than twenty pass initial selection, after which they undergo physical training, basic underwater training, commando training and parachute training. Only about five or six men complete the full training cycle. As Kopaska operates separately from the marines, the marines also have a similar unit, known as Amphibious Reconnaissance (Pasukan Intai Amfibi – Taifib).

**The air force**

The air force has a total of 27,000 personnel, with seventeen attack aircraft and twelve reconnaissance aircraft, along with approximately thirty-seven helicopters and a number of transports. However, more than half of the aircraft are not operational, due to the lack of spare parts.

Like the navy, the Indonesian air force, when compared with the army, has occupied a politically more liberal and subsequently less influential position in Indonesian political affairs. Furthermore, like the navy, it was also purged in the period after 1 October 1965, and only began to rebuild its political influence after Suharto’s fall. That said, the air force has been involved in a number of operations against separatist forces throughout the archipelago, most notably in East Timor, West Papua and Aceh. The air force’s capabilities were considerably diminished, however, by the twin effects of a ban by the US Congress on the sale or provision of military equipment to the TNI following events in East Timor in 1999, and by the impact of the economic crisis on the TNI’s official and non-official budget. Since 2000, it has been variously estimated that up to two-thirds of the Indonesian air force has been out of action due to a shortage of spare parts.

The air force maintains a ground force of five battalions, the Rapid Reaction Strike Force (Paskuan Pemukul Reaksi Cepat – PPRC\(^2\)), primarily for use in the defence of air installations. It also maintains a smaller unit for counter-terrorist purposes. This group is known as the Counter-Terrorist Task Force (Satgas Atbara). Satgas Atbara is an elite unit whose members are selected from the PPRC. This team specialises in hostage rescue situations involving hijacked aircraft and potentially any other anti-terrorist activities that might occur at Indonesian air force bases. Satgas Atbara is based at the Sukarno-Hatta International Airport, Jakarta.

**Formation of militias**

In East Timor, in August 1999, it was possible to identify militia members by their T-shirts and sometimes caps, which announced which militia group they were members of. Aitarak members wore black T-shirts with white
print, Besi Merah-Putih members wore olive T-shirts with yellow print, and Halilintar members wore red and green T-shirts and caps. In the early part of the campaign to destabilise the ballot on independence, militiamen usually carried large knives or machetes, and paraded with home-made weapons such as crude shotguns. But as August progressed, the militiamen were more often seen armed with standard TNI weapons, in particular M16 and SS1 assault rifles. The militias paraded or congregated in large groups, rarely travelling alone, for they were deeply hated by the vast majority of East Timorese. Although violence had been rife – murders, rapes and house burnings were regular events – automatic gunfire became increasingly common as the campaign progressed. The morning after the office of the Dili National Council for Timorese Resistance (CNRT) was opened it was raked with automatic gunfire, and on 26 August, a few days before the ballot, a wholesale militia riot broke out in Dili, during which people were shot in the streets. The following day, hundreds of militiamen travelled in convoy to Maliana, near the West Timor border, and then attempted to ransack the nearby village of Memo. The militiamen were escorted to the village by police, who blocked off the roads to let them pass unimpeded. There they killed two people and burned around a dozen houses. It was only because the people of Memo organised and fought back, killing two militiamen, that they managed to save their village from total destruction. A militia rally in Maliana hours after the attack weakly attempted to blame the violence on Falintil. On the afternoon of Monday 30 August 1999, militia violence disrupted voting at the village of Ritabou, near Maliana, and the polling booth there was closed early. The village was razed that afternoon. It was the start of what was to become the razing of around three-quarters of the buildings in East Timor, the killing of many hundreds, probably thousands, of people and the forced movement of more than a quarter of a million people into West Timor. Up until the moment when the author, an accredited UN observer, was forced to leave East Timor, it was quite apparent that the militia, uniformed TNI and plain-clothes intelligence officers were working very closely to destabilise and disrupt the ballot process, and that they acted in concert in the aftermath of the ballot. It was, of course, only one illustration of how many of Indonesia’s militias can and do function. But it was a very graphic illustration.

Following these events in 1999, Indonesia’s militias achieved considerable international notoriety. Although unheard of in the outside world prior to 1999, by 2001 various militia groups were active in West Timor, Aceh, West Papua, Maluku, Sulawesi and elsewhere. It should be noted, however, that militia organisation in West Papua was not the same as, or on the level of, that experienced in East Timor. Furthermore, militia members blended in more with the general population, and tended to infiltrate, or at least try to infiltrate, local pro-independence organisations.

As discussed below, the militias have a longer and more formal history than is generally credited, but the more recent and generally higher-level
militia activities may be traced to their development in East Timor as what amounts to ‘deniable’ components of the TNI. Their ‘deniable’ aspect is important, as the TNI was under some pressure from 1998 onwards to ‘clean up’ its reputation, both domestically and, more importantly for the Indonesian government, internationally.

Despite their officially accredited status as adjunct security organisations, according to a close observer of the TNI:

The militias that we’ve seen in East Timor and more recently in West Papua are the thugs and bully boys created by TNI to further their divide-and-conquer designs. They are totally ad hoc and outside of TNI doctrine. The term ‘militia’ was just used in an attempt to legitimise their existence.

(anon.)

These militia-style paramilitary groups – or militias as they are known generically – were supposed to contribute to Indonesia’s Total People’s Defence doctrine but, in practice, have further distributed and diluted the authority of the army down to the most local level of society. They operate as subservient and essentially deniable supplementary forces to the army’s Territorial units, although in critical situations they are usually organised by specialist elements within the army, such as Kopassus. In the early 1990s, total militia numbers were estimated to be between 70,000 and 100,000 personnel. In times of emergency, the various militias come under the command of the army area commander. The principal type of militia groups include Kamra (People’s Security Force) and Wanra (Perlawanan Rakyat – People’s Resistance), both of which come under the heading of Ratih (Rakyat Terlatih – Civilian Militia, literally ‘Trained People’). The militia groups Hansip (Pertahanan Sipil – Civil Defence Force) and Pam Swakarsa (Voluntary Militia) are organised by the TNI, while Ratih is technically under the control of the Ministry of Home Affairs. In practical terms, there is considerable overlap between the various formal militia groups (see Figure 3.11).

The idea of assigning militias as auxiliary forces primarily to the army but also to the police to help maintain order in areas prone to ‘security disturbances’ was publicly developed in late 1998 by the then defence minister, General Wiranto. The initial proposal to develop a new form of Ratih was at the time supported by the then chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama, Abdurrahman Wahid, who was then close to Wiranto. However, the initial proposal failed to gain support from some senior army officers, or from large sections of civil society, who viewed the proposed development as potentially repressive. With the failure of the new Ratih proposal, Kamra was instead formed outside the Home Affairs structure, and was legitimised by Presidential Decree No. 55 of 1978. In any case, militia history goes back further than its association with Wiranto, dating back to at least the mid-1980s.
The original Ratih is the oldest category of militia organisation, its first role being as a component of the Total People’s Defence and Security System. Under this system, the armed forces functioned as the main element of defence and was assisted in its duties by Ratih. The intention was for Ratih to face both invasions and internal rebellions; however, its only function to date has been the latter, and even then its job has been to assist in suppressing expressions of concern or grievance rather than true rebellions. In an operational sense, Ratih functions under Polri (the Indonesian state police). Kamra was perhaps more closely linked to the handling of regional security, while Wanra, which was also a part of Ratih, was focused on external enemies. Wanra is a part-time local military auxiliary under Korem command.

Kamra comprises civilian paramilitaries recruited and trained by the Indonesian army to serve in army and police auxiliary units. It was originally created to assist police personnel. Recruiting for Kamra began in January 1999 while the training programme started a month later, during which the army trained a total of 40,000 unemployed youths. An initial two-week training period was carried out by an educational institution belonging to the Indonesian army in camps at Korem military area bases, and was followed by a further three months of operational training. The original intention was to recruit approximately 29,000 Kamra members, but the number was later increased to around 40,000. Kamra personnel were
initially armed with shields, batons and handcuffs, and were authorised to make arrests and to take information from suspects.

Hansip is drawn from the local community and operated under government control through the department of home affairs at the village, sub-district and district levels. Part of Hansip’s duties are of a social/civil nature, and include giving basic social assistance to the local community. While Hansip is under the supervision of the district head and the governor of the province, who are in turn responsible to Home Affairs, the army provides its weapons and training and, in effect, is its local, practical supervisor (FAS 2001).

The Pam Swakarsa voluntary militia has neither a formal line of accountability nor does it exist within the state’s official defence and security structure, a situation that has been the cause of some disquiet. By way of illustration, in 1998 in response to a directive from the then commander-in-chief, General Wiranto, the army recruited approximately 125,000 civilians to bolster the defence of the special session of the DPR as it debated legislative provisions for the 1999 elections. Many of the Pam Swakarsa volunteers were recruited from violent criminal gangs and were eventually withdrawn after attacking demonstrators. Other Pam Swakarsa groups in Central Java were allegedly responsible for the vigilante killing of suspected criminals (which is ironic, given their own origins). Pam Swakarsa groups in East Timor were also often centred on criminal gangs or on thugs imported from West Timor and elsewhere, and formed the basis of the territory’s militia groups, which were closely linked to and, in part, merged with the army. The Pam Swakarsa in East Timor were rationalised as self-defence groups, intended to ward off the threat from the ‘terrorist’ Falintil. However, this was an exceptionally thin piece of logic, given that there was no Falintil terror campaign, they did not attack civilians, and not least because the Pam Swakarsa themselves perpetrated violence on the people they were allegedly ‘protecting’. It was, in short, a typical piece of New Order government logic, in which politically palatable rhetoric was diametrically opposed to the unpalatable truth. It was these militias (and their army colleagues) who in 1998 and 1999 created a climate of terror throughout the territory, murdering and raping numbers of pro-independence activists and destroying homes ahead of the 1999 ballot on independence, and contributing to the widespread killing and destruction that occurred during the post-ballot period.

**TNI–East Timor militia links**

The involvement of Kopassus in East Timor dates back to the very first days of Indonesia’s involvement in the territory, and the involvement of its forerunner, Kopassandha, goes back even further to before Indonesia’s invasion in December 1975. General Benny Murdani, who helped to plan the invasion (and who later became the armed forces commander-in-chief),
was previously a colonel with Kopassandha, and had helped to turn it into an organisation suitable for covert military and political activities. Prior to Indonesia’s formal invasion of the territory, Kopassandha troops were deeply involved from September through to December 1975 in covert operations against East Timor, in particular disguised as and leading ‘irregular’ Apodeti (Associacao Popular Democratica de Timor – Timor Popular Democratic Association) /UDT troops. It was disguised Kopassandha troops, under the command of the then Major Yunus Yosfiah, code-named Major Andreas, who led the attack against Balibo near the West Timor border on 16 October 1975 in which five Australian journalists were murdered. Their murder was intended to cover up Indonesian military incursions across the border (by removing the possibility of it being reported), and what at the time amounted to an attempted invasion centred on the sub-provincial capital of Maliana, south of Balibo near the border with West Timor. Yunus went on to become a senior Kopassus officer in East Timor, the head of military socio-political affairs in September 1997, and, in 1998–99, Minister for Information.

Until the early 1980s, the TNI’s special forces operating in East Timor did not take prisoners; all captives were tortured, interrogated and killed (a pattern of behaviour that was later replicated in Aceh). It was only after negotiations between Falintil and the Indonesian army in 1983 that Kopassus reluctantly agreed to hand their captives over for detention and trial. It was at this time, in the face of its own mounting losses in East Timor,28 that the Indonesian army considered entering into a compromise settlement with Falintil, the result of which were these new limitations on Kopassus.29 But moves towards a full settlement were quickly thwarted when, also in 1983, Benny Murdani was promoted to commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Murdani, a hardliner, was not interested in a brokered settlement with Falintil, instead preferring to try to crush them militarily. Murdani also had extensive business interests in East Timor at this time (see Figure 5.1, p. 196). From 1975 until 1999, Kopassus retained its own interrogation centres throughout East Timor. Because of the brutalising effect of duty in East Timor, after serving there soldiers were psychologically debriefed before returning to normal duties in Indonesia.

After the formal invasion, Kopassus stepped up its operations in East Timor in response to the stiff resistance being put up by Falintil forces. Because of Falintil’s continuing resistance, and until the independence ballot of 1999, East Timor became Kopassus’ principal training ground, and every member of the force was required to serve there, often on a number of occasions. During the 1980s and mid-1990s, a tour of combat duty in East Timor was regarded as the launchpad for an army officer’s career prospects and, increasingly after 1975, virtually all officers that reached the most senior ranks were East Timor veterans, in most cases with a Kopassus background.

Because Kopassus operations are concerned primarily with counter-insurgency, everyone in East Timor was seen as a potential enemy, and hence
a target. However, this rather counter-productive approach generated a new wave of local resistance, and by the early 1990s this resistance had developed a strong urban base, known as the Internal Political Front (Frente Político Interno – FPI). Gradually, Kopassus’ focus changed, to combating not only the guerrillas in the mountains but also the urban resistance. Meanwhile, the FIP’s clandestine network spread to several Indonesian university cities. In the face of a growing urban resistance, which could otherwise only really be quelled by new wholesale massacres of East Timorese, the idea of creating militia forces that could potentially divide the East Timorese and which had their roots in the old special forces-led Apodeti/UDT ‘irregulars’, was a logical outcome, intending to set Timorese against Timorese.

The militias that came to prominence in East Timor were an outgrowth of a militia that had been around since at least 1994 and arguably since 1975.\textsuperscript{30} The ‘senior’ militia, Halilintar, was led by Joao Tavares, one-time bupati (district head) of Bobonaro, but was under the command of Korem 164 (the local TNI headquarters) in Dili (Bartu 2000: 87). Although the original Halilintar was a development of Indonesia’s attempts to destabilise East Timor after the ‘civil war’ between Fretilin and Apodeti/UDT in August 1975, by the following year it had merged with the TNI, and was reactivated in 1994. This reactivation came at the same time that Prabowo Subianto established the Young Guards to Uphold Integration (Garda Muda Penegak Integrasi – Garda Paksi), the cadre of which were essentially interchangeable with that of the later Pam Swakarsa. Another early militia, specifically developed as a non-accountable indigenous combat team under the command of a junior army soldier, Juliao Fraga, and attached to the special forces, was Railakan I. Developed in 1981 and put into action against Falintil forces in 1982, Railakan I was formally incorporated into Wanra following a number of similar combat operations (Kammen 2001: 159–60).

**East Timor’s ‘ballot’ militias**

As a consequence of talks and tentative offers between President Habibie and jailed Falintil leader Xanana Gusmao, by 1998 it seemed inevitable that there was going to be some sort of change to the political orientation of East Timor. To that end, towards the end of 1998 Halilintar became increasingly active. In October 1998 it had 121 hard-core members, who reportedly had been with the group since 1975, while a further eleven militia groups were being organised in name and, increasingly, in substance (Bartu 2000: 87–8). Other militia groups that were established at this time include Saka (in Bacau), Tim Alfa (Los Palos) and Makikut (Manatuto), although proto-militia organisations were also established in each of the other districts, with the remaining militia organisations forming the final structure in December 1998 and January 1999 (Kammen 2001: 168, 180, 183). At the same time, political independence groups were beginning to consolidate.
In late January 1999, Major General Adam Damiri, the commander of what was then Kodam IX Udayana, held a meeting with militia leaders at which he gave the signal for Operasi Sapu Jagad (Operation Clean Sweep) to begin. Like many of the officers involved in East Timor, Damiri also had a Kopassus background, although he had served mostly with Kostrad. Together with Chief of Staff Mahidin Simbolon, Damiri directly facilitated much of the training, arms distribution and logistics for the militias in West Timor. Throughout the first and, after 4 September, second Sapu Jagad operations, intelligence, combat and Territorial activities were closely coordinated. The initial operation led to the first wave of killings of pro-independence figures, the burning of homes and the creation of tens of thousand of internal refugees. This activity was formalised when more than 1,200 Pam Swakarsa members were installed at a ceremony in the courtyard of the East Timor governor’s office on 20 April 1999. Eurico Gutteres and Manuel de Souza were thus formally recruited to the cause, along with their already established militia groups, Aitarak and Besi Merah Puti, and it was from around this time that large numbers of militia members were identified as having originated from West Timor. East Timor’s chief of police defended the recruitment of these militias into a civil security system, even though by then they had already been identified as being responsible for massacres in Liquisa, in which fifty-two people were murdered in and just outside a church, and in Dili. These militia groups were run in parallel with their ‘political’ wing, the inappropriately named Forum for Unity, Democracy and Justice (Forum untuk Persatuan, Demokrasi dan Keadilan – FPDK). FPDK president Domingos Soares was, at that time, a Dili council administrator.

Many aspects of the links between the TNI and the East Timor militias have been otherwise well documented (see Figures 3.12–3.14 for an illustration of the consistency of overlap between the two groups; see also Bartu 2000); furthermore, the author has personally witnessed the close association between the two putatively separate organisations, in July–September 1999. The leaking of the highly classified Australian military intelligence reports, in late 1999 and again in 2002, detailed the structure of the links as well as the lines of command and control between the TNI and the militias. These reports – intercepts of telephone and radio discussions between TNI and militia members – came directly from the Australian Defence Signals Directorate (DSD). They outlined a ‘covert chain of command down from the then president B.J. Habibie’s Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs, General (retired) Feisal Tanjung, to generals and colonels on the ground in East Timor’ (McDonald 2002). Two other ministers from Habibie’s Cabinet, General (retired) Hendropriyono and General (retired) Mohammad Yunus Yosfiah, were also identified in the leaked documents as having been involved in planning the operations against East Timorese civilians.

Interestingly, the published interpretation of the DSD documents said that they appeared to exonerate commander-in-chief General Wiranto from any involvement in the affair. And while it has been widely acknowledged
Figure 3.12 Maps of militia in East Timor

(1) Probably broken into cadres for AITARAK, MAHIDI, BMP, etc. Most recent reported activity in Liquica Regency

(2) Possibly more formalised than PAM SWAKARSA formation seen in Jakarta in Nov 98. Probably replacing static HANSIP & WANRA predecessors throughout the Province WEF 27 Apr 99

N.B. Generically named WANRA teams e.g. “Team Aleu”, omitted for clarity. Probably subsumed into newly created militia groups. Covert/clandestine troops (mahau) and KAMRA Police auxiliaries not included. See “Militias” text for expanded detail on groups.
that Wiranto and Feisal were factional opponents, equally as surprising is the fact that Wiranto directly appointed as chief liaison officer with the United Nations Assistance Mission to East Timor (UNAMET) another member of the factional opposition, Brigadier General Zacky Anwar Makarim; he also appointed Zacky’s replacement, Brigadier General Sjafrie Sjamsoddin. Furthermore, Zacky was later identified by UNAMET and the DSD documents as having been the officer primarily responsible for coordinating the TNI–militia activity in the territory at that time. Until 31 August 1999, Major General Zacky Anwar Makarim had been the officer directly in charge of the TNI and the militias in East Timor. Prior to that, until January 1999, Zacky had been head of the military intelligence agency BIA (renamed BAIS in April 1999). After initially operating covertly, he was given official status when Wiranto appointed him as the TNI’s UNAMET liaison officer. Zacky had had a long involvement with East Timor and had served as an intelligence officer from 1983 to 1989; thus he is the archetype of an officer who combines a Kopassus background with years of intelligence experience. Zacky was reported to be still involved in organising militias and anti-independence parties in West Timor in 2001.

The other key officer in charge in East Timor, from 31 August 1999, was Major General Sjafrie Sjamsuddin. Sjafrie worked in Kopassus in both combat and intelligence, and first saw duty in East Timor in 1976. He was a member of what became known as the nanggala teams, the Kopassus counter-insurgency units that became infamous throughout East Timor for their ferocity and brutality. Sjafrie attended a special intelligence course in the US in 1977 and later, in 1986, received anti-terrorist training there. During the Santa Cruz massacre of 1991, he was head of Kopassus intelligence in East Timor and is believed by many to have been the key man behind the massacre. Both Zacky and Sjafrie were reported two days after the East Timor ballot as preparing an emergency ‘scorched earth’ operation to be conducted by the TNI, Indonesian police and pro-integrationist East Timorese militias. The generals were planning arson attacks on and other damage to vital installations, such as telecommunications and electrical facilities, as well as the assassinations of pro-independence leaders (MateBEAn 1999). The ‘scorched earth’ policy was first noted in a leaked document stamped and signed on 3 July 1999 by the following: Major General (retired) H.R. Garnadi; First Assistant to the Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs and General (retired) Feisal Tanjung; and the Deputy Task Force Chief for the Secure and Successful Determination for Special Autonomy in East Timor (P4OKTT). In a sentence towards the end of his report, Garnadi urged the need to ‘if possible, destroy facilities at vital assets’, as part of a ‘contingency plan’ in the event of a pro-independence outcome. Garnadi’s report emphasised the need to honour the loyalty to Indonesia of East Timorese militias, describing them as ‘heroes of Integration’. ‘[W]ithout this contingency planning,’ Garnadi noted, ‘the government’s prestige will worsen in the
international arena, let alone in the view of the Indonesian people generally’ (Garnadi 1999: n31).

It was exactly this plan that came to pass, although in terms of timing it actually began on the afternoon of the ballot, at Ritabou near Maliana, and was unleashed in full force on 4 September. Sjafrie was appointed chief TNI spokesman in January 2002.

Another key TNI figure in East Timor was Colonel Gerhan Lantara, commander of the notorious Airborne Brigade Brigif Linud 17. This Kostrad brigade was one of the first units parachuted into Dili in 1975. During the peaceful demonstration that preceded the Santa Cruz massacre on 12 November 1991, Lantara managed to infiltrate the crowd, but when he began to behave provocatively someone slashed him with a knife. He was flown out of East Timor within hours and ‘disappeared’ for several years. Mystery surrounded his absence from the official inquiry into the massacre in 1992. But in 1996 he re-emerged as commander of Kopassus intelligence, and later reappeared in East Timor as the officer in charge of the Dili sector and surrounding areas.

Other senior officers were also directly involved in the violence in East Timor. For example, the officer later appointed to head what was then Kodam IX Udayana in Bali, Major General Mahidin Simbolon, was reported as having referred to a militia group as his ‘crew’. Mahidin Simbolon spent at least a total of eight years in East Timor, on six different tours of duty between 1975 and 1997, one of which included the invasion of 1975. He eventually became Dili military commander (for Danrem Wiradharma 164) and took the credit for arresting Xanana Gusmao in 1992, for which he was promoted to colonel. From 1993 to 1995 Mahidin was the head of intelligence at Kopassus. After his tour of duty as Dili commander, he retained his close connection with East Timor by being appointed Chief of Staff of what was then Kodam IX Udayana, the military command in Bali. An intelligence officer told this author in 1999 that ‘Mahidi’, which was supposed to be an acronym of the name of a militia group, Mati atau Hidup untuk Integrasi (‘Live or Die for Integration’), was in fact a play on words designed to reflect Simbolon’s personal involvement with that group. And far from Simbolon’s clear links to militia groups damaging his career prospects, he was later promoted to Brigadier General and given the West Papua ‘Trikora’ command.

Furthermore, according to the DSD documents mentioned above, two detachments of Kopassus troops were assigned to East Timor – arriving on 9 February 1999 – to help establish the militia organisations that were not yet up and running. The detachments were code-named Venus and Tribuana. The name Tribuana was taken from the Kopassus regimental motto adopted in mid-1996, Tribuana Chandraca Satya Dharma (Threefold Worlds of the Lords of Noble Service), and was in fact first applied, from mid-1996, to detachments assigned to East Timor, West Papua and Aceh. With regards to the TNI’s use of the term, ‘Tribuana’ was a code for the Kopassus Group IV Intelligence Task Force (Satgas Intel – SGI), which was
directly assigned in a support function to existing Kodam troops (hence in West Papua it was regarded as a part of the ‘organic’ TNI). Although intelligence is formally administered by Kopassus Group III, Tribuana members were drawn from Kopassus Group IV. Two lower-ranking officers directly involved in the organisation of East Timor’s militias were Lieutenant Colonel Nugroho and Lieutenant Colonel Yayak Sudradjat, both Kopassus intelligence officers. Yayak Sudradjat was involved in the Liquisa bloodbath on 4–6 April 1999. Both officers worked closely with Territorial officers, including Colonel Tono Suratman, the military commander of Korem 164 Wiradharma of East Timor and a former commander of Kopassus Group III, as well as the thirteen Koramil commanders.

The DSD intercepts also revealed a number of conversations that had taken place between the leader of the Aitarak militia, Eurico Guterres, and the Tribuana detachment. In addition, the military commander in East Timor at that time, Colonel Tono Suratman, was intercepted in the process of telling Guterres not to contact him directly but to do so through Suratman’s intelligence chief, Major Bambang Wisnumurti. The TNI’s intelligence organisation at that time, BAIS, was also intercepted discussing the preparation of materials for a demonstration against the presence of the UN mission in East Timor. A later intercept belonging to this same group, dated 4 September (the date of the ballot announcement), had Makarim contacting police to check on the latest ballot results. Makarim sounded ‘incredulous’ when he was told that the counting (which was supposed to have been secret) was showing an 80–20 split in favour of independence (McDonald 2002). And another intercept dated 21 September 1999, made as Interfet troops were still landing in Dili, gave details of Kopassus murder squads, formed to assassinate pro-independence figures. This confirmed a local report of 1 September 1999 which identified a ‘scorched earth’ policy in addition to the hit squads, based on a leaked ‘Menkopolkam’ document, which talked of a ‘rain of blood and tears’ if the ballot chose independence.35 Lieutenant General Hendropriyono was appointed as head of BIN in Septmeber 2001, while Tono Suratman was promoted to Brigadier General and appointed as the TNI’s deputy spokesman.

Kopassus has always had a high profile in East Timor, most notably for using the territory as a training ground, but it did attempt to employ methods of obscuring its role or influence, especially in the run up to the East Timor ballot. The reason for this was because the TNI wanted events in East Timor to be portrayed as essentially a conflict between pro- and anti-integration forces. As such, it was able to construe violence committed by itself or by organisations under its control as acts of self-defence committed by pro-integration groups, thereby constructing a shield behind which it could operate. It also had a back-up plan: to draw the pro-independence forces (notably Falintil) into open conflict, thereby constituting an excuse to cancel the ballot. As it transpired, however, each of these efforts failed, although this was not through want of trying.
The establishment of militia-type forces in East Timor began with the recruitment of pro-integration activists, local criminals and migrants to East Timor from other parts of the archipelago, in particular West Timor (Figure 3.15 below shows the various militias by region). By late 1998 and early 1999, as has been shown, Kopassus was deeply involved, along with other military agencies, in the establishment and training of these new, and in some cases existing, anti-independence ‘militias’ (see Table 3.1). The Indonesian government generally, and the army in particular, tried to maintain that these militias were independent, self-organised defence groups, although it was known from early on that their leadership and organisation were directly linked to Kopassus, and that they were trained and led by Kopassus officers and NCOs, and formed as a part of the TNI’s auxiliary structure.

After East Timor’s ballot results were announced on 4 September 1999, under what was known as Operasi Sapu Jagad II, the militias and six battalions of the TNI, spearheaded by Kopassus troops, unleashed a ‘scorched earth’ policy across the territory. Altogether about 15,000 men were involved. General Wiranto may not have been aware of the scale of Sapu Jagad II, but within days events had gone too far for him to rein in the monster that he had helped to create. He was visibly shocked when he visited Dili with five security council ambassadors on 11 September. This was when he decided that he could no longer withstand world pressure for international intervention.

The army has always tried to distance itself from the militias, maintaining that they were local self-defence organisations set up to protect East Timorese from Falintil guerrillas. As it turned out, in the run up to the 1999 ballot the militias and the army regularly killed pro-independence activists and blamed their deaths on Falintil, employing a transparent rhetoric that convinced no one. But as the evidence began to emerge, it became increasingly clear that the militias were trained, armed and paid for by the army (notably through its black accounts and yayasans), and, under the army’s direct command, that they were used to intimidate the local population into supporting the ‘autonomy’ (continued integration) option for East Timor, as opposed to the independence option. The human rights trials that were eventually held in Jakarta, although in many respects grossly inadequate, were at least one sign that even the Indonesian government recognised the fallacy of TNI denials. However, the TNI’s comprehensive misrepresentation of the events of 1999 at the trials encouraged many Indonesians to believe that there had indeed been violence between two evenly matched civilian groups and that the UN had had a hand in exacerbating it and doing nothing to stop it.36 It also established the precedent of the use of ‘militias’ as a proxy for the TNI in politically sensitive areas, or as an essentially deniable element of the TNI. Such militias included: the Satgas Merah-Putih in West Papua; the Laskar Jihad in Maluku and Central Sulawesi, and, later, in Aceh; and the indigenous militia organisations of Aceh, such as Unit Ksatria Penegak Pancasila (Noble Warriors for Upholding Pancasila), Bela Negara (Defend
Table 3.1: Diagram of East Timor militia command structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Militia Group</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Rifles</th>
<th>Pay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct 98</td>
<td>Mar 99</td>
<td>Apr 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dili</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAMSWAKARSA</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GADA PAKSI</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DARAH MERAH</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AITARAK</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manatuto</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOROK</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PENEGAK MODAK</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauca</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAKA</td>
<td>304*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>970*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Palos</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALFA</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JATI M.P.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viqueque</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAKIKIT</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59/75 JUNIOR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aileu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIM AILEU</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHI</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ainaro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIM AINARO</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAHIDI</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufahi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIM SAME</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABLAI</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covalima</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>° TIM SUAI</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAKSAUR M.P.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bobonaro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALILINTAR</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DADURUS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ermera</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the State), Pemuda Keamanan Desa (Village Security Youth) and Laskar Rakyat (People’s Militia) (Robinson 2001: 230), as well as some 10,000 ethnic Javanese militias in central Aceh.

**Intelligence**

Since 1965, Indonesia’s ‘intelligence’ community has been an obvious and often overbearing part of Indonesian political life, having a profile not ordinarily associated with conventional ‘covert’ organisations. Besides the armed forces and the national police, the intelligence service forms the third and integral element of Indonesia’s security apparatus. In addition to the predominantly and purely military intelligence organisations, the country has intelligence services for the police, the foreign department, the interior ministry, the department of justice, the general prosecutor and customs.

In fact, the term ‘intelligence’ only approximately describes the functions of these organisations. Their covert and overt activities, from political manipulation and violence through to surveillance and information gathering, has been in the area of political control and repression, more akin to the actions of a political police force in a totalitarian state. Yet, according to some definitions, this is exactly what Indonesian intelligence has been all about and, in many cases, still is.

The purpose of this ‘intel’, as it is so widely known throughout Indonesia, is to act partly as a visible deterrent, but also as an overt force for social control. Intelligence agents insinuate themselves into a variety of public institutions and situations, asking questions and making up obviously...
thin stories in order to justify assumed roles. In some cases, such agents have an open surveillance role; in others, they capitalise on their public acknowledge-ment. Although the author has had numerous experiences with various levels and types of ‘intel’, the presence of intelligence agents was especially noticeable in East Timor ahead of the 1999 referendum on independence, during which time they conducted openly threatening activities and participated in more clandestine kidnappings and killings of pro-independence activists. This was hardly surprising given that the principal operation in East Timor at that time was reportedly being run by the head of the Armed Forces Intelligence Organisation (Baden Intelijen ABRI – BIA), Lieutenant General Tyasno Sudarto. (Tyasno was identified as being one of the officers allegedly considering a coup against Habibie just after the ballot result was announced (McDonald et al. 2002)).

Perhaps the most blatant example of ‘public intel’ that I witnessed occurred on the day of the East Timor referendum, 30 August 1999, when an intelligence officer and some of his armed thugs occupied the veranda of a house opposite the polling site in the border town of Balibo, from where he observed and reported on the people who had queued to vote, spending hours busily talking over his conspicuously displayed two-way radio. When asked who he was he replied, less ambiguously than one might have expected, that he variously worked for the government and the army, and that he was a private citizen and interested observer in the day’s events. Like many others of his ilk, his actions would have been regarded as farcical if his purpose had not been so malignant.

Furthermore, the murder of non-GAM pro-referendum activists in Aceh was frequently attributed to intelligence agents, while intelligence agents would bluntly make themselves known to new arrivals at the airport at Banda Aceh. Similar types of operations were also common in West Papua and Maluku. The question of whether such activities were sanctioned or just the work of undisciplined minions, as was sometimes claimed, was designed to divert attention away from the broadly and often specifically endorsed nature of the activities. In part, the seemingly undisciplined and wide-ranging use of intelligence agents reflected the fact that many of them did not operate under any legislative provision, and that their agencies operated agendas that were not always in agreement with government policy, especially in the post-Suharto period. Yet the lines of command and control were well established, usually linked to or run by sections of the army and very often employing formalised techniques of surveillance and interrogation.

Like its military, Indonesia’s intelligence services operate primarily in relation to internal dissent and foreigners who are perceived to be acting against the ‘national interest’. ‘Intelligence’ in this case refers mostly to the gathering of information on the activities of individuals and groups for political purposes, and has much less to do with the gathering of information on the activities and interests of foreign governments (although this also constitutes an element of Indonesian intelligence activity). Since the fall of Suharto,
internal intelligence activity has slowed, in part because successive governments have been less paranoid and thus less concerned to exercise a tight grip on the political process. Furthermore, the climate of change has made such ‘intel’ far less politically acceptable, and the cohesive logic of the New Order government, which provided the focus for such activities, has long since fragmented. This is not to suggest that intelligence activities have disappeared, or that they do not retain their primary internal focus; they do, and intelligence agencies are still highly active, particularly in the outlying provinces where separatist tendencies are at their greatest. As was indicated earlier in this chapter, Indonesia’s intelligence agencies are run by, closely connected with or controlled by its military apparatus, and in many cases they are merely different sections of the same organisations, or share the same personnel. Given the distinctively political orientation of intelligence operations, this relationship with the military places another, more insidious form of political power in the hands of the latter. In running or otherwise controlling Indonesia’s intelligence agencies, the TNI retains many of the qualities that established it as essential to the survival of the New Order, including its function as a secret police force and an organisation of state terror. The TNI intelligence branches generally acted independently of the government and government policy, and at times seemingly independently of the TNI command structure. They were, in a real sense, a law unto themselves.

The intelligence agencies, whether run or controlled by the military, were at their peak of influence and organisational capacity during the mid-1980s, under the patronage of General Benny Murdani. With the official end of Murdani’s formal military career in 1988, however, the intelligence community was reorganised and to some extent downgraded, although it continued to play a highly active and important role in domestic political affairs.

In the 1990s, domestic intelligence activity continued to be noticeable to many with only the slightest awareness of or interest in such matters. The often poorly defined official function of the intelligence agencies may be outlined as follows: the first and foremost role of the intelligence agencies has been to spy on ordinary citizens and business people and to create a climate of trepidation. Even during the post-Suharto era, the presence of the intelligence agencies in the country’s numerous trouble spots was bluntly obvious. It was not so much the case that the work of the intelligence agencies in such areas lacked discretion as it was that it tended to advertise their presence, which had the effect of letting the citizens know that they were being watched.

A second, closely related role of the intelligence agencies has been to exert influence over and intervene in political matters, through organisational (for example, party political) structures, as agents provocateurs, and through threats and direct violence. And in connection with their surveillance role they have also been involved in more conventional analysis, for the purposes of helping shape government policy as well as, somewhat more independently, TNI policy.

The activities of intelligence agents in Jakarta was less pronounced after 1998, not least due to the fact that political activity and organisation had been
transformed from an illegal and potentially threatening activity into one that was open and legal. As a consequence of this increased transparency together with more open factionalism within and between the military and the police, cooperation and coordination between intelligence branches also diminished. Apart from anything else, this reduction in pronounced domestic intelligence activity, including counter-intelligence, meant that the presence of agents acting on behalf of other governments in Jakarta became more obvious.40

**Opsus**

Although their existence pre-dates the New Order government, since the 1960s Indonesia’s intelligence agencies have played a significant role in internal political affairs, in much the same way that intelligence agencies or secret police have influenced politics in a number of totalitarian states. The type of intelligence organisation that came to dominate Indonesia was created before the New Order era, while Sukarno was still president, but by an officer who would rise to become Suharto’s primary dirty tricks man, Ali Murtopo. The then Lieutenant Colonel Ali Murtopo developed the Special Operations (Operasi Khusus – Opsus) group in 1962 in response to Operation Mandala, which was intended to force the Dutch from what was then Dutch New Guinea (West Papua). Murtopo, who had worked under Suharto in this campaign,41 was assisted in Opsus by his protégé (and later rival) Benny Murdani, initially as the Special Operations Head for social-political intelligence operations.

Opsus was developed beyond its initial function in Operation Mandala by Murtopo as a secretive army intelligence unit during Sukarno’s last years as president, but really came to the fore when Major General Suharto seized power after October 1965, when it was technically placed under the control of Bakin, of which Murtopo was first deputy. Opsus thereafter effectively became Suharto’s personal intelligence vehicle for suppressing dissent. In the succeeding years, Opsus was removed from its primarily military function and lines of control, and became a more or less private and clandestine body that maintained a large network of unofficial informers and operatives – mainly criminals – who were used in a range of dirty tricks campaigns. Opsus was actively involved in the massacres of 1965–66, and during the subsequent ‘election’ campaigns (often through youth organisations affiliated with Golkar) in which unsympathetic or reluctant voters were encouraged to vote for the government. Notably, however, Opsus appeared to use its network of criminals most effectively in 1974 to turn a peaceful protest against a visit by the Japanese prime minister, Kakuei Tanaka, into what became known as the Malari riots. It was reported that these riots were instigated in order to discredit the head of Kopkamtib, General Sumitro (Bourchier 1990: 193), who at that time was challenging Suharto’s hold on political power (Elson 2001: 205–7; Kingsbury 2002: 84–6). There was also dissonance between Sumitro and Murtopo over the latter’s corrupt and interfering style (Elson 2001: 206). As a consequence of Suharto’s later concerns over Murtopo’s activities and
potential to launch a leadership challenge, including concerns over what he thought of as Murtopo’s ‘systematic encirclement approach’. Murtopo was increasingly sidelined from the political structure, and in 1984, just ahead of his death, Opsus was formally dissolved, to be replaced by the Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Agency (Baden ABRI Intelijen Strategis – BAIS).

**Kopkamtib and Bakorstanas**

The Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Komando Operasi Pemulihan dan Ketertiban – Kopkamtib) was the principal intelligence and covert operations vehicle for the New Order government, established under the provisions of *Supersemar*, or the Letter of Instruction of 11 March (1966) (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret), in which Sukarno gave Suharto the authority to ‘restore security and order’ (effectively, to hunt down remaining members of the PKI). As Suharto rose to power, as well as the massacres of suspected or alleged PKI members, between 600,000 and 750,000 alleged or suspected members of the PKI were detained in prisons, hastily prepared detention centres, work camps and military units. These prisoners were known as Tapol (Tanahan Politik – political prisoners). The military hastily established the intelligence body, Kopkamtib, to administer the arrest, interrogation and trial of Tapol. According to Tanter (1990: 220), Kopkamtib was not a genuinely autonomous organisation, but rather a means of organising military command under the New Order government. As such, there were no effective limits to the rights or powers of Kopkamtib or on regional military commanders who exercised authority under Kopkamtib provisions. However, it did provide the rationale for the army to act as an extrajudicial security force, having the powers of arrest without warrant and indefinite detention of ‘suspects’. Given the relatively arbitrary application of its powers, Kopkamtib was a widely feared agency and did much to establish the tone of the New Order’s repressive orientation and the heavy-handed aspect of the army’s interference in the lives of many Indonesian citizens.

After the removal of Sumitro as head of Kopkamtib (and deputy commander of ABRI) in late January 1974, operational control was handed to Admiral R. Sudomo, while Suharto became the formal head of the organisation. Benny Murdani was recalled from his post as a diplomat to South Korea and appointed to the defence department to revamp its intelligence capacity. In a reshuffle in 1978, which promoted General Mohammad Yusuf to the position of new commander-in-chief, Sudomo became Kopkamtib commander while also deputy commander of ABRI. General Yoga Sugomo, who, as head of Bakin, was directly responsible to the president, was appointed head of Kopkamtib. At this time, Murdani held posts as Assistant for Intelligence in the defence ministry. Head of the Strategic Intelligence Centre (Pusta Intelijen Strategik – Pusintelstrat) at the defence ministry, Assistant for Intelligence at Kopkamtib and, from 1978, deputy head of Bakin. After being appointed as commander-in-chief in 1983, Murdani expanded the military’s ideological
surveillance of society. This was conducted through the Tarpadnas project, by standardising the military’s view of the state as threatened by subversive forces, and which was transformed into ABRI’s ‘security intelligence’ project to shape and control political ideas in society. This move reflected and enforced the political requirement that all social organisations adopt the Pancasila as their sole philosophy (Honna 2001: 58).

Kopkamtib was replaced by a putatively civilian body, the National Stability Coordination Agency (Baden Koordinasi Stabilitas Nasional – Bakorstanas) in 1988. In part, the replacement of Kopkamtib by Bakorstanas was intended to reduce international criticism of the New Order government’s heavy-handedness, and, to a lesser extent, to assuage some domestic criticism. But the main purpose of replacing Bakorstanas was to control, and in part dismantle, the intelligence apparatus that had been built up by Murdani, something which Suharto feared might be used, after they began to fall out, to threaten his grip on power. Like Kopkamtib, Bakorstanas also operated outside the legal code and had wide discretion to detain and interrogate people regarded as a threat to national security. The establishment of Bakorstanas reflected both a consolidation of national security and the streamlining of the intelligence and security apparatus, enabling it to operate within the reorganised armed forces structure. The key organisations of the revised Bakorstanas system were the ten army Kodam and the two intelligence agencies, Bakin and BAIS. Bakorstanas relied on the staff of those organisations for its manpower, operating through the Kodam army structure.

The Bakorstanas system reinforced the power of the ten Kodam commanders, forming a new coordinating body in each of the country’s twenty-seven provincial jurisdictions. This body was called the Regional Security Council (Muspida). The provincial governor served as chairman of the Muspida within his geographical area, but the Kodam and Korem commanders exerted considerable influence within this framework. Other Muspida members included provincial or regional chiefs of police, the provincial legislature chairman, and the senior air force and navy officers of the province or region. The Muspida system was replicated at the district (kabupaten) and sub-district (kecamatan) levels, with army Korem and Kodim commanders serving as lower-level Muspida chairmen.

One of Bakorstanas’ powers – an indication of its overtly political intent – was its involvement in labour disputes. The armed forces, which at that time included the police, continued to be involved in labour issues, despite the 1994 revocation by the Minister for Manpower of a 1986 regulation allowing the military to intervene in strikes and other labour actions. A 1990 decree also gave Bakorstanas authority to intervene in strikes, sometimes violently or with the threat of violence, in the interest of what was claimed to be political and social stability. Furthermore, political parties were only allowed to field candidates from lists that had been screened by Bakorstanas, in order to assess whether candidates had any PKI or other leftist associations or posed other ‘security’ risks (FAS 2002).
Bakin

While Opsus was the key ‘dirty tricks’ intelligence organisation, and was formally contained within Bakin, the State Intelligence Coordinating Agency (Baden Koordinasi Intelijen Negara), that which most closely resembled a more conventional intelligence agency was Bakin itself. Bakin was established in 1967 in the wake of the closure of the Old Order government’s Central Intelligence Agency (Baden Pusat Intelijen – BPI) and was run as a parallel and nominally civilian organisation, directly responsible to the president for both internal and foreign intelligence assessments. Although Bakin did employ civilians in its lower echelons and maintained its own communications network outside the civilian and military administrations, its senior positions were filled with army officers; furthermore, field officers answerable to Bakin were also accountable under the military Kopkamtib structure. Armed forces officers were also seconded to Bakin for special duties. This was undertaken through the Regional Intelligence Coordinating Body (Baden Koordinasi Intelijen Daerah – Bakorinda) which was subservient to Bakin. With the development of BAIS in 1983, Bakin was increasingly sidelined, whereby senior officers were moved to joint positions between BAIS and Bakin, and was eventually limited to external intelligence matters only (FAS 2002).

BAIS

BAIS, the Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Agency (Baden ABRI Intelijen Strategis) was established to replace Pusintelstrat by Benny Murdani when he became the military’s commander-in-chief in 1983. BAIS reported directly to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, rather than to the president. The commander-in-chief determined what information should then be forwarded to the president. Information came up to the commander-in-chief through the Chiefs of Staff of each of the services, which in turn was reported up along the chain of command through SGI agents based in each Kodam, Korem and Kodim, down to local Koramil and Babinsa, and with further links with Hansip-level militia which provided ‘base-level intelligence’ (Tanter 1990: 225). The reporting line to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces was a highly unusual configuration, given that the practice world wide is usually for such agencies to report to their respective departments of defence. This set-up thus reflected the high level of political control the military exercised at this stage. In particular, it was highly unusual for the department of defence not to have exclusive or first-hand access to military intelligence.

As such, BAIS, as an all-military organisation (and one that relied heavily on the involvement of Kopassus members), was inextricably linked with the TNI’s Territorial structure; furthermore, it was formal and hierarchical, as opposed to Murtopo’s informal and personally controlled Opsus. BAIS was based on the establishment of the Armed Forces Intelligence School at Ci
Omas, near Bogor, which supplemented existing schools, especially the Army Intelligence School at Ci Kekeuh in western Bogor. BAIS had much in common with the other intelligence agencies, such as the Office of Intelligence of the Junior Attorney-General (Jaksa Agung Muda Bidang Intelijen), as well as some army positions, through the Bakorinda structure, thus linking BAIS with both the intelligence and the military structures.

One of BAIS’ more infamous activities was its role in the Petrus affair (mysterious killings) of 1983–84, in which more than 5,000 alleged criminals throughout Indonesia, many of whom had intelligence links, were killed. The killings were widely understood to be part of a crackdown on crime and, at least as significantly, a means of removing street-level operatives of Ali Murtopo’s informal Opsus ‘intelligence’ organisation (see Bourchier 1990: 184–201).

As noted by Tanter, BAIS (and its successors) ‘employ[ed] torture and abuse of legal rights on an administrative basis’ (1990: 224). BAIS was reformed as BIA in 1996, whereby accountability rested with the Chief of Staff, and was renamed as BAIS in 1999 following the separation of the national police and the armed forces to create the TNI. The rearrangement of BAIS in 1996 reflected the continuing ‘de-Benny-isation’ of the intelligence services, which was part of Suharto’s effort to break Murdani’s continuing influence over both the army and the intelligence communities. The return to the name BAIS in July 1999 also saw the line of accountability return to the commander-in-chief. Of the internal changes, the five departments of BAIS were increased to eight, and greater emphasis was placed on foreign intelligence.

BIN

After Suharto resigned from office, in 2000 Bakorstanas was replaced by BIN, the National Intelligence Agency (Baden Intelijen Nasional), which also took over Bakin’s role, and was increasingly promoted to a leading position within the intelligence community, coordinating all intelligence activities in Indonesia. In line with its increased level of responsibility and coordination, in 2001 BIN expanded its operations to include control of branch offices in all provinces. Foreign intelligence continued to be conducted by BAIS, which in 2001 was headed by an air force officer, although the air force Chief of Staff, Air Marshall Hanafie Asnan, maintained that it was still dominated by the army.

The creation of BIN was in part a response to the evolving intelligence needs of the post-Suharto era, and reflected the changing political circumstances as well as the difficulty President Abdurrahman Wahid was experiencing in obtaining intelligence material through BAIS and Bakin. The decreasing efficiency of Indonesia’s intelligence agencies was particularly noticeable in its obvious failures to detect acts of violence and their sources, such as the bombing of the Jakarta Stock Exchange in September
The future of the intelligence agencies also became the topic of political speculation surrounding the president’s frequent complaints of being deprived of intelligence from the state agencies. The reorganisation of the intelligence community also followed the reconfiguration of the army’s Kodam structure, although it was more likely due to the reassessment of Indonesia’s intelligence needs in the post-East Timor environment than it was to any direct links between the two bodies. BIN personnel report directly to the president, the Cabinet and the head of BIN, who at the time of writing was Lieutenant General (retired) Hendropriyono, who has ex officio Cabinet status.

One of the changes to have occurred within the intelligence community as a result of BIN’s establishment has been its increasing focus on the use of technological as well as human intelligence, and a greater emphasis on examining external ‘threats’ to Indonesia’s security, in addition to internal threats. In particular, the US and Australia, and activists within them, have come under increased scrutiny by BIN, based on a belief that those bodies were interested in dismantling the Indonesian state. The then defence minister, Mahfud MD, was quoted by Gatraneews, in Ingo (2000a), as saying:

this region is vulnerable to foreign intelligence activities. That’s why I always speak out loudly that those foreign power have their own interest. They wanted Indonesia to become divided as with the cases in Atambua, Irian Jaya, and probably Aceh—Nowadays the possibility of war between nations is very small. But we must remember, the wish of one country to destroy other still exist. But this time any effort to destroy enemy is no longer done through war. It’s like Yugoslavia who disintegrate without war. They were made to disintegrate within and dissolve themselves. We must be careful of this.

(Ingo: 2000a)

DPKN

In November 1998 the government formed a new organisation for overseeing the maintainance of security, the Council for the Enforcement of Security and Law (Dewan Pemantapan Ketahanan Nasional – DPKN), headed by the president but run by the armed forces commander. The Council was raised under presidential decree No. 191/1998. President Habibie formed the Council with the duties of guiding and coordinating efforts to overcome the crisis threatening national security and the maintainance of the law in an integrated manner. Members of the Council include key ministers, the heads of the TNI and Polri, the head of BIN, religious leaders and the chairman of the human rights commission, Komnas HAM. The executive of the DPKN reports its activities to the president, while the Council sits in session as required and determined by the president.
The stated mission of the DPKN is to control and coordinate efforts to resolve crises threatening national stability. It is reported to be advisory in nature, rather than operational, and does not have ‘technical authority’ as was the case with the former Kopkamtib, which had the power to arrest and detain people (FAS 2002).

*Kostrad’s intelligence*

Kostrad’s intelligence units, the Security Surveillance Platoons (Pleton Pengintai Keamanan – Tontaikam44), were established in March 2001. The primary role of these platoons was to act as reconnaissance units in combat zones, and in particular to gather information about the enemy’s strength (*JP* 2001c). The Tontaikam were founded in response to the increasing levels of political unrest and opposition to the central government, and in part to monitor the capacity of the international force along the border between East and West Timor. The Kodam-level Assistant for Intelligence (Asisten Kasdam) has an Intelligence Detachment Commander (Danden Intel) who oversees the chain of command, from four Intelligence Section Officers (Perwira Seksi Intelijen – Pasintel), who deal with mass mobilisation, research, logistics, and personnel placement and welfare, through to Platoon Intelligence officers (Pleton Intelijen – Tonintel).

Although an intelligence background generally helps with military career promotion, some specialists do not enjoy much career mobility, or have their careers sidetracked by being appointed as Kodim commanders who continue to be used in operationally sensitive areas. Officers who worked in areas of labour unrest in the early 1990s have been transferred to other similar areas to help control strikes. While promotional opportunities may be more limited, financial rewards (such as pay-offs from companies) are often associated with helping to control industrial unrest (Kammen and Chandra 1999: 62–4).

*The national police, Brimob and police intelligence units*

Polri, Indonesia’s national police (Kepolisian Republik Indonesia45), has occupied an unusual place in Indonesia’s military framework. Officially incorporated into the military command structure in 1967, with police officers having ranks as if they were in the army, it was removed from the military command structure on 1 April 1999 under the so-called ‘New Paradigm’ (see Chapter 4). Although they have always been subservient to the army, standard Polri officers have played a fairly conventional security function under both military command and thereafter. However, Brimob, the National Police Mobile Brigade (Brigade Mobil), is a paramilitary organisation armed and equipped with material identical to that of the army. The primary difference between the two organisations, from the perspective of an outsider, is that Brimob officers wear a predominantly
grey and brown uniform, whereas members of the TNI wear the conventional army green or camouflage. Importantly, Brimob functions in precisely the same manner as TNI units, having a conventional military and counter-insurgency role. This includes having designated ‘Hunter’\(^46\) (in English, meaning ‘pursuit’) units, which are more in line with military special forces than with police, and military-style checkpoints interspersed with army checkpoints along main highways in conflict areas. Furthermore, Polri also has its own intelligence unit, IPP/Intelpampol (Inteligien dan Pengaman Polri), as well as a SWAT-type counter-terrorist task force (Satgas Gegana). As Davies noted: ‘For practical purposes, BRIMOB must be considered as an *infantry* force, a fact reflected in its organisation, training, equipment, and even tactical symbol used in security forces’ operational mapping’ (2001: 24). By way of evidence for this observation, the pursuit of a group of Free Aceh Movement guerrillas near Lhokseumawe, perhaps the area of most serious conflict in Aceh at that time, was undertaken by Brimob personnel travelling by armoured truck.\(^47\)

Polri’s separation from the military was intended to ‘civilianise’ security operations and reduce the TNI’s overt role in ensuring internal order. Yet paradoxically what actually occurred was that the TNI’s function changed hardly at all, while the numbers and role of Polri – and in particular Brimob – escalated quite significantly. By way of illustration, Brimob units were supposed to replace conventional TNI units in Aceh in 2000 and 2001, in order to ‘civilianise’ the conflict there. However, it transpired that Brimob’s role was more to supplement the TNI’s presence, although there was a brief fluctuation of TNI numbers in late 2000 and early 2001. As a consequence of this heightened role for Brimob in Aceh, its numbers were also increased, almost doubling between 1995 and 2000 to some 13,000 personnel (Davies 2001: 41).

Considerable tension exists between the police and the TNI, in particular the army, due to the historical subordination of the police to the military. Since their separation on 1 April 2000, there have been a number of clashes between soldiers and police, over competing business and criminal activities, personal matters and, in Maluku, over political loyalties. Commonly, army soldiers have tried to assert their authority over the police, especially Brimob, the police have resisted, and this has led to the clashes.

There have also been reports of a breakdown of discipline among Brimob officers in a number of places, but notably in Aceh, with some acting as freelance bandits on the main highway in the east of the territory. A senior army general claimed that discipline within Brimob was poor, a situation that he blamed on the rush of recruitment (which introduced many poor quality recruits), the quick and inefficient training they received, and the relatively poor pay. No doubt his comments were also influenced by traditional army–Polri rivalry, which at that time was reflected in the conflict between Brimob and army units in Aceh, Maluku, West Papua and elsewhere.
In a situation similar to that in Aceh, in the region surrounding the troubled town of Poso in Central Sulawesi, Brimob checkpoints were interspersed at close intervals with Territorial and Kostrad checkpoints. Poso had been the site of previous violent conflict between Christian and Muslim militias, including the intervention of the Laskar Jihad in late 2001, during which hundreds of people had been killed and about half the town razed, along with houses as far away as eighty kilometres. This conflict stemmed from growing tension between Christian and Muslim populations as Muslim migrants increasingly moved into the once predominantly Christian area and diverted economic and political opportunities. However, there was a widespread belief that the actual outbreak or perpetuation of violence and the intervention by the Laskar Jihad, as had occurred in Ambon, was promoted by senior army figures, by playing on a complex set of conflicting interests. Contributing to the conflict was the sale of private army weapons to warring factions.

Although it may be claimed that there is some degree of separation between the army and Polri, and that without doubt a state of heightened tension exists between the two organisations, the formal lines of command are both ambiguous and overlapping. Davies (2001: 11) has shown how, in West Papua, local police and the TNI operate under a ‘blended’ command and control structure. The police, in this case the regional police (Polisi Daerah – Polda), together with the regional (Trikora) military command, operate under lines of control stemming from Command and Control of Operations (Komando Pengendalian Operasi – Kodalops), which is in turn answerable to the president and the DPR, based on a request by the provincial leader for assistance, and being responsible for all internal security in the province (see Figure 3.1 for TNI and Polri placement). Sitting alongside Kodalops and controlling both Polda and the local TNI is the board overseeing the State of Civil Emergency, allocating powers of arbitrary arrest and detention and denial of entry into the province from outside. The same state of civil emergency, with the same lines of control and command, applied in both North and South Maluku and in Aceh. Where the TNI retains a separate line of command and control is under a State of Military Emergency, which transfers all powers to the TNI commander (see Figure 3.13 for TNI placement).

At the time of writing, Polri had clear lines of authority leading back to Jakarta, in some cases via the Kodalops process. However, there was some potential for this to become confused at an operational level as a consequence of law no. 22/1999 on regional autonomy, introduced at the beginning of 2000, which implied a return of local security functions to the sub-provincial (kabupaten) level. It was unclear how the law would actually apply to Polri, but in theory at least it implied that Polri’s function as a national organisation would become redundant. However, given the increased function of Brimob in particular in security matters, and the tendency of the central government to try to restrict the powers of the regions, this matter was likely to be contested at the state level.
Internal or external focus?

This chapter has attempted to describe the structure of Indonesia’s military as it applies to the state, highlighting the overwhelming focus of the military on matters that are internal to the Indonesian state. The structure of the military in this sense is twofold: First, the TNI’s Territorial structure physically locates it throughout the archipelago and was originally based on the idea that, in such a physically dispersed and fragmented state, the first line of defence would have to be with the people. This model was derived from Indonesia’s revolutionary experience, in which its guerrilla army was (at least in principle) distributed among the people (whereas in fact it was heavily concentrated in the western islands, in particular Java). Second, and in more relevant, contemporary terms, the dispersal of the TNI throughout the archipelago has deeply insinuated it into the state’s political and administrative processes down to the level of the local district, and down to the level of the village. The rationale behind this has been the TNI’s ‘dual function’, whereby it assists with development projects as well as ‘defence’ needs, although the former also includes giving a high level of ‘guidance’ in day-to-day political and administrative affairs, while the latter has manifested itself as the provision of internal ‘security’.

*Figure 3.13* Map of TNI Territorial placements in Aceh
While ‘defence in depth’ and ‘development’ has rationalised the placement of the TNI throughout the archipelago, it has also ensured that the TNI has retained a close and minatory presence in relation to the people it was intended to protect. In this sense, the TNI has become a kind of ‘super-police’, which has meant that the practical function of the national police has blended with that of the TNI. Its recruitment of local people into auxiliary organisations – that is, the various militias – has augmented such ‘policing’ and has constructed for it an essentially ‘deniable’ aspect, to be used also when imposing a particular political paradigm. In terms of parallels with other countries where the military has a primary internal function, the TNI is more akin to a type of ‘national guard’, as exists in some Latin American states, designed to serve and protect elite interests, than it is to a ‘people’s army’. Indeed, to a very large extent, as is noted in Chapter 5, the direct interests that the TNI has served have been its own.

Because of the relative lack of efficiency and competence among the more localised Territorial units of the TNI, it was necessary to develop centralised specialist forces that were capable of being deployed to particular trouble spots at short notice. These forces, Kostrad and Kopassus, have provided the real strength of the TNI in more serious conflict situations. In the latter case, the role of the centralised forces has been more overtly and directly political: to shift the TNI’s focus away from defence or national stability and towards direct support for a particular regime or regime style through the suppression of what might otherwise be regarded as legitimate political expression.

Although the idea of ‘intelligence’ is structurally embedded in the Territorial function of the TNI, the centralised forces, and in particular Kopassus, have significant ‘intelligence’ capabilities. This is common to special forces throughout the world, although in most cases such capabilities are designed to gauge the efficacy or otherwise of an external enemy. However, because of the TNI’s primarily internal focus, its intelligence elements are also primarily internally focused. This has meant that, when combined with special forces capabilities, Kopassus has functioned, in practice, as a tool of terror, including in what have often been covert operations (see Figure 3.8). The blurring of the boundaries between Kopassus’ intelligence function and other elements of the TNI, along with military links to or control of intelligence agencies, has also meant that Indonesia’s intelligence services have been closely intertwined with or, in a practical sense, a part of the TNI in occupying a particular part of the minatory spectrum.

The TNI has continued to embed itself into almost every aspect of Indonesian life, both vertically within the political organisation of the state and horizontally throughout the physical territory of the state. The state has, in effect, become reliant upon the TNI to fulfil a number of functions in relation to state cohesion, from development and political organisation to security and ‘defence’. Despite later ambiguous moves for the TNI to reduce its overtly political role (noted briefly here and in more detail in Chapter 4),
the state has effectively been built around the idea that the TNI should or must have an integral functional role in its maintenance. That is, although there has been some discussion about modifying the role and position of the TNI in the state, it has for so long been so fundamentally ingrained in the state that to remove it, or even weaken it, would be to remove probably the state’s major structural support, without which it may not survive. The TNI, then, is so deeply implicated in the state structure as to be necessary for the continuing survival of the state, while at the same time being a deeply problematic organisation and in effect compromising state development and cohesion. This has profound implications for the character and viability of the Indonesian state.
The capacity and desire of the TNI to impose itself on Indonesia’s political process has varied over the history of the state, in keeping with the strength or weakness of government, the security environment and the extent to which the military has been divided or united. From 1965 until 1998, the key marker in the division of the military was its support for or opposition to Suharto, and after 1998 the resolution of these types of tensions. In the period following the fall of Suharto from power, it was widely suggested that the position of the military had seriously weakened, in part due to the lack of civilian support, in part because of the presumably logical reduction of military authority in a putatively post-authoritarian environment, in part because of Suharto’s own reduction of the active military’s political power and in part because of factionalism within the military, which was in large part engineered by Suharto.

The overt and formal political role of the TNI did diminish from 1998, and also before that, from the late 1980s, if one accepts its formal diminution under Suharto. Yet this is not to suggest that the TNI became powerless, or that it did not stay very close to being overwhelmingly dominant in political affairs. Furthermore, in the light of the decline in authority of other state institutions in the post-Suharto period, not least of which was the presidency itself, it may be argued that the TNI retained much of its relative if not absolute authority, a position that was increasingly reasserted under the presidency of Megawati Sukarnoputri. Due to the reduction of the TNI’s formal political role, the impact of the economic crisis on aspects of the TNI’s operational capacity, and increasing levels of separatist and communal violence, for a while the TNI no longer occupied the highest political ground. But, as one close analyst has observed, the TNI has continued to show that it has the capacity, if not the intention, to capture that highest political ground if it chooses to do so (ICG: 2001). Under Megawati’s presidency, it became increasingly clear that the TNI had in fact resumed a dominant role in what it defined as constituting its own areas of interest.
Factionalism

Within Indonesia’s military, there has long been competition between the three services, the army, navy and air force. The army has occupied the pre-eminent position among the services, through its role in the revolution, its influence in and at times control over the political process, its active dual function, notably through the Territorial structure, and its capacity to conduct private business. As Indonesia is an archipelagic state, the navy has also played an important role. Yet because the state has primarily faced problems from within, the role of the navy has largely been to transport soldiers from one point in the archipelago to another. It might be argued that the Navy’s external security role is more important than its simple capacity to transport troops, and this would be correct. But given that Indonesia has not faced a seaborne threat of any type since 1962, and then only in terms of a localised threat from the Dutch in their defence of West Papua, the primary role of the navy does not directly address the overwhelmingly most important function of the military, which is to secure the internal cohesion of the state. Similarly, the air force is able to play a role in both external defence (in theory, as it has never been applied in practice), and in maintaining internal cohesion. Indeed, air power lends the Indonesian military its single greatest tactical advantage over separatists, who have had neither air power nor meaningful air defences.1 That said, conventional attack aircraft have been of limited use against guerrillas, although specifically designed ground attack aircraft such as US-supplied Broncos, the British made Hawk2 and of course helicopters, have assisted the military greatly, especially in East Timor and in terms of transport in Aceh and West Papua. However, as overwhelmingly the largest, the most directly connected, and historically the most politically conservative branch of the armed forces, the army has always dominated the other two services.

This historical tendency for the army to dominate was enhanced by Suharto as he rose to power. There had been a high degree of factionalism in the armed forces from 1945 until the end of Sukarno’s era, reflecting the local origins of units, their religious or political affiliation, and the interests and ambitions of their regional commanders. This factionalism was reduced by communist, Islamic and anti-centralist forces showing their hand at different times and subsequently being repressed, and by the increasing professionalisation of the armed forces. From October 1965, Suharto, as effectively self-appointed head of the armed forces, had to placate, win over or remove other senior officers who were not comfortable with both his rise to the top of the military and his increasing control of Indonesia’s political life (Elson 2001: 100–10, 120–66).

One important way in which Suharto shored up his personal power base was by strengthening the army at the expense of the navy and air force. These latter services, in particular the navy, had been built up by Sukarno during his bid to secure West Papua from the Dutch and, later, as a part of the Confrontation (Konfrontasi) with Malaysia. These services were made
independent from the army by Sukarno in order to help balance the army’s power. As such they displayed a significantly high degree of loyalty to Sukarno, and were more influenced by leftist politics, including those of the PKI. The navy and air force also performed an indirect role in securing the state against internal fragmentation. So Suharto’s purge of their ranks was followed in the late 1960s by a rundown of their equipment. This was in partial response to the then parlous state of the Indonesian economy, but also reflected the redistribution of available income to Suharto’s army clients (Mak 1993: 60, 61). Thereafter Suharto faced two challenges, both related to corruption within the military and, on Suharto’s part, more personally. The first major challenge came from General Sumitro in 1974, resulting in what became known as the Malari riots. Although there were rumblings, the next real challenge to Suharto’s authority did not appear until 1986, and perhaps as late as 1988, from a ‘professional’ soldier and, at that time, commander-in-chief of ABRI, General Leonardus Benyamin ‘Benny’ Murdani.

The origins of political division

The divisions within the military stem from the earliest days of the Republic. Needing to finance themselves independently of the government in the period from 1945 to 1949, when the government had little or no income of its own, many army units engaged in their own business activities and were effectively self-supporting. This situation continued into the 1950s as the fledgling Republic struggled to meet its various financial commitments. However, as private army business became a lucrative source of often unaccountable income, supplementing income from the government, many generals were not only reluctant to give it up, but also saw it as an opportunity to keep more of the profits. Hence a core of ‘corrupt generals’ became established within the military. Suharto was acknowledged as being one of these corrupt officers by the head of the army, General Nasution (Crouch 1998: 40), and later by the sultan of Yogyakarta, with whom he had close contact during his period as a regional commander.3 The problem with corrupt generals can be traced through to the present time (see Opini 2000). It has been variously estimated, although unofficially and unaccountably, that in mid-2002 Indonesia’s military still derived at least a quarter and probably more of its income from legal business activities. It has been further estimated that ‘black’, or illegal, business activities account for more than twice this amount.

Despite the blot of corruption on his record, Suharto sufficiently redeemed himself at staff school, and was regarded as a sufficiently good, apolitical field commander, to be appointed as founding commander of the Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad), and then as commander of Operation Mandala, which was the planned military invasion of West Papua in 1962. As a consequence of this perceived loyalty, Suharto was not targeted along
with other senior generals in the events of 30 September 1965. After the murder of the six generals, in what Suharto quickly dubbed an attempted ‘coup’, while most remaining senior officers backed his developing grip on power, many thought he had assumed too much personal authority. This marked the beginning of Suharto’s dismantling of the armed forces’ ‘old guard’, marginalising and neutralising those officers whom he believed did not offer him total support.

By blaming the events of 30 September 1965 on the PKI, a move that proved popular with most of the army, Suharto was able to consolidate his power. Although there was some hesitancy, those who were sympathetic to the PKI or who believed that the actions of the armed forces were unwarranted were removed from their posts. As Suharto strengthened his position, particularly after Sukarno was obliged to hand over his authority to secure and stabilise Indonesia’s political environment on 11 March 1966, there continued to be ambiguity within the armed forces among those who supported Suharto’s general thrust but who believed that he was acquiring too much personal authority.

**Sumitro and the Malari riots**

By the early 1970s, Indonesia’s military began to split more forcefully with itself over Suharto’s role and style. Having politically established himself, Suharto moved to silence dissenters, by posting potential rivals to overseas posts where they might watch but do little, or by moving more senior officers into retirement. From around this time Suharto began to extensively employ financial patronage as a means of securing loyalty. This caused divisions between those generals who were happy to benefit financially from their association with, or support for, Suharto and those who either were not included in his largesse or opposed it on the grounds that it compromised the military’s professionalism. Having already alienated some of the more senior figures within the armed forces, as well as some of his more idealistic younger supporters, Suharto had to contend with a growing general concern about corruption, particularly from the early 1970s. Internal divisions began to manifest themselves more clearly, especially between the so-called ‘financial’ (primarily business-oriented or corrupt) and ‘non-financial’ (predominantly ‘professional’) generals and other officers, marking the beginning of an open split between Suharto and many of his earlier military supporters. By 1973, issues of corruption, patronage and the benefits that were perceived to be accruing to Indonesia’s Chinese minority spilled over, and there were anti-Chinese riots in Bandung. In particular there was a growing concern around the government’s failure to eliminate corruption, including corruption among the ‘financial generals’, some of whom were connected to a small group of ethnic Chinese business people, a concern which proved the underlying cause of the Malari riots (Malapetaka Limabelas Januri – 15 January Disaster) of 1974.
The riots – ostensibly against the Japanese prime minister, Kakuei Tanaka, and excessive foreign ownership – were the result of this power struggle within Indonesia’s top military ranks. The prevailing view, in part encouraged by the then Kopkamtib head, General Sumitro, is that in 1973 Sumitro and a number of other generals believed that Suharto should step down from the presidency. This view reflected what amounted to an initial division among those officers who wanted to see Sukarno out of office, and who were strongly anti-communist, but who wished to see the army ‘professionalise’ itself and move away from business activities generally and corruption in particular.

Among those generals who believed that Suharto should step down was Lieutenant General Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, who was highly influential in persuading Sukarno to hand over effective control of Indonesia to Suharto on 11 March 1966. Sarwo Edhie, as commander of the RPKAD (the precursor to Kopassus, the special forces), had been given the task by Suharto of restoring order in Jakarta after the 30 September and 1 October 1965 incidents, including those at the Halim air base. He later led the RPKAD in crushing opposition in Central Java. Lieutenant Generals Hartono Rekso Dharsono and Kemal Idris were also influential in helping to bring Suharto to power by forcing Sukarno’s hand in 1966. Sarwo Edhie was given the uninfluential job of regional commander of North Sumatra in 1968, was later posted to the army academy at Magelang and, following the Malari riots, was sent as ambassador to South Korea, which was a standard shunting move. Of the four officers who played a leading role in helping to bring Suharto to power, only Amir Machmud remained loyal to Suharto.

The events that led to the Malari riots began in 1973 with public discontent over favouritism shown to Chinese business people and foreign corporations at the expense of indigenous businesses, a sentiment that gained considerable sympathy within sections of the army. Muslims were also concerned about possible uniform marriage and divorce laws, which were proposed by the head of the Opsus intelligence network, Ali Murtopo. As head of Kopkamtib, the organisation specifically established to assert order, Sumitro not only refrained from taking action against protesters, but also visited university campuses throughout Java. He also approached Muslim leaders and offered to help work out new marriage laws, which were eventually passed with Muslim support in December 1973 (Crouch 1998: 313). Sumitro was clearly working against Murtopo and, by extension, against Suharto. It has been suggested that Sumitro initially asked for Suharto to step down, but Suharto declined and instead reprimanded Sumitro, in two meetings on 1 and 2 January 1974. Sumitro’s position became increasingly untenable, and it was apparent that Suharto was about to sack him.

In a last-ditch attempt to save his own position, topple Murtopo and, by extension, challenge Suharto (Vatikiotis 1993: 75–6), Sumitro did not oppose the student protests that took place when Tanaka visited on 14
January; in fact, many believe that he actually encouraged them. The protests, while specifically against Tanaka, were in fact also against the ‘financial generals’, who, in effect, included Suharto. After two days the riots were quelled, and Sumitro was sacked as Kopkamtib head and forced to resign as deputy head of the army (Crouch 1998: 304–17). Sumitro was offered an appointment as ambassador to Washington but turned it down and went into private business.

The Malari riots of 1974 marked a major split within the army and required a significant upper-echelon reshuffle by Suharto, which included the retrieval of Benny Murdani from South Korea in order to strengthen the intelligence community. It was from this time that a ‘professional–pragmatic’ dichotomy opened up within Indonesian military politics, the ‘professional’ side being associated with the army proper, and the ‘pragmatic’ with the intelligence agencies and Suharto (see Jenkins 1987: 14–32, esp. 30). But the failure of the challenge posed by the riots marked it as the last direct bid by other generals for authority within the new government. It was not until the mid- to late 1980s that such a strong source of opposition would again emerge, precipitating a new split that would eventually shape the course of Indonesian politics. After Malari, the next bout of overt anti-Suharto feeling within the military arose in 1988 over the appointment of Lieutenant General Sudharmono as vice-president. The military strongly opposed Sudharmono’s elevation and Sarwo Edhie, then a member of the DPR, resigned in protest. But most significantly, apparently in order to forestall any formal military response, Murdani was sacked as commander-in-chief just one month prior to Sudharmono’s appointment. This event, which may be seen as the beginning of a further deep division within the army, had been coming for some time.

**Murtopo and Murdani**

After the Malari riots, perhaps the next indication that all was not well arose when Murtopo and the rising military star Benny Murdani began planning for the invasion of Portuguese (East) Timor. Despite Suharto’s caution, the plan was developed by covertly establishing, influencing and supporting new political groupings within the colony. However, by August 1975 the political and military situation in East Timor had deteriorated, largely as a result of Murtopo’s influence, the argument for decisive action became stronger, and Suharto’s hand was eventually forced. Murtopo and Murdani might have been Suharto loyalists, but Murdani’s harder line on this issue marked the first time he was known to differ with Suharto.

One aspect of Jakarta’s political schism relates to the role of Murtopo. In Suharto’s early years as president, Murtopo was Suharto’s fixer and was regarded by some as the person who actually made the major decisions (see Schwartz 1994: 45). But while Murtopo worked for Suharto, his favourite was Murdani. Murdani was a rising young army officer during Sukarno’s
period of Guided Democracy, and Sukarno had viewed him so favourably, as a ‘man of ideals’ and as a ‘hero’, that he had even proposed that he should marry his daughter, Megawati (McIntyre 1996: 3, 6). Murdani, however, was already about to marry Hartini (whose family was also known to Sukarno). Although Murdani was under Suharto’s command during the West Papua Mandala campaign, and was defence attaché to the Indonesian embassy in Kuala Lumpur (where he conducted secret negotiations with the Commonwealth forces), and was then sent to Bangkok in an intelligence capacity, Suharto sent him as defence attaché to Seoul, the latter move often reserved for officers who had become troublesome. Murdani returned to Jakarta in 1974, in the wake of the Malari affair, as Murtopo’s protégé. Murdani was appointed as chief of SGI, the Intelligence Task Forces, which were responsible for much of the direct intimidation of and violence against dissenters.

From the time of Murdani’s return to Jakarta, he renewed his close alliance with Murtopo, with whom he had worked previously on intelligence matters. This collaboration was particularly noticeable at around the time of the 1975 invasion of East Timor, which Murtopo and Murdani planned, initially as Operation Komodo in 1974 and as Operation Seroja in late 1975. Suharto only reluctantly endorsed the latter plan, as he was well aware of the international furore that might follow such an invasion and was keen to try more subtle methods first. Murtopo was given the authority to support a pro-integrationist group within East Timor, Apodeti (Timorese Popular Democratic Association), but when this strategy failed to gather support, he helped to intensify divisions between the leftist Fretilin (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) and the rightist UDT (Timorese Democratic Union) by promoting their differences and encouraging UDT to believe that Fretilin was dangerous, sparking the brief civil war of August 1975, after which UDT, Apodeti and others fled across the border into West Timor. Murdani was thereafter in charge of incursions across the border, nominally under the banner of Apodeti–UDT, but in fact using Indonesian Kopassandha commandos, and later the more formal invasion. It is believed that Suharto had not been happy about how the whole affair had been handled, especially the botched parachute landing in Dili in which Indonesian soldiers mistakenly shot each other. The subsequent diplomatic difficulties presented by East Timor left some doubts among senior and rising officers about Suharto’s commitment to the military.

**Dissidence and the Petition of Fifty**

In 1977, following years of poor rice harvests and the closure of a dozen newspapers in the wake of the Malari riots, there were more demonstrations in the Javanese cities of Surabaya and Yogyakarta, and in the Sumatran cities of Medan and Palembang, over officially condoned corruption. Although these demonstrations did not explicitly reflect
tensions within the New Order government or the military, those within the government who believed that corruption was economically and ethically unacceptable felt their cause was being supported. As the presidential elections of 1978 approached, the governor of Jakarta, Lieutenant General Ali Sadikin, was nominated by the students as an alternative president. Another major figure identified with the student protests of 1977–78 was former Suharto supporter and by that time Secretary-General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Lieutenant General Hartono Rekso Dharsono. Other former New Order military figures were involved in the Study and Communications Forum (Forum Studi dan Komminikasi – Fosko), which promoted greater democratisation and a review of the military’s dual function, and in the Institute of Constitutional Awareness (Lembaga Kesadaran Berkonstitusi – LKB), in which former military chief General Nasution as well as Sadikin were prominent. The LKB also attracted the support of former vice-president Mohammad Hatta. Sympathisers included the army’s Chief of Staff, General Widodo, and the defence minister, General Jusuf (Jenkins 1987: 94–112).

The tensions that existed between Suharto and sections of the military, particularly over the financial generals and over the military’s inability to settle the East Timor question, were heightened in March 1980, when at Pekanbaru, Suharto ‘succeeded in insulting virtually everybody in an off-the-cuff speech to regional Military commanders’ (Jenkins 1987: 157–64; Coman 1987: 55). Then, on 27 March 1980, at an annual meeting of regional army commanders at Palembang, Suharto responded to criticisms over the dominance of the military and Golkar by saying that the military would continue its high-profile role in government and by questioning the loyalty of Muslim organisations. Notably, for the first time, Suharto acknowledged that his wife, Tien Suharto, had been accused of taking commissions on business deals. These speeches indicated that Suharto was campaigning for the 1982 DPR elections and for his own re-election in 1983, implicitly acknowledging opposition to his tenure within the ‘professional’ wing of the military.

On 13 May 1980, arising out of the views expressed by Fosko and LKB, a petition by fifty prominent Indonesians, including retired generals, former politicians, lawyers, intellectuals and students, expressed concern about Suharto’s speeches. This petition, known as the Petition of Fifty (Petisi Limapuluh), and one soon after by General Jasin, led to a domestic news blackout. Jasin’s petition, which alleged corruption on the part of Suharto and his wife, was widely circulated by photocopy. From about this time, Suharto began to formally distance himself from the military, moving to appoint civilian rather than military personnel to Cabinet positions. It was also at about this time that the outside world began to perceive a split in the New Order government (Crouch 1998). This would come to reflect a division between pro- and anti-Suharto generals.
Among the signatories to the Petition of Fifty were four retired generals who had played a significant role in establishing the legitimacy of the New Order government: former military chief Nasution, and Mokoginta, Yasin and Hugeng. Although the petition's broad focus was on its opposition to the excessive participation of the military in government and the increasingly authoritarian and exclusive role of the president, it also expressed concern about issues of corruption and the style of Indonesian development, the rule of law, and human rights. During this period at least, dissent and division within the military was muted, although this was primarily because the military’s more open dissenter had been removed. However, according to many in Jakarta, there were genuine and widespread ethical concerns, even among his former army colleagues, about Suharto’s behaviour, as well as the implications of his business dealings for the wider economy (see Jenkins 1987: Ch. 4).

An attack on Islam

One of the most controversial events of the mid-1980s was the Tanjung Priok incident. On 12 September 1984, at least sixty local people were shot dead – some claimed that the death toll was in the hundreds (IO 2000: 2) – and hundreds more were wounded when soldiers opened fire on a demonstration in Jakarta’s port district. The shooting followed a protest which occurred after officials had entered a local mosque to remove a poster inviting people to a meeting there to discuss the issue of poverty that was being exacerbated by Indonesia’s foreign income collapse. Complaints by people from the mosque led to arrests, which in turn sparked a protest by approximately 1,500 locals who marched to the local police station to demand their release. The locals were confronted by soldiers, who then opened fire. It has been alleged that although Try Sutrisno was in command of the troops at the time, as a good Muslim he faltered at giving the order to fire, which was given by his commander, Murdani, a Catholic. The reasons for and impact of the Tanjung Priok incident have been variously interpreted, but it is safe to say that Murdani had little tolerance for activist Muslims and had used them as a scapegoat for his otherwise harsh approach to security. The event, however, drove a wedge between a large section of the Islamic community and the secular wing of the army, creating a sense of mistrust and an environment, enhanced by Suharto, in which overtly Islamic generals were able to rise to power in opposition to Murdani-influenced secular officers.

Dissent

In 1985, following Suharto’s reinstatement as president for a fourth five-year term, the New Order government imposed its final constraints on free political organisation. Under law no. 3 on mass organisation, those parties that
were officially allowed to exist (other than Golkar) – that is, the PDI and the PPP – had to subscribe to the state ideology of Pancasila, their executive boards and members had to be registered with the government, and they were not permitted to organise between elections. Furthermore, the MPR (which requires a two-thirds majority vote in order to change the constitution) was hamstrung, with between a half and two-thirds of its members being effectively appointed by the president.

When Murdani rose to the position of commander-in-chief of the armed forces in 1983, he was at his most powerful, yet there were already signs of tensions between him and Suharto, with Suharto regarding him as too much of a ‘hawk’. For his own part, Murdani was not fond of having Suharto discuss matters with him in a patronising manner. Differences between the two also began to surface, over the role of the military in government, the tensions between ‘professional’ and ‘financial’ and ‘political’ officers in the armed forces, high-level corruption, and, in particular, the issue of succession, as was later demonstrated by Lieutenant General Sudharmono’s appointment as vice-president. When the falling-out between the two men became public in 1988, majority support within the armed forces for Suharto began to slip away, and a more obvious division opened up. A significant group within the armed forces had long been disenchanted with Suharto, but had constituted a minority. By the late 1980s the tide was turning, and the proportion who privately questioned Suharto’s leadership was developing as a majority – the core of what was to become the armed forces’ ‘red and white’ (nationalist, secular) faction. Suharto recognised this and moved to downgrade or remove completely the influence of the armed forces, primarily within the Cabinet, and to promote a more personally loyal faction.

One who questioned the direction of the New Order government, and who suffered as a consequence, was Lieutenant General Hartono Rekso Dharsono. Dharsono was one of the ‘generation of ’45’, who had fought against the Dutch and had participated in the suppression of the PKI’s Madiun revolt in 1948 and in the PRRI–Permesta rebellion in 1958. Suharto promoted Dharsono to commander of the Siliwangi Division, and from that position he was, along with Kemal Idris and Sarwo Edhie, among the strongest supporters of Suharto’s move to oust Sukarno from office, often taking a harder line than Suharto himself.

Dharsono began to run foul of Suharto by opposing Indonesia’s corrupt ‘financial’ generals, in particular Pertamina head Ibnu Sutowo, who was crucial to Suharto’s building of patronage through siphoning off Pertamina funds for his private projects and other patronage. Suharto sent Dharsono as ambassador to Bangkok and then Phnom Penh. Returning to Indonesia in 1976, Dharsono was appointed as Secretary-General of ASEAN. By 1978, however, Dharsono stated that he believed the New Order government had deviated from its original ideas and, refusing to back down, was dismissed from his post at ASEAN. Dharsono continued to move away from
Suharto, calling for greater democracy as a cure to what he saw as the country’s ills. Dharsono signed the ‘White Paper’ report on the Tanjung Priok killings, although at a meeting of radical Muslims shortly afterwards he opposed a violent response to the Tanjung Priok incident. Nevertheless, in 1986 he was imprisoned for ten years under anti-subversion laws (and released in 1990). At that time, neither dissent from former or serving officers nor public division within the ranks was tolerated.

Two ‘contests’

Political competition in Indonesia is often conducted indirectly; activity in one area may be intended to have consequences in quite another. In a political environment in which public dissent was not allowed, two events have come to characterise this peculiarly Javanese method of political play, both of which were predicated on ‘loss of face’ and public embarrassment.

By 1986 the austere and upright Murdani had begun to disapprove of Suharto’s personalisation of power and what was rapidly becoming fully developed corruption, particularly among those close to Suharto, including his family. In that year, Australian journalist, David Jenkins, was preparing to leave his posting to Jakarta and return to Sydney. Before leaving, however, he wrote an article about the corruption of Suharto and his family. While much of this information was widely known among Jakarta’s elite, it was never discussed publicly. Jenkins appears to have been encouraged to write his article by officers unhappy with Suharto’s corruption; indeed, they may even have helped him write it. The article duly appeared on the front page of Jenkins’s newspaper, the *Sydney Morning Herald*, on 10 April under the headline ‘After Marcos, now for the Soeharto billions’, and in its sister paper, the Melbourne *Age*.

The Indonesian response, apparently driven by Murdani, was swift, and included scathing commentaries in the army newspaper *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*. However, after the initial, relatively low-key phase of the Jenkins affair began to die down, an order was given to cancel the visa-free entry of Australians to Indonesia, resulting in an aeroplane load of tourists being returned to Australia upon arrival at Denpasar Airport, Bali. The turning back of the flight was orchestrated primarily by Murdani, although the order for the cancellation of visa-free travel for Australians to Indonesia was given, at least nominally, by justice minister Ismail Saleh. As the dispute escalated, photocopies of the Jenkins article became widely available in Jakarta. Furthermore, a document by the intelligence agency Bakin, which at the time was directly under Murdani’s control, outlined proposed reprisals against Australia, and was widely leaked in Jakarta in mid-May 1986 with the intention, seemingly, of escalating the dispute (Byrnes 1986). In terms of the cost to bilateral relations, Murdani claimed that Indonesia could live without Australia, but that Australia could not live without Indonesia. Murdani also noted that the dispute could escalate
further (Byrnes 1994: 258). The following September, a similar dispute arose over the publication of Robison’s *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital* (1986), which expanded on the issues raised in the Jenkins article. Rather than suppress discussion, the military response, directed by Murdani, served primarily to highlight the issue of Suharto’s corruption (Byrnes 1994).

Stackhouse (1986) notes that Suharto personally intervened and ‘forced a row-back’ after the Australian tourists were turned away from Denpasar following Saleh’s order. Saleh was a very senior official – not a junior official, as was initially claimed at the time by the Indonesian government (FEER 1986: 45). It was also extremely unusual for Suharto to become personally involved in such a matter. This perhaps reflected the fact that he could not trust all his senior officers to act on his behalf. Then, just as the matter was beginning to settle, the ABRI newspaper went on the attack again. Far from being hushed up, the matter was inflamed, the intention being, apparently, to embarrass Suharto.

This controversy coincided with a visit to Indonesia by the then US vice-president, George Bush. Bush’s visit to Indonesia came just before a visit by the then US president Ronald Reagan. Bush visited Indonesia as a part of a tour of oil-producing nations to discuss the slump in world oil prices, which that month had dropped to US$9 a barrel. Suharto was effectively asking for support for lifting the price of oil, an economic policy that had already put Bush in a difficult political position, further complicated by allegations that Suharto was engaged in corruption on a grand scale. It was difficult for Indonesia to maintain the position that it depended on a certain level of oil-based revenue when it was alleged that large volumes of public money had been siphoned off by a corrupt political leader and his family. The furor over the article and the details of the allegations of corruption were made available to Reagan’s party, including its media entourage, when it visited Indonesia some weeks later. The Reagan visit did not proceed as Suharto had hoped, especially after two Washington-based journalists from the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and a *New York Times* journalist, Barbara Crossett, were expelled from Indonesia upon landing with the official party. The visit was headlined as a ‘disaster’, and led to similar reports on Suharto’s corruption by American journalists in the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, the *Asian Wall Street Journal*, the *Guardian*, the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, the *International Herald Tribune* and the *Australian Financial Review*.

In confronting this precarious political environment, Suharto was increasingly able to consolidate power in his own hands, allocating as much authority as he felt necessary to those he trusted and who depended on his direct support for their own political survival. This was in part a response to a growing perception that the armed forces were not entirely committed to Suharto’s presidency, and in part the result of Suharto’s ‘traditional anxiety about a dispersion of power’ (Crouch 1994: 11), which was exacerbated by this lack of commitment. The move that most alienated military officers
from Suharto was the ‘election’ of Lieutenant General Sudharmono to the position of vice-president. Sudharmono had been instrumental in reducing the military’s access to funds through private business activities and had helped limit corruption among senior officers. He also oversaw the reduction of the military’s involvement in Golkar and the DPR, which paralleled the decline of military personnel in senior ministerial posts. Suharto knew that his plan to have Sudharmono ‘elected’ to the vice-presidency would be strongly opposed by the army, and perhaps he was beginning to spoil for a fight in any case. A month before Sudharmono was made vice-president, Murdani was sacked as commander-in-chief and as head of Kopkamtib, and was installed in the less influential position of defence minister. Kopkamtib was regarded by Suharto as having become too much like Murdani’s personal political tool; consequently, it was reorganised as Bakorstanas and Murdani’s intelligence power base was gradually dismantled. The move to sack Murdani as commander-in-chief was highly unusual, as such transfers otherwise occurred after an election, not before. A large section of the armed forces thereafter campaigned vigorously against Sudharmono, spending large sums trying to dislodge him as chairman of Golkar at the party’s congress in November 1988. To do this, 120 serving military officers retired from their posts to stand as regional Golkar chairmen, securing about two-thirds of all regional delegates to the congress (Vatikiotis 1993: 87). As a consequence, Sudharmono was dumped from the Golkar chair at the party’s congress, although this move seemed to also suit Suharto, as it reduced what might otherwise have been Sudharmono’s excessive personalisation of power.

After 1988, the contest between what was becoming an increasingly identifiable faction of the armed forces and Suharto’s camp was looking less like shadow boxing and more like a match in which the gloves had been removed. In a bid to construct a new power base less overtly reliant on this developing faction within the military, from the late 1980s Suharto was keen to be seen as an observant Muslim and he began to promote a number of Islamic causes, including the building of mosques (which was largely paid for by a Suharto-controlled yayasan, funded by an official levy on Indonesia’s public servants). He was also involved in 1990 in establishing the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia – ICMI), with Suharto’s trusted minion B.J. Habibie as its head. ICMI’s constituent think-tank, the Centre for Information and Development Studies (CIDES), was intended to counter what was then regarded as the Murdani-influenced think-tank, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Suharto also began to take a more detailed personal interest in the appointment and promotion of even junior army officers, and moved to promote officers who were personally loyal to him, many of whom identified with his more overt support for Islam, helping to create a more explicitly Islamic faction of the army that, by 1993, was clearly delineated. By 1991, Murdani was halfway through his term as defence minister, and was no
doubt aware that he had few remaining opportunities to push his case against Suharto from within the government. According to one version of events, Murdani encouraged army units in East Timor to step up pressure on anti-government activists at a time when he knew that representatives of the international media would be visiting the disputed territory; furthermore, Suharto was about to go on a world tour, and his son-in-law, Prabowo Subianto, was stationed at that time in East Timor. The army knew, through its informers, that pro-independence supporters were to demonstrate in front of the foreign journalists accompanying a Portuguese parliamentary delegation to Dili, and so it was decided to achieve two, possibly three, results with one action. A strong military response to the protesters would reassert the military’s authority in East Timor, and it would also show up Suharto as the supreme commander of an army over which he had little control. Implicating Lieutenant Colonel Prabowo in these events would put him in a difficult position with Suharto, hampering Suharto’s options for succession. Thus, the lives of more than 200 civilians in East Timor were written off in the power play between Murdani and Suharto. (For a similar version of events, based on the second-hand comments of Prabowo, see Honna (2001: 66) and Schwartz (1994: 215–16, 345 n56).)

Not to be outdone, Suharto used international public outrage over the ‘Dili massacre’ to round on the pro-Murdani group within the armed forces, removing from active duty East Timor commander Brigadier General Rudolph Warouw and Warouw’s regional superior in Bali, Major General Sintong Panjaitan. Both men were considered to be protégés of Murdani. Prabowo was not held accountable for any aspect of the incident. Nor was any responsibility attributed to Suharto’s brother-in-law, Wismoyo Arismunandar, who was commander of the Kostrad troops involved in the killings, or to Try Sutrisno, who was armed forces commander at that time (Wismoyo and Try were still then regarded as Suharto loyalists, a position that later changed). Panjaitan had been considered one of Wismoyo’s main rivals for the position of Army Chief of Staff.

The sacking of Murdani from the command of the military in 1988 and his removal as defence minister in 1993 was intended to limit his influence over the choice of appointment for the vice-presidency. It transpired, however, that the tactic did not work. In the general elections of 1992, Murdani and the commander-in-chief who followed him, General Try Sutrisno, encouraged the military to adopt a ‘neutral’ attitude towards the government party, Golkar, while ‘tolerating’ retired officers who supported the ‘opposition’, the PDI (Honna 2001: 66). This ‘tolerance’ manifested itself in December 1993 as support from this section of the army for the candidacy of Megawati Sukarnoputri as PDI chair.

One way in which the armed forces reasserted its political authority was through expanding its representation in the DPR, and hence the MPR and regional political forums. Apart from the seats automatically allocated to military officers, many officers also retired early from the armed forces and
officially stood for national, provincial and regional seats, as well as senior party positions as Golkar members. By the early 1990s, it was estimated that about 40 per cent of Golkar’s seats in the DPR were held by ex-armed forces members (Soejipto Wirosardjono 1992).

In early 1993, the armed forces pushed a hard political line with Suharto, nominating recently retired armed forces commander-in-chief General Try Sutrisno for the vice-presidency. Try had been an adjutant to Suharto and, as a notable Muslim, had accompanied Suharto to Mecca on the hajj, which was a part of Suharto’s strategy to bolster the Muslim vote. However, as military commander, Try was disenchanted with Suharto’s sidelining of the military, and increasingly came under the influence of Murdani. Significantly, Try was military commander at the time of the Dili massacre. Suharto roundly castigated the armed forces over the incident and took advantage of the issue to dispose of senior officers who were arrayed against him. Although Try supported the military action against the protesters in Dili and made demonstrably false public claims about the extent of the killings, he survived Suharto’s wrath and retained his position. However, if Try at this time was not already firmly within the anti-Suharto camp, the political fallout from the Dili massacre confirmed him in this position.

Try allowed himself to be nominated by the armed forces for the vice-presidency before Suharto had publicly named his deputy. This move, orchestrated by Murdani, was unheard of in Indonesian politics, as the president has traditionally had the right of appointing his own deputy, who would then be endorsed by consensus within the MPR. However, with the armed forces taking the public step of nominating one of their own before Suharto could choose, a decision that was openly supported by the PPP, and then engineering the vote in the MPR, Suharto had little choice but to accept the nomination. Suharto may well have appointed Try in any case, and perhaps he was not seriously opposed to having Try as vice-president. But Suharto was furious with the method of Try’s appointment, if not with its fact, and it was generally believed that he had favoured Habibie for the position (which he obtained in 1998). Try’s nomination was foisted upon Suharto as a deliberate gesture of defiance by the armed forces, one that would have begged a more broad and debilitating fallout had Suharto not accepted it. Murdani later said that it was in 1988 that he and others had decided that Try should become vice-president, in response to Suharto’s effective appointment of Sudharmono (Elson 2001: 272). Try was ‘elected’ to the position of vice-president unopposed and with just one note of dissent.6 Suharto thereafter ignored Try for the next five years, while the military’s representation in the Cabinet was further reduced. Suharto’s immediate response to the appointment was to sack Murdani, the person most strongly associated with the appointment, from his position as defence minister. Murdani lost a public position as a consequence of the military’s tussle with Suharto, but he did not lose his influence within the armed forces, or with Try or many other rising officers.
The year 1993 was a watershed for the military’s anti-Suharto faction in two other respects. The first was the banning of the state lottery, a decision that was foisted upon Suharto by militant Muslims who, it was believed, were encouraged, or at least given free rein, by senior military officers. Suharto was overseas when this issue blew up, and it was timed so that he would be unable to react in any meaningful way. As Suharto directly benefited from the lottery, through a family controlled *yayasan*, the move was a particularly personal snub. Then, in December 1993, a number of senior military officers, in particular Jakarta garrison commander Hendropriyono, and Agum Gumelar, publicly supported the campaign by Megawati Sukarnoputri to become chair of the PDI, despite Suharto’s best efforts to have her appointment derailed. Given her status as daughter of Suharto’s predecessor, support for Megawati’s appointment by a significant faction within the armed forces was a highly symbolic gesture of defiance against Suharto’s leadership. In particular, Brigadier Generals Agum Gumelar and Hendropriyono were active in supporting Megawati’s campaign, much to the displeasure of Suharto, for which Hendropriyono was sacked as Jakarta Garrison commander. These two officers retained close links to Megawati thereafter, and were eventually rewarded with positions in her first Cabinet.

**The armed forces divided**

By the mid-1990s, Indonesia’s military factions were again clearly identifiable. Some analysts have talked about the Indonesian armed forces as comprising ‘factions’ or, as the consensus-conscious Javanese called them, ‘fractions’ (fraksi) – factions being oppositional and fractions being a part of a whole. To this end, the factions were identified as being anti- or pro-Suharto, as ‘red and white’ or ‘green’, or along professional and pro- and anti-reform lines, identified by patronage, historical links and so on. The ‘red and white’ faction was generally anti-Suharto, secular, nationalist, ‘professional’ and was in part pro-PDI (at least as a vehicle for destabilising Suharto). In 1995, revealing his clear alliance with the ‘red and white’ group, the commander-in-chief of the armed force, General Edi Sudrajat, stressed the importance of strengthening ‘nationalism’ within the armed forces, indicating his concern with its Islamicist faction, and expressed concern about the military being seen as a ‘tool of the rich’, indicating a concern with Suharto. Speaking at Sesko in Bandung in September of that year, Edi said that the armed forces must be ‘reformed’, and other such calls for reform also began to increase in number from this time (see Honna 2001: 82). Given that Edi was indicating that the military might be too close to one particular political party (that is, Golkar), by contrast the defence minister and former commander-in-chief General Feisal Tanjung claimed that military members were in fact Golkar cadres, indicating his ‘green’ allegiances (Honna 2001: 76–8). The ‘red and white’ faction was not aligned with the rise of political Islam, reflecting a more nominal Islamic (*abangan*) base and was generally opposed to the influence wielded by ICMI. The ‘green’ faction was
generally pro-Suharto, pro-Islam, ‘political’, supported by or linked with ICMI, and, at least until late 1996 and early 1997, had a tendency to support the PPP, or groups within it. Leading members of the ‘green’ group included commander-in-chief General Feisal Tanjung (who had long been close to Suharto’s favourite minister, Habibie, and who was a Suhartoist sycophant), Army Chief of Staff Hartono and Suharto’s son-in-law, Prabowo Subianto. This faction was also linked to the strongly Islamic and anti-Murdani political think-tank, the Center for Information and Development Studies, which was established in 1995 by Hartono and Prabowo. On balance, the ‘red and white’ faction was identified with Murdani, while the ‘green’ faction was identified with former military commander General Feisal Tanjung and, after he moved to become defence minister, Prabowo.

While the terms ‘red and white’ and ‘green’ were broadly applicable to the army’s factions, during the mid-1990s it became clear that the armed forces contained numerous sub-groups. But the overarching view that there were two opposed groups commanding the loyalty of sub-groups meant that there was some sort of genuine, internal opposition to Suharto and a deep division within the army. These sub-groups, or ‘clusters’, were located around key generals within the armed forces, and among themselves they varied and coalesced on a range of issues. It is tempting here to use the Javanese term *aliran* (stream of influence), which has traditionally designated the influence and patronage exercised by key individuals within Java’s and, more recently, Indonesia’s religious and political systems. The types of issues that determined the ‘clustering’ within the armed forces included: whether the senior officers were pro- or anti-Suharto, formally or informally Islamic (*santri* or *abangan*), or even non-Muslim; support or opposition for the military’s continued political involvement and the extent and activism of that involvement; ‘professionalism’ within and levels of funding for the armed forces in relation to other national projects; the extent to which the military should be involved in both legal and illegal business; political and economic centralisation (which revolved around the army’s Territorial function); whether they were pro- or anti-democratisation (reformist or non-reformist); their responses to (and benefits from) corruption; their links with various members of the civilian elite; and so on.

In addition to the army’s ‘clusters’, a small group of officers coalesced as a sort of alliance, and readied themselves for the post-Suharto period. These officers were certainly arranged in opposition to Suharto, and were at least determined to influence the issue of his succession. Rather than mount a *coup d’état*, they considered as preferable, for Indonesia’s economic standing and for the legitimacy of the government, that the presidency change by constitutional means. There was also the very real question over the success of such a coup, most military power was in limited hands; however, sufficient military power was available outside this group to offer a real challenge to such a bid. But such a move was unnecessary while this military group was able to influence events throughout the archipelago to suit its own purpose.
While Suharto grew increasingly self-indulgent and opposition mounted, Murdani drifted further into the background. Many officers, who later came to play a significant role in Indonesia’s political future, acknowledged Murdani as their greatest influence. Although he was increasingly frail and sick, in practical terms the sort of background influence that Murdani was once able to bring to bear in Indonesian military politics had been passed on to an officer who was in many senses one of his protégés, Wiranto. Indeed, given the decline of other institutional political bases, Wiranto perhaps exercised relatively more political power behind the scenes than did Murdani. What was interesting, though, was the similar manner in which they had both exercised that power – as commanders-in-chief and then after they had officially retired – whereby both had reflected an authoritarian ‘nationalist’ agenda. In this regard, this ‘nationalist’ agenda was one aimed at retaining the unity of Indonesia, as a unitary (as opposed to federated) state, in which Java and its values were at the core and in which an imposed discipline was necessary for the maintenance of order.

Perhaps in real terms it matters little what Murdani’s actual contribution was to the internal opposition to Suharto, apart from providing Jakarta’s legion of rumour-mongers and conspiracy theorists with a continuous supply of subject material. There is no doubt that Murdani retained the respect and loyalty of very many in the armed forces. Many of the generation of senior officers who trained in the 1960s and particularly in the early 1970s still regarded him as something of a father figure. In this sense, Murdani was a rallying point for the ‘clusters’ that might more broadly have been identified as making up the ‘red and white’ group, particularly during the early to mid-1990s. In a country where symbolism is often thought to be more important than reality, the fact that so many people for so long believed that Murdani was the head of the anti-Suharto faction, and that he did little to dispel that belief, was enough to announce that Suharto could no longer rely on the majority of the armed forces to be his loyal supporters.

It was less an ironic twist of fate than an indication of the patterns of political thinking among Java’s elite, in particular in the military, that a situation reflecting Suharto’s loss of control over the army continued and further developed under Suharto’s successor, Habibie, and under Abdurrahman Wahid. Varying the focus of the ‘red and white’ faction, Wiranto drew together a somewhat differently constituted group of ‘clusters’, especially under the Abdurrahman Wahid presidency. Notably, the reformist element of the older ‘red and white’ group was disassociated from it, and was replaced with conservative, less overtly Islamic elements of what was once constructed as the ‘green’ faction. But the core of this later group of clusters, and the way in which it organised itself towards the presidency, was directly descended from the ‘red and white’ group of the late Suharto years. As such there developed a sense of an institutionalised military opposition to any president that did not represent the interests or views of the armed forces generally and of the army in particular.
Endgame

By the early 1990s it had become clear that the New Order government under Suharto had just about run its course, and that there was a growing sense of impatience across Indonesia’s political community with his refusal or inability to accept this fact. Although public expressions of discontent with Suharto were still mostly muted, centres of potential or actual opposition to Suharto began to develop – among sections of the formal political parties; among what would in a more open polity be regarded as civil society; among Indonesia’s Islamic organisations; and, not least, within the armed forces. Furthermore, a sense of a loose alliance between some of these often informally constructed groups began to grow, albeit an alliance that rarely lasted beyond a shared acknowledgement that some sort of change was necessary and inevitable. But the agendas that drove each of these groups were far too disparate to allow them to construct a cohesive opposition, a situation made all the more tenuous by Suharto’s ability to form new client relationships and his continuing, though shifting, control of the levers of repression.

Internationally, the rationale for supporting the New Order government had disappeared with the effective end of the Cold War (usually credited as having occurred in 1989). The international community generally and the US in particular began shifting from more or less uncritical support to a critical awareness and, eventually, degrees of opposition to Suharto’s tenure. As an awareness of an increasingly broad-based opposition to Suharto developed, some of Indonesia’s businesses began to look nervously at their investments. Yet before the bubble burst there was one last rush of profit-taking. But as the signals became clearer, confidence in the future began to diminish and domestic money began to move offshore, investors taking advantage of the country’s more liberal monetary regulations. This vast transfer of funds offshore precipitated the economic collapse of mid-1997. Yet the outcome of Suharto’s effective high-stakes endgame was never set, and ahead of his political denouement the factional manoeuvring became intense.

Insofar as the ‘red and white’ faction was opposed to Suharto’s continuing tenure in office, there was general agreement in 1997 and into 1998 that the status of the institution of president should remain largely intact and, to this end, that a coup against the president or other non-constitutional measures would be regarded, by the majority, as unsupportable. This pro-constitution position remained a dominant theme with the key leaders of this military group, even though in the period before Suharto’s eventual resignation as president, and during the Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid presidencies, their leading members changed. This position reflected a view privately expressed by Benny Murdani in the late 1980s, which combined lingering respect for Suharto and support for the presidency along with a view that the army should retain a background influence in the political process and support the constitution but eventually engineer Suharto’s departure.
With regard to his successor, Suharto had at first appeared to favour his family relative, Major General Wismoyo Arismunandar, as the main candidate, and by 1993, when he was promoted to Army Chief of Staff, many observers considered him to be the front runner for succession. But by 1995 Wismoyo had been dumped from presidential favour and from his position as army commander. The falling-out between Suharto and Wismoyo came to a head over Wismoyo’s moves to distance the army from the president and, in particular, from Suharto’s loyal ministers, including Habibie, Harmoko and the newly appointed head of the armed forces, Raden Hartono. Having risen rapidly through the ranks, at least partly because of his family association with Suharto, Wismoyo appeared to regard Suharto as having been too long in power. As a result, he effectively destroyed a strong likelihood of attaining command of the armed forces, the vice-presidency and perhaps even the presidency itself.

Although Try was forced upon Suharto as vice-president, Suharto’s failure to stymie the appointment was widely interpreted as his first major political failure and heralded a string of disasters for the ageing leader in 1993. The rift between Suharto and the armed forces was thrust into the open in late October 1993, when Major General Sembiring Meliala, a member of the MPR and a serving member of the armed forces, bluntly stated that the military would be the arbiter of presidential succession. Along with the demise of Suharto’s previously unchallenged leadership went the effective end of the government’s brief ‘openness’ and ‘democratisation’ programmes, such as they were. These programmes were designed to give vent to growing middle-class frustrations, as well as to put a more favourable post-Cold War spin on the often repressive activities of the government.

Suharto also faced a problem with the armed forces over technology minister and Suharto favourite, B.J. Habibie. Habibie authorised the purchase in 1993 of a group of East German warships for US$12.7 million, but which required a refit at an estimated cost of US$1.1 billion. Significantly, this purchase was not discussed with the armed forces, and made a serious and unwanted imposition on its budget, to the benefit of Habibie’s own ministry. Although Suharto had backed Habibie, he was embarrassed by the public response, and in particular by the airing in the media of differences between the armed forces and Habibie over the purchase. In a rare display of anger, Suharto lost his temper with the media and promptly closed three major publications. Then, in 1997, Habibie backed down on a proposal to build a nuclear reactor in Java, following expressions of concern about the geologically unstable nature of the region. Habibie was also keen to promote Indonesia as a base for high-technology businesses and attempted to launch a number of experimental or difficult industries, such as an aerospace industry. None of Habibie’s high-technology projects were a financial success, however, and all cost the government dearly, both in terms of financial support and in terms of
standing. When one also looks back at his idiosyncratic flamboyancy and his ability to make enemies within the armed forces, it was clear that Habibie’s political future was never going to be easy.

Megawati and the PDI

In the period between the election of Megawati Sukarnoputri as chair of the PDI in late 1993 and her forcible removal from office in mid-1996, she appeared to act as a catalyst for opposition to Suharto and was regarded by him as having the potential to pose a genuine political threat. Megawati’s pedigree as the daughter of Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, gave her some political legitimacy. To that end, Suharto engineered Megawati’s removal from the leadership of the PDI by orchestrating a rebel party congress in Medan, North Sumatra, in June 1996, from which Megawati and her supporters were barred. Although the congress removed Megawati as chair of the party, she refused to give in, holding out at the party’s Jakarta headquarters. On 27 July, strongly reinforced by soldiers and hired thugs dressed in PDI T-shirts, rebel PDI members stormed the building, killing at least five and probably more, and with a further twenty disappearing, while the headquarters was sacked and burned. The attack sparked the worst rioting and looting seen in Jakarta since the Malari affair of 1974, and was only brought under control by the army and police after two days. The officers who organised the raid on the PDI headquarters represented the core of Suharto’s personally loyal group and included armed forces chief General Feisal Tanjung, army chief Raden Hartono, armed forces Chief of General Affairs Suyono, and the chief inspector of Jakarta police, General Hamami Nata. The raid and subsequent rioting presaged a series of protests and riots (often anti-Chinese in nature), indicating that subterranean forces were at work to disrupt Indonesia’s political environment.

In the four months prior to the DPR elections in May 1997, protests and riots took place throughout Java, becoming an increasingly frequent occurrence. In a forceful display of defiance just before the elections, anti-government protestors confronted 20,000 police and soldiers, who had been deployed in addition to the already significant military presence in Jakarta. The death toll from the riots in Jakarta at this stage neared 100, with many more beaten and jailed. Outside Java, election-related violence claimed more than 150 lives. Even though the Jakarta riots began as PPP gatherings, many protestors carried banners or wore T-shirts bearing the likeness of Megawati Sukarnoputri, the ousted leader of the PDI, indicating that there was common opposition to the government. And significantly, for the first time, some senior army officers were saying off the record (but for publication nonetheless) that if the unrest against the government were to deepen, then they had a plan to ‘replace the President’. A coup was always unlikely, but the fact that it was being talked about more openly was an indication that some sort of political change was looming.
At this time, a Central Javanese officer who had been close to Suharto began to rise through the ranks, through Kostrad, reaching Army Chief of Staff and then, at the beginning of 1998, commander-in-chief. As a former Suharto adjutant, Wiranto provided the balance required to quell the armed forces’ rising resentment, through his close links to the ‘red and white’ faction and by playing a protective role towards pro-reform army officers, as well as by appealing to Muslim groups and even by giving a nod in the direction of pro-democracy agitators. Wiranto also had the maintenance of the country’s economic status quo at heart and was never likely to strongly support unsettling or deposing its wealthy Suharto-connected business magnates. From 1996 it was increasingly obvious that Wiranto’s position would be pivotal in the transition period that was approaching.

The fall of Suharto

Indonesia’s economy had begun to collapse in mid-1997, when it floated the rupiah in the face of pressure from Thailand, which had itself just floated its own currency. The rupiah sank in value, stabilised, and then sank further as Suharto failed to grapple with the IMF loan conditions he was forced to ask for. At the beginning of 1998, Suharto’s budget speech for the year was stunning in its unrealistic optimism, causing a further loss of confidence in both the economy and in Suharto’s ability to control economic and, increasingly, political affairs. Corruption on a massive scale, the flight of vast capital (in tens of billions of US dollars) to offshore locations and the hollow structure of much of the then recently vaunted investment was coming home to roost, and Suharto had no answers. Suharto’s weak response, having been ‘re-elected’ for a seventh term as president, was to appoint a crony-heavy Cabinet, with Habibie as vice-president. Student protests broke out and began to call for Suharto’s resignation. Some student leaders were kidnapped by members of Kopassus, then controlled by Prabowo, but sections of the army generally tolerated and in some cases even encouraged student protest.

Then, in Jakarta, while Suharto was attending a meeting in Egypt, students at the private Trisakti University campus joined the protest movement. Jakarta had been assumed as the direct security concern of Suharto’s son-in-law and the person who had taken effective leadership of the armed force’s pro-Suharto ‘green’ faction, Major General Prabowo Subianto. As students began to run back to their campus, they were fired upon. Rubber bullets gave way to conventional rounds, and fleeing students dropped before the gunfire; four were shot dead. Following the shooting, mass student demonstrations culminated in the occupation of the People’s Consultative Assembly’s building. Marines, sent by Wiranto, did not discourage the students, and in effect protected them. Faced with a massive breakdown of law and order and held hostage by the students, leaders of the
Assembly and the MPR, which had unanimously re-elected Suharto for his seventh presidential term just weeks beforehand, began to call on the president to step down. There were more protests in other Indonesian cities, and increasingly Jakarta’s poor and dispossessed joined in, turning events into an orgy of anti-government rioting and looting, in which more than 1,000 people died, mostly by being trapped in burning buildings. The mayhem was only quelled when the army brought its armoured cars and tanks out onto the streets. But the public demand for Suharto’s resignation reached unprecedented levels, with former generals, academics and ordinary Indonesians calling for him to quit. Major General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono personally delivered a message from a number of retired generals, addressed to armed forces commander-in-chief General Wiranto, requesting that Suharto resign. A similar petition was presented to a special session of the MPR, in which, in an act of unprecedented defiance, half of the assembly called on Suharto to resign.

On Tuesday 19 May 1998, in a public address televised live, President Suharto announced the formation of a ‘reform committee’ and a new ‘reform Cabinet’. But, more importantly, Suharto also announced that there would be fresh presidential elections and that he would not be standing as a candidate. No date was given for the election and many believed it would be more than a year away, which did not satisfy the protesters. On 20 May 1998, with Harmoko now threatening to have the MPR impeach Suharto, the MPR building swamped by protesters and all credible candidates refusing to join his ‘reform committee’, Suharto began to waver. When Harmoko again spoke against Suharto, and when the armed forces leader in the MPR, Syarwan Hamid, raised his fist in symbolic support, it was obvious that Suharto was alone. A visit to his home that evening by three former vice-presidents – Try Sutrisno, Sudharmono and Umar Wirahadikusumah – further encouraged Suharto to resign. A visit later that night by Wiranto sealed the arrangement: if Suharto resigned, he and his family would be protected from most of the potential retribution after his resignation. At around 11.00 p.m. Suharto summoned Habibie and informed him that he would become Indonesia’s third president on the following day, 21 May 1998.

Habibie was sworn in as president, but there were other serious concerns to resolve. Habibie was widely disliked; he was a direct Suharto beneficiary, and he had no power base of his own. In naming his new, very slightly more inclusive ‘reform Cabinet’, Wiranto was reappointed as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and as defence minister, a combination of roles that gave him a high level of power within the state. Wiranto was supported in his Cabinet by Brigadier General Yunus Yosfiah, former head of social and political affairs, who was noted for his hardline military position. The retention in the Cabinet of Hendropriyono and the ‘red and white’ faction supporter Juwono Sudharsono further indicated that the armed forces were again in the ascendancy.
There was a brief and ill-conceived show of power on 22 May, during which Prabowo stormed into Habibie’s office and demanded to be made commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Wiranto had already been confirmed in that position and Prabowo was quickly shuffled out. He was likewise quickly shuffled out of Kostrad, to which he had recently been appointed as head, to the Staff and Command College at Magelang, and then out of the armed forces altogether, on the nominal charge of failing to maintain control over some of the soldiers under his command. Meanwhile, Prabowo’s military allies were similarly moved from influential positions in a political purge of the army, to be replaced by ‘red and white’ loyalists. In particular, Kopassus commander Major General Muchdi Purwopranjono was replaced by Major General Sjahrir.

With Habibie’s future less than certain, there was an outpouring of pent-up political frustration in the form of the creation of political parties; a total of 149 parties were formed before the electoral culling process brought them down to a more manageable but still unwieldy 48. Habibie made a number of moves based on popular calls for reform, including: the freeing of labour unions, the news media and political prisoners; the disassociation of some areas of government from business; the ending of monopolies; and the announcement that all qualified political parties may contest future elections. One of the first results of the freeing of political prisoners was that Abdul Latief – a former colonel, alleged Gestapo conspirator and, for thirty-two years, a political prisoner – claimed that he had told Suharto of the plot against the army’s six senior generals before the events of 30 September 1965 unfolded. Latief said he had told Suharto of this because Suharto was regarded as a Sukarno loyalist. This allegation seriously damaged the already questionable official history of the New Order government, and further de-legitimised Suharto’s now ended presidency.

Habibie and reform

When Habibie succeeded Suharto as president, some believed that Wiranto would topple him in a military coup, which was the preferred option of some older, retired officers, including the former military commander and vice-president, Try Sutrisno, and another former military commander and defence minister, Edi Sudrajat. However, despite Suharto’s support for Wiranto to take political control to ensure stability, Wiranto told Habibie that he would support him as president so long as Habibie agreed to a quick re-election process. Wiranto later commented on how he might have easily staged a coup at that time, but was guided by a desire for a smooth transition to a more stable post-Suharto period, and by a respect for the 1945 constitution.

Throughout this period, many were of the opinion that Wiranto was somewhat weakened, being either unwilling or unable to depose Habibie,
unable to curb the excesses of sections of a politically divided armed forces and in large part responsible for the many atrocities committed by various commands of the army. The armed forces itself was regarded as having lost the support of most ordinary Indonesians and thus, as a consequence of this break with its civilian support base, its power (see Budiman et al. 1999; Mietzner 1998). This view, however, assumed that the armed forces were in some way reliant on popular good will. It also neglected the fact that although the armed forces had been weakened as a political power, so too had every other institution of state, especially the presidency, so while the armed forces were weaker in absolute terms they were, in a relative sense, probably stronger than they had been since the early 1980s.

The formal role of the armed forces in the political process by way of its dual function had been critical to the survival of the New Order government, not least through the rigging of the electoral process. To this end, the armed forces said that they would now remain outside the electoral process other than to ensure that there was no violence or other disruption. It was a promise they kept, and the elections of June 1999 were peaceful and orderly, except in the troubled territory of Aceh. In this era of flowering reform, a further significant change to Indonesia’s political system was the reduction to 38 from 75 (earlier 100) of the number of seats allocated to the military in the DPR, a change which the military appeared to accept with good grace.

In the early post-Suharto period, Wiranto faced a number of challenges to his authority, but in each case he either side-stepped the potential for conflict or moved decisively to overcome them. The first challenge came from Prabowo, who was quickly sidelined, along with his allies Major General Muchdi Purwopranjono, who was replaced as head of Kopassus, and Major General Kivlan Zen, who was held responsible for the organisation of Muslim volunteers acting against anti-government demonstrators and was replaced as Kostrad’s Chief of Staff.

It has also been suggested that Habibie fostered further splits within the armed forces by recruiting to the Cabinet Feisal Tanjung, Hendropriyono, Syarwan Hamid and Mohamad Yunus. However, Feisal was already a ‘green’ officer, having been appointed by Suharto to the position of commander-in-chief of the armed forces, while Syarwan had already openly turned against Suharto and, though a Habibie ally, was not one at any cost. Hendropriyono before his appointment had been close to Wiranto through the ‘red and white’ faction. In the immediate post-Suharto period Habibie had offered the position of commander-in-chief of the armed forces to Hendropriyono, then announced that Wiranto would take that position. It seems that Hendropriyono was Habibie’s favourite, but that Wiranto forced Habibie’s hand on the issue. Hendropriyono was given the Ministry of Transport by way of compensation, and later worked in collaboration with other officers close to Wiranto in organising the shipping of refugees from East Timor. Yunus was also regarded as ‘more “red and white” than “green”’ (Bourchier 1998). Furthermore, on succeeding to the presidency,
Lieutenant General Zen Maulani and Lieutenant General Sintong Panjaitan both became close advisers to Habibie, but were already firmly linked with the ‘red and white’ camp.

It may be argued that, under Habibie’s presidency, Wiranto made only one tactical error: the appointment of (Christian) Major General Johny Lumintang as Prabowo’s replacement as Kostrad commander – who was in turn replaced by (Muslim) Major General Djamari Chaniago the next day – and the aborted appointment of (Christian) Major General Luhut Pandjaitan as head of Kopassus. It was a relatively small matter, though, and did not affect Wiranto’s increasing grip on power. The care with which Wiranto worked at this time reflected less a sense of ‘weakness’ than it did a traditional Javanese marshalling of one’s power through inaction, or the subtle and bare minimum of action (see Anderson 1965; Moedjanto 1993).

Similarly, Wiranto acted where he could and otherwise rebuilt the armed forces as a cohesive force. To this end, his sacking of Prabowo and some pro-Prabowo/pro-‘green’ officers in 1998–99 helped to consolidate the position of the ‘red and white’ faction. This move was assisted by what amounted to a division within the Prabowo ‘green’ camp between usually Islamic officers who were more loyal to Prabowo and those who were more clearly pro-Islamic but favoured Prabowo less. Some officers remained outside Wiranto’s direct control, and attempts to force them out would have destabilised the relationship he was rebuilding with others. But there is little doubt that the armed forces was stronger and more cohesive by mid- to late 1998 than it had been since the late 1980s. For example, Army Chief of Staff General Subagyo Hadi Siswoyo was in 1997 regarded as a Prabowo loyalist, but then, like so many others, his loyalty became ambiguous as he moved closer to Amien Rais (Forrester 1998: 61), the leader of the modernist Islamic organisation Muhammadiyah, who rose to become a leading anti-Suharto campaigner in the president’s last days in office. He then moved decisively into Wiranto’s camp. His shift in loyalty was made explicit when he participated in the ‘Military Honour Council’ that delivered a finding of culpability in the abduction, torture and disappearance of activists during 1997 and early 1998 for Prabowo, Kopassus’s head (succeeding Prabowo) Major General Muchdi Purwopranjono, and Kopassus Group IV head Colonel Chairawan. The Council recommended that Prabowo be court-martialed, although he was only honorably dismissed from the army. Muchdi and Chairawan were also dismissed, although ordered to never again serve in active command.

In terms of the armed forces’ relations with Habibie, where Suharto was able to make or break armed forces’ leaders, Habibie was not. For example, when students were protesting at the DPR building in November 1998 and Wiranto refused to send in troops against them, Habibie turned to Yudhoyono and offered him the position of commander-in-chief if he would dispel the students. Yudhoyono, however, refused the offer, and the student protest ended with fewer casualties than might otherwise have been
expected. In this, it should be noted, Yudhoyono remained loyal to Wiranto, not to Habibie. Habibie was reported to have told Wiranto early in 1999 that he wished him to resign his position as commander-in-chief and be reduced to that of the less powerful position of defence minister. That Wiranto refused to resign indicates that Wiranto was probably, in practical terms, the most powerful individual in Indonesia at that time.

Another senior general close to Wiranto (one of his peers from the National Military Academy class of ’68), but who subsequently fell from favour, was Agum Gumelar. Agum was regarded, in the middle of 1998, as the officer at that time most likely to succeed Wiranto, being in a position to displace Yudhoyono due to the latter’s perceived lack of experience. Agum had intelligence and special forces experience in East Timor, Aceh and West Papua, and was commander in Sulawesi. But his being moved to head the Ministry of Defence’s National Resilience Institute indicated that Wiranto was increasingly sidelining Agum. One reason for this was that Wiranto considered Agum to be speaking out of turn on political matters, thus presenting an image of disunity. Furthermore, Wiranto and Agum differed in their approaches to reconciliation within the armed forces.

By contrast, Wiranto regarded Yudhoyono as a supporter if his ‘go lightly’ policy, being a cautious political and military reformer and at that time in favour of a measured transition to a more civilian-, less military-dominated government. Yudhoyono was also in favour of boosting the legislative authority of the DPR, as a means of checking the power of the president. By the middle of 1999, however, Wiranto had moved to distance himself from Yudhoyono, over differing conceptions of how to handle the mounting East Timor crisis and, some said, over what Wiranto perceived to be Yudhoyono’s aspirations to occupy Wiranto’s position.

Although their relationship was always tenuous, the major falling-out between Wiranto and Habibie occurred over Habibie’s announcement that he intended to allow the people of East Timor to vote in a referendum for independence or for autonomy within the Indonesian state. The rejection of the autonomy proposal would be for it to return to its 1975 status as a colony (in effect to be administered by the United Nations ahead of independence). Wiranto was not advised of the proposal prior to it being presented to Cabinet, which angered him and set him on the path of at least allowing if not actively planning for the undermining of the coming East Timor ballot.

### East Timor

The only real question that arose over the TNI’s involvement in East Timor was the extent to which Wiranto was directly involved. What there was no question about were the links between the TNI and the militias, and the TNI’s role in orchestrating the campaign of violence, terror and destruction that topped off a presence in the territory of almost twenty-five years. The
links between the TNI and the militias have been elaborated upon elsewhere in this book, and do not need repeating here. What is worth noting, however, is that the issue of East Timor crossed factional lines – such as continued to exist – within the TNI, and was one issue upon which virtually all could and did agree. The aftermath of the ballot would be the point at which the TNI developed a new sense of cohesion, representing both an affront to the core ‘nationalist’ values held by the army and, in practical terms, a defeat for the army by a section of the civilian population. It also set a potential precedent for the other provinces of Indonesia that were deeply unhappy about incorporation into the unitary state, and advocates of separatism began to couch their aspirations in terms of East Timor’s success.

As for Wiranto’s role, he began by appointing Major General Zacky Anwar Makarim as chief Indonesian military liaison officer to UNAMET. Zacky effectively controlled both the TNI and the militias in East Timor until the day of the ballot, 30 August 1999. Zacky had a history of being closely involved with Kopassus, and it was Kopassus that led the East Timor operation in the immediate pre- and post-ballot period. With regard to this point, it has been suggested that TNI members closely linked to Kopassus actually ran a policy independent of Wiranto, and that he was engaged in a struggle with the unit over his actual authority (Tapol 1999b). However, this presupposes that he actually endorsed Habibie’s plan for a ballot in East Timor, which insiders at the time said he did not, nor did he appear to by seeming to ignore events as they unfolded. However, Wiranto had to be seen not to be running contrary to the public policy of his president, Habibie, who continued to promote the ballot, hence his lack of public statements on the issue.

This army position on East Timor, though unofficial, was very similar in nature (though on a greater scale) to army involvement with gangsters (preman) who often carried out the army’s dirty work, or who ran illegal businesses throughout the archipelago either for army officers or under their protection. Similarly, Hendropriyono, who had been a political ally of Wiranto, was in 1999 Minister for Transmigration and was involved in siphoning off departmental funds for militia activity as well as helping to arrange transport for the quarter of a million East Timorese who were forced – most at gunpoint – to leave East Timor for West Timor in the aftermath of the ballot. Other ministers, in particular the Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, and the Minister for Information, Lieutenant General Muhammad Yunus Yosfiah, diverted funds from their departments to assist the militias, while other generals, including Major General Syafrie Syamsuddin, Brigadier General Mahidin Simbolon and Major General Adam Damiri, were similarly involved in providing money or logistical support for the army’s pro-integration agenda. Damiri, as commander of the relevant Kodam, Udayana IX, was responsible for the overall logistics of the operation, while Simbolen was the local Territorial commander responsible for allocation. In all, Wiranto and twenty-one other military and police officers
Zacky Anwar Makarim was not mentioned in the Indonesian indictment – were charged with war crimes by Indonesia, as a consequence of pressure from the UN and the international community. An investigation by the human rights commission, Komnas HAM, implicated thirty-three officers and others in acts of murder and other human rights offences.

Because of the deep unpopularity in Indonesia with the outcome of the East Timor ballot and the ‘nationalist’ fervour it engendered by way of a response to this ‘humiliation’, a sentiment in large part engineered by the TNI through Indonesia’s media, any chance Habibie might have had of retaining the presidency was ended. Naively, Habibie proposed that Wiranto be his vice-presidential running mate for the presidential election of October 2000, which Wiranto publicly declined. With this final humiliation, Habibie withdrew, leaving the way open for Abdurrahman Wahid to marshal disparate electoral blocs in the MPR in order to construct a majority and thus take the presidency and, later, arrange for Megawati to become vice-president (see Kingsbury 2002: 252–61 for a more detailed account of the process).

Meanwhile, throughout 2000, the arrest, release, rearrest and re-release of militia leader Eurico Guterres read more like a farce than an account of a judicial process at work. One local judge in Kupang, West Timor, dismissed charges against Guterres for shooting up a car in a Kupang street because the judge was unable to adequately determine whether or not Guterres was a member of the army (the armed forces having their own quasi-judicial procedure outside the civilian process); in fact, he was not. Under so-called ‘house arrest’, Guterres ended up serving a total of twenty-three days out of the original six-month sentence, although for much of that time he was not ‘at home’.

The recent political role of the armed forces

Wiranto was reappointed by Wahid to the Cabinet as Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs, and in that role Wiranto reasserted himself as being effectively equal to the most powerful person in Indonesia. And despite having been removed from his position as armed forces chief in October 1999, he retained a strong grip over the military through a coherent network of loyal officers, while the TNI retained its own firm grip over Indonesian political society. However, as Indonesia had moved through its post-Suharto transition towards democratisation, the role of the TNI as a political participant was identified as a major impediment to that process.

In part in response to Wiranto being identified as ultimately responsible for the events in East Timor up to September 1999, in part to break Wiranto’s grip on power and in part to strike back at circulating coup rumours, Wahid asked him to resign. For two weeks Wiranto refused Wahid’s request and, briefly, Abdurrahman Wahid appeared to accede. But then the president did an abrupt about-turn and on 14 February 2000
relieved Wiranto of his Cabinet position. This action followed weeks of speculation, based on thinly veiled threats, about a possible military coup against Abdurrahman Wahid, which in turn reflected disaffection among conservative TNI officers over what was perceived to be President Wahid's interference in its internal affairs. Although many ambiguities remained, Wiranto formally resigned from Cabinet on 19 May 2000.

As the TNI continued to reinvent itself, keeping a relatively low formal political profile and looking out for future opportunities, signs began to emerge that although to some extent it had changed its style, it had not fundamentally altered the substance of its position in Indonesian society. The TNI wished to continue to play a leading role in Indonesian political affairs, but it had to go carefully. In one sense, the number of secessionist movements and other indicators of civil strife helped to legitimise the role of the TNI in state maintenance, even though in a number of cases the TNI played an active role in fomenting such disturbances, not least in Maluku where it appeared that, as was the case in East Timor, funding for the Laskar Jihad militia came from sources within and formerly connected to the TNI as well as those close to former President Suharto. That is, the unofficial or semi-official militias served a dual purpose, of both requiring the ongoing, active participation of the TNI as well as helping to destabilise the broader political environment, including the presidency.

Some believed that the TNI, after the election of Wahid, might be more pliable. However, on a number of occasions during the post-October 1999 period, the balance of political power in Indonesia seemed to lie just as firmly, or even more so, with the TNI as it had done during the latter part of Habibie's presidency. If the balance of power later began to shift towards the presidency, then this was because the TNI had again splintered. In part, this splintering was a product of Abdurrahman Wahid's moves to rein in the TNI, and the effective coralling of General Wiranto's power, who was plotting revenge from his 'retirement'. But in part it also reflected different streams of influence and other tensions within the TNI. As Abdurrahman Wahid's presidency became increasingly embattled, however, the TNI waited in the political wings. It did not vote against Abdurrahman Wahid during the second motion to censure the president at the end of April 2001, abstaining instead. But its major grouping had made a political deal with the person it believed would be Abdurrahman Wahid's successor.

An example of the TNI's continuing influence during Wahid's presidency includes the occasion in November 2000 when, after announcing that the troubled province of Aceh may hold a referendum on independence, he was immediately contradicted by the then TNI chief spokesman, Major General Sudrajat, who said that the president did not have the authority to make such a policy and that the matter would have to be referred to the MPR. Abdurrahman Wahid said later that he would offer Aceh the option of applying shariah (Islamic) law, which was quite a different thing from his earlier proposition. There were also instances of Wiranto exercising his
considerable influence. For example, while he was still (just) commander-in-chief of the TNI, he organised and signed-off on the biggest reshuffle of the TNI’s senior positions in several years, but which was not enacted until two months after he had resigned, and in any case was undertaken without consulting either Abdurrahman Wahid or the defence minister, Juwono Sudarsono. Wiranto ensured that General Subagyo Hadisiswoyo retained his position as Army Chief of Staff, as Subagyo had shown himself to be politically inept and, with his son arrested on drugs charges (something that embarrassed Subagyo and made him politically vulnerable), was under Wiranto’s continuing influence. Wiranto’s office also issued a press release under Abdurrahman Wahid’s name that asked the security forces to take necessary measures in order to control the situation in Aceh and Ambon (JP 1999f).

Equally as significant was Wiranto’s guiding – if not controlling – hand in Cabinet meetings, until his suspension in February 2000. Juwono said that in Abdurrahman Wahid’s Cabinet meetings Wiranto would sit at Wahid’s right-hand side, acting as chairman, deciding the agenda and laying out the policy options (Richburg 1999). Other Cabinet ministers, mostly newcomers, were too intimidated by Wiranto to oppose him. Said Juwono: ‘Wiranto on occasion becomes effectively the president and the vice-president at the same time. He’s a very effective briefer. It’s a powerful role’ (quoted in Richburg 1999). Thus, these moves constituted at the very least a precarious balancing act by Wahid, in which he recognised both the continuing power of the military and its ability to hold on to aspects of national policy that traditionally it had considered as being part of its dual function.

At a time when many were calling for the TNI’s role to be reduced, it nevertheless benefited from the formation of Wahid’s new Cabinet, receiving five ministries as well as having close supporter Juwono Sudarsono appointed as defence minister. His appointment as defence minister was recommended by Wiranto, indicating that although Juwono was a civilian he was in practical terms very close to what was at the time the TNI’s core group. Juwono affirmed his commitment to the TNI when, on 22 November 1999, he asked the DPR to grant a 62 per cent increase in the 2000–2001 budget allocation for the TNI and the police.14 While conceding that the requested increase was significant, Juwono said that past inadequate budgetary allocation had forced the TNI into extra-military business activities: ‘We have seen in the past that the military’s involvement in politics, bureaucracy and business was due to its insufficient budget’ (JP 1999e). Juwono also affirmed his support for Wiranto by defending him against charges related to the East Timor ballot. He said that he did not believe Wiranto was guilty of any offence and was critical of ‘the court of public opinion’ and the UN investigation into the alleged offences (Murdoch 2000). Juwono later confirmed that although as minister he was in theory responsible for the TNI, his position was at best still in the process of becoming substantive: ‘I would like the commander of the forces to be subordinate to
me...That would be my long term goal" (Richburg 1999). Juwono acknowledged that Wiranto was the dominant power in military politics and also, until his suspension, in Wahid’s Cabinet.

In May 2000, Juwono floated the idea of establishing a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), whereby the chairman of the JCS would replace the commander-in-chief, on a rotational basis between the services. Under this system, the commander-in-chief would no longer have ministerial status and would be formally under the authority of the defence minister. One element of the plan did receive some support, being the rotation of the leading position within the TNI. However, after Wiranto the position was passed to Admiral Widodo, and after Widodo it returned to the former Army Chief of Staff, finishing off any notion that rotation of the top job between the services would become the norm. The JSC proposal was quietly dropped and the commander-in-chief retained ministerial ranking and remained senior to the defence minister. While this was a blow for the military reform movement, it did ensure that the commander-in-chief would henceforth have to be approved by the DPR. However, when Endriartono was nominated as commander-in-chief and the nomination was put before the DPR it was, in effect, a foregone conclusion that his appointment would be confirmed. Any politician who stood against him would otherwise have borne the wrath of the army, which, as President Abdurrahman Wahid found out, could be highly destabilising.

Even if one discounted Juwono, the appointment of five TNI generals to the Cabinet showed that the TNI’s political influence continued. The influence Wiranto was able to bring to bear from his position reflected less the authority of the ministry and more the power he retained through his links to the TNI. One of those links was, initially, to Admiral Widodo, who had been groomed by Wiranto for the position of the TNI’s pliable commander-in-chief after his appointment as deputy commander-in-chief earlier in 1999. On occasion, Widodo’s allegiance was later directed less towards Wiranto and more towards Abdurrahman Wahid, indicating that the game of politics in the Indonesian armed forces was at least as slippery as elsewhere. The significance of Widodo’s appointment as head of TNI was that, at the time, he was a close associate of Wiranto and was considered to be one of Wiranto’s inner group. While head of the navy, Widodo was also chief of the marine corps, which was more politically popular than the variously tainted arms of the army; consequently, his appointment did not represent a threat to Wiranto’s grip on power. Indeed, Widodo did not have a power base within the TNI independent of Wiranto’s group until he began to receive direct support from Abdurrahman Wahid towards the end of 1999.

The appointment of Lieutenant General Agum Gumelar, a former head of Kopassus (July 1993–August 1994), as Minister for Transport and Communication also contributed to the TNI’s impact in the Cabinet. Other TNI personnel who took ministerial posts included Lieutenant
A ‘New Paradigm’?

The ‘New Paradigm’, the framework through which the TNI intended to reform itself, had been under active discussion for at least a year before Suharto resigned as president, but was made more public following his resignation, when notions of reform were not only more acceptable but were widely demanded. The main proponent of and key figure within military reform at this time was Lieutenant General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. In broad terms, the reformist push came from two overlapping sources. The first main source of reformism came from what was considered to be the core group of the ‘red and white’ faction, including Generals Wiranto, Agum Gumelar, Hendropriyono and Yudhoyono. The second push for military reform came from a group of officers from the Akabri class of ’73, of which Yudhoyono was considered the intellectual leader, and of which Agus Wirahadikusumah, before his fall, later came to be considered the more public and radical leader, and Agus Widjojo the more thoughtful and ‘professional’ leader. Interestingly, in 1997/98, Prabowo Subianto, who had also been a member of this class, came to head the military’s pro-Suharto, pro-Islamic ‘green’ faction, which had developed in opposition to the ‘red and white’ faction.

Although informal discussion of the depoliticisation of the TNI had been taking place at in-house seminars at Seskoad for some years, it was not until Suharto’s resignation as president that serious public discussion was initiated. Within days of the resignation, Yudhoyono was reported as saying on 26 May 1998 that reform was the key to resolving the crisis that affected Indonesia, inferring that reform of the armed forces would be included in such a process. However, he said that such reform should take place within a much wider context of ‘reform’, and that ‘ABRI is aware of the fundamental weakness and…violations of procedures involving all sectors and elements in society’ (Tempo Interaktif 1998a). Similarly, the then commander-in-chief General Wiranto, who was also concerned for the standing of the armed forces, called on 10,000 soldiers from the Jakarta garrison to re-establish good relations with students following the May 1998 riots and the military’s response to those riots: ‘Let’s enter the campus and apologise to all of the students for all that has happened to their friends. Let them know that we share their views about reform’ (Tempo Interaktif 1998a). It was during this speech, at the Istora Senayan sports stadium in Jakarta on the night of 25 May 1998, that Wiranto also confirmed what was to be a brief period of unity among the armed forces, on the cusp of the denouement of the pro-Suharto ‘green’ faction.
The ‘New Paradigm’, which was the formal programme of the military reform movement, may be broadly categorised as the separation of the armed forces from civilian and political functions. In particular, it intended to achieve the following:

1. To separate the police and the armed forces. This was intended to ‘civilianise’ conflict in which the army had previously been arbiter. Although the separation took place on 1 April 2000, it was effectively a failure, as the army in fact retained and even expanded its role in conflict areas.

2. To end military involvement in local political affairs. This was effective in terms of serving officers having to resign their commissions if they wished to remain in the public service or as political administrators. But it failed in terms of withdrawing the influence of the army in local affairs.

3. To turn the office of Political and Social Affairs into the office of Territorial Affairs. This was intended to limit the TNI’s overtly political role; however, although it took place, it failed to diminish the effect of the political influence or connections of Territorial commanders. The Office of Territorial Affairs was later closed, making regional commanders directly answerable to the Army Chief of Staff.

4. To end the social and political role of the armed forces in political affairs down to the local level. This effectively failed, especially in conflict areas, and the parallel structure was maintained down to village level, except in Jakarta.

5. To end the appointment of military officers to civilian positions in central and regional governments. This effectively came about, although with some exceptions. Some officers first retired from the military before being appointed to various positions. It also meant that there were more officers requiring other appointments, which was one factor in the expansion of the number of Kodam.

6. To remove the influence of the military from day-to-day politics. This failed demonstrably.

7. To require that officers choose between military or civilian careers. This was legislated for and was relatively successful, although it had no impact on TNI business activities.

8. To reduce the number of seats allocated to the armed forces in the MPR. This was successful, reducing the number of seats from 75 to 38, with the formal withdrawal of the TNI from the MPR and DPR in 2004. The remaining 38 seats still over-represents the TNI in a formal sense.

9. To cut links with Golkar. This was successful, and reflected the existence of Golkar as an independent political party.

10. To remain neutral in politics, especially elections. This was successful in the case of the elections of June 1999, but failed in the case of the East Timor ballot of 30 August 1999. (See Layandor (1999) for further discussion of the key goals.)
The extent to which the TNI successfully removed itself from an active role in politics was limited, especially under the Habibie administration, and its influence was restored, albeit in a somewhat different shape, under Megawati. Central to the ‘New Paradigm’ was allowing other components of civil society to contribute to public debate on key issues, although Yudhoyono said that the TNI would have to lead such debate for some time as ‘the current national psychology is still not conducive to make this possible’ (Gatra 1999). In terms of the depoliticisation of the TNI, Yudhoyono noted that the June 1999 elections had been ‘far more honest and just’ than previous elections and had proceeded ‘fairly and honestly’. He added that, in terms of the TNI’s 38-man representation in the DPR/MPR, he favoured in principle a one-man-one-vote system. However, he also said that in the shorter term, the arrangement which secured for the TNI 38 seats was suitable, and that the TNI’s representatives should continue to vote as an institutional bloc. Some concern was later expressed about the possibility that if soldiers voted for different parties, then the parties would command their loyalty and would therefore divide them along partisan lines, with possible negative consequences for internal military harmony. Yudhoyono’s colleague, the more outspoken reformist Major General Agus Wirahadikusuma, said he hoped that the TNI might drop its representation in the DPR/MPR by the year 2004, starting in 2002 (AFP 1999). In fact, on 15 August 2000 the TNI persuaded the DPR to extend its formal political tenure until 2009.* The defence minister, Juwono Sudarsono, was quoted as saying that this decision may have been ‘prompted out of fear’ (JP 16.8.2000). Similarly, in May 2001 the TNI also managed to have all charges relating to activities in East Timor restricted to the period after the ballot on 30 August 1999, which meant that all events prior to that date were no longer punishable.

At the launch of the book Indonesia Baru dan Tantangan TNI (New Indonesia and TNI’s Challenge) on 26 October 1999, Agus Wirahadikusumah described the dual function’s original rationale as ‘temporary, but instead it became institutionalised; officers grew to enjoy their positions’ – a thinly veiled reference to military corruption. Agus Wirahadikusumah urged new commander-in-chief Widodo to purge the military leadership of officers ‘unworthy’ of their positions. He also stated during the book launch that the TNI wished to end its involvement in politics. He was supported in this call by sixteen other serving officers, who also contributed to the book. (Agus Wirahadikusumah had previously published a similar book, ABRI: Profesionalisme dan Dedikasi (ABRI: Professionalism and Dedication), although it was not made available to the public (JP 1999b).) Brigadier General Saurip Kadi, one of the authors of the book and a special investigator with the Ministry of Defence, said that ending the dual function ‘was the only way to put an end to the deviation

* n.b. Although bought back to 2004 in August 2002.
of commands’. Saurip was later removed from active duty for his outspokenness and association with Agus Wirahadikusumah.

Unofficial support for the book at the time of the launch came from Wiranto (JP 1999b). However, within two months of its release a major division appeared to have opened up between Agus Wirahadikusumah on one side, and Wiranto and his supporters on the other. This was the beginning of Agus Wirahadikusumah’s attempts to bring military issues into the public domain, a move strongly resisted and deeply resented by most of his army colleagues. Agus Wirahadikusumah criticised those officers who had taken up other positions but who had not resigned their commissions in the TNI, including Wiranto, Agum Gumelar and Yudhoyono. Agus Wirahadikusumah’s comments sparked a ‘heated exchange’ between senior TNI officers over the investigation into the involvement of senior TNI officers in human rights violations in Aceh and East Timor. In particular, the then chief of Kostrad and close Wiranto ally, Lieutenant General Djaja Suparman, said that ‘continuing humiliation of the Army generals would hurt the pride of their soldiers and could spark their ire’ (JP 1999g). Agus Wirahadikusumah replied by saying that TNI soldiers did not serve their generals but the TNI, as an institution, and the state. These, then, were the first shots of a heated battle between the two men, in which both ultimately lost out. Lieutenant General Agum Gumelar later said that he regretted the spat between the two generals and that such differences should remain an internal matter. Both Agum and the then pro-Wahid Chief of Staff, General Tyasno Sudarto, claimed that differences of opinion were normal between individuals within the TNI.

Agus Wirahadikusumah also angered a number of senior TNI officers by saying that the TNI should streamline its operational structure by abolishing some Territorial commands. Former Army Chief of Staff Rudini said that Agus Wirahadikusumah’s proposal would only work if the army changed its doctrine of Territorial defence (JP 1999g). In February 2000, Agus Wirahadikusumah’s comments came back to haunt him as Widodo ordered General Tyasno to take disciplinary measures against him for asking Wiranto to step down from the Cabinet. Agus Wirahadikusumah was called back to Jakarta to explain himself – although Wahid did in fact support him, saying that his comments reflected a need to create a greater dialogue given the previously poor communications within the TNI (JP 2000a). These events may be interpreted as an attempt by some within the TNI to isolate Agus Wirahadikusumah from the TNI’s more moderate membership, if not from the president himself.

Although Yudhoyono was seen as a – perhaps the – key reformer in the TNI, his opportunity for pushing through military reform was forestalled by his appointment as Minister for Mines and Energy. While Wahid personally
supported Yudhoyono’s inclusion in the Cabinet, his decision was promptly backed by Wiranto (JP 1999a). Wiranto’s immediate support for Yudhoyono reflected Wiranto’s suspicion that if Yudhoyono were to stay in the TNI then he would quickly achieve the top military job, thereby displacing Wiranto’s continuing dominance.

This split between Wiranto and Yudhoyono was the manifestation of a fundamentally different approach to both the TNI and politics. For example, Yudhoyono promoted the idea that the TNI should disengage itself from the political process; Wiranto agreed with this in theory, but in practice continued to play his political hand. It seemed to be that although Wiranto supported reform, albeit of a limited type, his long-term agenda included attaining the effective control of Indonesia – via a Cabinet position, the vice-presidency and, as many thought, even the presidency. In terms of policy, Wiranto pushed a ‘nationalist’ line, with a slightly reduced but continuing role for the TNI in the political process. Yudhoyono wanted a less active political role for the TNI, and for Wiranto. This, then, was the main reason behind the falling-out in the first half of 1999 between the two formerly very close military and political associates.

It should also be noted that while Yudhoyono had long advocated the depoliticisation of ABRI (which later became the TNI), he also insisted it be a gradual process. After his appointment as a minister, Yudhoyono initially refused to resign his commission from the TNI, a stand which contrasted with his earlier comments on the role of active officers in government positions (Abriansah 1999). The rationale for this apparent about-turn on what was a core reform issue signalled Yudhoyono’s reluctance to be permanently removed from the military. The move to the ministry, and its requirement that he resign from the army, ended what many believed to be Yudhoyono’s plan to become military commander-in-chief.

That Abdurrahman Wahid was able to move against Wiranto was due to the fact that Wiranto’s power base within the TNI had been eroded, between his appointment to the Cabinet in October 1999 and his suspension from the same in February 2000. Within the TNI, after a period of relative unity between mid-1998 and late 1999, at least five factions were in existence, together with a number of sub-factions. The cause of this factionalism reflected Indonesia’s unstable political dynamic, the residual loyalties of what has been described as ‘patrimonial-prebendalism’ (Bakker and Ferrazzi 1997; Weber 1958, 1968), and ideological differences within the TNI, in particular over the issue of the TNI’s dual function, reform and the role of Islam. At a time of shifting loyalties within a constantly moving political landscape, the blending and separating of factional interests was constant, unstable and often unpredictable.

However, one still significant faction continued to be loyal to Wiranto, and in early 1999 and again in early 2000 it hinted at the possibility of
staging a coup against the government. These coup rumours followed a public argument between Djaja Suparman and Agus Wirahadikusumah, in which Agus was backed by President Abdurrahman Wahid. There was deep discontent in the TNI at this stage, but to the extent that such a coup might be successfully mounted with overwhelming military support.

The Wiranto faction comprised a number of sub-factions (or constellations\textsuperscript{21}), centred around ideas such as ‘nationalism’, the TNI’s dual function, notions of ‘professionalism’, historical allegiances, personal loyalty, business interests and patrimonialism. Before his removal from Cabinet, it was estimated by some military observers in Jakarta that Wiranto enjoyed 60–70 per cent support, predominantly from the army. In part, this may have been due to the army reshuffle that was instigated by Wiranto on 4 November 1999, in which officers close to him were promoted. Such a shake-up might have been expected following the appointment of Admiral Widodo as new commander-in-chief, as was claimed by the TNI (\textit{JP} 1999c, 1999d). But to a large extent the reshuffle was intended to promote and reward those officers who had been close to Wiranto – a demonstration of his continuing power to determine the shape of what remained Indonesia’s key political institution.\textsuperscript{22}

In a system still dominated by patrimonialism, Wahid also moved to build his own loyal following within the TNI, a task which he had begun in October 1999. In particular, he favoured navy and air force officers and appeared to have secured the loyalty of TNI commander-in-chief, Admiral Widodo. Widodo was initially seen as a Wiranto appointee who would fall meekly into line with the latter’s wishes. However, Widodo supported Abdurrahman Wahid’s removal of Wiranto from the Cabinet, indicating his independence from Wiranto’s patronage. But he was ambiguous in his support for the TNI’s withdrawal from politics, saying that he wanted the TNI to maintain its presence in the MPR, even after it left the DPR in 2004 (\textit{JP} 2000b). This stance was seen as a bid for the TNI to retain political influence in the choosing of the president and vice-president, although it might also have been a sop to more belligerent officers within the TNI.

**Reformists**

A significant faction within the TNI during 2000 consisted of what might be described as ‘reformists’, which is to say they more strongly favoured the removal of the TNI from politics. The public leader of this group was Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah, while Territorial Commander Major General Agus Widjojo was also a prominent figure.\textsuperscript{23} In June 2000, two meetings were reported to have taken place at the home of Agus Wirahadikusumah at which a number of supposedly pro-reformist officers and others were present, including Major General Saurip Kadi, then
Brigadier General Mahidin Simbolen (otherwise thought to be a conservative) and a Lieutenant Colonel Baktiman. These meetings were played up by the opposing group as a bid to ‘politicise’ the army, and in June 2000 led to Saurip Kadi’s removal from active service.

However, this group had no clear plan of action for reform and varied in its commitment to pushing its cause in public. For example, there was a major difference of opinion between Agus Wirahadikusumah and Agus Widjojo over the retention and preferred number of Kodam, a dispute that had implications for the TNI’s Territorial structure and hence its involvement in politics at the local level. To some extent, Agus Wirahadikusumah moved towards abandoning the Territorial structure in its entirety, even though he had earlier been an advocate of its retention. The division between Agus Wirahadikusumah and Agus Widjojo also reflected a more personal dispute. This was in part over what was widely perceived to be Agus Wirahadikusumah’s inclination to shift his position to that which was most politically fashionable as opposed to that to which he had a principled commitment, and in part the private trading of insults between the two.

Because of his more radical stance and also the perceptions of superficiality that surrounded his commitment to his own proposed reforms, Agus Wirahadikusumah was unable to count on the loyalty of other reformists when the military reform process reached a critical juncture. The reformists generally (and Agus Wirahadikusumah in particular) enjoyed the support of Wahid. Nevertheless, and although some reformist officers did coalesce around Agus Wirahadikusumah, there was little sense of unity of purpose or agreed agenda within the reform camp. In part, this reflected the idea that escaping politics by playing politics was antithetical to the reformists’ final goal. But it also reflected the varying degrees of ease or lack thereof that many officers had in pushing what was far from certain to be a successful or clearly defined process. In large part, the success of the reformist group depended on the success of Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidency, which, increasingly, was opposed by the overwhelming majority of the TNI and which ultimately failed.

**Agus Wirahadikusumah and Kostrad**

In a bid to regain Wiranto’s influence within the TNI, on 28 February 2000 Widodo announced a further major reshuffle of seventy-four senior positions within the TNI, to take effect from 1 March of that year. This reshuffle was directly at the behest of Abdurrahman Wahid, and was viewed by some observers as a move to push the TNI out of politics. Another view was that it simply put in place officers less aligned with Wiranto, and more amenable to Abdurrahman Wahid. If there was any doubt about Abdurrahman Wahid’s involvement in the reshuffle, it was dispelled when he publicly said
that it was he who made such decisions in the TNI. This reshuffle did not displace all of Wiranto’s allies within the TNI, but it did begin to shift the balance of power further towards the Abdurrahman Wahid/reformist camp. The most notable change in this reshuffle was the appointment (and promotion) of Agus Wirahadikusumah to the position of new head of Kostrad (JP 2000c). This move had the effect of promoting the TNI’s most outspoken reformer to the most strategically central role within the TNI, and set him up for further significant promotion. It also had the effect of sidelining Wiranto ally Lieutenant General Djaja Suparman, who had publicly argued with Agus Wirahadikusumah over the future of the TNI. Djaja took the unprecedented step of appearing on television to criticise the move. Soon afterwards, in early March, Abdurrahman Wahid announced the dissolution of Bakorstanas, the New Order-era army-based political intelligence body.25

Agus Wirahadikusumah later launched a high-profile investigation into the corrupt use of funds from nine Kostrad yayasans, including the US$22 million that was spent during Djaja’s five months as Kostrad commander. The leaking of this information to the media caused a sensation in Jakarta, especially given that it reflected directly on the battle being fought between Agus Wirahadikusumah and Wiranto’s allies. A further investigation found that there had been an ‘administrative disorder’ but no embezzlement, and effectively cleared Djaja. However, Joko’s announcement was criticised by the Supreme Audit Agency (Baden Pemeriksan Keuangan – BPK) because it had not been cleared by them. In January 2001, Abdurrahman Wahid attempted to have Agus Wirahadikujumah promoted to Army Cheif of Staff. However, a meeting of 46 Army Generals, organised by Endriartono Sutarto, opposed the move and threatened to resign. The President backed down on his plan, and Agus Wirahadikujumah’s career became vulnerable.

On 30 July 2000, in a further reshuffle of the TNI, the by now Lieutenant General Agus Wirahadiksumah was replaced as head of Kostrad by Jakarta commander Major General Ryamizard Ryacudu (also seen at that time as an Abdurrahman Wahid loyalist but later as an army conservative), and was given no further command, effectively ending his ability to influence events within the TNI. Agus Wirahadikusumah together with his colleague, Major General Saurip Kadi, were initially threatened with disciplinary action for violating the ‘soldiers’ code of ethics’, although this threat was later dropped. Indicating the extent to which Agus Wirahadikusumah had alienated himself from the rest of the army, his former friend and close colleague, Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo, later said that he did not believe that Agus Wirahadikusumah should or would be given another command.26

In early August 2001, Agus Wirahadikusumah died suddenly at his home at the age of 49. Although his family said that he had been healthy
and fit and had had no medical complaints, some of his former colleagues tried to forward the idea that he had in fact been unwell. An Australian intelligence analyst said that his death may have been deliberate, and as a warning to other officers (such as his colleague Saurip Kadi) who may have been considering discussing internal financial matters with the public.

Another powerful position, that of TNI Chief of General Affairs, was vacated by Wiranto ally Lieutenant General Suady Marasabessy, who went on to join Zacky Anwar Makarim as an officer without a substantive post. However, although Zacky was without such a position, some believe that his involvement in fomenting unrest in East Timor was ongoing, in particular through support for and organisation of the country’s pro-Jakarta, pro-integrationist parties. Suady’s replacement was Deputy Army Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Djamari Chaniago, who was regarded as a Wiranto loyalist. Other senior officers aligned with Abdurrahman Wahid included the Army Chief of Staff, General Tyasno Sudarto,27 the head of BAIS, Air Rear Marshall Ian Santoso Perdanakusumah, and the military spokesman, Air Rear Marshall Graito Husodo. However, by 2001, even those officers in the TNI loyal to Wahid had begun to distance themselves from the failing president.

Other groupings

In the period between 1998 and 2000, a further, increasingly small faction remained loyal to Prabowo, although Prabowo had made moves to redress the divisions between himself and Wiranto. Prabowo moved to patch up differences with Wiranto first of all in early 1999, and again during Prabowo’s visit to the officer training college, Sesko, at Magelang during Idul Fitri in 2000. While some members of this faction were predominantly ‘political’, insofar as they regarded proximity to Prabowo and formerly Suharto as more important than Islamic affiliation, some supported a more explicit Islamic agenda, deriving their association with Prabowo from the more ‘green’ element of what was the pro-Suharto group. Aided by financial and political interests at odds with Abdurrahman Wahid’s government, these groups were thought to be behind much of the civil strife in Maluku, Central Sulawesi and Lombok from late 1999 into 2001. Furthermore, in Maluku they were reportedly involved in providing the Laskar Jihad with training, financial support and, later, army weapons. Allegations were also made that members of these groups were involved in the various bombings in Jakarta and across the archipelago in 2000, and that they were behind the sectarian violence in Central Kalimantan, in this case to protect illegal logging interests.

A number of officers, not surprisingly, remained on the sidelines, uncommitted to any specific faction. Within the above identified ‘factions’ there were, as noted, a number of sub-factions aligned with particular senior offi-
cers or having multiple or shifting agendas. It has also been suggested that such factions or constellations that did exist were not ideologically differentiated, but are reflections of a more traditional pattern of patrimonial loyalty, or *aliran* (Munir 2001).

One indication of the factional politics that existed within the army in the late 1990s was the rapid rotation of officer postings. This may be attributed to two causes. The first was said to be the pressure that was building from below as a consequence of an increase in the number of officers who had graduated from the National Military Academy during the mid-1960s through to the mid-1970s and who were coming up through the ranks (see Kammen and Chandra 1999: Ch. 1). However, the political manipulation and spirited factionalism and favouritism of the senior officer corps also greatly contributed to the high turnover and various appointments of staff, if not more so. In any case, the stability and regularity that tended to characterise most conventional armies were missing from the Indonesian army during the 1990s, with the effect that the upper echelons of the service were divided and in many cases morale was low.

Although not a part of the armed forces since its separation, on 1 April 1999, from ABRI (which led to the creation of the TNI), Indonesia’s national police, Polri, were also forming a faction in the competition for political power as it manifested itself on the ground. There has long been conflict between elements of Polri and the TNI, and clashes have occurred between them in West Timor and Ambon in particular since 1999, with resentment festering and occasionally spilling over elsewhere.

The appointment of Lieutenant General Rusdihardjo as chief of the national police on 4 January 2000 surprised both the public and the police, as his name had not been among those put forward to replace General Roesmanhadi; furthermore, Rusdihardjo himself was only notified of his appointment the night before it was announced. His appointment was interpreted as Wahid’s attempt to strengthen the independence of Polri in its relations with the TNI, in particular with the army, and to create for himself an additional directly loyal service. However, having failed to perform to Wahid’s satisfaction, especially over investigating a series of bombings in Jakarta, Rusdihardjo was replaced by Bimantoro, a notably corrupt police officer. Bimantoro proved less politically malleable than Wahid would have liked, and in the final days of Wahid’s presidency Bimantoro refused to countenance his proposal for declaring a state of emergency. Consequently, Wahid sacked Bimantoro, who refused to accept his dismissal and remained in place, dividing police loyalty between himself and his putative successor, his deputy, General Chaeruddin Ismail, who was appointed as acting chief of police on 20 July 2001. At one stage, armed police loyal to the competing police leaders confronted each other, although it never developed into anything more serious.
A ‘new’ dwifungsi?

Given all that had occurred, and even though Indonesia had witnessed significant political changes since May 1998, it seemed as though the TNI’s disengagement from the political process was slow in coming. The push for reform from within the TNI continued – albeit, in the period to mid-2001, with a ‘reform leadership’ divided between the less and more radical demands of Yudhoyono and Widjojo on the one hand and Agus Wirahadikusumah on the other. Their main point of contention – the future of the Territorial structure of the TNI – was, in one sense, the key to Indonesia’s further democratisation and certainly to plans for economic and political devolution. Among other things, the concern was that if decentralisation went ahead while the Territorial structure remained in place, then local military commanders would be given the opportunity to commandeer the local political and economic processes and re-establish themselves, in effect, as independent warlords.

For a time Wiranto had played godfather to the reform process while simultaneously managing to effectively quarantine it from his own activities. Some also believed that Wiranto and others continued to destabilise Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidency by engineering further conflict in the provinces. Such activities, and in particular Yudhoyono’s initial refusal to resign from the TNI after being appointed as a minister, appeared to indicate the existence of a deeply ingrained culture within the TNI that was inherently and overtly political. Abdurrahman Wahid referred to Bambang Yudhoyono as ‘the most politicised officer in the military’ (McBeth 2000). Not only were most of its moves towards reform intensely political, they were also played out within the national political arena and as a part of the national political process. It seemed that many senior officers of the TNI simply did not understand how to be non-political.

Two related propositions thus come to light: first, that Wahid’s attempts to create a personally loyal faction within the TNI signalled a return to ‘patrimonial-prebendal’ (regular payment from a patron) politics; and, second, that this in turn might engender a reactionary response from officers within the TNI, which again saw it consolidate into two, essentially pro- or anti-presidential factions. As Suharto discovered, attempts to appoint loyal officers to senior positions was far from guaranteed to ensure control over the whole of the TNI.

Apart from his involvement in the appointment and firing of senior officers and his cultivation of others, Abdurrahman Wahid’s most overt retreat towards military politics came in February 2001 when he canvassed the possibility with senior generals of declaring martial law to stave off attacks against his presidency. Abdurrahman Wahid’s spokesman, Wimar Witoeler, said that Abdurrahman Wahid simply outlined four or five scenarios for the officers to consider. However, another source close to the officers said that Abdurrahman Wahid actually sounded them out on their support for declaring martial law. The matter was subsequently reported as Abdurrahman
Wahid asking the officers to assist him in declaring a state of emergency or martial law, which the officers refused to do. The president again repeated his request to the TNI in May 2001, and again it was rejected.

In terms of a Weberian analysis, the continued existence of a power bloc outside the presidency challenged the notion of Indonesia as a ‘patrimonial-prebendal’ political society and introduced the type of power competition more often associated with a ‘patrimonial-feudal’ political society. Weber noted that ‘patrimonial-prebendalism’ constitutes a major obstruction to the development of democratic political forms, while the competing power bases in a more feudal arrangement eventually lead to the development of democratisation. It was the ‘red and white’ faction led by Wiranto that destabilised Suharto’s grip on power and opened up a political space for competing voices, a prerequisite for democratisation. However, the TNI quickly established itself as a power increasingly separate from the presidency, to which it was only nominally accountable. With the office of the president demonstrably weakened and the DPR more active, a case for the existence of increased democratisation could be made. However, insofar as the TNI acted in ways that limited democratisation, from mid-2001 it was regarded as increasingly and independently powerful.

In August 2000, a sense of déjà vu accompanied the appointment of Yudhoyono as Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs, a position previously held by his former colleague Wiranto. As a key architect of the TNI’s ‘New Paradigm’, Yudhoyono was seen as a former officer who believed in the necessity of a break between the TNI and Indonesia’s political process. Yet when Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidency was under challenge, it was Yudhoyono who said that if Abdurrahman Wahid were to back him to become the next president then he may also count on the support of a large majority of senior army officers. Apart from the fact that it was unlikely that Yudhoyono would be able to count on such support – he was viewed as too arrogant and with too little field experience – what this stance betrayed was his continuing belief that such support was not only necessary but natural for one seeking the country’s highest office. If, as a key military reformer, Yudhoyono himself was unreconstructed, then there was little chance that the rest of the TNI was any more inclined towards separating itself from Indonesia’s political process.

As 2001 progressed, the TNI again began to consolidate around a ‘professional’ but otherwise conservative core of officers, notably the top three army commanders, Army Chief of Staff General Endriartono Sutarto, deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Kiki Siyahnakri and commander of Territorial Affairs Lieutenant General Agus Widjoyo. These officers believed that the TNI should play a greater role in Indonesia’s political process than was envisaged under the ‘New Paradigm’. If the TNI intended to be more rather than less politically active, it did not appear to be about to act irresponsibly, at least so far as the central body politic was concerned. As Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidency foundered, on 1 February 2001 more
than thirty of the TNI's senior generals met in Jakarta to determine their collective position, and came to two decisions that were endorsed soon afterwards by a meeting of some fifty-five generals.29

The first decision was that although the TNI had decided that Abdurrahman Wahid should depart as president, they also endorsed the policy established by Wiranto that such a political removal should be undertaken within the confines of the 1945 constitution. Only two of the officers voted in favour of a military coup against Abdurrahman Wahid.

The second main decision of the 1 February meeting was that officers who held ‘active’ positions were to lead any future debate about the role of the TNI, and that officers ‘outside the structure’, who did not hold active military commands, should follow their lead; if they did not do so, then such officers would be forced into early retirement or sacked from the military. Retired officers were also told that their views on the TNI’s political role were no longer welcome. In particular, Wiranto was formally sidelined by this group, although as largely latter day ‘red and white’ officers, they continued to respect Wiranto. But they believed that Wiranto remained unnecessarily friendly towards Suharto and had otherwise refused to accept with grace his loss of military and political power. Yet certain retired officers were still treated with considerable deference. It was common at military ceremonies to have retired senior officers present, but it is interesting to note that at the official ceremony for the restructuring of the Kopassus special force on 16 April 2001, the senior retired officers present looked like a representation of the ‘constellations’ of the original ‘red and white’ faction. Present were the patron of that group, former commander-in-chief General (retired) Benny Murdani, former commander-in-chief General (retired) Edi Sudrajat, (Minister for Transport and Communication) General (retired) Agum Gumelar, and (Minister for Industry and Trade) General (retired) Luhut Panjaitan. While the TNI had been deeply fragmented, by early 2001, with formal decision-making again firmly in the hands of a small group of active officers, an increasing sense of unity was once more being imposed on the TNI.

One way in which this unity manifested itself was in opposition to Wahid’s continued presidency, and in support for the much more politically pliable Megawati, who in any case shared the ‘nationalist’ ideas of the aforementioned group. When push came to shove in Jakarta over Wahid’s presidency, and with the vote to oust him just hours away, the army showed its hand. On the evening of Sunday 22 July 2001, troops from the TNI’s three services began to form in and around Medan Merdeka – Freedom Square – in central Jakarta. Notably, the military formation was under the command of the Kostrad chief, Lieutenant General Ryamizard Ryacudu. By morning, a series of tanks, armoured cars and armed soldiers encircled the base of the National Monument in the centre of the square; further tanks, armoured cars and soldiers
guarded the main entrances to the area, with police in front of the MPR building and more soldiers and armoured vehicles in front of the presidential palace. In all, there were some 2,000 soldiers, thirty-five tanks and twenty-five armoured cars, and many of the tanks had their guns pointing at the relatively few supporters of the beleaguered president and at the presidential palace itself. It was not a coup, but equally it was perfectly clear that the army would not allow the removal of the president from office to be marred by any unforeseen difficulties. It was not, and Megawati became president on 23 July 2001.

The end of the ‘New Paradigm’?

In mid-August 2001, the TNI held a workshop to consider the future of the Territorial structure. This debate shifted attention away from reform of the TNI’s overall function and was intended to limit the scope of the reform process, especially the Territorial structure as central to the continued reform of the TNI under its ‘New Paradigm’ (Widodo 2001). Although the chief of Territorial Affairs, Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo, told the media that the Territorial structure might eventually be dismantled, he said that it would take until 2010 in the area around Jakarta and until 2020 in the outer islands to do so. Widjojo’s plan included the removal of the bottom three levels of the Territorial structure, meaning the disbanding of the village, sub-district and district headquarters. While this still allowed the Territorial structure to function at a local level, despite not being formally located there, the Army Chief of Staff, General Endriartono Sutarto, said that dismantling the bottom three levels of the structure was only one of a number of options facing the TNI. (Notably, Jakarta garrison commander Major General Bibit Wiloyo favoured the retention of the existing structure (ICG 2001: 5).) However, even assuming that greater rather than lesser change did occur, Agus Widjojo said, the Total People’s Defence and Security System would need to be replaced with a ‘total security system’. This, in effect, meant that some functional form of the Territorial structure would remain in place for the foreseeable future (TNI internal document 2001b: Appendix D). The strategy required to draw down the Territorial structure would include socialising the population to accept the change, developing other forms of territorial competence, the process of handing over to those new institutions, internal changes in defining the Territorial structure, and ensuring that no problems arose from such changes (TNI internal document 2001a; see also TNI internal document 2001b).

To quote Agus Widjojo on Indonesia society: ‘Thinking forward is not one of our strong points in the culture, which is reflected in the military’ (Agus Widjojo 2001b). In particular, he also noted that the specific organisational structure and cohesion that was needed by the military to deal with emergency situations also made it a politically conservative organisation
(Agus Widjojo 2001a). One of the problems with dismantling the Territorial structure, according to Agus, was that it would still need to be replaced with a civil security system, such as the police, a proper functioning judiciary and greater regional autonomy (see also internal TNI document n.d.). However, conventional police were not up to the task of containing communal conflict or rebellion, and Brimob ‘had problems with discipline’, reflecting the speed at which the force had been built up (Agus Widjojo 2001b).

Although the workshop on the future of the Territorial structure was sanctioned and addressed by the TNI’s commander, Admiral Widodo, many senior army officers felt that it was trying to push the reform agenda too hard, and that it lacked consultation. As a consequence, Agus Widjojo became increasingly isolated within the army: ‘Change always starts from a minority position,’ he said. However, a little over two years previously the army’s reform group had been in the ascendancy. In early October 2001, in a reshuffle and reorganisation of the TNI, the office of Territorial Affairs was closed and Agus Widjojo was moved to head the TNI’s faction in the DPR, pushing him out of active duty. He was thus the last influential serving officer able to claim any sort of meaningful reformist credentials.

In a speech of 16 August 2001, President Megawati reconfirmed that her government was committed to military reform. Regardless of the veracity of her comments, however, under Megawati’s presidency the TNI slowed its reform process and even, it might be argued, concluded it. With Yudhoyono ensconced in his ministerial position, Agus Widjojo out of active service, Agus Wirahadikusumah dead and his close colleague Saurip Kadi out of active service, the ‘reform’ group within the TNI was effectively finished. Even the affable ‘professional’ Lieutenant General Kiki Syahnakri, once seen as bridging the divide between the reformist and conservative generals, retired from active service in May 2002. Meanwhile, the army’s ‘green’ faction officers had made their peace with the conservative ‘professional’ faction and members of each were operating with impunity in many of Indonesia’s troubled areas, often fomenting such trouble.

While the TNI was due to be formally removed from the DPR in 2004, moves were afoot on behalf of a number of senior and former officers to ensure their presence in the ‘民主’ political process further into the future. These officers were securing their respective political futures by joining political parties, or by starting their own. The Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs, a former Lieutentant General, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, started the Democratic Party so as to endorse himself as a presidential candidate in the 2004 elections. The party’s foundation is religious nationalism, while its policy position is similar to that of the TNI, to defend the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia based on the state ideology of Pancasila and the
1945 constitution, and the importance of continuing the unitary (as opposed to federated) state. Apart from Yudhoyono, six other retired generals were expected to join the Democratic Party. This move towards establishing military-based political parties began in 1999, when officers began to desert Golkar for the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (Partai Demokratik Indonesia-Perjuangan – PDI-P), the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional – PAN) and the PPP. Other former and serving generals were also looking to join or establish parties ahead of the 2004 elections (Gendur et al. 2002).

In early 2002, Army Chief of Staff and former chief of Suharto’s presidential guard, General Endriartono Sutarto, had his commission extended beyond the compulsory retirement age to allow him to replace Admiral Widodo as commander-in-chief, despite the ‘rotation’ of the position indicating that it should go to a member of the air force. This move therefore reasserted army authority within the armed forces and acknowledged the dominance of the conservative ‘professional’ faction, earlier identified with Wiranto, Edi Sudrajat and Benny Murdani. As one respected observer, Kusnanto Anggoro of the CSIS, noted of the appointment, if Endriartono was not counterbalanced by a strong Army Chief of Staff then he had the capacity to ‘turn authoritarian’ (JP 2002d). Ryamizard Ryacudu, having established himself as a central member of the conservative ‘professional’ group, was appointed as Army Chief of Staff, and quickly outlined his own views on the military’s role in Indonesian public life. The army, and the TNI more generally, had asserted its authority in Megawati’s Cabinet but, more importantly, it reclaimed as its own prerogative the right to determine policy both in conflict areas and in regard to Indonesia’s status as a unitary state. After years of division and alienation from the highest levels of political office, the TNI was again in the central position of the politics of the state, and its policy position had largely regressed.
There is a view of Indonesian politics according to which the TNI’s primary consideration is not the protection of the people, the imposition of stability nor even the unity of the state; rather, the TNI’s primary interest is its own enrichment (McCulloch 2000a). According to such a view, the TNI’s Territorial structure and its engagement in Indonesia’s troubled provinces are focused primarily on securing and enhancing the TNI’s business interests, both legal and illegal. If one accepts the assumption that the principal motivating factors behind political behaviour are economic considerations, then a substantial amount of evidence may be found to support this view.

A competing view of the TNI’s involvement in business states simply that it is a means to an end: in other words, that the TNI would be unable to survive without engaging in extensive business activities, that this has been the TNI’s practice since the days of the revolution, and that this practice, if not formally endorsed, is at least not discouraged by the government. Furthermore, the state recognises, according to this view, that it cannot afford to sustain the TNI in its current form, given that it provides as little as 25 per cent of the TNI’s total income (Agus Widjojo 2002; Evans 2001; ICG 2001; see also Gunter 2001 re a figure of 30 per cent).

Of the TNI’s total income, the ‘black’ income is thought by various analysts to be in the order of double its legal off-line income. That is, assuming an on-line budget of US$1 billion, legal business activities would bring its income up to around US$2 billion, while illegal income would add approximately the same amount again, making a total of US$4 billion or more. In 2001, according to the then defence minister, Juwono Sudarsono, of the 75 per cent of the TNI’s budget that came from off-line sources, about 65 per cent of that was siphoned off. Such a scenario ‘leaves the average soldier with little choice but to go into “business” for himself; illegal logging or mining, gambling, drugs, prostitution, extortion’ (quoted in Weiss 2001). The drug trade revolves primarily around the distribution throughout the archipelago of marijuana, such as that widely grown in highland Aceh, although it also has links with the wider Ecstasy, amphetamine and heroin trade (which is also linked to the national police). Officers involved in such illegal activities are referred to as oknum, a pejorative term meaning, literally,
‘involved’, especially by the military and especially in an unscrupulous manner. A more general definition of *oknum* is ‘military mafia’.

Juwono also estimated that about US$90 million – a third of the non-salary component of the defence budget – was lost through corrupt equipment purchases, and that mark-ups were as high as 60 per cent in some cases. Of this, diverted funds were used to top up salaries, which were and continue to be fixed at unsustainably low levels,¹ and for other discretionary purposes (ICG 2001: 13; see also McCulloch 2000a: 10, 12–14). As an illustration of the extent of these activities and the problem of controlling them, in early 2001 the East Kalimantan police chief said that it was difficult to control petrol smuggling because he thought that only the department of religion was not involved (*Gatra* 2001: 89).

While there is no doubt that legal and illegal business is a significant motivating factor behind TNI activity, a third view, and that which is adopted here, is that the TNI is driven by a range of mutually coherent interests, ranging from *esprit de corps*, state creation and maintenance, the philosophical underpinnings of the form that the state takes, the bureaucratic logic of organisational self-perpetuation, the need to ‘supplement’ the official on-line budget, the institutionalisation of corruption and, not least, the private interests of particular officers or groups of officers who directly benefit from the TNI’s extensive legal and illegal (criminal) business activities.

The budget

The TNI’s on-line or formal budget varies from year to year, especially if measured in US dollars, due to the fluctuation in the value of the currency. In 1998–99, the budget was US$1 billion (CIA 2002), in 1999–2000 it was US$939 million² (Rohlfis 2000), and in 2000–2001 it was increased in 2000 to US$1.3 billion³ and by a further 18 per cent (in terms of the rupiah) in 2001. Of this total budget, a little more than 50 per cent was spent on salaries, about 30 per cent on equipment, about 8 per cent on maintenance and about 6 per cent on construction.⁴ In 1998–99 the defence budget equalled approximately 1.3 per cent of GDP; in 1991, it was 2 per cent, or US$1.7 billion. But prior to the economic collapse of 1997 the budget had been relatively stable at a little more than US$1 billion. Budgetary changes in 2000 saw the rupiah value of on-line TNI income lift by some 32 per cent, following a request from the defence minister, Juwono Sudarsono, for a 62 per cent increase. Juwono pointed out at the time that the only way to remove the TNI from business activities was to fund it properly. However, the 32 per cent increase failed to alter the level or style of the TNI’s financial activities.

Apart from on-line budgeting and its legal and illegal businesses, to demonstrate how desperately short of cash the military has been, and remains (in large part due to its funds being siphoned off), the TNI has also raised income from a range of official sources, including those generated by formal TNI activities. In its budget papers for 2001, the department of defence noted that
the TNI’s on-line budgeted costs were Rp8,553,529,870,000 (a little less than US$1 billion depending on the exchange rate), of which Rp9,295,500,000 (approximately US$1 million) was raised through official departmental means. While the TNI’s budget has varied in absolute dollar terms, it has risen quite markedly in rupiah terms, both as a consequence of the devaluation of the rupiah but also, in part, due to real budgetary increases in rupiah terms: Rp9.4 trillion in 1998; Rp12.2 trillion in 1999; and Rp18.9 trillion in 2000 (IISS 2001).

Previous contributions to the defence budget from the defence department came via various taxes and duties, profits from selling goods and services (including second-hand vehicles and waste paper), official activities such as legal prosecutions, rents for residences, and credits from money transfers (Department of Defence RI 2001). Needless to say, this form of income-raising did little to make inroads into the TNI’s significant budgetary shortfall. The shortfall between what was officially budgeted for and what was actually, as opposed to nominally, spent on the TNI, was made up primarily from TNI business activities, mostly run through yayasan, or non-taxable ‘charitable’ foundations that were only opened to auditing in 2000. An audit by the BPK in September 2000 found that internal control and supervision within these yayasan was effectively non-existent, that financial management was uncontrolled, that the relationship between the foundations, their businesses and the military units that operated the yayasan was unclear, and that most funds were not used for the purposes for which the yayasan were originally established (that is, troop welfare). In turn these yayasan ran their own businesses and received financial donations from unspecified and unaccountable sources. Despite their capacity to generate off-line income, the International Crisis Group claimed that yayasan only accounted for a fraction of such income (ICG 2001: 13).

According to Juwono Sudarsono, in 2001 the TNI owned or had interests in about 250 businesses (ICG 2001: 13; and see below). However, Juwono also claimed that about two-thirds of TNI business profits were siphoned off before reaching the coffers of the TNI’s respective forces (Weiss 2001). The practice of siphoning off funds dates back to the 1950s, and has continued since then as a conventional economic practice. This lack of accountability has given commanding officers the opportunity to fund networks of patronage, finance independent or unofficial military, intelligence and political activities, and supplement their official incomes. There are some minor – but relatively ineffective – regulations designed to limit such corrupt practices. These include a ban on officers and their wives engaging in defence or related business activities.

**Use of off-line income**

The TNI’s off-line or informal income is used for a range of purposes, although because most of it is hidden, via the network of largely unaccount-
able yayasan, the exact level of income and its usage are not precisely known. Even up to the highest level of the TNI there exists a genuine vagueness about exactly how much the military earns from its businesses and what it is used for, reflecting the often very localised nature of much of the income generation and expenditure. One investigation, by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia – LIPI), estimated that in 1998 TNI businesses had assets worth US$9 billion, across a range of legal and illegal activities. And of course, activities that fall outside even Indonesia’s own flexible legal parameters are never discussed or acknowledged in public. As with its manpower allocation, the TNI’s business activities are spread throughout the archipelago, although they tend to be concentrated in and around Jakarta and in the wealthier commodity-producing provinces.

The off-line income generated by the various branches of the TNI is used in three principal ways: first, to buy capital goods and equipment for the TNI and its personnel, including so-called ‘welfare’ items; second, for reinvestment into the businesses; and, third, by way of cash payments primarily to senior officers although also to TNI members of all ranks where they have access to differing levels of business activity or through patronage networks. Salaries for junior TNI personnel do not adequately cover their living costs, especially for those with families, so their income is ‘topped up’ by means of direct cash payments or, more usually, free or subsidised goods, education, health benefits and housing. Officers receive a slightly better income, but as a consequence of ingrained notions and requirements of patronage, they are expected to display significantly higher levels of wealth as well as to disburse such wealth, and this is well beyond their formal income. So they too receive cash payments from various sources, usually through military yayasan (from which profit is skimmed), from their own private businesses (which have TNI business directed towards them and which can place undue pressure on existing competition), and from percentage pay-offs from businesses under their ‘protection’.

The Territorial structure is the main institutional means by which wealth is created and distributed within the TNI. Members of the TNI who are able to manipulate their position, which basically means those of the rank of NCO and above, undertake ‘favours’ for more senior officers and are in turn ‘looked after’. Such ‘services rendered’ can include quite conventional or mundane day-to-day military duties, as well as ‘special favours’. As such, there is little distinction between official and non-official military duties, especially in the army. Being ‘looked after’ frequently means having education provided for one’s children, but can also mean a cash payment or the granting of opportunities by which easy money may be earned; for example, by establishing legal or ‘black’ businesses, by encouraging and receiving commissions on purchases made from such businesses; or by encouraging non-military businesses to deal with those that are linked with the military. According to Bob Lowry, in the mid-1990s, just prior to their
retirement, officers were usually posted to areas in which they wanted to retire and were then given the time and opportunity to set up local business activities (Lowry 1996: 129). And while Kammen and Chandra (1999: 74) had no evidence of this happening to officers, they did confirm that this was the case for NCOs. However, Rutherford claimed (with considerable evidence) that ‘Military officers have a stake in the designation of certain areas as “unstable”. Former commanders often live out their retirement in East Timor or Irian Jaya so they can reap the harvest of profitable business deals made in the areas under their command’ (Rutherford 2001: 193). (See also Figure 5.1 for an illustration of the links prior to September 1999 between senior officers, members of Suharto’s family and East Timor’s pro-Jakarta elite.) Being ‘looked after’ does not necessarily correspond to the performance of specific favours; rather, it is a type of irregular retainer which may increase in worth in response to the performance of particularly notable acts.

**Patron–client relationships**

In what amounts to a patron–client relationship – referred to by some outsiders as ‘*bapakism*’ – junior officers may owe allegiance directly to officers several rungs up their own command structure, or to officers outside their own direct command structure. Consequently, confusion may arise over the person from whom a given order actually originated, as opposed to the person from whom it was supposed to have originated. By way of illustration, a captain who may formally be accountable to a district colonel might in fact acknowledge actual allegiance to an officer in a completely different command line. Such patron–client relations may initially be established at a time when junior and senior officers are working in the same command and then separate, but retain their mutual obligation. Or they may originate, albeit somewhat less frequently, through an association with officers already established in such a relationship; for example, a captain who owes allegiance to a brigadier general in a separate line of command might bring in a colleague for a specific purpose, who would then also join that particular patron–client network (though usually at a lower level). Such patron–client relations are, according to a confidential intelligence assessment, ‘totally endemic’ to the TNI.

As a consequence of the pervasiveness of patron–client relations outside line commands, it can be very difficult to know who to deal with in terms of issuing orders. That is, an officer who has formal line command in one area may actually work for another, and may ignore or be unable to follow conventional line-command orders. This problem became particularly noticeable after the resignation from office of President Suharto, in large part because the overarching unity to this system that his presidency had provided, as the grand *bapak*, quickly disintegrated. Hence, a succeeding president may issue an order as formal supreme commander, for a particular
Figure 5.1
Patronage and East Timor's economy

PT Pre 1998 business linkages in East Timor Kima Surya Lestari Mutiara

Titiek (Prabowo)
COL Tono Suratman
DANREM 164

Mobil Oil

Genindo Western Petroleum Pty Ltd

PT TORR
Budi Prakoso
(51%)
Abilio Araujo
F. Lopes da Cruz
Francisco dos Amaral
(49%)

PT Putra Unggal
Tommy

PT Elnusa
Bambang

1. Perth-based
2. Output 33K barrels/day WEF Jul 98
3. Singapore-based
action to take place in a certain field, only to have that order disappear within the maze of competing patron–client networks. This scenario would be most likely to occur if such an order ran contrary to an order given by a very senior patron within the TNI. Indeed, this would explain in part why, although President Habibie had issued clear orders for the TNI and police to provide a secure environment for the ballot on independence in East Timor in 1999, the variously issued orders were subverted as they passed through the chain of command. Furthermore, what may at best be described as the TNI and police’s ambiguity of commitment to the referendum process made this subversion that much easier.

Interestingly, one side effect of the patron–client relationship is that junior officers with links to senior military patrons may sidestep the authority of their nominal superiors without fear. In some cases this has meant that junior officers with strong bapakist links have actually wielded more functional authority or independence within the TNI than nominally higher-ranking officers, both generally and within their own command structure. Within such a system, senior officers who have established themselves as major bapak figures within the TNI may operate with a high degree of autonomy from the central command, establishing themselves as a type of warlord. Again, this tendency was more muted under Suharto, the grand bapak, in particular as a consequence of his frequent rotation of Territorial commanders and his juggling and counterpoising of senior generals.

In addition to the making of cash payments or the giving of free or subsidised goods to military personnel, the various sources of income are also used for ‘professional’ purposes – from the purchase (and maintenance) of military goods and equipment as basic as petrol to vehicle, ship and aircraft spare parts; for purchases such as bullet-proof vests through to large capital items such as ships, planes and other major military hardware; and even for covert or otherwise formally unauthorised military operations, such as militia training, armaments and salaries. The TNI’s commander-in-chief, Admiral Widodo Adisucipto, was quite frank about his desire to purchase goods, mentioning specifically the planned purchase of two Parcham-class corvettes and the upgrade of seven F-16A/B jet fighters, at a combined cost of over Rp60 billion. He also wanted to obtain large fast patrol craft, as well as increase the number of navy personnel by 20,000 over five years. The intention, therefore, was not to use any increases in government funding for the TNI to buy itself out of its business activities, as was the initial plan as outlined by the then defence minister, Juwono Sudarsono, but to upgrade and maintain equipment and expand recruitment and training (McCulloch 2000b).

Sources of income

Income is derived from three main revenue streams. The first comprises businesses owned and operated by the different branches of the TNI, including those in the areas of natural resources and agribusiness, finance, real estate,
manufacturing and construction, usually via (still tax-exempt but now theoretically auditable) yayasan and cooperatives. The second comprises more ‘grey’ areas of business, such as the leasing out (or imposition) of military services, surcharges imposed on purchases, and the mixing of private and military business interests. The third and most lucrative source of income comprises the black market, in particular smuggling (especially of oil or oil-related products), and illegal mining and logging. With regard to the latter, one study showed that in the Bukit Tigapuluh National Park, thirteen of the twenty-five illegal sawmills operating just south of the park were connected to the military (McCulloch 2000a: 26). This black-market trade began as bartering and minor smuggling and was used to directly finance the TNI, but quickly became a source of personal enrichment for many senior officers. In addition to the black market, a range of other illegal activities also offer sources of revenue, including protection rackets, organised prostitution (in Surabaya, for example, it is run by the marines (McCulloch 2000a: 28)), drug production, distribution and dealing, gambling, and even piracy and gun running.

Not surprisingly, with so much of Indonesia’s wealth located in the commodity-rich provinces, the army also has close associations with key income-producing businesses. These associations are multifaceted: in part, they represent a response to separatist violence in Aceh and West Papua, initiated in order to protect key installations from attack or threat of attack; and in part they represent a form of rent-seeking behaviour rationalised under the army’s informal but lucrative ‘protection’ policy, in which a percentage of the profits are siphoned off as ‘protection’ payments. It is not surprising, therefore, that since 1988 the army has had a significant presence both near the Exxon-Mobil site near Lhokseumawe in Aceh and at the Freeport site near Timika in West Papua (Tapol 1999a). McCulloch noted that at Freeport, the company made an initial payment of US$35 million to a local military commander, a ‘necessary’ payment for operational purposes, to be supplemented by an annual payment of US$11 million. Furthermore, up to a third of this income is siphoned off by individual officers (McCulloch 2000a: 27). The creation of enclave industries imposed without the agreement of local communities has to date managed to breed high levels of conflict. In West Papua, the combination of military and economic clout has led to the intensive militarisation of a large area around the Freeport Grasberg gold and copper mine and its related operations. This militarisation has directly contributed to the more than twenty years of related human rights abuses that has been inflicted on the local indigenous population. Even ‘reformist’ President Abdurrahman Wahid relented on this matter when he said:

I have ordered the Mines and Energy Minister to provide mining investors with protection…Security is a vital factor for the sustainability of investment in Indonesia. Therefore, a conducive security condition is
important for economic recovery. The main issue is maintaining the rule of law. If necessary we will use force.

(DTE 2000)

He added that the government would not hesitate to take strong action to safeguard the mine. This announcement came at the time when there was a labour dispute at the Kaltim Prima mine in East Kalimantan, which is jointly owned and operated by the giant mining companies Rio Tinto and BP-Amoco. This dispute followed a similar disruption at Rio Tinto’s Kelian gold mine, in which local workers blockaded the mine site and forced a halt to production. The day after Wahid’s announcement, it emerged that foreign companies would be expected to pay for this military protection. The defence minister, Juwono, said ‘cooperation’ between security forces and investors was necessary because the government could not work alone to deal with the growing security problem, due to lack of funds.

To this end, local TNI battalions are well entrenched in the business of ‘protecting’ foreign-owned companies. As well as making direct cash payments to the local battalions, and, in at least one case, buying them equipment (armoured four-wheel drives), the companies provide regional officers with numerous perks, such as free air travel, holidays, housing and cash. One investigation by the human rights organisation Kontras-Aceh concluded that the company in question spent Rp5 billion per month (around US$500,000) on the local TNI battalions, based on the number of troops deployed to protect the company multiplied by the cost per day of Rp40,000 for the upkeep of each soldier (Budiarjo 2002). Government agencies such as Pertamina, the State Logistics Agency (Baden Urusan Logistik Nasional – Bulog), founded in 1966 and initially dominated by the army, and other private companies have also ‘donated’ funds to the TNI, especially where such companies were involved in natural resource extraction and were located in a site of potential or actual conflict. These funds comprised cash payments or gifts to senior officers to help ensure uninterrupted operations. In some cases they have amounted to ‘protection’ payments, whereby the TNI would be the agency that not only demanded payment but would fulfil threats if payments were not made. In other cases, payment was intended to buy political leverage or goodwill. In 2001 it was reported that a Suharto family member, among other private donors, had donated money to Kostrad, money which helped to supplement funds from a yayasan for the training of reconnaissance platoons (Kompas 2001).

Money and murder

Conventional wisdom has it that Dortheys (‘Theys’) Hiyo Eluay was murdered because of his views in favour of West Papua’s independence, and this may indeed be the case. However, while this is the prevailing view, it is not the only one. Some believe that Theys was murdered because of his
involvement in army business, and his capacity to block approval for logging concessions.

Theys was murdered, on 11 November 2001, by a Kopassus team at Koyo Tengah, about thirty-five kilometres from Jayapura, and it is clear that the order for his murder came from Jakarta. Before he was murdered, Theys had attended a Heroes’ Day celebration at the Kopassus headquarters in Hamadi, about three kilometres from Jayapura. All of this is well known, and appears obvious enough. According to Kusnanto Anggoro from CSIS, Theys was the victim of a dispute between two retired generals in Jakarta. One of them is no longer in a position of power and is facing charges of human rights abuses. The other is becoming more influential in the worlds of politics and intelligence. The two generals, according to Kusnanto, were fighting over who would become kingmaker in the national political arena. Because of the political sensitivity of the case and the potential for others also to be killed, Kusnanto had to be careful. However, it was revealed by another source – one that identified the Kopassus culprits months before they were publicly identified – that the two retired generals in question were Wiranto and Hendropriyono.

The company that was most likely, or had the potential, to be negatively affected by Theys Eluay’s views is PT Hanurata Co. Ltd, a forest concessionaire which holds the rights to log 150,000 hectares of forest in Jayapura and Sorong. PT Hanurata’s shares are owned by, among others, the Trikora and Harapan Kita Foundations (owned by Suharto), and the foundation belonging to Kopassus, Kobame (of which see below). The buildings on PT Hanurata’s site in Jayapura are occupied by Kopassus troops (Bina et al. 2002).

According to Kusnanto, quoted in a report by Tempo magazine, Wiranto and Hendropriyono had argued over forestry land worth US$40 million. Kusnanto was quoted by Tempo as saying: ‘It seems that one general was of the opinion that Theys had adversely affected the land business there.’ That retired general was Hendropriyono. As a local traditional leader, Theys was responsible for managing land use in his area. Consequently, businessmen holding forestry land-use permits in Theys’ area often asked for his help in disputes with local people (Ardi and Hadriani 2002; Maha et al. 2002). The whole logging issue had become much more sensitive and competitive after the introduction of the ‘special autonomy’ legislation that ensured that 80 per cent of all profits from natural resource exploitation would be returned to the provincial government.

Besides Kopassus/PT Hanurata, more than fifty companies were competing to control logging in the area, including Sumalindo Lestari Jaya III, Yuo Liem Saru and Wapoga Mutiara Timber. The fierce competition between these companies was exacerbated by the burning of the forests of Kalimantan. Logging in West Papua covered an area of 11.8 million hectares, compared with 10 million hectares in Kalimantan. As a consequence of this increased competition, and the need to secure the approval
of traditional leaders, many companies were busy distributing gifts. Not only was Theys close to many of the timber companies; he also received a lot of money from them. Theys’ ‘price’ was high. Businessmen frequently went to Theys’ house bearing gifts, and the car, a new blue Kijang, in which Theys travelled during his last ever trip, was a gift from PT Djayanti, the largest forest concessionaire in West Papua, with 1.9 million hectares, and a strong competitor to Hanurata (Bina et al. 2002). It has also been alleged that a large donation – some Rp60 billion – that had been promised by the giant Freeport mining company was a source of tension among some members of the PDP, of which Theys was chairman. Theys had travelled to Timika, the mining company town near Freeport, a few days before his death; indeed, Theys travelled frequently, and it is believed that such travel was paid for by private companies, and that he also received cash payments from some of them. As an article in Tempo put it:

It is not impossible that there are businessmen out there who Theys had disappointed, who then asked the soldiers to kill him. The businessmen in question would have to be civilians with strong influence on the senior military officials or Kopassus in Jakarta. Or perhaps the businessman might himself be a former member of Kopassus.

(Maha 2002)

Thus, it still may well be that Theys was murdered for purely political reasons. But in Indonesia politics is rarely pure, and the TNI’s motives for murdering Theys may easily have been mixed. As was noted at the beginning of this chapter, legal and illegal business is a significant motivating factor behind TNI activity, and Kopassus members would have been concerned with protecting the interests of their company, the interests of its major investors, and the interests of their former commander, an especially powerful figure in military and political life. The fact that business considerations may have been combined with ‘protecting’ the state from a leading separatist figure meant that Theys Eluay simply lived too provocative and dangerous a life not to be killed. Money and politics make a powerful combination, and anyone trying to come between the TNI and its main source of motivation would have to be either very brave, or very foolish.

Background to business

As was noted earlier, the origins of the TNI in business go back to its days as a self-sufficient guerilla army, and to the early days of the Republic when funding for the military was limited by the government’s general lack of discretionary spending power. A Dutch intelligence report from the time noted that Republican officers operating in the Yogyakarta region engaged not just in business activities but also in opium smuggling. It was also at this
time that young Sino-Indonesian businessmen, such as Liem Sioe Liong, began what was to become an enormously lucrative business association with army officers (Elson 2001: 21–2). In the early 1950s, plans to reduce and ‘professionalise’ the army meant that many units found that they were able to avoid much of this reductionist pressure by providing for themselves, and hence avoid the central budget. In fact, self-sufficiency was often regarded as an accepted part of a local commander’s responsibility (see Nasution 1970: 59, 137). Some commanders, such as then Colonel Suharto, appeared to take up this responsibility with considerable enthusiasm. Indeed, as a result of Suharto’s enthusiasm for business – including bartering, the imposition of ‘levies’ on goods and services, industry, and shipping, primarily via two yayasan (the model for the later development of military yayasan) – he became the subject of a corruption investigation and in October 1959 was unceremoniously transferred out of his post as commander of the Diponegoro Division, to redeem himself through a stint at the Army Staff Command School (Sekolah Staf Komando Angkatan Darat – SSKAD) (Elson 2001: 60–5).

The TNI received a big boost to its business activities in 1957 with the nationalisation of Dutch-owned businesses, many of which came under direct or indirect TNI control. The declaration of martial law soon afterwards enhanced the powers of regional commanders generally, and especially in relation to being able to determine business outcomes. The TNI’s business ownership was further boosted in 1964 and again in 1965, in response to the Confrontation (Konfrontasi) over the formation of Malaysia, with British-owned businesses also being placed under the control of the military, and with US-owned businesses being nationalised. As Indonesia’s economy contracted in the early 1960s, funds for the military similarly contracted, with military incomes falling to below subsistence levels. In response, local military units expanded their business operations, levied unofficial ‘taxes’ (see comment on Suharto), engaged in smuggling and were otherwise ‘entrepreneurial’ in developing sources of income. Officers in charge of businesses and other sources of revenue took profits directly for military use, rather than first forwarding them to the government. This in turn provided enhanced opportunities for officers to also skim off some of the profits for themselves. By 1965 Sesko was running lectures in economics and business management given by Indonesian economists trained at the University of California at Berkeley (a group who later became known in government circles as the ‘Berkeley Mafia’), a function later picked up by Lemhanas, the National Resilience Institute. In the days immediately after 1 October 1965, Suharto moved to assert and then consolidate his personal power, in large part through making it clear that he ‘would not interfere with, and would indeed enhance with bounteous patronage, army business interests’ (Elson 2001: 166). The direct use of funds generated by businesses owned or operated by the military increased rather than decreased in the early years of the New Order government, as the military budget as a
percentage of GDP was increasingly reduced, from 29 per cent in 1970 to less than 4 per cent by 1990, together with initial cuts of up to three-quarters of the military budget in 1966–67 alone (FAS 1992).

But the business fortunes of the TNI generally and the army in particular rose most dramatically after Suharto became president. It was common practice for officers to conduct business on behalf of the government, the TNI and themselves all at the same time. It was also common for generals, seeking aid or other business on behalf of the government, to seek a percentage of the total for themselves, which caused increasing concern among Indonesia’s many aid donors. One retired Australian government representative recalled how, in the early 1970s, when an Indonesian general came to Australia to negotiate a major wheat purchase, he expected, and received, a percentage of the sale price to be given to him personally.\textsuperscript{11} If this was not forthcoming, so it was made clear, then the sale would be cancelled. This type of personal enrichment was commonplace. At the same time, as Indonesia’s economy grew, so too did many of the businesses run by the different branches of the TNI, often through preferential deals or control of monopolies.

The generals continued to expect a share of the profits, and they were soon to receive it from a different source. In a political system in which patronage is not only widespread but expected, Suharto needed to be able to tap into a source of funds that was not directly tied to prying foreign donors or investors. In 1968 he turned to General Ibnu Sutowo, who was in charge of the state-owned oil company, Pertamina, established under army sponsorship in 1957. In 1958, in a campaign against corruption, General Nasution had suspended Sutowo (then a colonel) from the general staff. In the same campaign, a year later, Suharto (also then a colonel) was transferred from his post as Central Java commander.\textsuperscript{12} In order to finance projects ranging from education to industry development, which were thought necessary or expedient, and to ensure that there was cash on hand to reward his supporters, Suharto received funding from Sutowo. In exchange, Sutowo was given almost entirely free reign over Pertamina, which was the country’s largest source of foreign income and which operated in a manner that was effectively independent of official government policy. Funds sourced from Pertamina were used for a range of purposes, from building the presidential offices, Bina Graha, to funding shortfalls in the military’s budget, to providing slush funds for Suharto that were then used to buy the loyalty of senior officers. Elson notes, in what can only be an ironic tone, that ‘Pertamina was an outstanding example of army enterprise’ (Elson 2001: 191).

Apart from diversifying into myriad other businesses, from tourism to insurance to steel manufacturing, Sutowo’s primary method of raising funds was to borrow against the value of Pertamina, which was outside the existing government borrowing regime. This effectively raised the debt of the state well beyond levels regarded as acceptable by economists both in
Indonesia and in aid-donor countries. But treating the company as his personal fiefdom, Sutowo limited the amount of information that was available about Pertamina’s financial status, and creditors were left with a misleading economic picture. The effect of this process of unofficial fund-raising was that Indonesia ended up running a ‘two-track’ economic system. This dual economy deeply concerned Indonesia’s economic ministers, but as the system suited his political and personal purposes, Suharto feigned ignorance and avoided action (Winters 1996: 84).

By 1972 the rogue economic policy of Pertamina was of such concern that, in support of IMF attempts to curtail the organisation’s borrowings, the US suspended eligibility for programme loans. In 1973 the IMF urged Indonesia’s other creditors to take similar steps to have Pertamina’s borrowings limited. With this support behind them, the economics ministers of the Indonesian government began to make some headway towards rein in Sutowo’s borrowings through Pertamina. In May 1973 Suharto finally relented to pressure from the IMF, the US and his own economic ministers, agreeing to have Pertamina’s borrowings limited to the short term in order to cap overall borrowing while allowing working capital to be made available (Winters 1996: 89). With long-term borrowing no longer available, Pertamina’s debt became unsustainable.

Within three years, Pertamina’s short-term debt escalated from US$140 million to over US$1 billion as Sutowo attempted to have debts rolled-over from the long term into the short term. By May 1975 Pertamina’s short- and long-term debt amounted to US$3 billion, which was over twice the value of the country’s foreign currency reserves. The roll-over strategy came to an abrupt halt in early 1975 as Pertamina began to default on loan repayments, which in turn began to affect the conventional economy. Built-in crossover provisions meant that, should the Indonesian government not guarantee Pertamina’s debts, it would default on its own borrowings and all debts would have to be repaid in full. Sutowo was effectively put out of business and formally sacked from his job by Suharto in 1976. When Pertamina finally collapsed, it had over US$10 billion worth of debts (Mackie and MacIntyre 1994: 14; Hill 1994: 69). The political fallout was significant, but by then the unexpected income from the first surge in world oil prices, soon to quadruple the price of oil, had begun to arrive. Indonesia’s overall economy became buoyant, providing Suharto with yet another method of ensuring development and increasing his system of patronage. With the oil-price boom, a new phase in Indonesia’s economy under the New Order government had begun. As an epilogue to this period, Sutowo was later made chairman of the Indonesian Red Cross; by the 1990s owned a string of companies, including the Jakarta Hilton Hotel and a family bank; and reportedly was still able to bring some influence to bear on his former patron, the then president. An audit of Pertamina by PricewaterhouseCoopers for the period 1 April 1996–31 March 1998 found that even two decades after the Pertamina debacle had taken the Indonesian
economy to the brink of collapse, it still had ‘inefficiencies’ – it was still used as a lucrative source of non-accountable funds or corrupt deals – to the value of US$4 billion. Around half of all Pertamina projects were cancelled as a consequence of the audit, and a further sixth were renegotiated (Pertamina Audit, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 1999, quoted in McCulloch 2000a: 21–2).

Some business activities

The role of the military in business has generally been one of informal financial success. In part, this success has been due to the army’s higher level of organisation and logistics compared with other businesses, especially in the early years, and it benefited significantly from the windfall gains from the nationalisation of Dutch and British businesses in the late 1950s and in 1964. Most notably, however, after Suharto came to power the military’s business interests developed in leaps and bounds, usually in cooperation with private businesses and often as a consequence of being granted special privileges or access. In particular, having the military’s businesses run through yayasan meant that, until 2000 (but largely even since then), they were able to avoid auditing and scrutiny of their cash flows, allowing money to come in from non-legitimate sources, such as the black market, as well as to be spent on unaccountable projects, such as politically questionable military campaigns. Of equal if not greater importance, though, was the fact that such yayasan were not subject to tax, so all profits remained with the business, allowing accelerated growth.

However, even with such a cozy arrangement and the influence that the different branches of the military were and remain able to bring to bear in their business dealings, not all businesses have been an informal success. Somewhat surprisingly, the business owned and operated by the special forces, Kopassus, is a case in point. Despite Kopassus’ high profile within Indonesian society and its notorious capacity for ‘persuasion’, it seems that Kopassus might have fallen victim to the twin problems of Indonesia’s corruption-induced economic collapse in mid-1997 and of having relied on Suharto family connections rather than business acumen.

In 1993, the special forces established its own yayasan, the Red Berets Welfare Corps Institution (Melalui Yayasan Korps Baret Merah – Kobame), which developed quickly under the leadership of Brigadier General Prabowo Subianto after his appointment as Kopassus commander in 1995. For example, while Kopassus was expanding numerically under Prabowo’s leadership, the unit also expanded its education programme for its officers, sending many to universities in Europe and the US. Funding for education reportedly came directly from the funds of Prabowo’s relatives, including his businessman brother, Hashim Djojohadikusumo, and his businesswoman wife (and Suharto’s daughter), Titiek. Prabowo’s close relationship with President Suharto, as his son-in-law, also helped with
securing lucrative business contracts, loans and other preferential deals. The first major project for Kobame was to build the Graha Cijantung shopping centre on land belonging to the Kopassus headquarters in Cijantung, East Jakarta. The new shopping centre, including a cinema complex, a McDonald’s restaurant and shops, was initially a 50/50 joint venture between Kobame and the son of the founder of the Gunung Agung business group, Ktut Abdurachman Masagung; the new company that was to oversee the project was named Kobame Propertindo. The complex cost Rp55 billion to build, Rp45 billion of which came from Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) and Bank Pelita, the latter of which was owned by Prabowo’s brother, Hashim Djojohadikusumo. Halfway through building the centre, in 1998, Ktut resigned from the partnership, so that Kobame became the sole owner of Kobame Propertindo and, hence, Graha Cijantung. At about the same time, Prabowo was removed from active service, and soon afterwards, in November 1998 – as the coup de grâce of a factional battle with General Wiranto – was discharged from the army. By this stage, and before the business was able to start generating profits, Indonesia’s economy had collapsed and interest rates shot up to 70 per cent, making it difficult for Kobame Propertindo to meet its repayments to BRI and Bank Pelita. Bank Pelita’s assets were frozen in March 1999, and as a consequence Kobame Propertindo’s debts were passed to IBRA, the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency.

Kobame’s fortunes declined in line with the collapse of the Indonesian economy and Prabowo’s fall from grace. Ktut appeared to have recognised that the project was heading for economic and political difficulty, and decided to bail out while he could. However, apart from the Graha Cijantung venture, Kobame did well for several years, through a cooperative for lending and borrowing, a bus route operated between Jakarta and Semarang, part-ownership of the Horizon Hotel, and other assorted ventures. In partnership with the Arseto group, a conglomerate owned by Suharto’s eldest son and Prabowo’s brother-in-law, Sigit Harjojudanto, Kobame invested Rp7 billion in building two charcoal briquette factories in Solo (Surakarta) and Semarang. Kobame also set up and owned 70 per cent of PT Tribuana Antar Nusa, which operated a shipping business. Tribuana later sold the ferry Tribuana I, which plied the Merak–Bakauheni route, for Rp7.5 billion. The ferry ended up under the ownership of Prabowo, as part of the Nusantara Energy Resources company.

Another Kobame business, Kobame Super Sentra (KSS), which operated wholesale stores, went bankrupt after failing to compete with other discount and wholesale businesses such as Hero. By 2002, KSS had bad debts of Rp624 million. Other Kobame business plans failed to materialise, most probably because Prabowo was no longer in charge and unable to provide patronage through his close link to the presidency. Similarly, Kobame had joint timber concessions in Kalimantan and a methanol distribution agency under licence from the state-owned company Pertamina, although these
business ventures have subsequently collapsed. Kobame’s tendency towards imposing some of its services and accepting ‘gifts’ increasingly brought Kopassus into disrepute (though this was nothing in the context of its more general offences), leading the TNI to attempt to curtail its activities (Tempo 2001).

Meanwhile, Kopassus was able to find a private source of funds for its operations. In addition to the funds received from the Kopassus commander’s brother, Hashim Djojohadikusumo, a group of forty ethnic Chinese businessmen contributed Rp10 million (US$1,000) a month each to Kopassus for equipment and training. The businessmen even built a mess hall at the Kopassus base in Cijantung shortly before the May 1998 riots. The implicit understanding was that as a result of their contributions, the businessmen had secured their families and property. The payment ceased after the May 1998 riots, which had a distinctly anti-Chinese focus, as even though their properties were not directly attacked they felt betrayed (Aditjondro 2000d).

More successful, however, has been the Kartika Eka Paksi Foundation (YKEP), founded in 1972 under President Suharto’s direction as the army’s primary yayasan for the purpose of improving the welfare of ordinary soldiers. YKEP has subsequently become a successful conglomerate, owning some twelve primary businesses. One of its subsidiary businesses is the business group Kartika Plaza, which owns and operates the Kartika Plaza Hotels in Jakarta and Bali (Taufiqurohman 2002). Often in partnership with businessman Tommy Winata and Sugianto Kusuma through the Artha Graha (‘House of Money’) group, who injected significant capital into the foundation in 1985, YKEP controls such companies as the Sudirman Central Business District (which in turn controls forty-four acres in the area of Jakarta’s ‘golden triangle’), Bank Artha Graha, the International Timber Corporation of Indonesia, Danayasa Artaama (which owns the prestigious Hotel Borobudur) and a further twenty-six companies linked under the umbrella of Tri Ubaya Bhakti. As of 2000, the Artha Graha group had assets totalling Rp3.7 trillion – from a satellite communications company (which was transferred from government ownership in 1993 at zero cost, losing the government about US$100 million a year in lost revenue) to a fishing fleet in the Banda Sea in Maluku, as well as joint ventures with Suharto’s middle son, Bambang Trihatmodjo (Aditjondro 2000d). Artha Graha’s operations also extend beyond the purely financial: Tommy Winata and Sugianto Kumala have been linked to the Jakarta underworld, including Yorris Raweyai, who is also a leader of Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth). The chairman of this organisation, Yapto Suryosumarno, is close to the Suharto family, both via Suharto’s children and through the royal court at Solo, to which Suharto’s late wife Tien and Tommy Suharto’s wife are related (Aditjondro 2000d). Pemuda Pancasila acts as a quasi-militia/quasi-political thug operation, and has been responsible for numerous attacks against pro-democracy activists.
The off-line budget exposed

Shortly after he was appointed as commander of Kostrad on 28 February 2000, army reformist Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah launched a high-profile investigation into corruption regarding the use of funds from nine Kostrad yayasan, the first ever such audit. The audit followed the introduction of law no. 31/1999. The investigation included an inquiry into how Kostrad’s previous commander and close Wiranto ally, Djaja Suparman, had succeeded in spending approximately US$22 million in his five months as Kostrad commander. The leaking of information from this investigation to the media caused a sensation in Jakarta, especially given that it reflected directly on the battle being fought between Agus Wirahadikusumah and the TNI’s reformist camp on the one hand, and the more conservative ‘professional’ camp of Wiranto and his allies on the other. A further investigation by the Army Inspector General, Major General Joko Subroto, claimed that although there had been ‘administrative disorder’ within Kostrad, which accounted for the missing funds, there had been no embezzlement, thus effectively clearing Djaja. However, Joko’s announcement was criticised by the BPK because it had not been cleared by them, the inference being that it was a cover-up. The BPK thus acknowledged that there had been losses of between US$8.8 million and US$22.2 million, from assets totalling US$22.2 million. A high level allegation that financial data to the auditors had been doctored indicated that Kostrad’s total assets were much greater and that losses were probably double the amount acknowledged, further indicating the false accounting that diminished capital value, not to mention accrued (though often diverted) profits.

According to the BPK audit, ‘disordering’ and the flouting of rules and regulations accounted for 70 per cent of the losses, inefficiency in using state finance for 20 per cent, and ineffectiveness for 10 per cent. At least some of the funds that had disappeared from the Kostrad yayasan had been ostensibly used for other purposes, but had in fact been channelled for use in ‘black’ or covert military operations, especially as contributions to the financing of the TNI’s covert East Timor campaign of 1999 (Tempo 2000; JP 2000d, 2000e; Tempo Interaktif 2000; McCulloch 2000a). As a consequence of the furore over the leaking of the audit results, and the sacking of Lieutenant General Agus Wirahadikusumah, it was likely that there would be no further audits of military yayasan – or at the very least that the yayasan would be given ample warning to allow them to clean up their books, and that they would otherwise be much less transparent. Furthermore, the outcome of the Kostrad audit was not regarded as unusual, and many believed that it would have been reflected in any other audits of military businesses that may have been undertaken.

The TNI also had another, particularly novel source of income. In order to raise funds for at least two of its operations, including East Timor in 1999, the TNI simply printed the money it required. Lieutenant General Tyasno Sudarto, who was then head of BIA, was publicly identified in 2000 as having been involved in the counterfeiting of some US$2.2 million,
allegedly at the request of the then commander-in-chief General Wiranto. The counterfeit money was printed in Rp50,000 notes and was widely circulated in East Timor in August 1999, for payment to militia members. The counterfeit scam was exposed when militia leader Eurico Guterres tried to keep the funds for himself by depositing them in a bank. However, the bank, aware of the counterfeiting, refused to accept the fake notes. Eurico complained to his TNI paymasters, who responded by saying that the money was for militia members, not for his personal use. It turned out that Tyasno had asked TNI headquarters for legitimate funds with which to pay the militias, but had been turned down because of financial constraints. Tyasno then went to the governor of the Bank of Indonesia, Syahril Sabirin, who sold Tyasno genuine banknote serial numbers. It was also reported that the counterfeit notes were used to pay soldiers stationed in East Timor (The Editors 2001: 150). Another general, Subagyo Hadi Siswojo, was implicated in another counterfeit scandal, although it is unclear whether it was connected to the East Timor operation.

Although the example of fund-raising in East Timor in 1999 is a special case, such diversion (or manufacture) of funds for supplementary purposes generally, and in particular to what amounts to a critical area for the TNI, is typical of how the TNI has been able to arrange its finances without being officially accountable. On 30 July 2000, Major General Agus Wirahadikusumah was dumped from his position as Kostrad commander, indicating how little institutional tolerance there was for insiders who made public the TNI’s private affairs. The conservative US Heritage Foundation noted that after this investigation ‘it appears unlikely that the government will prosecute any officer for mismanaging or stealing funds from these enterprises’ (Dillon 2001).

**Diversion of funds**

Not only has the TNI employed both on- and off-line sources of funding for purposes not formally endorsed by the government, it has also diverted large amounts of foreign aid for its own purposes. There is a rule of thumb in the distribution of aid money in Indonesia that of any donation, as little as 10 per cent or less of the original amount actually finds its way to the purpose for which it was intended, due to the successive cuts that are taken for ‘services rendered’ as the money passes down through the chain of bureaucracy. However, few examples of this practice have been as blatant, as politicised or as comprehensively corrupt as in the case of the World Bank’s ‘Social Security Net’ (Jaring Pengamanan Sosial – JPS). This donation was intended to provide funds for Indonesian citizens who had become desperate as a consequence of the economic collapse from mid-1997, in a bid to prevent further outbreaks of rioting and looting that had characterised the early months of 1998. However, the JPS funds were used to directly finance East Timor’s militias and other aspects of the pro-integration campaign, the
aim of which was to stop the restive territory from breaking away from Jakarta’s political control.14

As early as 10 June 1999, the East Timorese/Indonesian activist news-group *MateBEAn* reported that a leaked document signed on 3 June 1999 by the governor of East Timor, Abilio Soares, provided for the even distribution of Rp39 billion under the JPS programme to the territory’s thirteen districts (*kabupaten*). The letter was addressed to each district head (*bupati*), and marked for the attention of the director of the East Timor Regional Development Bank, so that the funds might be released to the districts. The governor was to receive monthly reports detailing the funds that had been distributed.

The funds were formally distributed as follows:

30% community assistance
20% command and control for interior ministry (Regional and village councils, and triumvirates)
20% ‘socialisation of autonomy’ (propaganda)
15% political mobilisation/rallies/campaigning (militia rallies)
5% volunteer security forces/pro-government vigilantes (Pam Swakarsa)
5% infrastructure work
2% operational control teams (Kopassus/milsus)
2% organisational aid
1% consultation

Allowances were also paid to functionaries and groups as follows:

*Interior ministry*

Rp100m *bupatis* (Rp7.7m each)
Rp50m *kabupaten* representative council chairmen (Rp3.85m each)
Rp80m indigenous district chiefs (Rp1.29m each)
Rp290m village heads (approximately Rp1m each)

*Armed forces and police*

Rp30m TNI sector commanders (Rp10m each)
Rp50m TNI Kodim commanders (Rp3.85m each)
Rp50m Polri police precinct chiefs (Rp3.85m each)
Rp25m Territorial battalion commanders (Rp12.5m each)
Rp25m Kopassus ‘Tribuana’ task unit commander

*Pro-integration front*

Rp50m militia groups
Rp25m the BRTT
Rp25m the FPDK
Rp25m the KOTBD (this was a joint pro- and anti-independence ‘organisation’ based on the signing of a ‘peace’ agreement in February 1999; it existed only as a group at the signing ceremony)
Another report gave details of a further leak, which supported the fund-diversion authorised in Governor Soare’s province-level document proposing the local use of the JPS funds by the Regent of Manufahi, Bupati Nazario Jose Tilman de Andrade, who planned to spend Rp700 million out of Rp1,245 million on pro-autonomy activities. Also reported was Governor Abilio’s instruction for all government departments to set aside 10–20 per cent of their budgets ‘towards a pro-autonomy victory’ (MateBEAN 1999a, 1999b; UPC 1999). This diversion of funds, in this case JPS funds from the World Bank, is a well-developed example of how the TNI used funds for purposes other than which they were intended, and was able to divert funds from official sources for uses other than that to which they were directed.

Selling guns

In another, albeit somewhat different, case of the mixing of military business and illegal sources of income, a non-active lieutenant general who identified himself as being close to Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto and, by association, Suharto, was shifted to a large military business to see out the rest of his period of duty until retirement. This general, who explicitly identified himself as having belonged to the ‘Islamic’ (or ‘green’) faction of the armed forces, made several business trips to Malaysia, where he was feted. According to two sources, this general was involved in smuggling small arms from and through Malaysia to Indonesia. One of the sources was associated with one of the purchasers of the weapons, on behalf of a separatist movement. The other source identified this general as also providing weapons to the Laskar Jihad, who had been trained by members of Kopassus in West Java and had travelled to Maluku to wage ‘holy war’ against the Christians there.

The origins of the conflict in Maluku are multifaceted: they include the sectarian tension that followed a shift in population patterns as a consequence of migration; shifts in political power and economic opportunities between sectarian groups; and, at least in part, the violence between gangs in Jakarta that saw Ambonese Christian criminals returning to Ambon en masse. However, the military also had a significant interest in seeing the violence in Ambon develop and continue – in part to legitimise itself at a time when its political stocks were low, in part to destabilise the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid and, in part, because it had long-standing as well as new business interests in the province and elsewhere that might be threatened by Wahid’s introduction of political and economic decentralisation.

Aditjondro notes that ‘Maluku was indeed ridden with military business interests, which was mostly through charities which had shares in the conglomerates operating in Maluku, through joint ventures with members of those conglomerates, or by using certain Sino-Indonesian business people
as their financial operators’ (Aditjondro 2000c). These ‘business interests’ involved all three armed services. For example, PT Green Delta, a company owned by the air force, supplied logs from their 74,000 hectare concession on Morotai Island to Barito Pacific’s mill in North Maluku. The army was also involved in widespread protection racketeering (notably but not exclusively concerning Chinese-owned businesses) and in the sale of weapons to combatants in the conflict.

The sale of weapons was not restricted to Maluku; the army was deeply involved in gun-running in Aceh, too. In the latter case, although small arms came and do come from a number of sources, many of these weapons originated in Cambodia and Thailand. The Thai military has a history of corruption and business activity, so illegally selling small arms was not an unusual practice for them. In Cambodia, not only is there a history of corruption in the military, but the disarming of the Khmer Rouge in the late 1990s resulted in a vast surplus of small arms coming up for sale. Furthermore, the border area between Thailand and Malaysia had long been a site for guerrilla activities and, consequently, a regional conduit for buying and selling weapons. The ASNLF/GAM had for some time been buying weapons through Malaysia and smuggling them across the Malacca Straights. As one senior general privately acknowledged, adequate surveillance of the straights, a traditional avenue of transit between Sumatra and the Malay peninsula, was almost impossible. Other small arms were smuggled into Java, through the port at Surabaya, the southern Malaysia state of Johore Baru and then Singapore. Smuggling arms, or gun-running, was a particularly lucrative business for this general, and others.

According to an official from the ASNLF, it was not always necessary to buy guns smuggled from overseas. It was quite possible, he said, to buy Indonesian-made small arms direct from the defence department’s own factory, PT Pindad, in Bandung, Java. The purchases were made through corrupt generals, and the weapons were shipped, still in crates, to the separatist army waging a war of secession against the government for which the generals supposedly worked. The official said that the generals who sold weapons did not have sons fighting in Aceh, so to them it was just a business deal. He added that the ASNLF was happy to buy weapons from the generals as they came at a price that was competitive with the cost of weapons sourced from overseas. ‘We don’t care where they come from if it is a good price,’ he said.

**Associated business**

According to Aditjondro (2000d), the owners of ten conglomerates were involved in helping to finance Indonesia’s various military and paramilitary organisations. Six of these conglomerates were owned by members of Suharto’s extended family, including Suharto’s cousin, Sudwikatmono, his
half-bother, Probosutedjo, his sons Bambang Trihatmodjo and Hutomo Mandala Putra (Tommy), his daughters Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (Tutut) and Titiek, and Titiek’s brother-in-law, Hashim Djojohadikusumo (Prabowo’s brother). A further eight other conglomerates have also been identified as having connections with the army, as well as having close ties to the Suharto family. These companies have been linked to Kostrad, the retired generals’ Yayasan Kejuangan Panglima Besar Sudirman, the army’s Tri Usaha Bhakti (Truba) group, Tommy Winata’s Artha Graha group, Prajogo Pangestu’s Barito Pacific group, Burhan Uray’s Djaajanti group, Ciputra’s Ciputra group and Murdaya Widayawimarta’s Cipta Cakra Murdaya group.

Sudwikatmono and Ciputra were also identified by Indonesian Democracy Advocacy Team member Trimedya Panjaitan as having funded the attack on the PDI headquarters in Jakarta on 27 July 1996. Between them, they contributed Rp1 billion to complement the Rp500 million already given by the military for the hire of some 400 thugs, who were to be paid Rp200 million each (see Aditjondro 2000b).

Suharto’s daughter, Tutut, also founded Yayasan Kesejahteraan Masyarakat Indonesia, the covering organisation for the Tebas Taskforce (Satgas Tebas). Members of this taskforce constituted the private security guards (or Pam Swakarsa) who formed the front line in the fight with the student activists who were opposed to the November 1998 special session of the MPR. Satgas Tebas members were also identified as being present in Ambon, Maluku, during the first wave of the communal violence in January 1999 (Aditjondro 1999). Bambang’s Bimantara group helped fund the activities of a military-linked ‘private soldier’ group known as the ‘Tidar Boys’,17 who operated in Java and Maluku, while Hashim admitted that his Tirtamas group (known overseas as Comexindo) helped finance Kopassus while it was under brother Prabowo’s control. Tommy Suharto allegedly coordinated most of the pro-Suharto rallies in Jakarta after May 1998 while his crony Nurdin Halid financed sectarian violence in Makassar, South Sulawesi.

Suharto also retained a long association with Kostrad’s Yayasan Kesejahteraan Sosial Dharma Putera, which he founded in 1964. Fundraising activities for this group are basically conducted through a holding company, called PT Dharma Kencana Sakti, which holds shares in a number of other companies. In addition, this Kostrad-linked group is also a direct shareholder, in companies such as Mandala Airlines (founded on 17 April 1969, and later sold to Tommy Suharto) and PT Bank Windu Kentjana, founded in 1967. After initial early growth under an erstwhile Suharto crony, Sofyan Wanandi, Kostrad-linked companies foundered until Prabowo’s appointment as head of Kostrad in 1997. Prabowo’s successor at Kostrad, Lieutenant General Djaja Suparman, was identified as having supported the radical Islamic Defender’s Front in Jakarta, which had publicly destroyed bars and nightclubs and was active in Ambon and Central Sulawesi, and the Laskar Jihad, which was deeply involved in the violence that engulfed Maluku and Poso.
The Tri Usaha Bhakti (Truba) conglomerate is predominantly owned by the army’s largest charity, Yayasan Kartika Eka Paksi, which at one time was run by Mayor General Kivlan Zen, who succeeded Prabowo in the job of coordinating the ‘Tidar Boys’ and was accused by President Abdurrahman Wahid of being involved in instigating sectarian violence in Ambon (which Kivlan denied) (Aditjondro 1999). Kivlan was also identified as having been involved in providing logistical support for pro-Jakarta militias in Aceh.

The Yayasan Kartika Eka Paksi is closely involved with Tommy Wintata’s conglomerate, the Artha Graha group, one of the main financial providers for Indonesian generals. Tommy was a close friend and alleged financier of Yorris Raweyai, executive chairman of the pro-Suharto paramilitary organisation, Pemuda Pancasila. At one stage, Tommy Winata was raising funds for Kopassus via a group of forty conglomerates owned by ethnic Chinese businessmen. Links between the TNI and Chinese businessmen date back to the period of the revolution, but were capitalised on in particular by officers such as the then Colonel Suharto, as commander of the Central Java Diponegoro Division during the 1950s, and later, to an even greater extent, by Suharto’s officer corps from the mid-1960s onwards.

In the late 1980s, it was reported that approximately 3,000 ‘clandestine’ Kopassus members without official registration numbers were being funded by Prajogo Pangestu’s Parito Pacific group. These were highly trained troops loyal to Prabowo Subianto, they were based in East Kalimantan, not in Java where the three main Kopassus bases were located – in Jakarta (Cijantung, Kopassus headquarters), West Java (Batujajar) and Central Java (Kandang Menjangan). However, in June 1995 Barito Pacific’s fund-raising activities in Malaysia were forestalled, when its planned share-swapping with a Malaysian conglomerate, CASH (Construction and Supplies Houses) Berhad, at the Kuala Lumpur stock exchange, was rejected by the Malaysian Securities Commission. Since Prajogo had no more cause to fund the unregistered Kopassus members, they were thereafter funded directly by Suharto, through the national budget, under the then commander-in-chief of the armed forces, General Feisal Tanjung.

During the Suharto and Habibie periods, Walubi was the only nationwide Buddhist organisation recognised by the government; among other things, it helped to mobilise support within the ethnic Chinese community for the government party, Golkar. The Cipta Cakra Murdaya (CCM) group (previously the Berca group), a Nike sports shoe producer run by Murdaya Widyawimarta (Poo Tjie Guan) and his wife, Siti Hartati Murdaya, also led Walubi. CCM made its fortune from contracts with the state electricity corporation, Perusahaan Listrik Negara. After President Abdurrahman Wahid rescinded Walubi’s position as the country’s only Buddhist organisation, the Murdayas reportedly aligned themselves with factions in the military that were opposed to Wahid’s presidency.
Defence spending and the defence industry

As a consequence of the cuts to defence spending that began in the first years of the New Order government, by the late 1970s military hardware, particularly Soviet-bloc systems left over from the Sukarno era, were increasingly no longer functional. To counter this, between 1977 and 1982 budget allocations to the defence department doubled in absolute terms, allowing modest upgrades to equipment in all three military services, including the purchase of F5, A420 and F16 aircraft (between 1978 and 1988), second-hand frigates and destroyers, some tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and artillery. However, although there was an absolute increase in funding, because the economy was running strongly at this time (on the back of the oil price boom) the military share of the budget actually declined.

In 1978, the Indonesian government formally encouraged the development of a domestic defence industry to lessen Indonesia’s dependence on foreign manufacturers and to reduce the use of scarce foreign currency reserves on weaponry. Domestic capacity to maintain, repair and produce military equipment was improved, while aircraft and shipbuilding industries were removed from military control and upgraded. These industries produced helicopters, light aircraft, transport aircraft, landing craft, patrol boats and small arms, as well as spare parts for all of these items, mostly under licence from foreign firms and often through deals involving technology transfer and commercial off-set arrangements, such as the PT PAL shipyard agreeing to undertake minor repairs for US Navy warships (FAS 1992).

By the early 1990s, the army’s heavy Soviet-bloc equipment had been replaced by items either produced locally or purchased from Western countries, primarily the US. Because of funding constraints, emphasis was placed on maintenance and the rehabilitation of older equipment, through the aforementioned local companies. The mainstay of the armoured force was the French-built AMX-13 light tank and the AMX-VCI reconditioned armoured personnel carriers, mostly acquired in the late 1970s. The small arms industry supplied most of the military’s small arms requirements, although a substantial number of M-16 rifles purchased from the US in the 1980s and ex-Cambodia AK-47s remained in use. Domestically produced arms included the SS1 rifle, sub-machine guns and machine guns made under licence from Belgium.

Military businesses

Of the following list of businesses (see pp. 217–223) with which the TNI is, or was, involved – a list that indicates the extent of the business reach of its various branches – it should be noted that the identified businesses represent only those that are, or were, directly owned or controlled by the TNI; neither is the list exhaustive, even of officially owned military companies. For example, it does not include the vast array of ‘non-institutional’ military businesses owned or controlled by serving or former military officers. By way of
illustration, the family of the late general Ibnu Sutowo, once a close associate of President Suharto, had ownership of fifty-two separate companies, while Suharto and his family owned or controlled more than a thousand companies, many of which could never be properly traced due to the layers of ownership and control that spread from one company to another. Even the Indonesian government, through its various agencies, has been unable to uncover for legal purposes more than a small proportion of the Suharto family’s wealth – although the few reports of it that have been given tend to substantiate claims made elsewhere that, prior to the collapse of the Indonesian economy, the Suharto family’s fortune (much of which is probably still offshore) was worth something in the order of US$16 billion (Tempo Interaktif 1998b). Michael Backman identified a minimum of 1,251 companies in Indonesia in which, as late as the middle of 1999, Suharto and his family had a direct and significant equity interest, with nineteen of them listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange (Backman 1999). Expatriate Indonesian academic George Aditjondro also listed the Suharto family’s overseas assets, including five homes in Britain, a hunting lodge in New Zealand, five homes in the US, a network of toll roads in Malaysia, the Philippines, China and Burma, logging concessions in Surinam, a fleet of tankers based in Singapore, hotel interests in the Asia-Pacific region, and a luxury cruiser berthed in Darwin (Williams 1998). As Time Magazine noted, the Suharto family’s wealth ‘was built over three decades from a skein of companies, monopolies and control over vast sectors of economic activity in Indonesia…the Suharto family on its own or through corporate entities controls some 3.6 million hectares of real estate in Indonesia, an area larger than Belgium. That includes nearly 40 per cent of the entire province of East Timor’ (Colmey and Liebhold 1999). The same article also noted that soon after Suharto was pushed from power, in June 1998, US$9 billion – money either controlled or owned by Suharto – was moved from Swiss bank accounts to a bank in Austria.

The TNI’s institutional business structure

The following list represents the business structure of the TNI as of 1998. Since this time, a number of these companies have ceased trading (some went into receivership or liquidation as a result of Indonesia’s economic crisis), while others have begun. Nevertheless, it provides a useful indicator of the extent to which the TNI was engaged in legal business activities prior to Indonesia’s economic collapse. It should be noted, however, that the list does not indicate the size or reach of each of the listed companies, nor is it able to include the ‘grey’ companies that are owned or operated by or on behalf of members of the TNI and their families. Needless to say, it also does not include any of the ‘black’ or illegal business activities with which the TNI was or continues to be involved. (Note: PT, or Persoan Terbatas, translates as ‘Incorporated’, or ‘Limited’.)
Among other financial activities, the business interests of one of the army’s two elite units, Kostrad, included a film company, an airline and the Volkswagen assembly franchise. The companies it owns are listed below:

**HOLDING COMPANIES**
- Yayasan Darma Putra Kostrad
- Pakarti Yoga

**TRADING COMPANIES**
- Astra Basic Industries
- Dharma Kencana Sakti
- Federal Dinamika Lestari
- Marga Bharata
- Santi Yoga

**FORESTRY**
- Hela Nusantara Cemerlang
- Pakarti Wanayoga

**FOOD AND BEVERAGES**
- Tirta Mukti Indah Bottling Co.

**CHEMICALS**
- Aica Indonesia

**METAL PRODUCTS**
- Federal Motor
- Pakarti Jaya
- Pakarti Riken Indonesia
- Yuasa Battery Indonesia

**OTHER INDUSTRY**
- Tokai Dharma Indonesia

**CONSTRUCTION**
- Wira Karya Yoga

**INDUSTRIAL REAL ESTATE**
- Dharma Karya Persada
- Pakarti Tata
- Pen Asia Expres Lines

**FINANCE**
- Asuransi Beringin Sejahtera
• Asuransi Wahana Tata
• Indosuez Indonesia Bank

Kopassus
• Yayasan Kobame
• Kobame Kopertindo, PT (Graha Cijantung in cooperation with PT Graha Haji Masagung)
• KMP Tribuana (Selat Sunda Straights ferry, transportation between Java and Kalimantan)
• HPH
• Distribution of methanol from the state-owned oil company Pertamina

TNI headquarters
• Yayasan Mabes ABRI (Yamabri)
• Yamabri Dwibakti, PT Utama (Pandaan–Malang toll road project)
• Balai Sudirman, Tebet, Jakarta Selatan
• PT Primasel (joint venture between Yamabri and PT Inti, Indosat and Primkopparpostel)
• PT Manunggal Air Service
• Internet Services Provider (joint venture with PT Elang Mahkota dll)

Department of defence

HOLDING COMPANIES
• Yayasan Surdiman
• Yayasan Satrya Bhakti Pertiwi
• Bank Yudha Bhakti
• Asabri
• Yayasan Sudirman
• Yayasan Maju Kerja

TRANSPORT
• Yamatran, PT

FISHERIES
• Mina Jaya, PT

FORESTRY
• Undagi Wana Lestari, PT
• Yayasan Maju Keraja, PT
Army

HOLDING COMPANIES

- Yayasan Kartika Eka Paksi
- Tri Usaha Bhakti
- Primkopad – various types of businesses across Indonesia
- Inkopad – various types of businesses across Indonesia
- Kartika Plaza Hotel
- Orchid Palace Hotel
- Duta Kartika Kencana Tours & Travel
- Kartika Aneka Usaha (general trading)
- Kartika Buana Niaga (export–import)
- Duta Kartika Cargo Service
- Kartika Cipta Sarana (construction)
- Mina Kartika Samudera (fishery)
- Rimba Kartika Jaya (timber)
- Mitra Kartika Sejati (shrimp)
- Kartika Inti Perkasa (holding company)
- Kartika Summa (holding company)
- Mahkota Transindo Indah (holding company)

AIR SERVICES

- Aerokarto Indonesia, PT
- Aerotografia Pratama, PT
- Indomas Pratamacitra, PT
- Mandala Dirgantara, PT

FINANCE

- Asiagraha Securindo, PT
- Asuransi Cigna Indonesia, PT
- Private Development Finance Co.
- Bank Artha Graha, PT
- Bank PDCFI, PT
- Danayasa Arthatama, PT

METAL PRODUCTS

- Cilegon Fabricators, PT
- Purna Sadhana, PT
- Sakai Sakti, PT
- Truba Gatra Perkasa, PT

TRADENG

- Bakti Wira Husada, PT
- Kartika Paksi Perkasa, PT
- Prasada Samya Mukti, PT
The political economy of the TNI

- Sinkona Indonesia Lestari, PT
- Kultujaya Tri Usaha, PT
- Lukita Wahanasari, PT

PLANTATION
- Indotruba Barat, PT
- Indotruba Tengah, PT
- Indotruba Timur, PT

FISHERIES
- Karko Kultura Utama
- Minamulia Djaya Bhakti

FORESTRY
- International Timber Group, PT
- Sumber Mas Timber, PT
- Sumber Mas Indonesia, PT
- Taliabu Lina Timber, PT

WOOD
- Kayan River Indah Timber Plywood, PT
- Kayan River Timber Product, PT
- Meranti Sakti Indah Plywood, PT
- Panca Usaha Palopo Plywood, PT
- International Timber Corp. Indonesia (ITCI), PT

MANUFACTURING
- Truba Anugerah Elektronik, PT
- Truba Gatra Perkasa, PT
- Truba Sadaya Industri, PT

MINING
- Truba Sandaya Industry, PT

TEXTILES
- Truba Raya Trading

PHARMACEUTICAL
- Sinkoma Indonesia Lestari, PT

CONSTRUCTION
- Truba Daya Konstruksi, PT
- Truba Jatipurna Eng.
- Truba Jurong Eng., PT
- Truba Jurong Eng. Pte., Ltd
INDUSTRIAL REAL ESTATE
• Truba Inti Development, PT
• Pondok Indah Padang Golf, PT

TRANSPORTATION
• Sempati Air, PT

EDUCATION
• Universitas Ahmad Yani, Bandung

Navy
• Inkopal – chemical business based in Surabaya
• Primkopal – various types of businesses across Indonesia

HOOLDING COMPANIES
• Yasayan Bhumyamca
• Admiral Lines
• Trisila Laut
• Jasa Bhakti Yasbhum
• Sekolah-sekolah Hang Tuah
• Bhumiymacca Film
• Karimun Kecil (oil)

BANKING AND FINANCE
• Bank Bahari
• Pelayanan Nusantara Bahari Finance

TOURISM/RESORTS
• Bintan Beach International Resort
• Pulau Bayan Marina Club
• Marintour Ina

TRADING
• Yala Gada, PT
• Yala Trade
• Yala Trading (suku cadang)

FOOD AND BEVERAGES
• Yala Ladang Kurnia

FORESTRY
• Sangkuliang
WOOD

• Sangkuliang Bhakti

CONSTRUCTION

• Samudera Gunadharma
• Yala Nautika
• Yala Perkasa International
• Yala Persada Angkasa

PROPERTY (OFFICES/SHOPPING CENTRE)

• Bhumiyamca Sekawan

TRANSPORTATION

• Adhini Barna Lines
• Jasa Transportasi Yala Githa
• PBM Adhi Gunung Persada
• PBM Bintang Upaya Samudera

Air force

• Inkopau – various types of businesses across the whole of Indonesia
• Primkopau – various types of businesses across the whole of Indonesia

HOLDING COMPANIES

• Yayasan Adi Upaya
• Bank Angkasa
• Aerokarto Indonesia
• Dirgantara Air Service (cargo)
• Angkasa Pura (airport construction)
• Cardig (cargo ground handling)
• Mediarona Dirgantara, PT (penerbitan)
• Kreshna Puri Dirgantara, PT (telecommunications, general trading)
• Konstruksi Dirgantara, PT (engineering)
• forestry

Police

• Inkoppol
• Primkoppol
• Yayasan Bhayangkara
• Yayasan Brata Bhakti
• Tansa Trisna, PT (general trading, timber, chemistry, shrimps)
The TNI without business?

Resolving the issue of the gap between the TNI’s spending and its on-line budget is widely regarded as critical to the reform of the TNI, in terms of removing officers and troops from unofficial and corrupt activities, removing the capacity for private profiteering, and breaking the nexus between the economic well-being of the TNI’s business interests and the management of the state. The International Crisis Group (ICG) outlined three options for resolving the TNI’s budget gap. They included cutting the size of the TNI to fit the budget, increasing the budget to fit the TNI, or something in between combined with efficiency measures. As the ICG noted, the first option would mean that Indonesia would be unable to confront separatist and communal conflict and hence be unable to maintain the unity of the state. It might also create the problems of unemployed former soldiers having to seek alternative sources of income (or indeed sources related to illegal activities) and the capacity that would have to further generate instability. The second option ‘would be a waste of money because of endemic corruption and inefficiency’, and would exceed the state budget’s existing capacity to support such budget increases without external support. The ICG also suggested that the TNI should assist this process by selling ‘some of its large land holdings scattered all over Indonesia, including in the major cities’ (ICG 2001: 12–13).

A significant question mark hangs over the TNI’s ability to conceivably function without its extensive business interests and other sources of off-budget income. Almost certainly it would be unable to survive in anything like its existing form. However, given that the TNI’s current form is so problematic, this does not seem to be an impediment to separating the TNI from off-budget sources of income. Indeed, one option for the TNI is for it to reduce itself to a core ‘professional’ presence – professional in the real sense of the word, as in disciplined, ordered and under civilian control – and to allow its internal security functions to be taken over by a retrained national police and overseen by a functioning, non-corrupt judiciary working with clear and equitable laws.
But the basic problem lies only in part with the TNI and its business activities. According to its own logic, a state of Indonesia’s size and fragmented nature requires an internally active military, yet the state cannot afford such a military and hence it must have its own off-budget sources of income. Off-budget sources of income almost by definition, and especially within Indonesia’s historical context, lead to corruption and illegal activities. The problem, then, comes back to the nature of the Indonesian state. But assuming that the state does have some internal legitimacy and logic, it should not require an organisation like the TNI to sustain it. Perhaps the equitable and consistent rule of law and a genuine distribution of the fruits of development, if and when they return after they were so mindlessly squandered, would ensure a degree of state cohesion. But to suggest that cohesion can be legitimised at the point of a gun, or that to express concern over the way in which the state is constructed or operates makes one somehow a lesser person (as the TNI says it does of people who ‘lose’ their ‘nationalist spirit’), is illogical.

But regardless of the logic, or lack thereof, of state construction, and to some extent even regardless of the related logic of the TNI, the TNI’s role in business, ‘grey’ income generation and criminal activities is overwhelmingly more of a problem for the state than it is a benefit. Not only does it institutionalise corruption and crime, and subvert legitimate business activities that might otherwise aid development, it institutionalises a structure that provides a self-referential logic that no longer requires the security of the state as its justification. The TNI is in business to support itself, and, as a result, its officers grow relatively wealthy, sometimes extremely so. The TNI may argue that it must engage in business to survive, but from an external perspective it looks very much more to be the case that the TNI must continue to secure for itself a major role in the running of the state, by perpetrating the problems of the state, in order to stay in business.
Dawn broke on the mountainside to the calls of birds and monkeys in the upper canopy. The ‘boys’ rose slowly, took up their weapons and wandered down to the stream to wash. We later organised ourselves and trekked down along the overgrown track, across gullies, over fences and across a river, coming up to a dirt road along which a dozen or so schoolgirls in neat uniforms were walking. The schoolgirls smiled and seemed unconcerned by this gang of long-haired guerrillas carrying automatic weapons. Here the guerrilla movement and the people are one and the same. The night had passed safely; the paramilitary Brimob patrol had not found us.

In Aceh, on the north-western tip of Indonesia, some 30,000 or so Indonesian soldiers and paramilitary Brimob police have instilled in the people fear, anger and an overwhelming desire for a referendum on self-determination. To date, the Indonesian government has refused, instead using violence to quell separatist claims. One cannot help but be struck by the similarities of Aceh’s situation to East Timor ahead of its own referendum in 1999. As was the case in East Timor, the TNI and Brimob have looked and acted like an invading army, killing civilians and feebly trying to blame the separatists, burning homes and schools and using rape as a weapon of intimidation and punishment. Also, desire for independence is very strong across a range of groups and organisations, and the country has a historical claim to separation (partially recognised in Aceh’s ‘special region’ and more recently ‘special autonomy’ status) and a long history of rebellion against outsiders, starting in 1873 and only pausing in 1949 and then again between 1963 and 1976. The movement started in 1976 is popularly known as the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka – GAM), but prefers to be called by its official name, the Aceh–Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF).¹

Aceh’s struggle for sovereignty began in 1873 when, in an arrangement to divide the remainder of the archipelago, the UK removed its objection to the Netherlands incorporating the wealthy sultanate into its East Indies empire. After more than thirty years of fighting and the loss of innumerable lives, many thousands of them Dutch, the colonial forces managed to capture the capital, Banda Aceh. But the resistance simply moved to the villages, jungles and mountains. Acehnese were still fighting the Dutch when
Japan invaded in 1942, providing the Acehnese with a new enemy. The old men said that the Japanese were little problem and, when they left in 1945, the Dutch, preoccupied with the revolution for Indonesian independence, did not return to this most difficult of its claimed territories.

Pressing their claim against the Dutch, the Acehnese under Daud Beureuh supported the revolution, even buying the fledgling state its first aircraft, a DC3, upon which was eventually based the national airline, Garuda. But the Acehnese idea of independence was, at best, independence within a loose confederation of states, and they were deeply upset when, in 1950, the government in Jakarta unilaterally announced the abandonment of the federalist constitution in favour of a unitary state based on Java and centred on Jakarta.

Making common cause with Muslims in West Java and South Sulawesi, the Acehnese joined in with the Dar’ul Islam rebellion against Jakarta. The rebellion has been portrayed by many historians as an attempt to change the nature of the state, not to secede from the state itself. Yet the Acehnese operated quite independently within the rebellion and, from 1950 until 1963, they claim their goal had been to secede. But with the collapse of the Dar’ul Islam rebellion in West Java in 1963, Aceh made a separate peace, achieving ‘special region’ status under which it intended to achieve most of its separatist claims. According to a senior GAM official in Banda Aceh, many good men had already died and they hoped that they had achieved an honourable peace. But as other regions had learned, deals reached with the government in Jakarta were usually worthless. Over the following years resentment built anew, as outsiders gradually exploited the region’s rich natural resources, marginalising the Acehnese, and another generation girded itself for a war of independence. In 1976, ASNLF, under the leadership of Hasan di Tiro, launched this new war for independence.

Since 1976, the war has undergone three distinct stages: 1976–89, during which the rebellion was at a relatively low ebb; the Military Operations Area (Daerah Operasi Militer – DOM) or ‘total war’ period from 1989–98, which came close to crushing the resistance; and the period after 1998 and in particular from 1999 when GAM increased its activity and the TNI similarly increased its activity. Methods used by the military to crush the resistance were based on US experience in Vietnam. Under DOM, at least 10,000 were killed. Rape and torture became tools of punishment, homes were burned and the Acehnese became the enemy in their own land. By 1998, after ten years of DOM fighting, the government in Jakarta was confident that it had won. Riding a wave of ‘reform’ and ‘democratisation’ in Indonesia, the DOM was ended. The supposed ‘civilianisation’ of the conflict in Aceh had begun. Yet the fall of Suharto and the bitter-sweet success of East Timor’s referendum for independence the following year spurred GAM on with a renewed energy. GAM stopped the 1999 elections taking place in most of Aceh, and over the next two years extended their control from two or three districts to most of the province.
From the experience of the author, the TNI and Brimob in Banda Aceh and the major industrial city of Lhokseumawe were conspicuous, but it was the highway which ran from Banda Aceh to close to the North Sumatra border that revealed their real presence. North of Lhokseumawe the military presence was predominantly that of the paramilitary Brimob, such as the signposted ‘Hunter’ (pursuit) companies, followed by the Siliwangi Division and the marines. South of Lhokseumawe the presence was more in the order of the marines, Brimob, Territorial troops and the Siliwangi Division. South of Lhokseumawe the many military posts and roadblocks were as frequent as every several hundred metres for dozens of kilometres – the range of their weapons. Burned homes were littered in between. Yet just a short distance from the highway one immediately found oneself in ASNLF-held territory.

A conservative estimate would put the ASNLF’s military force at 3,000–4,000 full-time members (they claimed 6,000) and more than 10,000 armed part-timers, plus a large network of active supports. Like any other guerrilla force, the ASNLF relies on popular support. Moving from point to point near the important industrial city of Lhokseumawe, I met no one who was not as one with the ASNLF. A local ASNLF leader in the region said that the organisation was inseparable from the people; it could not otherwise function, he said. From what the author saw in this area, there was indeed nothing to separate the two. The ASNLF received fulsome and open support wherever they went; there was a high level of not just recognition but fervent support of and sympathy with their cause; and there was a high level of enthusiastic cooperation with and respect for the rebel fighters. Perhaps there were some, or even many, who did not support the ASNLF, and quite probably it would have been unwise to show such lack of sympathy. But based on the author’s similar experiences elsewhere, there did seem to be a genuinely high level of support for the rebels, an observation that has since been confirmed by others the author has been in touch with who have also visited the field.

In its claims to the wider world, the ASNLF has been portrayed by the Indonesian government as a fanatical Islamic organisation, in particular from July 2002 as a ‘terrorist’ organisation under the terms of the US-led ‘war on terrorism’. While the ASNLF and its supporters may be identified by their devout Islamic beliefs, another cultural marker, and one that sets them apart from others in the archipelago, is their language, which is a Malay dialect. Language, religion, territory and a common history, especially in adversity, are the classical markers of ‘nation’. And there is no doubt that Aceh has such markers, overwhelmingly so, to distinguish it from the rest of Indonesia. Aceh is sometimes referred to as ‘Mecca’s verandah’. But although they are a devout people, the religion they practise is a surprisingly tolerant form of Sufi-influenced or quasi-mystical Islam. For example, in 1998, when some other Indonesian Muslims were raping ethnic Chinese women and burning churches and Chinese Christian homes, there was no such violence in Aceh. The ethnic Chinese and Christian Bataks live side by
One ASNLF official I spoke to in Banda Aceh was keen to state that his organisation did not want to impose itself on the people of Aceh. What it wanted, he said, was a popular referendum to determine whether or not Aceh should remain as a part of Indonesia. The idea of holding a referendum was graffitied all around Banda Aceh and in Lhokseumawe. Of the Acehnese organisations I contacted, all were unanimous in wanting a referendum.

The ASNLF official stressed that although Aceh did have historical and religious links with other Islamic communities, it was not funded or supported by them. However, according to an ASNLF official, soldiers from the organisation had earlier received training from Libya, although the ASNLF had broken off such links many years beforehand. The ending of the Libyan training came because it was no longer necessary – the ASNLF established its own training bases in the north – and because the ASNLF was concerned that Libya might have an agenda other than Aceh’s independence. Indeed, he was at pains to point out that the ASNLF was horrified by the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in New York and against the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, even though the attackers were allegedly Islamic extremists. According to the ASNLF official, his organisation looked to the rest of the international community for support, including to the countries with which it once had direct diplomatic relations, the UK and the US.

Apart from language, religion, territory and history, what the ASNLF has is organisation. It has its own government, with ministers responsible for specific areas, and, importantly, it raises ‘taxes’. All local businesses pay a tax to the ASNLF, as a percentage of profits, up to and including the giant Exxon-Mobil-operated Arun liquid natural gas plant near Lhokseumawe. On one occasion the Arun plant had been closed down by the ASNLF for refusing to pay its taxes and, at one stage, two of its American employees were killed. But the management of the plant and the ASNLF had come to an ‘understanding’, despite the massive military presence around the plant, and it too now paid taxes. Because of its ability to raise such income, the ASNLF is well funded and, consequently, well equipped.

The ASNLF’s high level of organisation also manifests itself in other ways. In meeting a regional ASNLF commander, the network of drop-offs, pick-ups and exchanges that I experienced was extraordinary, complicated and perfectly timed. Everyone along the route knew what was going on, and many had late-model two-way radios. I was finally deposited in a small and remote village and told to wait on a timber pavilion under a palm-thatched roof. I had only just begun to remove my small backpack when, through a bamboo gate, a young man appeared wearing a baseball cap and a clean white T-shirt over which was black military webbing containing clips of ammunition. In his belt was a pistol and in his left hand an AK-47 assault
He held out his right hand to me and said: ‘Hello, I am Jamaika,’ indicating his code-name. Behind him followed seven or eight young men similarly dressed, carrying AK-47s and M-16s.

Jamaika beckoned me onto the pavilion as more young men emerged out of the undergrowth. Jamaika and I sat in the middle of the platform, his pistol between us, and the other young men, twenty or so in all, sat around us, their weapons clattering on the wooden floor. A small sticker of the ASNLF’s flag, red-banded with a star and crescent, was stuck to the pistol and on the carriages of the automatic rifles, and many were also festooned with small red ribbons at the tips of the barrels.

We talked about war and politics, then and much later that night. Jamaika wanted Hasan di Tiro to return as Aceh’s sultan, but within a political system that included elected parties. We discussed the UK’s constitutional monarchy, and that of Thailand, which he thought were suitable models. Others I spoke to said they wanted an elected US-style executive president and separate legislature, although with Islamic ethics, and within a local federalist system. The notion of a referendum on self-determination led logically to a discussion of a vote for representative government, and of what policies should be followed. Jamaika, the local guerrilla leader, did not want to see one repressive system replaced by another. Here, again, were similarities to the situation in East Timor.

I was introduced to ‘Grandfather’, who was in his 70s. Grandfather had been fighting since the early 1950s as, he said, had his father before him. Even though he was too old to fight, Grandfather was enthusiastic. He later led Jamaika, myself and a group of the ‘boys’ into the jungle to hide overnight from a Brimob ‘Hunter’ patrol. I later met other old men, drinking sweet tea in the half-light of an open-fronted light-blue shop, by the intersection of a small town. The town was mostly deserted. But some of the boys sat drinking black coffee and tea with ice, their radios crackling with intermittent traffic, exchanging banter with the old men. With guards posted at intervals and bombs set on three of the four roads in and out of town, it was as safe as it could be anywhere else in Aceh. In the past the army and Brimob had come, but each time they had been beaten back, which was why none of the buildings here had been burned.

So these other old men were also happy, knowing that their fight against the invaders was being carried forward by the next generation, as they had done for the generation before them, and as had the generation before that, and even before that. A 10-year-old boy stood nearby, self-consciously part of this group of hardened men. His father had been shot by Brimob a few days previously, and died soon after. This boy was already the next generation of the struggle, waiting his turn.

Soldiers and paramilitary police had been given the task of suppressing the separatist rebellion and, by so doing, of maintaining the unity of the state. They had already killed thousands, terrorised many more and had burned
numerous homes and schools, evidence of which was easy to find. But they had failed to win the hearts and minds of the people here and, as a consequence of what may only be called a deeply ingrained culture of violence, probably would not. What they had instilled among the local people, perhaps to the exclusion of all else, was fear and anger. Yet without their presence, another part of the state would break away, and the archipelago might start to fragment. This, then, was the role of Indonesia’s military as the binding agent of the state. It was a role that was, at best, only partly successful.

In an address made at an army parade by President Megawati Sukarnoputri on 29 December 2001, she told the audience that ‘it was their duty to do everything to hold the country together. They should not hold back out of a fear they might be violating human rights, as long as they acted within the law and upheld the soldiers oath’ (Tapol 1999b). On 7 February 2002, two days after re-establishing the Iskandar Muda Military Command in Aceh, the Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, said that ‘any separatist movement must be crushed, and we have the international support to maintain our national territorial integrity’. These comments legitimised a new wave of military violence in Aceh, although one might argue that there had been no break from the record level of violence of the previous year. In July 2002, the Indonesian government gave the TNI a free rein in its attack on the ASNLF. Just days after this announcement, another mass grave of non-combatant Acehnese was discovered, just thirty-five metres from the command post, formerly occupied by Batallion 123, at the Exxon-Mobil Arun plant, about twenty-five kilometres south-east of Lhokseumawe.

A brief comparison

As part of an attempt to understand the continuation of basically the same policy by the TNI in two different parts of Indonesia, the following is a brief comparison between Aceh and East Timor. The primary difference between the two is that Aceh, from the beginning of 2002, was constituted as a separate military command area, Kodam I Iskandar Muda. This move gave Aceh its own distinct and complete military organisation, equivalent to a Territorial division, and answerable only to the most senior levels of the TNI staff in Jakarta. By comparison, East Timor (Korem 164) was a part of Kodam IX Udayana, based in Denpasar, Bali, which had responsibility for the whole of Nusa Tenggara (the south-eastern islands).

By the middle of 2002, about 32,000 militarised personnel had been posted to Aceh (see Figure 3.1 on p. 71), approximately 12,000 of whom were Brimob forces. Although Brimob had been technically separated from the TNI in 1999, to ‘civilianise’ conflict situations, it operated in Aceh (and Papua) under the same line of command and control as the TNI, used the same weapons, had the same training programme and operational proce-
dures, and, for the purposes of this exercise, was essentially a part of the armed forces. By comparison, East Timor in 1999 had approximately 18,000 militarised personnel and Brimob operated as a separate force, with a separate line of command and control; its explicit function (and in particular that of Kontinjen Lorosai) was to prevent violence, although it largely failed to do this and occasionally even participated in such violence. There were no Brimob ‘Hunter’ companies in East Timor, as there were in Aceh.

The TNI in both Aceh and East Timor were drawn from all three military services, including Territorial battalions, the highly trained Kostrad, the marines and Kopassus, the special forces. Kopassus operated in both places officially and unofficially, including through its clandestine Group IV. Its primary function was, and remains, to kidnap and assassinate politically active civilians (see Figure 3.8 on p. 100), to organise and lead militias, and to conduct specific precision attacks. A small number of non-accountable ‘freelance’ agents (milsus), usually ex-Kopassus Group IV personnel, also operated in each environment, and were involved in kidnappings, assassinations, and militia training and leadership.

In 1999, East Timor had about 13,000 (East and West Timorese and other islander) militiamen operating under TNI instruction. Aceh had about 10,000 (predominantly ethnic Javanese) militiamen, located primarily in the central lake district (see figure 3.10 on p. 107), and who were also operating under TNI instruction. The East Timor militias were armed over a period of about nine months, and were only fully properly armed by August 1999. In Aceh, the militia used predominantly standard TNI-issue SS1 automatic assault weapons.

By way of comparison, Aceh was by far the more militarised environment of the two. A similar level of violence existed in both Aceh and East Timor in the latter’s post-ballot period, when recent violence was at its greatest. More accurately, however, Aceh may be better compared with East Timor as it was in the early 1980s, when the territory was still an active war zone with a ‘free fire’ policy. At that time, East Timor witnessed tens of thousands of deaths. Deaths in Aceh were at a somewhat lower level, due in part to different strategies of relocation, the relative adequacy of food and the capacity of the resistance. However, the policy of killing significant numbers of people, often a section of a whole village – in Aceh’s case, on suspicion of supporting the Free Aceh Movement – was the same. Similarly, the policy (and methods) of interrogating and then killing prisoners was the same in Aceh as it had been earlier in East Timor. The murder of moderate Acehnese leaders by the TNI also had the dual impact of removing a civil independence movement – one that could potentially reach a compromise with the Indonesian government – from the equation, while radicalising those Acehnese who had not previously taken a definitive position on independence. Widespread repression and terror were common to both East Timor and Aceh, and in both places people might be, and were, killed on the slightest of pretexts.
The situation was only a little different in West Papua, where the indigenous Melanesians were regarded by many Indonesians, especially those from Jakarta, with a deep racist contempt that seemed to make killing them so much easier. According to lawyer John Garnaut, the murder of Theys Eluay was another example of a ‘collective blindness that afflicts Indonesia’s security forces and sections of Jakarta’s political elites’. Garnaut noted that the West Papuan movement for independence had evolved since its earlier days as a purely military opposition, and more recently had developed as a widespread civic movement. Consequently, he observed, conventional anti-guerrilla responses were inappropriate and simply would not work against this different type of independence movement (Garnaut n.d.).

Yet the TNI seemed incapable of responding in any other way. It is interesting to note that the West Papua (Trikora) commander, Major General Mahidin Simbolen, had been identified as one of the military officers most closely associated with the establishment and development of East Timor’s militias ahead of its 1999 referendum.7 ‘Contrary to dominant views in Jakarta, indigenous Papuans are close to unanimous in their aspirations for independence. Papuan aspirations and Indonesian sovereignty can not be reconciled whilst Papua continues to be ruled like a military franchise’ (Garnaut n.d.).

The self-fulfilling prophecy

Understanding what sort of organisation the TNI is, or is in the process of becoming, is complex and in significant part influenced by competing factors. A generous interpretation of the TNI based on the TNI’s rhetoric about its intentions presupposes acceptance of a world-view in which Indonesian civil society continues to show that it is unable to function cohesively and without internecine strife from extremist political and religious groups and from ethnic and regional groups. A less generous interpretation is based on the TNI’s history of political interference and its lack of political awareness, its responsibility for vast human rights abuses, the self-serving nature of its embeddedness in the state and the economy, and its commitment to the preservation of ideas that do not adequately reflect the aspirations of a very large majority of Indonesia’s population. In all of this, as was noted towards the beginning of this book, one may identify the individual cases of where and how the TNI has acted, but it is more useful to look for patterns in this action. Not only do such patterns clearly reflect recurring themes, they also provide some insight into how the TNI is likely to act in the future.

There is no doubt that the TNI (and its predecessor organisations) has undergone a process of change, one which began in the early 1960s, ran throughout the period of the New Order government, and which has continued since then. But this change does not appear to have been fundamental in any sense, being rather a part of an evolutionary process,
brought about by its responses to a powerfully driven but in many ways also powerfully constrained political climate. Indonesia under Suharto pushed ahead with a very particular vision for the state and, although in a declining sense, the role of the armed forces was defined within that. In the period after Suharto, the military was in part driven by internal considerations and in part by the need to respond to external pressures, and looked as though it was about to substantially evolve again. However, the fragility of the state, the revival of weak but conservative elite politics along with the end of reformasi, and the reassertion of control by the conservative wing of the army have all contributed to the armed forces occupying a role in the state that, if not as overwhelming as it was under the early years of Suharto, is in some senses more powerful because it is not so closely tied to the favour of the president. The long sought-after ‘professionalisation’ of the TNI and the political independence this has delivered means that while the military is in one sense not as directly powerful as it was when one of its own was president, it has developed a new type of power by only becoming close to politicians on its own terms. It is, in this sense, much less open to the political divisiveness that characterised it during the later New Order period, and much more independent in its self-defined spheres of interest.

…the more they stay the same

Despite the claim that the TNI had begun to reform, in early 2001 the then deputy chairman of the TNI group in the DPR, Lieutenant General Hari Sarbono, expressed the commonly held view that the TNI was the guardian and escort of the country’s constitution, and that the army would ‘defend to the death’ the state ideology of Pancasila, and the unity and unitary structure of the state (ICG 2001: 2). This view, expressed at a time when the TNI was meant to be well down the path of reform, indicated that there were areas of the TNI’s self-proclaimed political responsibility that were non-negotiable. These areas were the bedrock of the Indonesian political system, a system agreed to and in large part defined by the TNI itself. In August 2001, Sarbono was appointed Minister for Home Affairs in Megawati’s new Cabinet, helping to strengthen the notion that while TNI representation in the Cabinet and hence in direct politics might not have been at early New-Order levels, there continued to be a strong, conservative and growing military influence.

Since the inception of the armed forces, there has been a distinct lack of clarity about the extent of civil authority over it. Although the TNI nominally regards itself as answerable to the president, this duty has been breached as often as the TNI has thought it necessary. In the post-Suharto era, TNI opposition to the referendum in East Timor in 1999 and a refusal to enact a declaration of emergency in mid-2001 were cases in point, as was the failure of President Wahid to dismiss the chief of the national police.
Similarly, the defence minister continued to act without any executive authority over the TNI, while the commander-in-chief of the TNI, and later the (ex-military) head of BIN, had ex officio cabinet status. This created problems not only with policy coordination but also with determining exactly who was responsible for and had authority over the TNI. The theoretical linking of the TNI to direct presidential control was certainly problematic when the president enjoyed military support and chose to abuse that support by using the TNI in ways that would otherwise be considered illegal. Similarly, direct presidential control was also problematic when the president was unable to exercise a restraining influence over the TNI, as was said to have been the case with events in East Timor in 1999 and which appeared to have been the case when six warships (five more than were agreed to) entered East Timorese waters on the day of East Timor’s independence in 2002, when President Megawati was on stage with East Timorese President Xanana Gusmao.

However, during the euphoric wave of ‘reformist’ sentiment that swept Indonesia in the wake of the resignation of President Suharto, the TNI did voluntarily reduce it’s representation in the DPR to 38 seats for the elections of June 1999. The TNI was to remove itself in 2004 from the DPR, stepping away from its minor legislative function, and from the MPR, which chooses the president, it said, in 2004. This was intended to be a concrete step along the path of its total removal from politics. The reforms of 1999 in particular did make substantive changes to how Indonesia operated, in particular in opening up the space available to civil society. Yet by 2001 it appeared that the reform process had stalled, and probably stopped, and that a conservative reaction was underway.

If the reform movement had come to a standstill, or had been reversed, in Indonesia’s more general political society, then it had certainly come to a halt within the TNI, as was noted in Chapter 4, with the ascendancy of the conservative ‘professional’ faction that was able to trace its lineage back through Generals Wiranto, Try Sutrisno, Edi Sudrajat and Benny Murdani. The end of the reform process in the TNI may be identified most clearly in its role during the presidential crisis of 2001. In February 2001 it voted in favour of the first DPR memorandum giving President Abdurrahman Wahid three months in which to address its complaints about his rule. This move, by both the civilian members of the DPR and the TNI, prompted riots in East Java – the president’s heartland – that troops were unable (or unwilling) to contain. Given that this was an overtly political step on the part of the TNI, there was some internal dissent about the appropriateness of such action (especially given that it breached a promise made in April 1999 to remain non-partisan). Consequently, the TNI’s remaining lead reformer, Lieutenant Agus Widjojo, said that the conflict between the TNI’s promise to remain non-partisan and its active involvement in implicitly partisan politics signalled that it was then a good time for the TNI to withdraw from the DPR
(Forum Keadilan 2001: 16). However, by this stage, Widjojo was in a self-acknowledged minority position within the TNI (September 2001: personal communication), and his call was ignored by the majority.

The TNI decided to formally abstain from voting on the second memorandum, to call to account Abdurrahman Wahid, although there was some internal dissent over the decision (ICG 2001: 3). This tactical manoeuvre allowed the TNI to be seen to have placed itself ‘above’ politics, even though it was well aware that the memorandum would be overwhelmingly passed in any case. Capitalising on this display of newly found political purity, the TNI then announced that it would not support the president’s threat to declare a state of emergency, in response to what was looking like a constitutional coup. By announcing that it was refusing to follow the president’s overtly political orders it was refusing to be a political tool. Yet the decision to refuse presidential orders was also itself a deeply political decision, both because it rejected a legitimate (although controversial) presidential decision and, more importantly, because according to majority popular opinion it presented the TNI as being ‘non-political’ which, conversely, strengthened its political legitimacy.

The group that dominated the TNI at this time was the ‘conservative professionals’. They could no longer be called a ‘faction’ as there was no effective alternative group remaining within the TNI. This group’s ability to trace its roots back to the ‘professional’ officers of the early 1970s and late 1960s (and to the early 1950s if one looked closely enough) was what had separated it from Suharto’s direct patrimonialism. And although it had a close association with President Megawati Sukarnoputri, it was a relationship established on its own terms and not on those dictated by the president. When Megawati’s predecessor, Abdurrahman Wahid, had attempted to assert his authority over the TNI, it quickly moved to undermine his authority. Such rejection of presidential control had something of a history to it. While the ‘professional’ group had been uncomfortable being a pawn of Suharto, and acknowledged that there should be a separation between the presidency and the TNI, this was more to remove presidential control of the TNI than it was to limit TNI political influence. By 2001, the prevailing TNI view had become that day-to-day government policy was the preserve of the government executive, but that the context within which the state operated remained the preserve of the TNI. Hence, when Lieutenant General Hari Sarbono said that the TNI would ‘defend to the death’ the Pancasila and the united and unitary state, he was in effect announcing that the ‘nationalist’ claim to the structure and therefore basic operation of the state was the sole preserve of the TNI. At a time when the troubles of the state, and a new era of relative openness, had inspired some people to consider the legitimacy of alternative models of the state, the TNI announced that no such alternatives would be countenanced and that the TNI alone was the final arbiter on such matters.
The military’s self-defined role as guardian of the state, and all that such a claim represented, was most clearly defined in 1958, with the attack on the PRRI–Permesta rebels without the approval of the president. It was this act, and Nasution’s defining of the military’s ‘middle way’, later reconfigured as the ‘dual function’, that crystallised the previously ambiguous role of the military in the state. Once the military had defined for itself its role as partner in the running of the state, and had ensured a largely independent source of income allowing it to act as such, its effective refusal to prosecute the Confrontation (Konfrontasi) over Malaysia and, more importantly, its move to directly take over the running of the state between late 1965 and early 1966, were little more than logical outcomes. Similarly, when Suharto’s personalisation of power began to run contrary to military organisational ethics from early on in his rule, it was in keeping that the military – at this time, ironically, the section most closely aligned with Suharto – began to plan and put into effect the subversion and covert invasion of Portuguese Timor, the consequence of which was to push the fledgling government of the territory into unilaterally declaring independence and thus precipitating a full-scale Indonesian military invasion. This plan was developed and initially undertaken without the knowledge of all senior military officers at the time, and was only communicated to them once the operation had begun.

Indonesia denied its direct involvement in destabilising and then attacking Portuguese Timor, but this denial was a fallacy. The initial cross-border attacks of Operation Komodo, to try to covertly overthrow the Fretilin government established in power at that time, had been organised by Opsus chief Ali Murtopo. This strategy, however, ran into unexpectedly stiff resistance and consequently failed, which was seen by Murtopo’s protégé Benny Murdani, as unsatisfactory. Murdani then unilaterally decided to covertly deploy ‘volunteers’ in Portuguese Timor, led by close Murdani associate Dading Kabualdi, in order ‘to stimulate local fighting spirit’ (Pour 1993: 324). On the border, Dading and his men changed their uniforms for civilian clothes and quietly crossed into the Portuguese colony. Murdani himself had to work hard to coordinate this ‘volunteer’ operation, particularly with regard to deniable supplies, which under no circumstances could be traced back to the Indonesian army. On 7 October 1975, ‘after a bitter battle, Batugade, which is just across the border, was freed from FRETILIN control by a joint force of Timorese freedom fighters and Indonesian volunteers’ (Pour 1993: 325–6). That is, members of Indonesia’s special forces, operating without the knowledge of the president or, at that time, even the senior commanders of the army, had launched an invasion of a neighbouring territory. They were assisted by members of a small Timorese political party, Apodeti, which had been set up as a part of Operation Komodo, and members of the UDT, which, as an additional part of the operation, had been persuaded into breaking with and then attacking Fretilin. But at this stage the invasion was not official Indonesian
government policy. Rather, it concerned an area that some influential members of the military felt was within their jurisdiction, and they would set policy unilaterally. Eventually, between the lies about events in Portuguese Timor that were being relayed back to Jakarta, the military-engineered deteriorating security environment within East Timor, and Suharto’s pathological hatred of ‘communists’, the final invasion became official policy. But the engineering of events that led up to this shift in policy indicated that issues of internal state security (for that was how an independent East Timor was defined) were the preserve of the military. And if some of the military did not initially know what was going on in East Timor, that was because those particular officers had not fully appreciated the proactive nature of the military’s self-defining role. This role was replicated with the establishment and arming of pro-Jakarta militias in 1998–99, and one may find a further trace of this proactive role in the events of mid-May 2002, when six Indonesian warships entered East Timor’s territorial waters for its formal declaration of independence. One ship had been agreed to by the UN to provide logistic support for President Megawati, who attended the independence ceremony. But the six ships were an unsubtle message that the TNI had not forgotten the humiliation that it had suffered in the tiny new state. However, foreign dignitaries and heads of state from around the world who were in Dili to attend the independence ceremony viewed the TNI’s presence as oafish and heavy-handed, reminding all who cared to ask just why, despite Indonesia’s touted role in the US-led ‘war on terrorism’, so many countries at this time refused to restore military-to-military relations with or the supply of arms to Indonesia.

If there was ever any doubt about how the TNI viewed its role in resolving Indonesia’s myriad problems, one only needed to look at its continued and expanded deployment. Beyond its Territorial component, and including its regular rotation of troops ‘in the field’, in the three years between early 2000 and early 2002, the TNI deployed more than 41,000 troops, or about one-fifth of its total force, to conflict-prone areas, half of whom were sent to Aceh. The TNI’s spokesman, Major General Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, said: ‘The massive deployment of troops to Aceh began in 2001 in line with the issuance of a presidential decree on restoring security and peace in the province.’ More than 21,000 military reinforcement personnel had been posted to Aceh by early 2002, along with around 12,000 police, the pre-existing Territorial command based in the then newly created Kodam I Iskander Muda, some 10,000 predominantly ethnic Javanese transmigrant militia, and several hundred members of the army-backed radical Islamic Laskar Jihad militia. The reinforcement figure was effectively double the entire regional military command, although instead of quelling the violence, according to a flood of reports coming from Aceh human rights groups, it actually escalated it over this period. Similarly, in Maluku, a new Kodam, XVI Pattimura, was established, and over 9,800 military personnel were stationed there, in addition to the usual Territorial requirements.
However, they were still slow to quell regional violence and continued to be implicated in attacks both within Ambon town and against particular villages (Annastashya 2002). The reorganisation of the South Malku security structure in May 2002, whereby an army major general would oversee his police counterpart, a brigadier general, was described by some as a concealed version of ‘martial law’ (*JP* 2002g). The TNI also had some 3,800 troops in and near the town of Poso in Central Sulawesi, along with thousands of police, although they too were apparently unable to quell the sporadic but brutal violence they encountered. Furthermore, as was the case in Maluku, evidence suggested that members of the TNI and the police were partisan to the conflict. Beyond these areas, the troubled province of West Papua played host to around 4,350 troops over and above its usual Territorial allocation, ostensibly to quell the activities of the OPM, the numbers of which optimistically were said to be in the hundreds, and as for armed insurgents, in the dozens. And although East Timor (Timor Lorosa’i) was an independent state, whose primary security concern was an attack from across the West Timor border, the TNI still felt it necessary to deploy along the East–West Timor border some 2,300 troops in addition to the local Territorial personnel already there (Tiarmo 2002b), while a new strategic command centre was to be established in Atambua, just a few kilometres from the border, because of the potential for conflict with East Timor or Australia. The initial suggestion, one that agreed with the 1999 Kodam restructure, was that the proposed Kodam XV Nusa Tenggara be located at Kupang, the capital of West Timor.

An incoherent state

Distributed throughout the archipelago, the armed forces paralleled and were represented (through the appointment of former officers and through liaison) at each level and region of government, limiting functional democracy as well as developing widespread legal and illegal businesses. As an actor with interlocking political and economic interests, the armed forces thus became guarantor of and at the same time the major single political and economic stakeholder in the unitary state, institutionalising its profound conflict of interests. The main consequences of this incoherent, imposed state structure have been the challenges to both the state as such and its specific form. These challenges have necessarily been met by vested and institutionalised military (as opposed to civil) responses, the outcome of which has been and will continue to be gross human rights abuses and the effective denial of a broad range of social, political and economic aspirations of many and perhaps most ordinary Indonesian citizens.

In recognising the military’s role in holding the country together, it seemed as though the construction of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia from the disparate archipelago that constituted the Dutch East Indies did not, beyond anti-colonial aspiration, have any fundamentally
unifying or coherent feature. Thus, as the imposed state, when it began to unravel, it was the military that imposed a more or less arbitrary cohesion upon it. Yet this imposition bred further resentment about being unilaterally incorporated into the state. The opportunities that the state might have had of ‘buying’ unity, through a fulsome redistribution of the wealth accrued during the New Order era, were wasted on massive accumulation by the powerful elite and, at the centre, on the wholesale exploitation of the state for the benefit of the elite, and with unrepentant repression when there was local objection to this manifestly inequitable state of affairs. Thus the construction of the state, its method of cohesion and the centre/elite disregard for the periphery has required a continuing logic of violence. The centre and the elite cannot survive without the periphery, yet any attempt by the latter to alter or renegotiate the nature of the relationship is met with violent rejection. This only compels the periphery, variously conceived, to greater alienation and a desire to leave.

The extent of cohesion within the state of the Republic of Indonesia has been and remains problematic. The state was constructed as the successor to the Dutch East Indies, and membership of the state by provinces within the Dutch colonies of the region was not at any stage based on jural consent. Where provincial members of the state have expressed a desire to no longer be a part of the state they have been held within it by force, exercised almost exclusively by the TNI. Although Indonesia has been subject to numerous rebellions, some characterisations posit most of them as wanting to change or reform the existing state, not wanting to leave it. One may argue that this is true in particular of the PRRI–Permetsa rebellion and probably of the Dar’ul Islam rebellion. However, within both of these rebellions were sympathies that wanted to see the construction of a different type of relationship with Jakarta, in some cases overlapping with separatist ambitions. Explicitly, however, separatist rebellions have existed in Maluku, West Papua, Aceh and East Timor. Separatist claims have also formally been expressed in Riau, near Singapore, and among less formally organised groups and individuals throughout the archipelago.

The Indonesian government has claimed that in most cases, such as Aceh, the provinces voluntarily agreed to join the new Republic, as an expression of anti-colonial sentiment. This may not, of course, be claimed for East Timor, or West Papua, and may have only marginal validity in some other areas. But what seems to have happened is that the legitimacy of anti-colonialism long ago faded and in the interim the state failed to legitimise itself in other ways. The primary means by which the state did try to legitimise itself was through ‘development’, which became the core rationale for the extended role of the TNI under the New Order government. However, there were serious doubts about the success of the development project even prior to the economic collapse of 1997, mostly because there was such an imbalance in the distribution of income, from the outlying provinces to Jakarta, because of the corrupt manner in which
development was handled and because of the insensitive and often brutal responses to local claims to economic sharing or compensation. While a negotiated resolution to economic compensation may have been achieved, because of the corrupt and often violent methods of the New Order administration claims against the central government expanded to include political redress. This was particularly so in claims against the army for brutality. The failure of the government to address such issues, and the further brutality applied by the army to quell such dissent, hardened separatist sentiment in places like East Timor, Aceh and West Papua, and among some groups in Maluku, Sulawesi and Kalimantan. If they had begun as more individually defined rebellions, then the issue had subsequently become one of a loss of faith in and a delegitimisation of the idea of the Indonesian state.

By way of illustration, the troubles of Aceh, which in their current incarnation began in 1976, were not responded to by seeking a negotiated settlement until well after such a settlement was no longer a viable option for many and perhaps most Acehnese people. Even when talks were being conducted between government leaders and GAM representatives in early 2001, the TNI was engaged in an escalating military campaign, the vast majority of the victims of which were non-combatants. Even TNI ‘reformer’ and then Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, opted for a military solution to this political problem, saying ‘No country solves its armed movement problem with dialogue’. This comment came just days after Kostrad chief (and later Army Chief of Staff) Lieutenant General Ryamizard Ryacudu said that GAM ‘must be eliminated’. To qualify these comments, the commander of military operations in Aceh, Brigadier General Zamroni, said that the army would continue to talk with moderates. ‘But,’ he added, ‘we have to eliminate the hardliners as they only cause destabilisation.’ Unfortunately, most of those ‘eliminated’ in Aceh were the ‘moderates’ Zamroni referred to, or simple villagers. This then led to the continued radicalisation of the local population, which led GAM to reject backing down from its claim for separation (JP 2001e; see also Pereira 2001; Poer 2001).

The various claims against the central Indonesian government, for example by Aceh, called into question the legal status of the state in the international community, and this in turn raised significant issues for such claims to independence. The first issue raised was whether or not claims to separation from the state were based in international law. The case of East Timor was based in international law, and the UN refused to recognise its occupation. Thus, an international legal mechanism existed for East Timor’s separation. West Papuan separatists make a similar case, noting that although West Papua’s incorporation into the state was recognised by the UN, the UN also subsequently recognised that it was a profoundly flawed process and might not stand up under critical scrutiny. Consequently, if West Papua were able to find a sponsor to have its case reopened by the UN,
potentially it might establish a claim for having its incorporation into the state reassessed on the basis of a vote of West Papuans. The problem with this process, however, would be that a significant proportion of the residue West Papuan population is not ethnic Melanesian but ethnic Malay, which would be difficult to separate out on the basis of birth, as opposed to ethnic origin. For the separation of West Papua to be a success, it would need to enjoy the support of at least two-thirds of the population, if not more, and would undoubtedly engender a very significant backlash from pro-integrationist sympathisers. Furthermore, as West Papua is such a significant contributor to the Indonesian economy, one might expect the TNI and indeed other agencies of the state to go to very great lengths to derail an independence process, as indeed to date they have.

Aceh’s claim to independence is much more problematic in international law than either East Timor’s or West Papua’s, as Aceh willingly became part of the state in 1949. Acehnese separatists note, however, that Aceh only agreed to become part of the state under a federal system with a high degree of local autonomy. Once this was subverted by the imposition of the unitary state in 1950, the Acehnese separatists argue, the validity of any existing agreement with Indonesia was nullified.11 Such separatists also argue that Aceh has a history of being identified as a separate and independent state, having been recognised as such by, and having had trading relations with, Britain until 1871, when such recognition was withdrawn and Aceh was attacked two years later by the Dutch. Even then, many Acehnese argue, the sultanate of Aceh never surrendered to the Dutch. While this particular issue remains the subject of legal and academic debate, what is not debated is that the Free Aceh Movement in any case says that it is less concerned with establishing the niceties of history than it is with settling its claim to independence by popular ballot. Other restive provinces in Indonesia, such as the South Maluccas (Maluku Selatan), might also make similar claims based on the unilateral revocation of Indonesia’s federal system in 1950. However, in other areas, such as Riau, claims to independence have been more muted and have not been supported by an armed wing or an official separatist organisation.

**Autonomy?**

In large part, such claims to a separate political identity were to be resolved by the introduction of the autonomy legislation of 1999 (law no. 22/1999 and no. 25/1999), introduced at the beginning of 2001. These laws were intended to allow for a high degree of decision-making in most spheres of government, to be based on income derived from taxes on locally generated wealth, with the major exception of returns from oil and natural gas (Aceh was later made exempt from this restriction). One aspect of the idea was that with greater control over local wealth, and potential wealth creation, centrifugal tendencies would be reduced.
However, Indonesian ‘nationalists’, and in particular the army, who were concerned over the capacity for self-governing and self-funding districts to break away from the state, insisted that autonomy only exist at the lowest functional level of government. Based on sub-provincial government districts (kabupaten), the limited autonomy package precluded the larger provinces from the opportunity to exercise their own autonomy, which might have led to the creation of effectively viable independent states. In principle, then, the autonomy legislation seemed to offer a means of assuaging, or more locally focusing, at least some regional discontent while retaining the overarching structure of the unitary state. In practice, however, the autonomy laws were flawed, the first major problem being that the laws simply failed to go far enough in granting regional autonomy, and that they were long on rhetoric but allowed very little to change in the daily lives of ordinary Indonesians. Although at the time it was too early to say definitively, it also appeared as though, under the autonomy laws, there was greater scope for the army, through its Territorial structure, to bring pressure to bear on the more vulnerable regional officials to produce outcomes more favourable to its business interests, thus strengthening the non-accountability of any income and expenditure. In settling separatist claims, therefore, the autonomy laws attempted to invoke a panacea that neglected issues of ethnic identity, which were notable in Aceh and West Papua. Nor could it redress the loss of homeland to Dayak communities in Kalimantan, or resolve disputes defined along sectarian lines in Maluku and Sulawesi. While it was possible there might be some localised catastrophes as a consequence of the poor implementation of the autonomy laws, it was also quite possible that many of the potential problems would remain muted, and that they would only shift by degrees the existing state of affairs. Similarly, the benefits from the laws that were intended to address the wider issues of social and ‘national’ cohesion were, in their functionally limited form, unlikely to be significant.

TNI links to the presidency

At a time when the dominant group of the TNI was explicitly opposed to being subservient to the president, that group maintained a close association with President Megawati. The issue was less one of political association than it was of patrimonialism. Resentment within the TNI over the level of control exercised by President Suharto had existed since the earliest days of the New Order government, and resurfaced when President Abdurrahman Wahid tried to influence the TNI’s political colouring. But the issue was always one of control, not linkages per se. The TNI was happy to have a close relationship with the president, so long as the president was amenable to the TNI’s prevailing orientation, allowed the TNI to run what it saw as its own areas of responsibility and did not interfere in the TNI’s self-defined ‘internal affairs’. President Habibie was largely compliant with TNI wishes, as expressed by General Wiranto, and where the TNI and the president fell
out, in particular over East Timor, Habibie was powerless to stop the TNI pursuing its own agenda. The situation was similar with President Megawati, except that she had a long and close association with at least some senior TNI officers, and was widely regarded as a ‘friend’ of the TNI.

Some observers have disputed how close Megawati was, or remained, to the conservative, professional group within the TNI that came to dominate it from 2000 onwards. But as early as 1993, the then Jakarta garrison commander Hendropriyono was clearly instrumental in helping Megawati gain the chair of the PDI, as was Agum Gumelar. Her association with these two former generals was acknowledged by generals from across the TNI’s spectrum. A conservative and self-confessed ‘political’ lieutenant general (since retired) said that Hendropriyono and Agum Gumelar had, from inception, protected and supported Megawati’s political career. Although both had ministerial status prior to Megawati becoming president, they were both rewarded for their long-standing support for her, not least during the presidential crisis of 2001, with positions in her Cabinet of August that year (ICG 2001: 4), as head of BIN and transport minister, respectively. The elevation of the head of BIN to the Cabinet reflected the importance of intelligence in addressing terrorist bombings in Jakarta and elsewhere, and widespread regional conflict. BIN and its predecessors had since 1966 been headed and primarily staffed by military officers, although its predecessors were for some years formally less politically influential intelligence organisations. Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo said that while the TNI had not explicitly influenced Megawati’s decision-making process, both Hendropriyono and Agum Gumelar had acted as a bridge between the TNI’s senior officer group and the presidency (Agus Widjojo 2001b).

Furthermore, and equally as importantly, apart from its active influence in the Cabinet, the TNI received little formal direction from President Megawati, and was allowed to pursue its self-defined agendas without presidential interference.

The TNI’s influence in Megawati’s Cabinet was also identifiable through the appointment of Lieutenant General (retired) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs, and Lieutenant General (retired) Hari Sarbono as Minister for Home Affairs. Like Hendropriyono and Agum Gumelar, Yudhoyono had prior ministerial status, notably occupying the same senior position from August 2000 until near the end of Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidency. As the principal architect of the TNI’s ‘New Paradigm’, Yudhoyono continued to be regarded as having pro-reformist sympathies. But such sympathies were never at the expense of the TNI’s self-appointed core political functions of security and stability, for which he was directly responsible. Sarbono, as has been noted, explicitly endorsed those self-defined core political functions. Sarbono was also well positioned to exercise influence in the appointment of retired TNI personnel who continued to occupy ministerial and regional governmental positions, if in decreasing numbers, throughout the archipelago.
According to one observer in early 2001, when coup rumours were rife: ‘The army is so disorganised and demoralised and is too fragmented for a coup.’ However, this same observer also said that many within the army remained uneasy with democracy and the push for greater human rights accountability and freedom of expression. He said that the meetings of generals in early 2001 that had explicitly opposed Abdurrahman Wahid’s continuing presidency also explicitly endorsed the future presidency of Megawati, who he said shared their concerns. One of the army’s top generals at this time said that he believed the army would again be sought by Indonesian society to play an active role in Indonesian public affairs: ‘We are convinced that sooner or later the Indonesian military will be looked for.’ He later added that he expected the TNI to play an advisory role to Megawati as president. While he said that the TNI would only act under orders from Indonesia’s civilian political leaders, ‘firm action is a last resort if the integrity of the state is threatened–Indonesian society still relies on strong leadership, as civil society is not yet [mature] enough’. The Army Chief of Staff (and later military commander-in-chief), General Endriartono Sutarto, also said that the TNI should be given ‘more room to help maintain security nationwide’, and that there should be a regulation to allow soldiers to be more ‘pro-active’ in the field (JP 2001a). The re-creation of the Iskandar Muda Military Command was indicative of the TNI’s self-defining security role, and its endorsement by Megawati illustrated her compliance to and support for the TNI generally, and in particular was payment for the TNI support that she had received in her bid for the presidency (JP 2002a).

In gauging the post-reformasi direction of the TNI, the appointment of its new commander-in-chief seemed to offer a clear indicator. It appeared very clear from early 2001 that the core conservative ‘professional’ group in the army was beginning to coalesce around a small handful of key figures, most notable among whom was Endriartono Sutarto, and that it was increasingly determined to ensure that one of its own was appointed as the new commander-in-chief, rather than have the appointment rotate from the navy to the air force, as was originally stated in 2000. Consequently, Endriartono had his service tenure extended for a further five years in early 2002, to make sure that he would be available for appointment beyond the official retirement age of 55.

Eventually, President Megawati formally forwarded Endriartono’s name to the DPR for approval, where he was summoned to outline his plans for the reform of the TNI. However, although he outlined a plan for the further ‘professionalisation’ of the TNI15 and a greater military involvement in Indonesia’s numerous trouble spots, in a remarkable display of self-assurance, which also reflected the extent to which he commanded TNI loyalty, he refused to give any commitments to the legislature who, in theory, might have rejected his appointment as a consequence (JP 2002e). As one commentator noted: ‘What was conspicuously lacking was a vision of what
the TNI would become in, say, five years from now’ (Kurniawan 2002). Endriartono was also light-hearted about the TNI’s human rights record. Responding to the comment that many soldiers had committed human rights abuses, Endriartono said: ‘I don’t want to make excuses, but a few soldiers violating the rules is normal’ (Kurniawan 2002). In a less light-hearted, although at least as unrepentant, display, the TNI officially supported pro-integrationists charged with human rights violations before a specially convened court in Jakarta, at which a number of senior officers were present to show their solidarity with the defendants (JP 2002b; Tiarmo 2002a). Despite this clear signal that the TNI continued to endorse violence as a means of resolving political problems, and that Endriartono did not feel the need to distance himself from this position, the prospect of the DPR refusing to appoint Endriartono as commander-in-chief was never likely (JP 2002f). But Endriartono’s appointment did raise concerns among human rights activists and NGOs, who commented on his role as head of Kostrad under Suharto, and raised the prospect that, at least in part, his appointment had been a reward for refusing to act on the order of President Abdurrahman Wahid to enforce martial law, the refusal of which paved the way for Megawati to become president (England 2002).

Endriartono’s appointment was followed up with the appointment of Kostrad chief Lieutenant General Ryamizard Ryacudu as the new Army Chief of Staff. Like Endriartono, Ryamisard had at one time been regarded as being close to Suharto (he is the son-in-law of former vice-president Try Sutrisno) (JP 2002h), and had been active in opposing the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid. Also like Endriartono, Ryamisard is first and foremost centrally located in the ‘conservative professional’ core of the army.

As to other signals emanating from Endriartono’s appointment, even during his questioning before the DPR he indicated that the TNI would take a stronger position in West Timor as a consequence of East Timor’s independence. This stance was confirmed soon after when the Udayana commander, Major General Willem Da Costa, said that a new strategic command centre would be established at Atambua, near the East Timor border. However, Da Costa did say that the command would not be permanent, and that it would be phased out depending on the settlement of the East Timorese refugee issue and if ‘no threats come from East Timor’ (Yemris 2002). It is worth noting, though, that since Indonesia’s retreat from East Timor in September 1999, almost three years previously, the only threats to have emerged have come from West Timor towards East Timor, rather than as Da Costa had suggested.

Where it is and what it means

At a time when it was still possible to claim that reform was a motivating force in Indonesian political society, a draft defence act prepared by the defence department in the second half of 2000 was roundly criticised for
failing to consider changes to the 1945 constitution and amendments passed by the MPR relating to civil authority. As a result, the then defence minister, Mahfud MD, commissioned a revision of the draft, including greater input from community groups, academics and NGOs. The major concerns were with the continued inclusion of the idea of ‘total people’s defence’, which might legitimise the retention of the Territorial structure and the TNI’s involvement in the economy. There was also concern that such a wide-ranging idea might be used to encompass aspects of what were, or had become, civil affairs, and that the notion contained the capacity for the militarisation of the civil community under the guise of national security. Major areas of contention continued to exist over the status of the TNI’s executive authority. The TNI’s ability to maintain its independence from the Ministry of Defence allowed it not only to preserve its ex officio status in the Cabinet, but also to reduce the possibility of it being subject to bureaucratic control and accountability. To ensure that the commander-in-chief did not become too dominant in relation to security matters, however, President Suharto had ensured that all service Chiefs of Staff were promoted to the same rank as the commander-in-chief. While this constrained the authority of the commander-in-chief, it also meant that the Army Chief of Staff had practical operational control of his service and could veto its use. As such, the army was functionally a law unto itself.

Given the assumption that any policy guidelines created for the TNI would likely be those that steered it into the twenty-first century and, normatively, into a period of greater democratisation for Indonesia, there was some chagrin when a seemingly new defence policy paper was regarded as being merely a minor variation on previous papers. In particular, the policy paper offered a general discussion about the broad role of the TNI, but offered few practical guidelines for Indonesia’s future defence posture. There was, it seemed, little or no detail concerning force purpose, development or use (ICG 2001: 11).

**Indonesia as a distinctive type?**

One may trace many of the TNI’s, and therefore Indonesia’s, problems back to specific instances or primary root causes, or confluences of causes. But it does seem as though there has been a repetition of certain types of events that mark Indonesia as being relatively distinct, though with some antecedents or parallels elsewhere. One might look elsewhere for examples of politics by assassination (the murder of a Supreme Court judge and the suspicious death of a sacked reformist general marked the ascension of Megawati to the presidency), such as pre-war Japan, and an ethnically disparate empire masquerading as a modern state, such as Burma. But what is worrying about Indonesia is that its characteristic use of violence continued even though the state was, after the fall of Suharto, supposedly ‘democratising’. Furthermore, while the increased use of the national police
was intended to ‘civilianise’ Indonesia’s conflicts, Brimob is nothing so much as a poorly trained branch of the army and both groups escalated their actions in Aceh and Papua, rather than doing the opposite as was earlier promised. The reports of TNI and Brimob killings of civilians that came direct from Aceh were much greater than those published in Jakarta and were well detailed, indicating a higher degree of veracity than one might rely on from reports received through official channels.

In trying to understand the nature of the Indonesian state and its use of violence, one is immediately drawn to the idea of politics by coercion as opposed to the politics of consent. Insofar as a significant number of Indonesians subscribe to the politics of coercion, even though not all are such obvious beneficiaries that their interests would be served by subscribing to this model, it is worth reconsidering ideas such as the ‘Stockholm syndrome’, whereby there is acceptance of and even support for the perpetrator of violence as a means of resolving inescapable violence, and the idea of hegemony, which may employ more subtle means of coercion and acceptance. It has been noted by some of the author’s colleagues in private discussion that, when looking at Indonesia, a selectivity of perspective sometimes tends to emphasise the negative at the expense of the positive. I have been in some violent places in Indonesia, but have also found havens of tranquillity within them, as well as elsewhere. And of course, violence is usually sporadic and inconsistent, although East Timor, Aceh and perhaps West Papua have experienced much more consistent violence than have other parts of the country. But if violence is not a permanent state, the threat or sense of violence may be. This is what is most important, because it is this, as a sort of hegemony of violence, that shapes people’s behaviour. By way of illustration, if a person has political tendencies and lives in a town with political activists, some of whom ‘disappear’ and perhaps one of whom later shows up dead, having been tortured, the violence may have come and gone but its effect on the behaviour of the living is likely to be profound. The knowledge of violence, the memory of violence and the understanding that violence might and can exist is more than enough to modify behaviour, especially political behaviour, in a way that accords with the wishes of the source of that violence.

The logic of intervention

In principle, it may and normatively should be argued that the TNI does not have a separate interest in the political affairs of the state. The TNI is, like other state institutions, merely an agent of state will, intended to perform state functions as directed by the custodians of the state – the civil politicians. The civil politicians, in turn, are or should be responsible to the civilian population. If they are not, then one must ask in whose interest does the state serve, and what type of state is it? In practice, however, in Indonesia since 1945 there has been a tension between what amounts to the civil and
military wings of the government, initially over the method of conducting the war of independence with the Netherlands and, soon afterwards, in dealing with a spate of issues which challenged the central government, in South Sulawesi, South Maluku, West Java and Aceh, and then throughout Sumatra and eastern Indonesia, East Timor, and West Papua. Furthermore, there has been a disturbingly high level of so-called ‘horizontal’ or sectarian violence, between Muslims and Chinese, between Muslims and Christians, between Dayaks and Madurese, and so on. The logic of the state has demonstrably not been based on a pre-existing or unchallenged sense of community cohesion nor, in the means by which the archipelago was united, is there a necessary coherence in the composition of the state. In this respect, Sukarno’s early vision of Indoensia Raya, including what is now Malaysia, Brunei, East Timor and the Philippines, made at least as much sense from a pre-colonial perspective as does constructing states along the current post-colonial lines (other than employing the arbitrary logic of colonial boundaries as somehow legitimate). Conversely, there is little beyond arbitrary colonial boundaries that implies any particular logic to the states of the region as they exist. This is, though, no reason why a different colonial context might not have produced an entirely different geo-spatial state configuration to that which currently exists. However, history is what it is and colonialism has defined the regional boundaries that, like a number of other post-colonial states, leaves disparate groups occupying what is technologically common territory.

In order to resolve the contradictions that have arisen as a consequence of these arbitrarily inclusive boundaries, as previously noted, the TNI acts as an enforcer and guarantor of state cohesion, by imposing itself on and through the formal and informal political process. Relative to the extent to which the TNI is required to address issues of communal and state cohesion, the TNI also involves itself in local political affairs. Indeed, at one level, the types of issues that (given the logic of the state) require TNI involvement are themselves deeply political. The effect of this is that the TNI has implicated itself in political affairs both vertically, from the most local or village level up to the Cabinet and, previously, the presidency itself, and laterally, throughout the spatial territory of the state. Because political involvement implies the exercise of authority or power, while focused on the party or institution of government it has been applied across the political spectrum. It should be noted that while the level of political involvement of the TNI has varied according to prevailing circumstances, the consistency of the TNI’s involvement, notably throughout the period of the New Order government and beyond, has ensured through an institutionalised process that this variation of political involvement occurs at a relatively high level and, as a consequence, the degree to which the TNI engages or disengages in the political process may be said to be marginal; that is, that it is structurally engaged at a high level and only varies the extent of its engagement at the margins. As two TNI
observers have noted, the TNI’s reforms have done little more than pay lip service to the idea of reform, the reforms it has undertaken have been insubstantial, and it has defined ‘itself in its own interests’. According to Rifqie Moena of RiDEP: ‘Now, despite all the hopes for military reform, things have returned to square one with the TNI playing dirty, vulgar games and ignoring the political aspirations of the civilian population.’ Criticism of the increasingly conservative tilt of the TNI have also come from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, and from the then recently retired Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo (Tiarmo and Tertiarni 2002).

The path towards real democratisation and reform in Indonesia has been littered with obstacles, each of which the TNI and a significant proportion of Indonesia’s elite have cited as a reason, or excuse, to retain the military in the active affairs of the state. Key among these obstacles has been the nature of the state itself, in many ways divided and chaotic, and the TNI’s role in ensuring state cohesion. Perhaps at one time Indonesia might have struck a balance between these competing concerns, which would then have come to be defined as ‘democracy Indonesia style’. But perhaps this might also have meant, derived from a dominant political culture in which appearances have been more important than reality and in which language has proven highly malleable, that the TNI would have continued for quite some time to influence Indonesian politics, and that eventually political practice would beg the semantics of the terms *demokrasi* and *reformasi*. In particular, the idea that Indonesia was somehow set on a path that would inevitably lead to ‘democracy’ implied a certain fatalism in a process that would actually require a high level of practical social support. Perhaps even if practical support for the state had been available, for some places it might in any case have been too late. There is a logic in politics whereby once a certain stage of events is reached, or passed, there is no possibility of going back. Some indiscretions may be forgiven, and some will fade with memory. But in some cases, forgiveness is no longer an option, and historical memories last for generations. This has been the case for Aceh, and East Timor started that way. Once such a stage has been reached, the only option is complete repression or complete collapse or defeat. And even if democratisation is the answer to Indonesia’s problems, through articulating the grievances of its people, by making its elite accountable and by allowing expression of civil aspiration, then all the signs are that there is little elite support for notions of such genuine democratisation, with even the most outspoken leader of the movement to topple Suharto, Amien Rais, having eventually admitted in mid-2002 that he favoured militarism over democracy in resolving Indonesia’s problems (Laksamana.net 2002). This was less a recognition of some basic truth about Indonesia, or at least the people who constitute the civil population of the archipelago, than it was Amien revealing a basic truth about himself as a typical member of the state’s elite.

The construction of Indonesia as a post-colonial state relied on an imposed order and unity, which in turn required the political and ‘territorial’
participation of the TNI. Yet this ‘participation’ itself was inherently anti-
democratic, and moves towards the reining-in of the TNI’s power have
presented a direct challenge to the state itself. As such, there appears to be
an inbuilt and self-referential logic to the critical tensions between ideas of
the Indonesian state, the role of the armed forces and democratisation. On
the face of it, a fundamental contradiction exists between the aspirations
of the state, as expressed by its military, and the aspirations of its people.
Of the two, the aspirations of the people, as made manifest in a genuinely
participative and representative process of democratisation, appears to be by
far the most vulnerable.
Introduction

1 The commander of those troops was Hendropriyono, head of the National Intelligence Agency and ex officio member of the Cabinet of President Megawati Sukarnoputri.

2 Various historians debate the extent to which the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia – PKI) was a potentially malevolent or emancipating force. Few would argue that many of the issues the PKI campaigned on reflected structural inequalities in Indonesian society, but many of those murdered were either only loosely associated with the PKI and its affiliated organisations or, in many cases, completely unconnected.

3 This phenomenon is popularly known as the ‘Stockholm syndrome’: the response to a perceived threat to one’s survival where the captive believes that one’s captor is willing to act on that threat, the captive’s perception of kindesses from the captor is within the context of terror, there is a general isolation from perspectives other than those of the captor, and where the captive believes that they are unable to escape.

4 It is worth noting that a number of the websites that were originally sourced have been subsequently closed down, especially those sites that might be regarded as ‘sensitive’. In many cases these closures have occurred as a consequence of external interference.

5 This is in accordance with my own values and a commitment given to Deakin University’s Ethics Committee.

6 Although it is necessary to fly between many of the islands, I travel on as few aeroplanes as possible. To quote a personal comment from a diplomat, it is the difference between being over the landscape and being part of the landscape.

1 The problematic role of the TNI

1 The TNI was known as the Republic of Indonesia Armed Forces (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia – ABRI) until 1 April 1999 when, after splitting from the national police force, it changed its name. Tentara Nasional Indonesia literally translates as Indonesian National Army, but is intended to mean the whole of the armed forces.

2 In part this can be seen as a result of the legitimising role of independence struggles, but it can also be attributed to the linkages between state elites and the military in post-colonial states, which also better explains the default to military governments in Latin American countries that have been independent for almost 200 years.
3 See Chapter 5 for more detail.
4 The New Paradigm is discussed in Chapter 4. The reform process it was intended to encapsulate was only about a third complete when it was abandoned for the foreseeable future.
5 It is also a view I have expressed elsewhere; see Kingsbury (2002).
6 It is likewise commonly used by political leaders to rally support when they are being challenged either personally or politically.
7 This, of course, does not take into account the variable quality of legal representation or the economic capacity to employ higher quality legal representation. But the principle remains broadly applicable.
8 The general model for the state, in which borders were poorly defined and often fluid and in which authority revolved around the monarch (though often relying on powerful regional lords), was similar in most feudal and pre-feudal states regardless of location.
9 Javanese influence in or control over the court at Funan in what is now Cambodia (Coedes 1968: 2–3, 73–83) and close relations with Champa in what is now central Vietnam indicate the extent of regional links, if not control. Suzerain relations were also conducted with a number of nearby principalities within the archipelago.
10 This statement is made with an awareness of the implications of the ‘politics of self-congratulation’. To clarify, Australia has many problems, not least those that stem from a barely submerged racism. But there is little if any dispute about the voluntary nature of inclusion, and only slightly more so about the nature of a broad social contract.
11 The main force of the Indonesian military has reconfigured itself on a number of occasions. It was originally known, from August 1945, as the Badan Keaman Rakyat (BKR – People’s Security Corps), then from October 1945 as the Tentara Keaman Rakyat (TKR – People’s Security Military), from January 1946 as the Tentara Republik Indonesia (TRI – Republic of Indonesia Military), soon after as the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI – Indonesian National Military), in August 1949 as the Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Serikat (APRIS – Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Indonesia), in August 1959 as the TNI again (MacFarling 1996: Chs 2, 3), and from July 1962, when it included the national police, as Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI – Republic of Indonesia Armed Forces). The literal translation of tentara is not ‘military’ (militer) but ‘army’. However, this confuses the roles of the three services within the TNI, which are respectively designated as TNI-AD (TNI-Angkatan Daerah, or TNI-Land Force), TNI-AL (TNI-Angkatan Laut, or TNI-Sea Force) and TNI-AU (TNI-Angkatan Udara, or TNI-Air Force).
12 Despite denials by Armed Forces chief General Benny Murdani at the time, President Suharto later acknowledged that the extrajudicial Petrus killings were a result of government policy.
13 Supreme Court judge Syaifuddin Kartasasmita was assassinated while on his way to work by four men on two motorcycles, the passengers on the bikes shooting him five times in the chest and head. The guns used to kill the judge were later identified as being military-style FN Brownings, the bullets having been manufactured by PT Pindad, the army’s munitions factory. Having refused attempted bribes, in 2000 Syaifuddin had sentenced Tommy Suharto to eighteen months in gaol and fined him US$3 million dollars. He also sentenced Suharto’s crony Bob Hasan to six years in gaol in early 2001. At the time of his shooting, he was about to start proceedings against senior army officers involved in the killing and mayhem in East Timor in 1999.
14 A foreign intelligence analyst told the author that he believed that Agus Wirahadikusumah had been poisoned in retribution for having revealed
damaging information about the misuse of Kostrad funds. Although colleagues of the dead general said that he had been in poor health (personal communication), his own family said that he had no health concerns at the time of his death, aged 49.

15 One of five groups, as discussed in Chapter Three.

16 Organicism can be described as a political system in which ‘the people’ are as one with the state, and in which the state is the most pure manifestation of ‘the will of the people’. This implies both a singularity of will and state activity as its pure expression. Hence the decisions of the state cannot be questioned, and the state usually responds to any questioning with a high degree of repression.

17 This is an association of wives of civil servants, but corresponds to the Japanese imperial model.

18 This source cannot be identified for personal and professional reasons.

2 Context, continuity and change

1 Animism is a generic belief system which attributes spiritual qualities to natural phenomena, for example plants, animals and land forms such as hills and streams. More generally, it is a belief in supernatural powers that animate the experienced universe.

2 Thanks to Professor Ann Kumar for noting additional Javanese terms (personal communication), and to Dr Laine Berman for further elaboration on and explanation of these terms.

3 In its original cosmic sense, the mandala was intended to be a metaphorical rather than literal interpretation of the universe. It reflected as much a desire for order and balance as it did a method of explanation. Furthermore, particular models of mandalas, like other forms of cultural expression, varied from one cultural environment to another and, while retaining the same basic characteristics, said as much about their makers as about the thing they were supposed to represent.

4 Ethnic Greeks living in Istanbul are still referred to as ‘Roman’, going back to a time when it was indeed a city of the Roman Empire.

5 Elson notes that Suharto, who later became president, joined the KNIL in 1940 as an alternative to unemployment (Elson 2001: 8).

6 The National Socialist Bond (NSB) – the Dutch Nazi party.

7 By 2001, Javanese servicemen only constituted around 35 per cent of the central army elite, with a further 9 per cent being of Sundanese (West Javanese) background, another 9 per cent originating from West Sumatra (Minangkabau), and slightly fewer having come from Bali. However, about half of the regional commanders were still Javanese (The Editors 2001: 136–7).

8 Pancasila includes a belief in one God, a just and civilised humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy guided by the inner wisdom of unanimity arising out of deliberation among representatives, and social justice for all Indonesian people.

9 Abangan denotes informal Javanese Muslims, who often have a syncretic religious belief system incorporating aspects of animism and Hinduism as well as Islam. Formal or observant Javanese Muslims are known as santri.

10 This issue was under debate in mid-2002. On one side was the view that if soldiers were to vote they might divide the military into political blocs, hence the need for singular representation; on the other was the view that the allocation of seats to the TNI and Polri might give them undue political influence, potentially as the arbiter of a divided vote.
3 The functional structure of the TNI

1 Officers holding ministerial or other administrative posts were required to resign their commissions from October 1999, a regulation with which they slowly complied, but which did not meaningfully sever their links with their erstwhile colleagues still in active service.

2 Although widely regarded as an ‘intellectual’ and a reformist, Agus Widjojo’s position on a number of key reform issues has vacillated depending on the prevailing circumstances; Indonesian critics of the TNI viewed him as being essentially conservative when it came to core reform issues.

3 Perhaps the hardest-edged soldier that the author met at Motaeen was a Timorese member of the notorious Battalion 744. His colleagues confirmed that he wanted to cut the author’s throat, something that was already apparent from his demeanour. The Australian soldiers the author visited, mostly of the Second Royal Australian Regiment, exhibited a relatively high degree of self-motivated professionalism, along with what one UN-appointed US military observer called a ‘robust posture’.

4 Kostrad also had a strong presence in Aceh, but because of the nature of that particular area and the level of conflict at the time of the visit, the author judged it unwise to strike up a conversation.

5 By way of illustration, the Kostrad troops at Motaeen in 1999 were based at Kodam VII Wirabuana in South Sulawesi.

6 These and other anonymous comments were made by a military observer who cannot be identified.

7 Kontras, Tapol and other similar human rights organisations maintain files of all recorded offences committed against civilians by TNI troops in Aceh, some of which are carried out by Kostrad troops. Two or three sets of documented cases are filed each day, ranging from beatings and the burning of homes to rapes and murders. The total number of people killed in 2001 was conservatively estimated to be more than 1,700. A spokesman for Tapol said that 2001 was the worst year for killings in Aceh since before 1945, having even more than for the whole of the Military Operations Area (Daerah Operasi Militer – DOM) period (1989–98).

8 This information came from a military-related source that cannot be identified.

9 The word *sandhi* or *sandi* conventionally means ‘code’, but may also be used to mean ‘secret’ or, contextually, ‘covert’, even though the conventional word for ‘secret’ is *rahasia* and for ‘covert’ is *tersembunyi*. ‘Sandhi Yudha’ has also been translated, literally, as ‘code for war’ (*Tempo* 2002), although this says less about its function than does the former interpretation.

10 Interestingly, however, although the Dac Cong has a history of successful high-profile operations against other forces (Carl Thayer, August 2001: personal communication), one foreign military assessment described them as actually ‘pretty hopeless’ (confidential source, August 2001: personal communication).

11 For example, seven soldiers from Group IV were reliably identified as having murdered the Papuan independence leader, They Hiyo Eluay, in November 2001.

12 Group IV operatives were active members of the key pro-Jakarta militia units located in East Timor in 1999. A small number of them were identified to the author by security analysts working with the UN Assistance Mission to East Timor (UNAMET). One agent in particular acted as a leader in attacks against pro-independence villages. The author witnessed this agent lead an attack on the village of Memo, near the West Timor border, on 27 August 1999, in which two villagers were murdered and about a dozen homes burned. That night, this same agent led an attack against student activists, one of whom was kidnapped and later murdered.

13 It should be noted, however, that the Laskar Jihad and mujahidin have not been connected in any way. Each ran quite separate policies in terms of potential
peace agreements in Maluku, with the mujahidin being totally opposed to any settlement.

14 This intelligence source cannot be identified.

15 According to a confidential source who at the time was close to the Nahdlatul Ulama.

16 The attack followed the death of a junior officer in a dispute over the forced loss of land.

17 The account given here is based on numerous interviews by the author with people close to Theys Eluay, and on the local police investigation that was conducted in and near Jayapura in the second half of January 2002.

18 Two others on the Kopassus hit list included Eluay’s effective replacement, Thaha Al Hamid, and the governor of Riau, Saleh Djasit.

19 Judging by their equipment and skills, many of the ‘irregular’ Indonesian forces who crossed the border into East Timor and engaged with Interfet/UNTAET forces after October 1999 were thought to be Kopassus members.

20 From discussions between the author and GAM representatives in Banda Aceh and near Lhokseumawe in September 2001.

21 Australian SASR troops also clashed with the forerunner of Kopassus, RPKAD, in north Borneo during the Confrontation of 1963–66.

22 From an interview with Martin Ronberg, the UN security officer in Ambon, February 2002; see also Davies (2001: 21).

23 This information is based primarily on an interview with a senior military figure close to the operation, and supported by other interviews conducted in Ambon, February 2002.

24 Indonesian waters had the highest incidence of piracy in the world in 2001–2002.

25 This is a translation for meaning. The literal translation is ‘Frog Force Command’, as in frogmen.

26 The Editors (2000: 134) called this group Pasukan Khas AU, and, based on a newspaper report, said that they would be increased in strength from six to ten squadrons.

27 Before the ballot had taken place some 60,000 people were made internal refugees as a direct consequence of these events (NRC/Global IDP Project 2001: 55).

28 A reliable estimate has it that 10,000–11,000 Indonesian soldiers were killed in East Timor between 1975 and the early 1980s.

29 Interestingly, the commander who negotiated the intended settlement with Falintil, Willem Da Costa, was appointed as military chief in West Timor after East Timor was separated. Da Costa was born in West Timor and his mother was originally from the East Timorese enclave of Oecussi. In 1985, as Major Da Costa, he was Korem 164 Wira Dharma (Dili) intelligence chief, and later the Udayana Kodam chief.

30 The militias of East Timor were identified by Tapol in 1984, referring to documents from 1982. The ‘irregular’ Apodeti/UDT forces that accompanied Koppasanda forces into East Timor in 1975 were the first such militias; some of their members served again, or were still serving, in 1999.

31 Nobel Laureate and East Timor’s foreign minister, Jose Ramos Horta, said he believed about half of the militia members were West Timorese. The experience of the author, especially in the Bobonaro district, was that large numbers of militia members were unable to speak Tetum – Tetum Dili being the lingua franca of East Timor and Tetum Praca the region’s dominant dialect – and that some were openly insulting the language(s) and using Bahasa Indonesia, the national language of Indonesia.

32 The intelligence reports were leaked because a number of Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel were deeply angry about the cover-up of the atrocities
both in the run up to the 1999 East Timor ballot and in the period thereafter. One officer claimed that ADF engineers had been instructed to destroy and dispose of any bodies they found when they entered the territory in late September 1999. Official figures put the number of East Timorese killed during and after the ballot process at less than 2,000, but UNTAET investigating officers said that they believed the figure to be at least 5,000–6,000; one ADF intelligence officer, not connected with the leaks, told the author that he believed the real number to be double that.

33 Suara Merdeka cites Munir, a member of KPP HAM, as stating that P4OKTT membership comprised Major General Zaky Anwar Makarim, Brigadier General Gleny Kairupan, and Colonel Andreas (of the police). He added that the P3TT’s twenty members were mostly civilian, and included Chairman Agus Tarmizi (of the foreign ministry) and Deputy Chairman Major General (retired) H.R. Garnadi. The report cited clarification of this matter by Brigadier General Gleny Kairupan, who stated that P4OKTT was only short-lived due to interdepartmental confusion, and that P3TT was the body’s successor title, as agreed by its membership from the TNI and the foreign and defence and the security ministries.

34 This is an approximate translation, offered by Dr. Greg Barton. The ‘threefold worlds’ are land, air and sea.

35 The author saw a copy of this leaked document in Maliana on 29 August 1999.

36 The TNI had insisted that Indonesia retain full responsibility for the maintenance of law and order during the referendum period, while UN civilian police had been unarmed and only allowed to call on Indonesian police for assistance (which rarely brought a meaningful or timely response).

37 These observations are based on the author’s personal experience.

38 The intelligence services have always had a foreign intelligence arm, its purpose being almost exclusively to assess the attitudes of neighbouring or other important countries (for example, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and the US), the work and intentions of Indonesia-oriented NGOs in those countries, and the activities of Indonesian students and other nationals living abroad.

39 It should be noted here that ‘terror’ does not have to be continual to function effectively. Once it has established a precedent, and provides occasional reminders of its capacity, it retains a background quality that distinctly inhibits activity.

40 The increased presence of foreign intelligence reflected a concern among other nations to understand the changing shape of Indonesia’s political landscape.

41 Ali Murtopo had previously been a company commander under Suharto, when Suharto was commander in Central Java.

42 Murtopo was thought to have been behind a campaign to embarrass Suharto by leaking damaging information to the media (Bourchier citing Tanter, 1990: 208. nb 84). Interestingly, this was the same tactic thought to have been employed by Murdani against Suharto in 1986 (Kingsbury 2002: 92–7).

43 Sudomo had worked with Suharto on Operation Mandala, heading the naval contingency, and was later appointed by Suharto as admiral to purge any remaining leftist-PKI influences.

44 In mid-2002, General Ryamisard Ryacudu changed the name of the platoons to Tontaipur (Pleton Pengintai Tempur – Reconnaissance and Combat Platoons). Twenty such platoons operated in Aceh.

45 More commonly known as Polisi Republik Indonesia, although this only refers to an individual officer.

46 Noted by the author as operating in Aceh in 2001.

47 Based on the author’s own experience with the ASNLF/GAM members in question, near Lhokseumawe in September 2001.
48 General Wiranto was named by many as having been involved in fomenting the Ambon troubles; for example, by assisting with the payment of Laskar Jihad members, and by organising their arms. In these activities he was alleged to have been assisted by both active and non-active senior army officers, some of whom had previously been identified as factional enemies but who had subsequently made their peace with him. Funding for these groups declined during 2001, reflecting Wiranto’s reduced access to sources of official and unofficial income.

49 In North Maluku the local governor is a former army officer, imposing de facto military control. In Aceh technical authority lies with the governor, while actual authority lies with the TNI. The ‘civilianising’ of the Aceh conflict was intended to act as a means of allowing dialogue to occur without changing security activities on the ground.

4 Factions, reform and reassertion

1 Falintil brought down a helicopter that was transporting twelve senior officers across East Timor on 4 June 1998, including local commander Colonel Slamet Sidabutar and the commander of Kodam IX Udayana, Major General Yudomo. The crash of the helicopter at Liuraca, near Viqueque on East Timor’s south coast, and the death of all those on board was attributed by the military to bad weather. An unofficial Falintil report attributed the downing of the helicopter to a ground-to-air missile, the only one that Falintil possessed.

2 There were reports of some of Indonesia’s sixteen Hawk aircraft in action in Aceh in mid-2002, despite an agreement with the British government that the aircraft would only be used for training and would not be used for counter-insurgency operations. It was reported that the aircraft were based at Medan, near Aceh. A Colonel Djubaedi was quoted as saying that the aircraft were being used to ‘restore order’ in Aceh. There were also reports of the Hawk aircraft in action in East Timor prior to August 1999 and also in West Papua (Norton-Taylor and Aglionby 2002).

3 Interestingly, Elson dismisses or plays down Suharto’s corruption both in Yogyakarta and, later, as president (Elson 2001: 71–2, 196–8, 281).

4 Authority was handed over in a letter known as the Letter of Instruction of 11 March (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret), popularly known as Supersemar.

5 Sometimes known as the ‘Hankam Group’, or Department of Defence Group.

6 PDI chairman Wahono complained that the whole ‘electoral’ process needed reform.

7 He was removed from his post by Suharto in 1994 as a consequence of this outburst.

8 This observation is based on discussions with senior members of Aceh’s ASNLF/GAM and West Papua’s PDP, as well as more junior members of Ambon’s FKM.

9 Wiranto would have been well acquainted with events in East Timor through conventional intelligence sources that reported to him as part of their duties.

10 There were some differences between Wiranto and Hendropriyono, based primarily on competing personal ambitions and, to a much lesser extent, the degree of their personal relations with Suharto and Megawati Sukarnoputri respectively.

11 The depopulation of East Timor reflected an army policy dating back to the 1950s of leaving as little as possible in place in a territory that was about to be occupied by an ‘invading’ force. This also explains much of the burning and destruction of East Timor that occurred after the ballot.
12 Syafrie was also linked to the unprovoked shooting of protesters at the Trisakti University, Central Jakarta, in May 1998, and to what was believed to have been the instigation of rioting at that time in Jakarta.

13 Major General Damiri later told the trial of former East Timor governor Abilio Soares that the UN was responsible for the violence and destruction in the territory in the period before and after the referendum on independence. He claimed that the UN police were ‘the only party responsible for having the authority to maintain security and order’, and cited clashes between pro- and anti-integration groups in Dili on 25 August 1999. However, the UN civilian police in East Timor were unarmed and under explicit instructions to call on Indonesian police to quell disturbances, while the Indonesian government stipulated that, under the 5 May agreement which allowed the referendum to go ahead, that Indonesia would be wholly responsible for security in the territory at that time. The 25 August incident occurred when gangs of pro-integration militia members, having paraded around Dili, began attacking pro-independence individuals and buildings with the active support of the TNI. As an accredited UN observer at that time, the author had arrived in Dili from Maliana that day to find that while most of the destruction and killing had ended, armed pro-Jakarta militiamen were still roaming the streets unchecked. These same militiamen travelled to Maliana the following day, as did the author, where they attempted to sack the combined pro-independence villages of Tapo-Memo near the West Timor border. In this unprovoked attack, the militias were openly assisted by the TNI and police, one of whom shot a villager in the back as he tried to flee the attack. Fabrications such as those espoused by Damiri were regarded as stock-in-trade for the TNI in relation to its more gross violations, and Damiri’s patently dishonest testimony in court indicated that the TNI was far from reformed.

14 In fact, a 32 per cent increase was granted.

15 Juwono’s intention to scale back the Kopassus force from around 7–8,000 to 800 may be seen not only as an attempt at asserting control over the TNI but also, and more importantly, as breaking the back of a branch of the TNI that had supported Prabowo’s ‘green’ faction and which had run an agenda somewhat independently of the TNI.

16 Surjadi was later appointed by Abdurrahman Wahid to replace Wiranto as Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs.

17 Brigadier General Farid Zainuddin was also identified as belonging to this core group, as assistant head of socio-political affairs in 1996 and, after promotion in 1997, as head of BIA. However, Farid was sacked from this position shortly afterwards and appeared to lose influence within this group as well as more generally.

18 Prabowo graduated in 1974 and is therefore formally regarded as being of the class of that year, rather than of ’73.

19 Sources close to these officers say that the identification and organisation of pro-Islamic ‘green’ officers in the army was carried out during meetings held at the masjid, or mosque, at Akabri.

20 Sesko Angkatan Daerah (Sesko land force, or army).

21 The idea of constellations of officers rather than factions was first mooted in my presence by Herb Feith and Lance Castles in Yogyakarta in 1997. At that time it had considerable validity, and which in late 1999 and early 2000 became more explicit.

22 In early December 1999, twenty-three senior officers were further promoted by TNI chief Widodo, for ‘dedication and loyalty’.

23 One critic of the TNI, Munir, observed that, because of his support for the continuation of the Territorial structure, Agus Widjojo was in fact not a reformist but a conservative. Agus Widjojo would shift his position on questions
of fundamental reform so as to appear more like a reformer depending on his audience at the time.

24 It would not be overly cynical to suggest that at least some of Agus Wirahadikusumah’s enthusiasm for military reform stemmed from his own career aspirations.

25 Bakin was also replaced, in December 2000, by BIN, a move intended to integrate existing state intelligence bodies. The Ministry of Defence, however, also established its own new intelligence body, the Directorate General of Strategic Environment Analysis, covering both intelligence and counter-intelligence activities.


27 One observer described Tyasno as ‘politically flexible’.

28 In May 2001, Abdurrahman Wahid acknowledged that this had been the case.

29 On 1 March 2001, there was a further meeting of ninety-five senior officers, including all key current and immediate past officers.

5 The political economy of the TNI

1 Salaries have varied between ranks and depending on variables such as length of service, family allowances and other assorted allowances. However, according to McCulloch, it was generally accepted that salaries were only capable of sustaining servicemen for between one and two weeks of each month (McCulloch 2000a: 13).

2 This was a pro-rata budget based on changing budgetary dates, and was therefore less than was expected for that year.

3 This increase was about half of the 62 per cent increase originally requested by the defence minister, Juwono, which was intended to redress the TNI’s loss of capital purchasing power and to begin to buy itself away from its business activities. The budget increase had no effect on the latter area.

4 This allocation was based on estimates for a larger budget than was actually delivered for that year, but is indicative of the conventional distribution of online funds.

5 It should be noted that the exchange rate between the rupiah and the US dollar is volatile and fluctuates regularly, so valuations are only approximate.

6 These yayasan were initially developed by Suharto in the early 1950s as a means of generating income to support the troops under his command, although it was widely believed that he also benefited personally from such business activities.

7 According to a confidential report, one example of the use of this broadly defined ‘welfare’ was for the purchase of bullet-proof vests. Lesley McCulloch also noted that it included cars for use by officers (2000a: 20).

8 Such favours can range from personal services to undertaking highly illegal tasks.

9 ‘Bapakism’ derives from the term bapak (father), which is frequently used as an honorific to denote either respect or a male of superior status.

10 Bulog has been the subject of extensive corruption investigations since 1999, primarily in relation to funds being siphoned off for political purposes, in particular to Golkar, the former government party.

11 Australian Wheat Board employee (January 2001: personal communication).

12 The divisional finance officer at the time of Suharto’s transfer was Sudjono Humardhani, who later rose to become a leading ‘financial general’ and one of Suharto’s top ‘fix-it’ men during the early years of the New Order government.

13 Formally, many TNI businesses were empty shells, and a number collapsed after the economic meltdown of mid-1997.
14 This information was initially compiled by Matt Davies, and later reported by the authoritative Australian SBS television programme *Dateline*.

15 From an interview conducted in 2001 in Jakarta. The general’s identity, in this context, has to remain confidential.

16 From an interview with the official, 10 September 2001, Banda Aceh.

17 The ‘Tidar Boys’ from West Java, near Mount Tidar (hence the name), were a group of drop-outs from the Indonesian military academy and martial arts practitioners, trained by members of Kopassus. The martial arts section, Satria Muda Indonesia (Indonesia Young Knights), was under the patronage of Prabowo.

18 Tommy also co-owned, with Suharto’s son Bambang, a huge fishing fleet, PT Ting Sheen Bandasejahtera, and a Taiwanese company, Ting Sheen Oceanic Developments Co. Ltd.

19 Considerable evidence showed that numerous ‘special military’ personnel (*militer khusus* – *milsus*) – former members of Kopassus – were in fact active in East Timor and Aceh, and probably in East Java and Maluku (having helped train the Laskar Jihad in West Java). However, the exact numbers of *milsus* in operation at the time were unknown.

20 It is believed that these particular aircraft were bought using off-line budget income.

21 Lesley McCulloch noted that ‘No discussion of the Indonesian military in business would be complete without attention being drawn to the inefficiency, mismanagement, and rampant corruption which have all become hallmarks of ABRI’s commercial activities’ (McCulloch 2000a: 3).

### 6 The more things change …

1 ASNLF/GAM’s military wing, known as Free Aceh Movement Force (Angkatan Gerakan Aceh Merdeka – AGAM) changed its name in August 2002 to Aceh State Army (Tentera Negeri Aceh).

2 There is some debate about exactly when the ASNLF severed its ties with Libya. Some say the ties were cut in the late 1980s or early 1990s.

3 The preceding text was originally published in a slightly different form as ‘With Aceh’s guerrillas’, *Inside Indonesia* 69, January–March 2002.

4 From personal experience, this response to military atrocities was exactly the same as the response that I had witnessed in East Timor, which overwhelmingly chose to separate from Indonesia.

5 The following was originally written to support a hearing in the US to consider the status of an Acehnese refugee.

6 These comments are based on personal experience of both East Timor in 1995 and 1999, and Aceh in 2001.

7 One militia group, Mahidi, was said by a military intelligence source to have been established by and named after Mahidin Simbolan, and that its name as an acronym was a play on both his name and the term ‘*mati atau hidup untuk integrasi*’ (‘live or die for integration’).

8 In fact, military representation in the Cabinet was quickly reduced soon after Suharto assumed power, although this did not reflect its real political power at that time.

9 In effect, and after removing Territorial troops from the equation, all troops who might have been deployed to trouble spots were so deployed at this time, or were on rotation from such deployment.

10 An English journalist who had visited Aceh in mid-2002 reported that ‘Jakarta’s popularity in rural Aceh is not zero, it’s in minus figures’, and that ‘the countryside seems anarchic and the “hearts and minds” of the Acehnese are not with Jakarta’ (May 2002: personal communication).
11 This is based on numerous discussions with various senior figures in the Acehnese separatist movement.

12 A wide range of views have been expressed on this issue, and a few of them, held by Indonesian scholars, have been communicated to the author over a number of years. They range from close or general agreement to degrees of disagreement; the latter generally state that Megawati was not especially close to any officers in particular and that she was not favourably disposed towards the TNI. All of the evidence that I have been able to gather since 1993, when such closeness first became obvious, has confirmed that she has in fact maintained a close relationship with a number of senior officers.

13 This observer, who cannot be identified, has had close relations with a wide range of senior officers for many years, and has helped the army draft documents regarding internal organisation and reform.

14 These comments were made in an off-the-record setting, and so cannot be attributed.

15 Endriartono focused his account to the DPR on the issue of ‘professionalism’, opening the hearing with his presentation of a twenty-page paper entitled ‘Developing professionalism: changing the essence of the military into a State Defence Force’ (Kurniawan 2002).

16 For example, Borneo/Kalimantan might conceivably become a single entity, as it arguably once was; Java and perhaps Bali might constitute a further single political entity; while Sumatra (excluding Aceh) has a degree of communal cohesion as does Aceh itself and, so it is claimed by the PDP, as does West Papua.
Bibliography

Aditjondro, G. (n.d.) ‘East Timor: will the UN make another blunder?’ The Jakarta-post.com, online special.
—— (2000a) ‘Chopping the global tentacles of the Suharto oligarchy’, unpublished paper, University of Newcastle, NSW.
—— (2000b) ‘Financial underwriters: companies which directly or indirectly financed military and paramilitary operations to repress pro-democracy and pro-independence activism in Indonesia and East Timor’, 18 November, University of Newcastle, NSW.
—— (2000c) ‘Guns, pamphlets and handie-talkies: how the military exploited local ethno-religious tensions in Maluku to preserve their political and economic privileges’, paper given at Conflicts and Violence in Indonesia conference, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Humboldt University, Berlin, 3–5 July.


—— (2001b) Interview given to the author, TNI headquarters, Jakarta, 9 September.


Bibliography
Bibliography


DTE (2000) ‘The role of the military in regional autonomy or TNI hegemony?’, *Down to Earth No. 46*.


FICA (Fellowship of Indonesian Christians in America) (n.d.) ‘Waai war’, available online at www.fica.org/hr/ambon/enwaai%20war.html


Infobisnis (1997), no. 47/III/May, available online at www.munindo.brd.delartikel\llartikel_03\artikel_03.htm


Institut Studi Arus Informasi (1995) Bayang-Bayang PKI, ISAI no. 01/95, Jakarta: Percetakan PT Intermasa.


—— (1999g) ‘No friction in TNI, says General Tyasno’ The Jakarta Post.com, 18 December.
—— (2001a) ‘TNI should be given more authority to maintain security’, The Jakarta Post.com, 2 March.
—— (2001b) ‘Kostrad declares war against GAM’ The Jakarta Post.com, 8 March.


—— (1999c) ‘Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin Siapkan Pencana Daruat’, 1 September.


Sudrajat, E. (1997)


—— (1998b) ‘Chasing after Soeharto’s wealth: where should we begin?’, 6 June.

Bibliography


TNI internal document (n.d.) Rumusan Sementara Pokok-Pokok Pikiran Binter Kedepan, TNI Headquarters, Jakarta.
—— (2001a) Pokok-Pokok Pikiran Tentang Penyelenggaraan Fungsi Teritorial Kedepan (Sebagai Fungsi Pemerintahan), March, TNI Headquarters, Jakarta.


Xihuanet, 17 May.


Index

ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) 11, 64, 172
Aceh: Brimob bandits 135, 222, 224, 227–8; deployment to (2001–2) 234; Dutch conquest of 43, 222–3; East Timor comparison 227–9; elections (1999) 223; Free Aceh Movement 91, 107, 135, 222, 228; gun running 209; independence 19, 169, 223; intelligence agencies in 126; Iskander Muda Military Command 227, 234, 241; Islam 224–5; Japanese invasion 223; Kodam 80, 227, 234; Kopassus groups 97, 102, 107, 109; Kostrad brutalities 91, 251n-7; marines involvement 8; massacres (1989–98) 223; massacres (1991) 91; militias 123, 228; murders 126, 228; natural resources 20, 223; negotiated settlement, problems with 237; paramilitaries 9; rebellion 19, 48, 85, 223, 226–7; shariah 22, 169; ‘special region’ status 223; State of Civil Emergency 136, 227; sultan 226; taxes 225; TNI placements in 71, 137
Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF) see Free Aceh Movement
Aditjondro, G. 103, 208, 209, 213
Afghanistan 93
Agum Gumelar 155, 171, 175; and Megawati 240; reform 172; sidelined 166
Agus Widjojo: and Agus Wirahadikusumah 178, 179; on Indonesia society 185; and ‘New Paradigm’ 183; ‘professional’ leader 172; Territorial structure reform 77, 78, 86–7, 185–6, 255n-23; on TNI 23, 231–2, 246
Agus Wirahadikusumah: death of 28, 180; investigates corruption 205; on Kodam 77; and Kostrad 92, 178–80; and reform 177–8; sacking of 205; Territorial structure reform 87, 172; on TNI 174–5
aid 200, 206–8
Aidit 58
air force: business interests 219; equipment purchases 32; Hawk aircraft 254n-2; primary role 141–2; purging of 8, 60; service hierarchy 32; size of 8; special forces 111
Airborne Brigade 121
aircraft industry 212
Aitarak militia 118, 122
Akabri see Armed Forces Academy
Alatas, Ali 167
aliran 156
Ambon: marines involvement 8; violence in 108–9, 208, 211, 235, 254n-48
Amphibious Reconnaissance 111
Anderson, Bennedict 12, 14, 38
Andreski, S. 26
animism 37–8, 105
Anwar, D.F. 36, 64
Apodeti (Associacao Popular Democratica de Timor) 146, 233
Archipellic Outlook 32, 36
Armed Forces Academy 9
Armed Forces Enters the Village 79
Armed Forces Intelligence Organisation see BIA (Baden Intelijen ABRI)
Armed Forces Intelligence Schools 131–2
arms industry 212
army: brutality of 237; business interests
142, 167, 170, 188, 216–18; domination of 141–2; size of 7–8; size reduced 8
Army Chief of Staff 243
Army Parachute Regiment Command 94
Army Strategic Command see Kostrad (Komando Strategik Angkatan Darat)
Artha Graha group 204, 211
Arun plant 225
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 147, 149
Australia: Interfet 88; journalists murdered 95, 116; Kopassus training in 108; leaked intelligence 118, 120, 253n-32; national identity 23; post-war 45; relationship with 27; scrutiny by BIN 133; visa-free travel cancelled 150–1
authority 24–5
autonomy legislation 22, 136–7, 197, 238–9

Babinsa (Bintara Pembina Desa) 85, 87
Backman, M. 213
Bahasa Indonesia 14, 36, 42, 43, 224
BAIS (Baden ABRI Intelijen Strategis) 130, 131–2
Bakin (Baden Koordinasi Intelijen Negara) 60, 129, 130, 131, 132; Australia, reprisals against 150–1
Bakorinda (Baden Koordinasi Intelijen Daerah) 131
Bakorstanas 130, 132, 179
Baktiman 177
Bali: Kodam 81; massacres (1965–6) 58; military command 121; occupation of 43; overpopulation of 42; tourism 20, 150; transmigration programme 80
Balibo 95, 116, 126
‘Balkanisation’ 11
‘ballot’ militias 117–26
Bandung 143
banking 49
‘bapakism’ (patron–client relationship) 192–4
Batak 224–5
Batu Merah 92
Bela Negra 123
Bereh, Daud 223
Besi Murah Puti militia 118
BIA (Baden Intelijen ABRI) 120, 126, 132
Bimantoro 181
BIN (Baden Intelijen Nasional) 68, 103, 132–3, 240
‘black’ income 188, 195
Borneo 92; see also Kalimantan
BPI (Baden Pusat Intelijen) 131
BPK (Baden Pemeriksaan Keuangan) 179, 205
Brigif Linud 17 121
Brimob (Brigade Mobil) 134–7; as bandits 135, 222, 224, 227–8, 244; in reform 86; vulnerability of 109
Brunei People’s Party 92
Buddhism 15–16, 211
Bush, George 151
business activities: associated business 209–11; background to 142, 170, 198–202; extent of 167; institutional business structure 213–20; legal activities 188–9; money and murder 196–8; off-line budget exposed 205–6; off-line income 190–2; views on 188
Cabinet members 68
Cambodia 209
CASH Berhad 211
Central Intelligence Agency (Indonesian) 131
Central Java 80, 97, 115
Central Sulawesi: Christian–Muslim conflict 136; civil strife (1999–2001) 180, 235; militias 123; paramilitaries 9; rebellion 19, 48
centralisation 26
Chandra, S, 86, 191
‘charitable’ foundations see yayasan
Chiefs of Staff 68
China, arms from 55
Chinese Indonesians 143, 144, 211, 224–5
Christian–Muslim conflicts 91–2, 102–3, 136, 224–5
Christians in military 165
CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) (US) 58
civic action campaigns 79
Civil Defence Force see Hansip
civil role 10
civil service secondment 76–7
‘civilianisation’ of police 9, 85, 135, 173
civilians 75, 76
class structure 20
‘clusters’ 156–7
Cold War 11
colonialism 18, 37, 43–4, 46
Index

combat units 87–9
Comexindo 210
commander-in-chief 68, 69, 131, 243
communism 45–6, 70; see also PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia)
Confrontation (1963–6) 17, 27, 59, 74, 233
conglomerates 209–11
conscription 8
‘conservative professionals’ group 232, 240, 241
constellations 177, 181, 255n-21
constitution, changes to 17, 149
Constitutional Commission 22
construction projects 75, 79

copper 20
corruption: Chinese and 143;
demonstrations against 146–7;
financial generals 142, 147, 167, 190, 200; investigations into 205; in Kostrad 179, 205; levels of 30;
regulations against 189
Costa, Willem Da 242, 252n-29
Council for the Enforcement of Security and Law 133–4
counterfeiting 205–6
coup (1956) 49
coup (1957) 49
coup (1965) 54–8, 142
cover operations see Kopassus (Komando Pasukan Khusus)
crime 90
criminals, killing of 132
culture 37

Damiri, Adam 118, 167
Dar’ul Islam rebellion (1953–65) 19, 47–8, 223, 236
Dayak communities 239
defence act draft 242–3
defence department, business interests 215
defence industry 212
defence operations 69
defence role 9–11
democracy 246
Democratic Party 186
‘democratisation’ programmes 159
demonstrations (1952) 48
demonstrations (1977) 146–8
demonstrations (1991) 153
development: and economy 20–1; local projects 79–80; New Order and 14;
and stability 30–2; success of 236–7; TNI role 75–9
devolution 22–3
Dharsono, Hartono Resko 149–50
Dili: massacres (1991) 111–12, 118, 121, 153, 154; parachute landings 146; see also East Timor
dissent 70, 146–8, 148–50
district heads 11
Dive Force Command 110
divisional identification 80
Djaja Suparman 179, 205
Djamari Chaniago 180
DOM (Daerah Operasi Militer) 89, 223
domestic policy, influence on 27–8
DPKN (Dewan Pemantapan Ketahanan Nasional) 133–4
DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) 6–7, 63, 164, 174, 231; commander-in-chief, approval for 171
drill 35
drug trade 188, 195
dual function see dwifungsi (dual function)
Dutch East Indies 37, 43, 46, 222–3
Dutch New Guinea 50
dwifungsi (dual function) 9–11; law for 29, 64; and ‘Middle Way’ 52; ‘new’ 182–5; as official policy 53; opposition to 62; original rationale 174, 233; and stability 31

East Jakarta shopping centre 203
East Java: army divisions 80, 88; ‘ninja killings’ 103; riots (2001) 231; Trisula campaign 92
East Timor: Aceh compared 227–9; ‘ballot’ militias 117–26; battalions 120; border patrols 88, 134, 235; Brimob 228; economy 193; hit squads 122; independence ballot 111–12, 122, 123, 166–8; independence ceremony 231, 234; integrationists 123, 146; intelligence agencies in 126; international force 88; and international law 237, 238; invasion of 40, 93, 115–16, 121, 145–6, 234; Kodam 227; Kopassus groups 97, 106–7, 167; marines involvement 8; massacres (1991) 111–12, 118, 120, 121, 153, 154; massacres (1999) 118, 122, 253n-32, 255n-13; militia command structure 124–5; militias 111–13, 115–17,
Index

Hartono Resko Dharsono 147, 156
Hasan di Tiro 223, 226
hegemony 26
Hendropriyono: at BIN 122, 133; in Cabinet 164; corruption of 167; in East Timor 104, 118; and Kopassus 103–4; and Megawati 155, 240; Theys Eluay murder 197
Heritage Fund 206
Hindness, B. 26
Hong Kong 50
‘House of Money’ group 204
Hugeng 148
human rights abuses: continuation of 227, 235; endorsement of 242; investigations into 175, 196; organisations 131, 196, 251n-7; trials 126, 168
‘Hunter’ units 135, 224
Huntingdon, S. 29
hydro-carbon 20
ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia) 155–6
IMF (International Monetary Fund) 11, 201
imperialism 41–3
income: ‘black’ income 188, 195; diversion of funds 206–8; off-line 190–2; sources of 194–6
independence: aftermath of 65–6; attaining of 7; compromises for 47; declaration of 44–5
indoctrination 76
Indonesia: allegiance to 30; formation of 44–5; importance of 11; as Javanese empire 41–3; national interest in regional relations 12–14; political geography 15–19; power as political application 24–7; stability of the state 19–22; the state 14–15; state reorganisation 22–4; symbiosis with TNI 12
Indonesia Baru dan Tantangan (Agus Wirahadikusumah) 174–5
Indonesia Raya idea 245
Indonesia Raya version of the state 17
Indonesia: The Rise of Capital (Robinson) 151
Indonesian Communist Party see PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia)
Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle 187
Indonesian National Police see Polri
Indonesian Young Knights 96
infrastructure 75
Ingo, W. 133
insecurity of elite 64–6
Institute of Constitutional Awareness 147
integralism 63–4
integration option 123
intelligence agencies 123–9; BAIS (Baden ABRI Intelijen Strategis) 130, 131–2; Bakin (Baden Koordinasi Intelijen Negara) 60, 128, 131; Bakorstanas 129; BIA (Baden Intelijen ABRI) 120; BIN (Baden Intelijen Nasional) 68, 132–3; chain of command 131; downgrading of 127; DPKN 133–4; functions of 123; information gathering 126; internal focus of 138–9; Koplamtib 129; Kostrad’s intelligence 134; Opsus (Operasi Khusus) 59–60, 128; police intelligence 134–7; reorganisation of 132–3; running of 126–7; SGI (Satgas Intel) 97
Intelligence Task Force 97
Interfet (International Force in East Timor) 88
Internal Political Front 117
International Crisis Group report (2001) 8, 189, 220
international operations 93
Irian Jaya 58–9
Iskander Muda Military Command 227, 234, 241
Islam: attacks on 103, 148; and Free Aceh movement 224–5; Islamic factions 155–6; Islamic law 22; and Pancasila 42; promotion of 152; see also Dar’ul Islam; Muslims
Islamic Laskar Jihad see Laskar Jihad (Holy Warriors)
Islamic rebellion see Dar’ul Islam rebellion
Islamic State 19
Ismail, Chaeruddin 181
Jakarta Charter (JP 2001g) 22
Jamaika 226
Japan: influence of 27–9, 29–30, 44; occupation by 19, 27, 44

Jasin 147

Java: demonstrations (1977) 146–8; Kodam 80–1; Kopassus groups 98; Kostrad 88; Majapahit Empire 16; massacres (1965–6) 58; overpopulation of 42; paramilitaries 9; pre-election riots 160; transmigration programme 80; see also Central Java; East Java; Jakarta Java-centric project 18, 20–1, 47; and devolution 22–3

Javanese empire 41–3

Javanese language 36

JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) 171

Jenkins, D. 98, 150

Joko Subroto 179, 205

journalists expelled 151

JPS (Jaring Pengamanan Sosial) 206–8

Jusuf, Mohammad 33, 147

Juwono Sudharsono 162, 170–1, 188–9

Kakuei Tanaka 128, 144

Kalimantan: autonomy laws 239; independence 23; intervention in 68; Kodam 81; milsus 103; natural resources 20, 196; TNKU 92–3

Kaltim Prima mine 196

Kammen, D. 86, 191

Kamra 113–15

kasekten 38

kekaryaan 76–7

Kelian gold mine 196

Kelas Tidur see Tidar Group

Kesatuan Gurita 110

Kesatuan Komando Teritorium III 94

Kiki Siyahnakri 183, 186

Kivlan Zen 164, 211

KKAD (Kesatuan Komando Angkatan Darat) 94

KNIL (Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger) 43, 44, 47, 49

Kobame 197–8, 202–4

Kodalops (Komando Pengendalian Operasi) 136

Kodam (Komando Daerah Militer) 79–85; administration 85; battalions 81; coordinating body 130; intelligence role 130; restructuring of 77–8, 80–4; retention dispute 178

Kodim (Komando Distrik Militer) 85, 87, 130

Komnas HAM 133, 168

Kontras-Aceh 196, 254n-7

Kopaska (Komando Pasukan Katak) 110

Kopassandha (Komando Pasukan Khusu Sandhi Yudha) 95, 115–16

Kopassus (Komando Pasukan Khusus) 93–9; business interests 215; charitable foundations 197–8, 202–4; clandestine members 29, 211, 228, 254n-12; domestic training 105–8; in East Timor 97, 106–7, 167; education programme 202; foreign training 108–9; ‘irregulars’ 102–4; prisoners of 116; specialist groups 96–102; Theys Eluay murder 104–5, 196–8; training 95–6, 98, 99–101, 116

Kopkamtib 59, 76, 128, 129

Koramil (Komando Rayon Militer) 85, 87

Korem (Komando Resort Militer) 85, 130

Kostrad (Komando Strategik Angkatan Darat) 87–9; and Agus Wirahdikusumah 178–80; ‘attempted coup’ 58; brutalities 91; business interests 213–14; company links 210; corruption investigation 179; intelligence agencies 134; and politics 92–3; Polri clash 91; professionalism 89–92

Kowilhan (Komando Wilayah Pertahanan) 78

KSS (Kobame Super Sentra) 203

Ktut Abdurachman Masagung 203

Kusnanto Anggoro 187, 197

labour disputes 130, 163

Lampung 80, 103

Land Force Command Unit 94

languages 14, 36, 42, 43, 224

Lantara, Gerhan 121

Laskar Jihad (Holy Warriors): in Central Sualwesi 136; in East Timor 234; funding for 169, 180, 254n-48; in Maluku 102–3; support for 9, 28; as TNI proxy 123; weapons for 208

Laskar Rakyat 125

Latief, Abdul 57, 163

law 15, 29, 61

Lemhanas 76, 199

Lev, Daniel 52

Lhokseumawe 224

liberalism 46–50, 62

Libya 225
Lindsey, Tim 61
lines-of-command 192–4
Liquisa massacre (1999) 118, 122
LKB (Lembaga Kesadaran
   Berkonstitusi) 147
local politics, ending military
   involvement in 173
logging 195, 197
Lombok 180
lottery, banning of 155
Lowry, Robert 62, 191
Lukes, S. 24
Lumintang, Johnny 98
McCulloch, L. 195
MacFarling, Ian 55
Machmud, Amir 144
Mackie, J. 21
Madiun affair 46, 91
Madura 80
Mahfud MD 133
Mahidin Simbolen 121, 177, 229
Majapaphit Empire 16
Mak, J. 31–2
Makikut militia 117
Malaysia: and Borneo 92; business trips
to 208; Confrontation (1963–6) 17,
27, 59, 74, 233; creation of 18; gun
running 209; share-swapping 211
Maluku (Moluccas): Christian–Muslim
   conflict 102–3; civil strife (1999–2001)
   180; coup (1957) 49; intervention in
   68; Kodam 81, 234–5; Kopassus
groups 102–3; Kostrad brutalities
   91–2; militias 123; paramilitaries 9;
   rebellion 19; and TNI interest 208–9;
   see also paramilitaries
Milsus 103
mining 20, 195–6
Mobile Brigade see Brimob (Brigade
   Mobil)
Moertono, S. 16
Mokoginta 148
Moluccas see Maluku (Moluccas)
monarchy 16, 37–8
monopolies 163
mosques 152
MPR (Mejelis Permusyawaratan
   Rakyat): constitution, changes to
   149; members of 6–7, 53, 63;
   representation in 174, 231; TNI
   withdrawal from 173
Muchdi Purwopranjono 163, 164
Muhammadiyah 165
Murdani, Benny: BAIS established 131;
as commander-in-chief 68;
indoctrination programme 76;
intelligence agencies 60, 127, 128,
129; in Kopassandha 115–16; and
Murtopo 145–6; Portuguese Timor
98, 233; sacked as commander-in-
   chief 145, 152, 154; ‘stability in
depth’ 75; successor to 157; and
Suharto 149, 150–1, 152–3; Tanjung
Priok incident (1984) 148
Murdaya Widyawimarta 211
murders: generals 54–8, 142–3, 163; and money 196–8
Murtopo, Ali 59, 128, 144, 233, 253n-42; and Murdani 145–6
Muslims: Christian–Muslim conflicts 91–2, 102–3, 136, 224–5; informal 249n-9; lottery, banning of 155; marriage and divorce laws 144; organisations 165; strategy to obtain votes 154; Tanjung Priok incident (1984) 148, 150; volunteers 164
Muspida 130
Musso 45–6
mysterious killings 28, 132, 249n-12
mysticism 96, 105
Nahdlatul Ulama 49, 103
nanggala teams 120
Nasution, Abdul Haris: attempted kidnap of 55; bloodless coups 49; in LKB 147; martial law (1957) 29; Middle Way 51–2; Petition of Fifty 148; PRRI-Permetsa rebellion (1950) 51; sacked as Chief of Staff 48; on Suharto 142
nation, meaning of 13–14
National Council 49–50
National Council for Timorese Resistance 112
national identity 13–14
National Intelligence Agency see BIN (Baden Intelijen Nasional)
National Mandate Party 187
National Military Academy 76
National Resilience programme 31, 74, 75, 76
National Stability Coordination Agency 130
National Vigilance Refresher Course 76
nationalisation 50, 199
nationalism 20
nationalist myths 14, 26–7
natural resources 20, 196, 223
navy: brought to heel 60; business interests 218–19; primary role 141–2; size of 7–8, 110; special forces 109–11; upgrading of 33
NCOs (Non-commissioned Officers) 87, 191–2
Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) 19, 47–8
Netherlands: colonial army 44, 47, 49; colonialism 18, 37, 43, 43–4, 46; nationalisation of Dutch interests 50, 199; wars with 19
New Order: ABRI 11; business activities 199–200; decline of 64; demonstrations (1977) 146–8; and development 14; discontent within 61; economic distribution 20, 21; endgame 158–60; intelligence agencies 129; mass organisation law 148–9; military culture 10; and power 38; violence of 95
‘New Paradigm’ 9, 86, 172–7, 183, 185–7
‘ninja killings’ 103
Noble Warriors for Upholding Pancasila 123
North Muluku 136
Numberi, Freddy 172
Nusa Tenggara 49, 227
October 17 affair 48
off-line budget exposed 205–6
off-line income 190–2
officer corps 8–9; ‘active’ officers in debates 184; in civilian positions 173; education of 76; increases in size 76–7; military culture 34–5; political and administrative role 63; resentment of 48; turnover 85–7, 181
oil 30, 151, 200–2, 201
‘oknum’ 188–9
Old Order 54
Operation Clean Sweep 118
Operation Komodo (1974) 146, 233–4
Operation Mandala (1962) 92, 128, 253n-43
Operation Seroja (1975) 93, 146
Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order see Kopkamtib
OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka) see Free Papua Organisation
Opsus (Operasi Khusus) 59–60, 128
orders, disappearance of 192–4
organicist thinking 64
‘otherness’ 35
Overall Struggle rebellion 50–1
P4 63, 253n-33
Padjadjaran 19
Pakistan 18
Pam Swakarsa 113, 115, 118
PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional) 187
Pancasila: development of 76; guidelines for understanding 63; mass organisation law 149; meaning of 250n-8; as sole philosophy 52, 130
Pancasila Youth 204
Panjaitan, Sintong 153
Papuan Presidium Council/Free Papua Organisation 17, 102, 104, 105
paramilitaries 113, 114; see also Brimob (Brigade Mobil)
Parito Pacific group 211
Paspampres 96, 111
‘patrimonial-prebendalism’ 176, 182–3
patrimonialism 25
patriotism 35, 106
patronage 143, 149, 156, 192–4; see also ‘patrimonial-prebendalism’
PDI (Partai Demokratik Indonesia) 149, 153, 160–1
PDI-P (Partai Democratik Indonesia-Perjuangan) 187
PDP (Presidium Dewan Papua) see Free Papua Movement
Pemuda Pancasila 204, 211
Pemuda Keamanan Desa 125
People’s Consultative Assembly see MPR (Mejelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat)
People’s Legislative Assembly see DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat)
People’s Militia 125
People’s Resistance 117
‘people’s war’ 74
Perdanakusumah, Ian Santoso 180
Permesta group 51
Pertamina oil company 149, 200–2
Petition of Fifty 146–8
petrol smuggling 32
Petrus affair (1983–4) 28, 132, 249n-12
philosophical origins 27–9
physical geography 32
piracy 195
PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia): air force loyalty 8; anti-PKI putsch 20, 54–9, 92, 142–3; in government 51, 53; growth of 53; policies of 55–6; as political prisoners 129; Sukarno-Hatta revolt 46
PNI-NU coalition 49
Polda (Polisi Daerah) 136
police see Polri
political and administrative role 63–4, 140
Political and Social Affairs office 173
political geography 15–19, 40
political parties, formation of 187
political prisoners 129, 163
Polri: business interests 219–20; ‘civilisation’ of 9, 85, 135, 173; in DPR 6; factionalism 181; hostility towards 91; intelligence units 135; Kostrad clash 91; in military command structure 134; paramilitaries 114–15; regional police 136; and TNI 135, 136; see also Brimob (Brigade Mobil)
population redistribution see transmigration programme
Portuguese Timor 18, 98, 145–6, 233–4
Poso 136
post-colonial era 17–18
post-war period (1945–9) 44–6
power 24–7, 37–9
PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) 149, 187
PPRC (Pasukan Pemukul Reaksi Cepat) 89–90, 108, 111
prabhawa 39
Prabowo Subianto: business interests 95; dismissal of 102; in ‘green’ faction 156, 172; hostage rescue 102, 108; independence demonstrations 153; Kobame 202–3; in Kopassus 95; Kopassus groups 97–8; in Kostrad 92; martial arts 96; sacking of 163, 165; supporters of 180; and Wiranto 180; Young Guards 117
PRB (Brunei people’s Party) 92
pre-colonial era 16–17
presidency: authority of 29, 231–3; and foreign policy 27; personal ties 11; petition against role of 148; presidential crisis (2001) 231–2; presidential guard 96, 111; status of 158; TNI links to 239–42; weakened 183
prisoners, treatment of 116
‘professional faction’ 155, 187, 232
prostitution 195
protection rackets 195–6
provinces, influence of 36–7
PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia) 51
PRRI-Permesta rebellion (1950) 21, 50–1, 233, 236
PT Hanura Co. Ltd. 197
PT Pindad 209
‘public intel’ 128
Pusintelstrat 131

Raden Hartono 159, 160
Railakan I 117
Rais, Amien 78–9, 165, 246
Rapid Reaction Strike Force see PPRC (Pasukan Pemukul Reaksi Cepat)
Ratih (Rakyat Terlatih) 113–14
Raya version of the state 17, 245
Reagan, Ronald 151
rebellion (1950) 47
‘red and white’ faction 149, 155, 165, 172, 177
reform: under Habibie 163–6; lack of success 245–6; ‘reform committee’ 162, 186; ‘reform leadership’ 182; reformists 177–8; at standstill 231; see also ‘New Paradigm’
Regional Intelligence Coordinating Body 131
regional relations and national interest 12–14
Regional Security Council 130
regions: as income earners 20; influence of 36–7; resentment of 21
Renville Agreement 19, 47
Republic of the United States of Indonesia, formation of 18, 44–6
retired officers 10, 63, 154, 184, 210
revolution (1945–9) 14, 18
revolutionary councils 56
Revolutionary Government of the RI see PPR1 (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia)
Riau 20, 23, 80, 236, 238
Rickleffs, M. 14
Rifqie Moena 246
right, issue of 26
riots (1968) 8
riots (1973) 143
riots (1996) 160
riots (1997) 160
riots (1998) 172
riots (2001) 231
RMS (Republik Maluku Selatan) 23, 47, 238
Robison, R. 151
Rose Team 102
Royal Netherlands Indies Army see KNIL (Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger)
RPKAD (Resimen Pasukan Komando Angkatan Darat) 94, 144
Rudini 77, 175
Rusdihardjo 181
Ryamizard Ryacudu: as Army Chief of Staff 92, 187, 242; in Kostrad 179;
RWS (Republik Maluku Selatan) 23, 47, 238
Sabah 74
Sadikin, Ali 147
Saka militia 117
salaries 191, 256n-1
Saleh, Ismail 150–1
Sapta Maga 52
Sapu Jagad operations 118, 123
Sarawak 74
Sarono, Hari 230, 232, 240
Sarwo Edhie 95, 144, 145
Sastroamijoyo Cabinet resignation 29, 49
Satgas Atbara 111
Satgas Intel 97
Satgas Merah-Putih militia 123
Satgas Rajawali 85
Satgas Tebas 210
Saudy Marasabessy 180
Saurip Kadi 175, 177, 179
Sayidiman 76
security 10, 31; Council for the Enforcement of Security and Law 133–4; Political and Security Affairs 183; Regional Security Council 130; Security Surveillance Platoons 134; ‘Social Security Net’ 206; Total People’s Defence and Security System 31–2, 74–5, 114, 186, 243; Village Security Youth 125
Security Surveillance Platoons 134
self-sufficiency 199
Sembiring Meliala 159
separatism 91, 236, 237–8
Sesko 9, 77, 199
Seven Pledges 52
SGI (Satgas Intel) 97
shariah 22
ship building 212
shipping 49
Sidwell, T. 69, 75
Simbolen, Mahidin 121, 167, 229
Singapore 50
Sjafrie Sjamsuddin 120, 121
Sjahri 163
Sjarifuddin, Amir 45
SMI (Satria Muda Indonesia) 96
smuggling 49, 195
Soares, Domingos 118
Index

‘Social Security Net’ 206
South Maluku 136, 235
South Sulawesi 19, 47, 48
Souza, Manuel de 118
‘special autonomy’ legislation 197
Special Forces Command see Kopassus
(Comando Pasukan Khusus)
Special Operations see Opsus
Srivijaya 16
stability 19–21; and development 30–2; DPKN 134; education for 76; National Stability Coordination Agency 130; power sites 16
stability-in-depth 75
Stackhouse, J. 151
Staff Training Command College see Sesko
the state 14–15; cohesion of 235–7; conceptions of 15–19; construction of 37, 221; ideology of 52; legitimacy of 17–18; stability of 16, 19–21; state reorganisation 22–4; unitary structure of 22
state institutions 15
states of emergency 136, 227
‘Stockholm syndrome’ 244, 248n-3
stream of influence 156
strikes 130, 134
student protests (1977–8) 76, 147
student riots (1998) 161–2, 172
student riots, organised by military 28, 144
Study and Communications Forum 147
Subagyo Hadi Swiswoyo 77, 165, 170, 206
subversion 70
Sudharmono 145, 149, 152
Sudomo, R. 129
Sudrajat, Edi 76, 155, 169
Sudwikatmono 209–10
Suharto: anti-PKI putsch 57–8, 92; and Benny Murdani 149; and business 199, 213; challenges to 142; and conglomerates 209–10; consolidation of power 143; corruption of 142–3, 147–8, 150–1, 199; demonstrations against 28; East Timor invasion plans 146; election campaigns 147; endgame 158–60; factionalism 141–2; fall of 160–3; financial generals 147; Islamic causes 152; opposition to 61–3, 144, 149; Opsus (Operasi Khusus) 128; Pancasila 52, 64; and Pertamina oil company 200; power grows 59–61; Territorial structure 72; and TNI 11, 147, 239; vice-presidency ‘election’ 152, 154; wealth of 213
Suharto, Tommy 257n-18
Sukarno: air force loyalty 8; cabinet members 46; deposed 61; economic distribution 21; factionalism 141–2; Guided Democracy 29–30, 49–50; intelligence agencies 128; martial law (1957) 50–1; and Middle Way 52; Murdani, Benny 145–6; nationalist myths 14; ousting of 149; and the PKI 51, 53, 56–7; power base crumbles 59, 144
Sukarno-Hatta ascension 46
Sulawesi: bloodless coup 49; Kodam 81; PRRI-Permetsa rebellion (1950) 21, 50–1, 233, 236; see also Central Sulawesi; South Sulawesi
Sumatra: bloodless coup 49; Kodam 80; mandalic status 16; massacres 1; natural resources 20; PRRI-Permetsa rebellion (1950) 21, 50–1, 233, 236; see also Aceh
Sumitro 128, 129, 142, 143–5
Supersemar 59
Supreme Audit Agency 179
Surabaya 146–8
Surjadi Sudirdja 172
Suryadharma 51
Sutan Sjahrir 45
Sutopo Juwono 76
Sutowo, Ibnu 149, 200–2, 213
Syafuddin Kartasamita 249n-13
Syarwan Hamid 162, 164
Sydney Morning Herald 150
Taifib (Pasukan Intai Amfibi) 111
Talangsari 103
Tanaka, Kakuei 144–5
Tanjung Priok incident (1984) 148, 150
tanks 212
Tanter, R. 129, 132
Tapol (Tanahan Politik) 129, 251n-7
Tarpadnas 76, 130
taxation 20
technology projects 159–60
Tempo 198
Territorial Affairs office 31, 173
Territorial Defence Commands 78
Territorial structure 69–74; achievements of 75; attempts to disband 62, 178;
BAIS 131–2; Chiefs of Staff 69; commanders’ role 7; consequences of 66; dismantling of 86–7, 182, 185–7; formalisation of 72–4; numbers in 62; operations 69–70; strengthening of 77–8; Territorial affairs 31, 173; weakness of 26; workshop on dismantling 185–7

Thailand 101, 161, 209

Theys Eluay murder 104–5, 196–8, 229, 251n-11

30 September movement 54–61, 143

Tidar Group 96, 210, 211, 257n-17

Tien Suharto 147

Tim Alfa militia 117

Tim Mawar 102

Tirtamas group 210

TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia): administrative and political role 63–4; air arm 85; budget 9, 188, 189–90; budget gap, resolving 220; budget increased 170, 189; business activities 198–9; business activities, without 220–1; civil authority over 230–1; civil role 64; corruption 189; development role 75–9; dispersal of 138; dissent 148–50; East Timor ballot 166–8; East Timor militia links 115–26; formalising political power 29–30; formally in politics 51–4; headquaters business interests 215; income 188; initiative, lack of 34–5; insecurity of 64–6; members of 6–7; military activity 33–4; military capability 32–3; military culture 34–5; military policies 55–6; military power 25–6; military precedents 43–6; national interest in regional relations 12–14; New Paradigm 9, 86, 172–7, 185–7; philosophical origins 27–9; political authority reasserted 153–5; political role (recent) 168–72; political role reduced 140, 152; and the presidency 11, 231–2; role of 23–4, 149; service hierarchy 32–3, 69; the services 7–9; symbiosis with Indonesia 12; turnover 85–7, 181; unity of 185; see also dwiftungsi

TNI-AD (TNI-Angkatan Darat) see army

TNI-AL (TNI-Angkatan Laut) see navy

TNI-AU (TNI-Angkatan Udara) see air force

Tono Suratman 122

Tontaikam (Pleton Pengintai Keamanan) 134

torture 116, 132

Total People’s Defence and Security System 31–2, 74–5, 114, 186, 243
tourism 20

trade, spread of 43, 50

traditional society 25

transmigration programme 42, 75, 80, 167

Trisakti University 161–2

Trisula campaign (1968) 92

Try Sutrisno 148, 153, 154, 159

Tyasno Sudarto 126, 175, 180, 205–6

UDT ((Uniao Democratca de Timor) 146

UK (United Kingdom) 45, 51, 199

UN (United Nations) 50, 123

UNAMET (United Nations Assistance Mission to East Timor) 120, 122

unemployment 8

unions 130, 163

Unit Ksatria Penegak Pancasila 123

unitary state 19

Untung 54, 56–7

urban resistance 117

USA (United States of America): on corruption 206; independence 65; Indonesia’s importance 11; Kopassus training in 108; opposition to Suharto 158; programme loans suspended 201; PRRI-Permetsa rebellion (1950) 51; scrutiny by BIN 133; US-owned businesses 199

USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republic) 32

Venus troops 121–2

vice-presidency ‘election’ 152, 153, 154

vigilance doctrine 80

Village Builders 85

Village Security Youth 125

violence, continued use of 244

Voluntary Militia see Pam Swakarsa

Volunteer Army of Defenders 27, 44, 45

Wahid, Abdurrahman: and air force 8; becomes president 168; Free Papua Organisation 104; intelligence agencies 132; martial law request 181, 182–3; on mining 195–6; and the navy 110; opposition to 11, 157, 169; presidential crisis (2001) 28,
Index

231–2; removal of 7, 68, 93, 184, 185; supporters of 177, 178, 182; Territorial structure reform 78–9; TNI reform 92, 178; and Wiranto 176

Walubi 211

Wanra (Perlawanan Rakyat) 117

war (1948) 19

war crimes 168

weapons 90

Weber, M. 24–5, 183

welfare, improving 204

‘welfare’ items 191

West Java: army divisions 80, 88; conceded 47; Kopassus groups 96–7; rebellion 19, 47

West New Guinea 74

West Papua: claim to 17; deployment to (2001–2) 235; Free Papua Organisation 17, 102, 104, 105, 229, 235; incorporation of 50, 50–1; and international law 237–8; Kodam 81; Kopassus groups 107; logging 197–8; military support for campaign 32; militias 112–13, 123; natural resources 20; Operation Mandala 92; paramilitaries 9; Polri-TNI command 136; protection rackets 195; Revolutionary Government 51; special forces in 110; TNI placements in 72, 137

West Timor 118, 242

wilhawa 39

Widodo Adisucipto 69, 110, 147, 171, 186, 194

Wiranto: Ambon 254n-48; challenges to 164–5, 175–6; as commander-in-chief 68, 92; control of Cabinet 170; and East Timor 167; and East Timor massacres 120; and Habibie 163, 167, 168; nationalist agenda 157; Political and Security Affairs 69; and Prabowo 180; Ratih proposals 113; reappointed to Cabinet 168; reform 172; resignation of 167–8; revenge after resignation 169–72; rise of 160, 162; sidelined 184; student riots (1998) 172; supporters of 176–7; Territorial structure strengthened 77; Theys Eluay murder 197

Wismoyo Arismunandar 153, 159

Worldwide Fund for Nature hostages 102

workshop on dismantling 185–7

World Bank 206

World Trade Centre attacks 225

Xanana Gusmao 117, 121

Yasin 148

Yayak Sudradjat 122

yayasan 190, 191, 202, 204, 205, 210, 256n-6

YKEP (Kartika Eka Paksi Foundation) 204

Yoga Sugomo 129

Yogyakarta 81, 142, 146–8

Yongab battalions 85

Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang: Democratic Party 186; offered commander-in-chief 165; Political and Security Affairs 183; reform 172; on separatism 227, 237; Suharto resignation 162; and Wiranto 166, 175–6

Yunus Yosfiah 118, 162, 167

Yunus Yosfiah, Mohamad 95, 116, 164

Yusuf, Mohammed 129

Zacky Anwar Makarim 120, 122, 167, 180